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Foreword 
 
Daniel Calleja Crespo 
Director General, DG Enterprise and Industry 
 
Dear Reader 
 
This year’s European Competitiveness Report coincides with the first preliminary signs that Europe is finally 
joining the rest of the world on the path to steady recovery, leaving the worst years of the crisis behind. The 
report is dedicated to the role of manufacturing in making this growth path irreversible and sustainable in the 
long term. 
Despite  its  declining  share  of  EU  GDP, 
manufacturing  is  widely  acknowledged  as  the 
engine of the modern economy. This is due to its 
lead  contribution  to  overall  productivity;  to  its 
input  to  research  and  innovation,  which  is  four 
times  higher  than  its  input  to  GDP;  and  to  its 
multiplier  effects  on  growth  in  the  rest  of  the 
economy. 
The volume and power of this engine, however, is 
declining  vis-à-vis  the  overall  weight  it  carries, 
including private and public service sectors. 
The declining share of manufacturing in EU GDP 
is not a new phenomenon. Part of the explanation 
is related to long-term structural change. With the 
growth in personal incomes, advanced economies tend to consume more services than manufactured goods. 
Secondly,  services  have  been  relatively  shielded  from  price  competition  as  they  are  less  ‘mobile’  than 
manufactures.  This  keeps  their  relative  prices  higher,  with  more  attractive  and  often  faster  returns  than 
manufacturing. Thirdly, some services have low price elasticities: households cannot react to high prices by 
reducing consumption (e.g. health, education or legal services); in the same way firms cannot freely adjust their 
consumption  of  compliance-related  services  (accounting,  audit,  reporting,  conformity  assessments,  legal 
services, other professional business services, information to consumers and authorities, etc.) and other business 
related  services.  Finally,  with  the  increasing  specialization  of  manufacturing  and  the  high  share  of  small 
businesses, a growing share of the above mentioned services are bought in the market rather than produced in-
house,  thus  pushing  further  the  structural  shift  to  a  service-dominated  economy.  These  trends  have  been 
observed and empirically established for quite some time. 
What is new however is that in the last decade the shift away from manufacturing in Europe has accelerated, 
reaching a critical threshold below which the sustainability of the European economic and social model might be 
at risk. This is partly due to the financial and construction bubbles prior to the crisis and partly because of the 
faster decline of manufacturing relative to services during the crisis. But the report also shows that a large part of 
this phenomenon stems from growing competitive pressures from emerging industrial powerhouses, and this is 
not only in the low-tech homogenous products where competition is mainly on price. If the EU economy is to 
return to the path of sustainable and inclusive growth and find solutions to the pressing societal challenges of the 
21
st century, we need a larger and more powerful manufacturing engine to take us there. 
The crisis has left little doubt in this regard. The report documents that the recovery has been driven mainly by 
exports of manufactures, benefiting from the EU’s preserved and upgraded comparative advantages in high-end 
products. Despite the crisis, the EU has a comparative advantage on the world markets in about two thirds of the 
manufacturing sectors, which account for ¾ of EU manufacturing value added. The report also finds that these 
comparative  advantages  are  concentrated  in  products  with  a  high  degree  of  sophistication  and  knowledge 
intensity. Additional evidence of the sophistication and resilience of the EU industrial base is its higher domestic 
content of exports relative to its competitors. And this is not because EU enterprises are less integrated in the 
global value chains: EU content in US, Chinese and Japanese exports is higher than other foreign content in 
these countries' exports. Taken together, this evidence shows that the EU can rely more on local supply chains 
for high-tech inputs than our major competitors. These are strengths and advantages which provide a firm ground  
for further gains and upgrades of EU industrial competitiveness, and for increasing the volume and power of the 
manufacturing engine of the EU economy. 
The report, however, reveals a number of challenges which call for an urgent and well-targeted policy response. 
In the high tech sectors, the EU has comparative advantage in pharmaceuticals but lags behind in the rest of this 
broad  category  (computers,  electronics,  optical  equipment).  Even  in  the  medium  high-tech  sectors,  EU 
comparative advantage is lower than for the US and Japan. More importantly, China and the other emerging 
industrial powerhouses are quickly gaining ground in the knowledge intensive sectors and rather than merely 
assembling high-technology products they are now producing them. 
The report looks at the EU-US productivity gap and finds that after a short period of narrowing prior to the crisis, 
it is widening again. A decomposition of US higher productivity gains vis-à-vis the EU shows that they are 
accounted for by a higher contribution of investment in ICT and by higher total factor productivity gains. The 
report looks as well at the contribution of the technical efficiency gap to EU productivity underperformance and 
derives  the  relevant  implications  for  industrial  policy.  Business  expenditures  on  R&D  in  the  EU  remain 
considerably below the US. More importantly, the report provides evidence that this is not due to a difference in 
industrial structure, but to a lower level of R&D spending across all sectors. Finally, the report sheds light on the 
slower market uptake of research results in the EU. 
These are important issues which mark the transition in our policy agenda from crisis management to smarter, 
longer-term and more coherent governance of EU industrial competitiveness, which will bring us back on the 
road of sustainable and inclusive productivity growth. They will be at the centre of the EU industrial policy 
debate in the run-up to the elections of the new European Parliament in May 2014. Your voice, the voice of 
private and public sector experts, academia, entrepreneurs, consumers and employees in this debate is more 
important than ever. Therefore I would invite you to participate in our discussions (including online), and share 
with us your thoughts and ideas about the future of European manufacturing. I hope that the empirical evidence 
and analysis presented here provide interesting and inspiring pointers in this debate. 
 
 
 
                  Daniel Calleja Crespo 
 
 
  
1 
 
Contents 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  ....................................................................................................................................  3 
Chapter 1.  The competitive performance of EU manufacturing ....................................................................  15 
1.1.  Delayed recovery  ................................................................................................................................  15 
1.2.  EU industries’ performances on world markets .................................................................................  17 
1.3.  Drivers of sectoral competitiveness  ....................................................................................................  22 
Chapter 2.  Structural Change  ............................................................................................................................  41 
2.1.  Broad Trends in Structural Change ....................................................................................................  41 
2.2.  Productivity improvements and changes in demand as drivers of structural change .........................  45 
2.2.1.  Interaction of supply and demand factors  ...........................................................................................  45 
2.3.  The expansion of the Services Sector .................................................................................................  47 
2.3.1.  Interaction of manufacturing and services  ..........................................................................................  50 
2.4.  Heterogeneity of structural change in Europe ....................................................................................  52 
2.5.  International trade and specialisation as drivers of differences in the economic structure .................  53 
2.5.1.  The role of institutions in structural change .......................................................................................  58 
2.6.  Summary and policy implications ......................................................................................................  61 
Chapter 3.  Reducing productivity and efficiency gaps:   the role of knowledge assets, absorptive  
capacity and institutions  ..................................................................................................................  69 
3.1.  Growth accounting and the effect of the crisis at country and sector level ........................................  70 
3.1.1.  Economic performance of the EU and other major economies: overview of aggregate output and 
productivity trends  ..............................................................................................................................  70 
3.1.2.  Growth accounting analysis: Sources of productivity growth at aggregate level ...............................  72 
3.1.3.  Productivity developments in the EU and the United States: a sectoral perspective ..........................  73 
3.2.  The role of knowledge transfer, absorptive capacity and institutions for productivity growth ..........  76 
3.2.1.  Empirical model and estimation .........................................................................................................  77 
3.3.  Efficiency analysis at the industry level .............................................................................................  81 
3.3.1.  Reducing efficiency gaps: discussion of the main determinants ........................................................  84 
3.4.  EU productivity performance at the firm level: evidence from EU-EFIGE survey on  
manufacturing firms ...........................................................................................................................  87 
3.4.1.  Analysis of the productivity effect of the crisis: econometric evidence .............................................  90 
3.5.  Summary and policy implications ......................................................................................................  93 
Chapter 4.  A ‘manufacturing imperative’ in the EU: the role of industrial policy .....................................  105 
4.1.  The manufacturing imperative in a European Context .....................................................................  106 
4.2.  The main source of innovation and technological progress .............................................................  106 
4.3.  Increased linkages between manufacturing and services .................................................................  107 
4.4.  The ‘carrier function’ of manufactures  .............................................................................................  108 
4.5.  Productivity growth ..........................................................................................................................  108 
4.6.  Does manufacturing offer higher wages in Europe? ........................................................................  109 
4.7.  Structural Change in the EU Economy.............................................................................................  109  
2 
4.8.  Trends within EU manufacturing .....................................................................................................  111 
4.9.  External competitiveness  ..................................................................................................................  112 
4.10.  R&D as means to meet competition .................................................................................................  115 
4.11.  Industrial policy measures in the European Union ...........................................................................  116 
4.12.  Industrial policies at the Union level and by Member States ...........................................................  116 
4.13.  Quantitative assessment of state aid and export orientated manufacturing ......................................  119 
4.14.  Company-level analysis of commercialisation performance ............................................................  121 
4.15.  Effects of public funding for firms' R&D  .........................................................................................  126 
4.16.  Summary and policy implications ....................................................................................................  128 
Chapter 5.  EU production and trade based on key enabling technologies  ...................................................  147 
5.1.  Technology positions and market potential ......................................................................................  147 
5.1.1.  Introduction ......................................................................................................................................  147 
5.1.2.  Approach ..........................................................................................................................................  148 
5.1.3.  Industrial biotechnology ...................................................................................................................  148 
5.1.4.  Photonics ..........................................................................................................................................  149 
5.1.5.  Micro-/nanoelectronics  .....................................................................................................................  150 
5.1.6.  Advanced materials ..........................................................................................................................  152 
5.1.7.  Nanotechnology ...............................................................................................................................  152 
5.1.8.  Advanced manufacturing technologies ............................................................................................  153 
5.1.9.  North American decline, East Asian rise  ..........................................................................................  154 
5.2.  The position of Europe in the production and trade of KETs-related products ................................  155 
5.2.1.  Introduction ......................................................................................................................................  155 
5.2.2.  Technology content of products related to key enabling technologies .............................................  155 
5.2.3.  Type of competition and competitive advantages in international trade ..........................................  158 
5.2.4.  Link between patenting and technology content of products related to key enabling technologies .  161 
5.3.  Value chain analysis of promising KETs-based products ................................................................  162 
5.3.1.  Introduction ......................................................................................................................................  162 
5.3.2.  Selection of products ........................................................................................................................  162 
5.4.  Value chain analysis of lipase enzymes ...........................................................................................  164 
5.4.1.  Value chain decomposition ..............................................................................................................  164 
5.4.2.  EU activity along the value chain  .....................................................................................................  164 
5.4.3.  EU position in the value chain of lipase enzymes ............................................................................  167 
5.5.  Value chain analysis of the accelerometer .......................................................................................  167 
5.5.1.  Value chain decomposition ..............................................................................................................  167 
5.5.2.  The EU position in the value chain of the accelerometer .................................................................  170 
5.6.  Conclusions and policy implications ................................................................................................  170 
Chapter 6. Statistical annex ..............................................................................................................................  177 
6.1.  Sectoral competitiveness indicators .................................................................................................  177 
6.1.1.  Explanatory notes .............................................................................................................................  177 
  
3 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
MAIN FINDINGS OF THIS REPORT: 
  Although the weight of manufacturing in the EU economy is decreasing in favour of 
services, manufacturing is increasingly seen as a pivotal sector. However, critical mass 
in the form of a minimum production base is needed. Industrial policy supporting 
innovation and external competitiveness can play a role to reverse the declining trend. 
  To this end, EU industrial policy needs to steer structural change towards higher 
productivity in manufacturing and better positioning of EU enterprises in the global 
value chain based on comparative advantages in knowledge and technology intensive 
products and services. 
  This is a must and a challenge for two reasons. First, the EU is lagging behind in 
productivity gains relative to emerging industrial powerhouses and some of its major 
competitors. The EU-US productivity gap, for instance, is growing wider again after 
years of narrowing. It is linked to a production efficiency gap caused by regulations, 
lower investment in ICT and intangible assets. In some sectors there is also a 
‘commercialisation of research gap’ between the EU and the US. Policies targeting not 
only creation of new technologies, but also knowledge diffusion through measures to 
stimulate the supply of skills on the one hand, and demand for R&D on the other can 
help bridge such gaps. 
  Second, structural change is slow, path-dependent and needs to build on existing 
strengths, but can be stimulated by having the right institutional framework in place, 
covering education, research, technology and innovation policies but focusing also on 
the general quality of governance. 
  On the positive side, the report documents that the existing strengths of EU 
manufacturing are substantial. The revealed comparative advantage of EU 
manufacturing is linked to complex and high-quality product segments. By gradually 
increasing the complexity of their products, EU manufacturing industries managed to 
maintain their competitive position in 2009 compared with 1995. Moreover, EU 
manufactured exports have less embedded foreign value added than exports by third 
countries such as China, South Korea, Japan and USA. 
  The EU is a major producer of new knowledge in key enabling technologies. Its 
products based on industrial biotechnology or advanced materials have higher 
technology content than competing North American or East Asian products. Apart 
from advanced manufacturing technologies, EU products based on key enabling 
technologies are mature and need to compete on price. Adding more innovative and 
complex products to the product portfolio will help manufacturers move up the value 
chain. 
THE COMPETITIVE PERFORMANCE OF EU MANUFACTURING 
This year’s edition of the European Competitiveness Report uses a number of traditional and 
advanced indicators of industrial competitiveness to provide insights into the strengths and 
weaknesses of EU manufacturing and draw implications for EU industrial policy. It shows 
that  the  EU  has  comparative  advantages  in  most  manufacturing  sectors  (15  out  of  23)  
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accounting for about three quarters of EU manufacturing output. They include vital high-tech 
and medium-high-tech sectors such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals, vehicles, machinery, and 
other transport equipment (which includes aerospace). 
EU  MANUFACTURING  VALUE  CHAINS  CAN  SUPPLY  HIGH-TECH 
INTERMEDIATES FROM THE HOME MARKET 
Furthermore,  the  report  evaluates  industrial  competitiveness  by  looking  at  trade  in  value 
added to analyse the place of EU manufacturing in the global supply chains. The domestic 
and  foreign  content  of  a  country's  exports  provide  information  on  whether  that  country 
develops or merely assembles high-technology products. Analysis of manufacturing exports 
from China, the EU, Japan, South Korea and the US from 1995 to 2009 shows that foreign 
value added embedded in EU manufacturing exports – the part of value added coming from 
inputs imported from other parts of the world – is lower than for other countries. Conversely, 
EU added value in the exports of emerging industrial powerhouses increased more than that 
from  other  parts  of  the  world.  Between  1995  and  2009,  when  Chinese  exports  increased 
dramatically,  EU  industries  managed  to  increase  their  value  added  content  in  Chinese 
manufacturing exports more than industries from other parts of the world. Japanese, South 
Korean and US value added content shares of Chinese manufacturing gross exports decreased 
during the same period. Summing up, the report finds that the EU has a higher share of 
domestic content of exports than established and emerging industrial competitors, while at the 
same time has a higher share of its intermediates in other countries' exports. This is evidence 
of a strong industrial base which allows EU enterprises to source most of their high-tech 
inputs (goods and services) domestically, while also supplying them to the rest of the world. 
EU MANUFACTURING EXPORTS HAVE HIGHER DEGREE OF COMPLEXITY 
A further evidence of the industrial strengths of the EU is the analysis of the sophistication 
(knowledge intensity) of EU exports of products with comparative advantages. This is an 
advanced indicator of non-cost competitiveness which shows that manufacturing industries in 
the EU have a higher degree of complexity. The report documents that EU exports have 
preserved their advantages thanks to developing sophisticated, knowledge-intensive products 
to address the cost advantages of emerging industrial powers. By gradually increasing the 
complexity of their products from 1995 to 2010, EU manufacturing industries managed to 
maintain  their  competitive  position.  By  contrast,  products  from  BRIC  countries  (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China) underwent major changes in the same period – goods produced by firms 
in wood industries, radio, TV and communication equipment industries, medical, precision 
and  optical  instruments  industries,  and  furniture  industries  in  BRIC  countries  have 
considerably improved in terms of their average complexity – but the majority of industries in 
BRIC countries still produce less complex products than EU industries. As a consequence, in 
2010 the EU exported around 67% of products with revealed comparative advantage, while 
China had comparative advantage in 54% of its exports, the US in 43% of its products, and 
Japan in 24%. 
A ROLE FOR INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
The  report  however  documents  trends  and  developments  which  call  for  urgent  and  well-
targeted  industrial  policy  measures  to  build  on  the  identified  strengths  and  upgrade  the 
competitiveness of EU manufacturing. 
Of the 15 sectors with comparative advantages mentioned above, about two-thirds are in the 
low-tech and medium-low tech manufacturing groups. On a positive note though, even in 
those sectors EU competitiveness is based on high-end innovative products.  
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In  the  high-tech  sectors,  the  EU  has  comparative  advantages  in  pharmaceuticals  but  lags 
behind  in  computers,  electronics  and  optical  products,  while  in  the  medium-high  tech 
industries its comparative advantages are lower than in the US and Japan. China and other 
emerging  industrial  powerhouses  are  also  quickly  gaining  ground  in  the  international 
competition in the knowledge-intensive sectors, successfully upgrading their exports from 
assembly to developing high-tech products and knowledge-intensive services. 
With  a  view  to  identifying  the  drivers  of  non-cost  competitiveness,  the  report  looks  at 
indicators of skills and investment in physical capital and intangibles to draw the relevant 
policy implications for guiding EU manufacturing to knowledge-based productivity gains. 
US private spending on R&D (as a share of GDP) is almost 1.5 times that of the EU (2.7% in 
the US; 1.85% in the EU). A sector breakdown indicates that this is not a result of differences 
in industrial structures or US specialisation in knowledge-intensive sectors, but due to an 
overall underperformance of EU sectors in terms of R&D investment across all sectors. The 
output of research is new products, new technologies, new materials and processes. A rough 
indicator  of  this  output  is  patents.  The  report  documents  that  in  a  number  of  high  and 
medium-high technology industries (such as pharmaceuticals, optical equipment, electrical 
equipment, medical and surgical equipment, telecom and office equipment, radio and TV and 
accumulators and batteries), the EU is lagging behind in terms of patenting. As the RCA 
(revealed comparative advantage) indicators show, EU export performance depends crucially 
on some of these sectors. It may be hard to preserve current EU comparative advantages in 
these industries if the EU loses its technology lead (as indicated by patent data). Another 
problem is that the transmission of research results from the laboratory to the market which 
seems to be more difficult in the EU than for its major competitors. 
The implications for EU industrial policy of its export complexity is that targeting only high-
tech  sectors  might  be  less  rewarding  than  increasing  the  share  of  knowledge-intensive 
products in all tradable sectors, including medium-low tech and medium-high tech sectors. 
Moreover,  some  of  the  labour-intensive  sectors  with  lower  knowledge  intensities  may  be 
better suited to tackle the EU's unemployment challenges than the high-tech sectors. About 
40% of EU manufacturing employment is in low-tech sectors. Therefore the policy priority 
attached  to  key  enabling  technologies  which  lead  to  new  materials  and  products  in  all 
manufacturing sectors has a strong potential to upgrade EU competitiveness not only in the 
high-tech sectors but also in the traditional industries. 
LONG-TERM DYNAMICS OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
Almost  all  countries  follow  a  broadly  similar  pattern  of  structural  change.  As  economic 
development gets under way, the share of agriculture in national employment and value added 
falls, and there is a rapid increase in the share of manufacturing and services. The resource 
reallocation  process  associated  with  structural  change  shifts  economic  activities  from 
agriculture to industry and services. 
DRIVERS AND IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
There are two central, possibly complementary, theories of the observed patterns of structural 
change. The first, supply-side, explanation highlights the differential patterns  of technical 
change  between  sectors.  Here,  structural  change  can  be  viewed  as  a  consequence  of 
differential  productivity  growth  rates  across  agriculture,  industry  and  services,  where 
technological  progress  is  the  main  driving  mechanism  behind  productivity  growth.  The 
second,  demand-side,  theory  relates  structural  change  to  different  income  elasticities  of 
demand between products and services of different sectors. These different elasticities provide 
a sorting mechanism on the development of sectors.  
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The increasing contribution of the service industry, at the expense of manufacturing, can also 
be  partly  explained  by  an  increasing  service  content  of  manufacturing  final  output.  This 
content reflects the total value of the services required for the development, production and 
marketing of a modern manufacturing product. The service content of manufacturing has been 
growing in the EU and elsewhere in the world.  Currently about a third of the price of a 
manufacturing product in the EU is associated with integral services. Whilst manufacturing 
products too are used for producing services, the manufacturing content of services produced 
in the EU is only around 10 per cent. 
The gradual rise in services and reduction in the manufacturing share of valued added do not 
mean that manufacturing can be ignored. It is still seen as a pivotal, though heterogeneous, 
sector  with  important  production  and  demand  linkages  that  play  a  significant  role  in  the 
process of economic development. 
The analysis in Chapter 2 confirms that the structural change across economies produces 
more  diverse  country  profiles  in  manufacturing  sectors  than  in  services  sectors.  Wider 
tradability of manufactured goods leads to more variability. 
Analysis also confirms that structural change is gradual and path dependent based on the 
specific capacities and capabilities of individual economies, which are important determinants 
of sector growth. 
Structural  change  can  generate  both  positive  and  negative  contributions  to  aggregate 
productivity growth. On average, structural change appears to have only a weak impact on 
aggregate growth over short time periods. 
THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
Institutions  can  positively  affect  structural  change  in  a  number  of  ways.  For  example, 
differences in the patterns of technology diffusion are considered to account for a sizable part 
of the divergence in incomes between rich and poor countries. Educational attainment can 
also be linked to product specialization patterns, with a positive correlation between high 
knowledge  intensity  and  product  complexity.  Microeconomic  evidence  also  suggests  that 
credit  market  imperfections  are  important  sources  of  differences  in  productivity  across 
countries.  Market  frictions  can  also  hinder  structural  change  due  to  the  existence  of 
regulations and administrative burdens that inhibit the reallocation of resources across sectors 
and  firms.  Many  factors  can  be  identified  such  as  certain  types  of  taxes,  labour  market 
regulation, size-dependent policies or trade barriers in addition to regulations and costs of 
doing business in the formal sector. 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE: POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Structural change is thus dependent on progressive policies and institutions that allow an 
efficient allocation of resources within economies. Policies and institutions that hinder such 
reallocation are a source of inefficiency and impede economic development.  Policies to foster 
structural adjustments should be conceived in a broad way and span such different areas such 
as education policies, research, technology, and innovation policies, but also focus on the 
general quality of governance. 
International  trade  is  an  important  determinant  of  the  development  of  sectoral  shares  in 
countries. The successful catch-up stories of Germany in 19th century, and Japan and South 
Korea in the 20th century, cannot be explained without taking into account international trade, 
comparative advantage in tradable goods and specific competencies and capabilities in the 
production of new and high-value added products. Here it is important to acknowledge that 
structural change that shapes economic development of countries is highly path-dependent  
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and cumulative. Any change is rooted in present knowledge bases and constrained by existing 
specialisation  patterns.  Complementary  capabilities  need  to  be  built  up.  Thus  policies  to 
support structural change should always start by taking into account the existing production 
structures of countries and regions, as well as the knowledge base of supporting institutions. 
Countries seeking to shift their industrial production up the technology ladder are likely to 
also need to increase and improve non-government services, such as education and business 
services. 
The centrality of institutions and policies in the process of structural change leads to a view 
that the general quality of institutions is important to structural change. Policies that foster 
structural adjustments should therefore be conceived in a broad way and cover such different 
areas as education, research, technology and innovation policies, while also focusing on the 
general quality of governance.  
DIFFERENCES IN PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH BETWEEN THE EU AND THE US: 
EVIDENCE FROM A GROWTH ACCOUNTING ANALYSIS 
In  the  late  1990s  and  early  2000s,  the  US  productivity  lead  resulted  from  a  first  mover 
advantage  in  ICT  as  is  illustrated  by  the  relevant  growth  accounting  analysis.  The  EU 
experience reveals  that  movements  in  Total  Factor  Productivity  (TFP)  have  followed  US 
productivity developments, but with a time lag.  
Prior  to  the  financial  and  economic  crisis  of  2007-2008,  the  debate  on  the  European 
productivity slowdown focused on the slower adoption of new technology as the main reason 
behind the EU’s relative productivity under-performance. Moreover, industry-based studies 
revealed that  the US productivity advantage  was  found in a  few market services sectors, 
mainly trade, finance and business services.  
The initial hypothesis was that the EU was lagging behind the US merely in the adoption of 
ICT but would eventually benefit from the same productivity gains.  Chapter 3 reveals that 
high investments alone are not sufficient to boost economic growth and to guarantee a better 
productivity performance.  
The EU is not only still lagging behind the US, but the productivity growth gap has recently 
increased. 
THE  CHANGES  IN  THE  EU-US  PRODUCTIVITY  GAP  FROM  A  SECTORAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
The European failure to match the US acceleration in output and productivity between 1995 
and 2004 has largely been attributed to developments in market services. The analysis reveals 
that  the  sector  which  contributed  most  to  amplify  the  US  productivity  advantage  was 
wholesale and retail trade, due to its strong productivity performance and its relatively large 
share in the economy. Other service sectors with sizeable contributions included professional, 
scientific, technical, administrative and support services, plus finance and insurance activities.  
Throughout the period 2004-2007, two factors contributed to the reduction of the EU-US 
productivity gap, the acceleration of productivity in most EU manufacturing industries, and a 
robust performance of many EU services sectors.  
In the US wholesale and retail sector, labour productivity slowed significantly between 2004 
and 2007 compared to the exceptional performance observed in the previous period. On the 
other  hand,  the  EU  performance  in  the  same  sector  improved  substantially,  reaching  3% 
productivity growth, nearly double the rate achieved in previous periods. In most EU services, 
labour productivity improved, particularly in professional, scientific, technical activities, and 
community, social and personal services. Overall, between 2004 and 2007, those sectors that  
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contributed to narrowing the EU productivity gap relative to the US were the same ones 
which had caused EU productivity to stagnate in the previous decade.  
During the financial crisis (2007-2010), labour productivity stalled in the EU, while in the US 
it continued to improve. The majority of manufacturing sectors in the EU experienced a fall in 
productivity levels, probably reflecting a higher exposure to global demand fluctuations than 
the  services  sectors.  Manufacturing  productivity  as  a  whole,  decreased  by  more  than  1% 
annually, with chemicals down by more than 4%. In the US, manufacturing productivity grew 
by over 4% a year during 2007-2010. One of the few sectors to experience a worsening in 
productivity levels was chemicals.  The majority of services activities though, experienced 
robust  growth,  particularly  telecommunications,  finance,  insurance,  IT  and  information 
services.  
The  sectors  where  the  US  productivity  advantage  increased  are  electrical  and  optical 
equipment  and  the  majority  of  manufacturing  sectors,  as  well  as  construction,  and 
telecommunications. On the other hand, service sectors such as financial activities, business 
services,  accommodation,  food  and  some  public  services  are  among  the  EU  sectors  that 
helped narrow the gap during the most recent years.  In the EU manufacturing sector, TFP 
was the main driver of the output growth up to 2007 but it was also the main cause of the 
declining productivity thereafter. In services, the picture is more heterogeneous. In the US, 
substantial  TFP  gains  explain  the  productivity  acceleration  relative  to  the  EU  in  the  late 
1990s.   The finance and insurance sector in the US also experienced considerable ICT-driven 
productivity growth in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
TFP improvements in the EU wholesale and retail sector took place with some years’ delay 
and contributed to closing the gap in the period just prior to the financial crisis. Since the 
crisis, the EU finance and insurance sector has also shown a considerably better performance 
than in the US. 
THE  ROLE  OF  KNOWLEDGE  TRANSFER,  ABSORPTIVE  CAPACITY  AND 
INSTITUTIONS FOR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 
In the EU, too little has been invested in the skills and organisational changes necessary to 
reap the benefits of ICT technologies. Lower investments in intangible assets (R&D, human 
capital, etc.) are likely to explain a portion of the US-EU  productivity gap as these factors 
affect  a  country’s  absorptive  capacity,  i.e.  its  ability  to  take  advantage  of  technology 
developed elsewhere (international technology transfers). Given that the bulk of technological 
innovations  is  concentrated  in  a  few  leading  countries,  improvements  in  the  absorptive 
capacity will be needed in order to assimilate foreign technologies. 
DETERMINING THE EU-US EFFICIENCY GAP  
Understanding why industries vary in their ability to use resources effectively, and identifying 
suitable policies to improve efficiency performance, requires the analysis to look into factors 
that cause industries to lose productivity and hence widen efficiency gaps.  
The empirical results show that ICT plays a key role in reducing inefficiencies in the use of 
resources. In addition, more upstream regulation significantly increases the efficiency gap. In 
other  words,  administrative  restrictions  imposed  on  service  market  competition  have 
widespread negative effects on production efficiency. 
These  results  provide  strong  support  for  the  hypothesis  that  a  more  competitive  business 
environment reduces the efficiency gap. More flexible product market regulations, largely 
concentrated in key service-providing industries, are likely to raise efficiency levels across the  
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whole economy. Regulatory changes in the labour market should also be tailored to restore 
the necessary balance between regular and temporary workers.  
A  few  market  service  sectors  were  the  main  cause  of  the  EU  productivity  disadvantage 
compared to the US during the emergence of ICT technologies (in the late 1990s). However, 
in the years leading up to the financial crisis, the EU experienced strong ICT-related labour 
productivity growth in these sectors, mirroring earlier developments in the US, and thereby 
reaching the US productivity levels. Since the crisis, the EU-US productivity gap has widened 
again.  
Chapter 3 examines two main channels for raising productivity growth potential and closing 
the  gap  with  the  technology  leaders.  The  first  is  the  role  of  absorptive  capacity  and 
knowledge-base  (intangible)  assets  (R&D  and  human  capital)  in  activating  international 
technology transfers. This mechanism has been found in the literature to be highly conducive 
to TFP growth through spillovers. However, its growth-enhancing effect is heterogeneous; the 
ability to accommodate the inflow of new technological knowledge by re-allocating factors or 
expanding new product lines is required.  
The second channel is via production efficiency as a possible factor behind the widening 
productivity gaps between the EU and the US. There is evidence that technical efficiency is 
significantly  higher  in  countries  with  less  restrictive  product  market  regulations  or 
employment protection laws. Investments in ICT assets, on the other hand, help in reducing 
the gap with the most efficient country and/or industry. 
Intangible assets (e.g. R&D, human capital, organizational change, etc.) are important sources 
of TFP growth and sustained long-run competitiveness.  In this context, initiatives which 
stimulate investments in these areas may be particularly useful.  
Similar measures may also be put in place to increase the number of qualified staff per firm. 
These measures could facilitate the hiring of highly qualified workers or promote workforce 
training. Other policies could be directed towards enhancing inputs such as ICT which can 
assist  in  the  reorganisation  of  production.  Specific  ICT  applications,  such  as  enterprise 
software systems, increase productivity at firm level. These measures would also be viable for 
smaller  firms  which  do  not  always  have  the  necessary  financial  and  human  resources  to 
undertake  R&D  activities  and  for  that  reason,  seek  alternative  ways  of  increasing  their 
competitiveness. 
As regards the key role of financial resources on productivity performance, policies which 
increase access to finance for SMEs are needed. The above measures should be conceived and 
applied within an appropriate regulatory framework that will safeguard the stability of market 
regulation and facilitate the reduction of productivity and efficiency gaps. 
A  ‘MANUFACTURING  IMPERATIVE’  IN  THE  EU  —  DECLINING 
MANUFACTURING SHARES OF VALUE-ADDED AND EMPLOYMENT 
There are at least two well-documented reasons for the declining share of manufacturing 
value-added in GDP.  
Firstly, the higher productivity growth in manufacturing implies that in the longer term prices 
of manufactures will decline relative to services, leading to a lower share of manufactures in 
value-added in nominal terms. Therefore, a declining value-added share of the manufacturing 
sector per se is not a reason for concern, but rather the logical consequence of a European 
manufacturing sector that is constantly becoming more efficient. 
Secondly,  demand  structures  characterised  by  low  price  elasticities  of  demand  and  high 
income elasticities for some services like education, tourism, health and cultural activities  
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change  the  composition  of  demand  as  income  increases.  These  elasticity  differentials 
(discussed above in the context of structural change) compound the effect of the declining 
relative importance of manufacturing in value-added terms. 
These two factors driving the downward trend of a manufacturing sector in relative terms can 
be countered by increased external competitiveness of the manufacturing sector and industrial 
policies working towards this end, as set out in Chapter 4. 
ARGUMENTS FOR THE MANUFACTURING IMPERATIVE 
Fears  have  been  raised  that  the  declining  manufacturing  share  of  GDP  entails  loss  of 
manufacturing capabilities which, once lost, are hard to recover. Manufacturing capabilities 
specific to particular industries – even if they are low-technology industries – may at a later 
stage become important inputs for fast-growing new products. 
There are at least three arguments for a ‘critical size’ of the manufacturing base:  
  Manufacturing  still  accounts  for  a  major  part  of  the  innovation  effort  in  advanced 
economies and this translates into above-average contributions to overall productivity 
growth and thus to real income growth.  
  There  are  very  important  ‘backward  linkages’  from  manufacturing  to  services  which 
provide  important  inputs  for  manufacturing  (in  particular  business  services). 
Manufacturing has a ‘carrier function’ for services which might otherwise be considered 
to have limited tradability. This operates through international competitive pressure and 
has  an  added  stimulus  effect  for  innovation  and  qualitative  upgrading  for  service 
activities.  Another  linkage  is  increased  ‘product  bundling’  of  production  and  service 
activities in advanced manufacturing activities. 
  Lastly,  and  related  to  the  first  argument,  is  the  higher  productivity  growth  in 
manufacturing which is important because the sector of origin of productivity growth 
may not be the sector which benefits most from the productivity growth. 
THE EXTERNAL COMPETITIVENESS OF EU MANUFACTURING 
There are also structural changes within the manufacturing sector, as explained in Chapter 2 
above. These go in the direction of a  mild but persistent shift towards more technology-
intensive  industries  (chemicals,  machinery,  electrical  equipment  and  transport  equipment) 
which also tend to be less labour-intensive.  
This  mild  trend  towards  advanced  manufacturing  industries  reflects  international 
specialisation  patterns  of  EU  Member  States  because  in  general  technology-intensive 
industries  offer  more  possibilities  for  building  comparative  advantages  by  product 
differentiation and quality aspects. At the same time, low-technology-intensive industries still 
accounted for almost 40% of EU manufacturing employment in 2009. 
Traditionally,  EU  manufacturing  has  faced  competition  in  more  technology-intensive 
segments from producers in Japan, Korea or the US. However, over time competition from 
producers in BRIC countries is gradually changing and increasing.  
Given  the  structural  upgrading  in  emerging  economies,  competitive  pressures  from  these 
countries are not limited to low-technology-intensive industries but are also felt in advanced 
manufacturing  industries.  Brazil,  India  and  China  all  increased  considerably  their  market 
shares in global value added exports of manufactures over a period of 15 years. It is especially 
the outstanding performance of Chinese producers, whose market share quadrupled between 
1995 and 2011, which drove this change.  
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All in all, EU manufacturing seems to have managed to defend its positions on world markets. 
In general, the EU manufacturing sector is seen as rather well-diversified. Over time, the EU 
manufacturing sector has succeeded in upgrading product quality by engaging in R&D&I.  
The challenge is more demanding for low-tech and medium-low-tech industries for which this 
may require a higher degree of specialisation and entering or creating niche markets. Existing 
evidence suggests that many European firms follow such a ‘premium strategy’ within their 
respective industry. European firms typically operate in the top quality segments.  
R&D in manufacturing is key to maintaining or expanding market shares for knowledge-
intensive goods. It is therefore worrying that EU manufacturing has a lower R&D intensity 
per firm than the US and Japan. The R&D intensity in seven EU Member States, for which 
data are available, is only 62% of that of the United States.  
R&D and innovation are not the sole ingredients for a highly productive and internationally 
competitive manufacturing sector. In order to differentiate products and charge higher price-
cost mark-ups, manufacturing firms depend increasingly on sophisticated services inputs.  
The  ever  tighter  inter-linkages  between  the  manufacturing  sector  and  the  increasingly 
dominant services sector in the EU economy work in two ways:  
  Increased use of services inputs and services embedded in manufacturing products can 
increase the EU manufacturing sector’s competitiveness 
  Through this increased interdependence, manufacturing can increase the tradability of 
services.  
INDUSTRIAL  POLICY  AND  THE  EXTERNAL  COMPETITIVENESS  OF  EU 
MANUFACTURING  
Sectoral aid does not show any significant effects on extra-EU exports or value added per 
capita  for  export  oriented  firms.  On  the  other  hand,  internationalisation  measures  are 
horizontal and have significant and positive effects on extra-EU exports.
1 
Other effective horizontal aid measures seem to be regional aid and aid for training of the 
employees.  
An industrial policy providing funds to different parts of the innovation process have positive 
and  significant  effects  on  R&D  intensities  and  patent  application  propensities  for 
manufacturing  firms  in  the  EU-15  and  EU-12  irrespective  of  firm  size  and  technological 
intensity of the firm.  
The effects on output of the innovation process, of the amount of the innovative sales or of 
public  funding  differ  according  to  the  geographical  location  of  the  firm,  its  size  and  its 
technological intensity. Public funding has positive and significant effects, in particular for 
EU-15 firms. Further positive and significant effects are found for high-tech and medium-
high-tech and for SMEs.  
These results suggest that there is potential to improve the targeting of public support and to 
make it more effective. Especially in the EU-12, and irrespective of the actual objectives of 
the support programmes,  governments end up providing innovation support more often to 
larger  firms  than  to  their  smaller  competitors.  Given  that  small  firms  in  particular  face 
considerable financial problems due partly to asymmetric information flows, they should be 
the primary target of public funds. 
                                                            
1   For the purposes of this report, internationalisation  measures mean horizontal measures aimed at supporting internationalisation of 
commerce. (Export aid is generally prohibited under EU state aid rules).  
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The special targeting of grants is one way to improve the allocation of public funds to SMEs. 
Other  initiatives  could  include  information  campaigns  about  credits,  cost-deductions  and 
subsidised  loans  for  new  entrepreneurs.  As  financial  problems  occur  mainly  in  the 
commercialisation phase, fostering venture capital investment would be another starting point. 
RESEARCH COMMERCIALISATION 
The  EU  is  usually  perceived  as  less  effective  at  bringing  research  to  the  market  when 
compared  to  its  main  competitors  such  as  the  US,  Japan,  and  South  Korea.  The  relative 
underperformance in research commercialisation in the EU has been attributed to a number of 
factors  including  the  absence  of  an  entrepreneurial  culture  and  a  less  developed  venture 
capital sector. The discussion about the main factors explaining the European innovation gap 
is related to the so-called European innovation paradox which suggests that Europe does not 
lag behind the US in terms of scientific excellence, but lacks the entrepreneurial capacity of 
the  US  to  effectively  commercialise  inventions  and  step  thereby  on  an  innovation-driven 
growth path.  
Analysis  on  the  specific  innovation-related  factors  and  types  of  public  funding  on 
commercialization  performance  focused  on the  commercialisation  of  R&D  efforts  at  firm 
level.  In  particular,  the  actual  R&D  performed  internally  and/or  acquired  from  external 
sources,  the  research  collaboration  activities  with  different  players  such  as  customers, 
suppliers, public research institutions and other firms, and the firm’s use of particular types of 
public funding for innovation were examined, using the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) 
micro-data.  Focusing  on  the  commercialisation  of  R&D  efforts,  innovation  output  was 
analysed in terms of innovative sales of companies. 
The results of the analysis suggest that the impact of the R&D efforts on commercialization is 
positive for both manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. It is observed that the firms 
which, in addition to their own R&D, also acquire R&D services externally tend to have 
higher share of turnover from innovative products. This external acquisition of R&D results 
can take place as a pure purchase of services, but also can be acquired in the framework of the 
inter-firm R&D cooperation. 
Concerning the different forms of R&D cooperation activities the results are mixed across 
different  groups  and  classes  of  firms.  It  can  be  seen  that  vertical  cooperation  (i.e.  R&D 
cooperation  with  suppliers  and/or  customers)  is  positively  associated  with  higher 
commercialization  performance  in  firms  coming  from  different  size  classes  and  different 
technology intensity groups. 
The effects of public funding on the commercialization performance of firms appear to be 
positive in most classes and groups of firms considered. The relationship between the use of 
local public R&D support and the commercialisation performance shows positive across all 
different technology intensity domains. Public R&D support at the national level is positively 
related  to  the  share  of  innovative  turnover.  Firms  appear  generally  to  have  higher 
commercialisation performance when making use of EU-level public R&D support, with a 
consistently strong and positive effect of public funding being found especially for firms in 
medium-high and high-tech industries.  
Bringing the most important findings together suggests a number of conclusions regarding the 
general patterns of innovation and commercialisation performance of European firms. When 
observing  the  behaviour  of  individual  firms,  the  link  between  the  R&D  effort  and  the 
commercialisation performance is rather pronounced and a positive relationship is observed in 
number  of  cases,  not  only  the  R&D  itself,  but  also  its  origin  and  the  patterns  of  R&D 
cooperation among firms play a role.   
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In  particular,  the  results  suggest  that  local  R&D  support  does  positively  affect  firm 
commercialisation performance in all technology intensity and size classes. The effects of 
national and EU funding are positive and significant for all firms and manufacturing firms 
only,  but  mixed  results  are  found  for  smaller  subsamples.  Overall,  public  funding  has 
consistently positive effects on innovative sales for medium-high and high-tech sectors firms, 
while this statement is true to a lesser extent for firms in lower tech industries. 
PRODUCTS AND TRADE BASED ON KEY ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES 
Every two to three decades, an innovative concept or material comes along with the potential 
to bring about fundamental change throughout the economy. Silicon arrived in the 1940s, 
paving the way for the ICT revolution. In the 1970s, gallium arsenide made lasers ubiquitous 
in DVDs, CDs and modern telecommunications. The late 1980s witnessed the interconnection 
of several existing computer networks to create the internet. In the 1990s there was gallium 
nitrite, which revolutionised photonics and in particular solid state lighting. Right now the 
world  is  exploring  the  potential  benefits  of  graphene,  isolated  as  recently  as  2004  and 
subsequently acknowledged by the 2010 Nobel Prize in physics, as well as by the European 
Commission which recently launched a ten-year flagship programme with a budget of EUR 1 
billion to develop graphene technology. Decades from now, with the benefit of hindsight, 
people may look back at graphene as another game-changing discovery. 
The stakes and potential gains are high. In 2011, the European Commission’s first High-Level 
Group on Key Enabling Technologies (KETs) presented its final report which estimated the 
market for key enabling technologies to be worth USD 1,282 billion by 2015 (photonics 
480 bn; micro and nanoelectronics 300 bn; advanced manufacturing systems 200 bn; advanced 
materials  150 bn;  industrial  biotechnology  125 bn;  nanotechnology  27 bn).  As  2015 
approaches, it is of course crucially important to ensure that EU manufacturing is ideally 
placed to benefit as much as possible from this potentially huge and growing market. To that 
end, it is not enough for the EU to produce state-of-the art research results in key enabling 
technologies, there must also be mechanisms in place to bring those results to market in the 
form of commercial products, and there must be demand for the products. This was one of the 
key conclusions of the first High-Level Group’s report. This report develops that theme by 
assessing  the  position  of  the  EU  in  the  production  of  and  international  trade  in  certain 
products based on key enabling technologies, including changes in EU competitiveness over 
time. Chapter 5 goes on to examine the specialisation of Member States in the production of, 
and trade in, products based on key enabling technologies. 
EUROPE IS A MAJOR PRODUCER OF NEW KNOWLEDGE IN KEY ENABLING 
TECHNOLOGIES … 
In terms of knowledge production, Europe appears to be doing well. Measured by its share of 
the global number of patent applications in each of the six key enabling technologies, Europe 
is maintaining a similar share as North America (US, Canada, Mexico) in most key enabling 
technologies,  while  East  Asian  patent  applicants  tend  to  be  more  productive  than  their 
European  and  North  American  counterparts.  Unlike  North  American  applicants  though, 
European patent applicants have lost little or no ground in recent years: Europe’s shares of 
global patent applications are similar to those reported in the 2010 edition of this report (EC 
2010),  whereas  North  American  applications  have  fallen  back.  It  is  also  important  to 
underscore that in absolute terms, European patent applications are increasing from year to 
year in most key enabling technologies. 
…  BUT  IS  NOT  ALWAYS  IN  A  POSITION  TO  BENEFIT  IN  THE  FORM  OF 
PRODUCTS  
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But knowledge production is not synonymous with job creation and growth. In order to turn 
patents into marketable products based on key enabling technologies, manufacturers need to 
be well positioned in terms of the technology content of their products and in relation to the 
competition they face on the global market.  Unit value analysis indicates that EU products 
based on industrial biotechnology and advanced materials have a higher technology content 
than  North  American  or  East  Asian  products  in  the  same  fields,  while  in  advanced 
manufacturing  technologies  for  other  KETs  the  technology  content  is  similar  to  North 
American  but  higher  than  East  Asian  products.  In  nanotechnology  and  micro-  and 
nanoelectronics  on  the  other  hand,  EU  products  have  a  relatively  low  and  generally 
decreasing technology content. 
The technology content should be seen against the backdrop of the competitive situation in 
which EU manufacturers have to sell their products. The analysis presented in Chapter 6 
suggests  that  in  all  key  enabling  technologies  except  advanced  manufacturing,  EU 
manufacturers are predominantly up against price competition, and in three technologies – 
industrial biotechnology, nanotechnology and advanced materials – they are able to compete 
on price. This finding is new and runs counter to the generally held view that production costs 
are too high in the EU to enable manufacturers to compete on price. In photonics and micro-
and nanoelectronics, where price competition prevails as well, EU manufacturers tend to have 
little or no price advantage and therefore struggle to compete with North American and East 
Asian manufacturers. This does not mean that EU manufacturers in those fields should exit 
the market or that policies to strengthen competitiveness should not be pursued. It simply 
reflects the fact that historically EU manufacturers have not had a price advantage on a market 
where price competition prevails. 
The  only  key  enabling  technology  in  which  quality  competition  dominates  is  advanced 
manufacturing technologies for other key enabling technologies, where EU manufacturers are 
able to compete with North American and East Asian rivals thanks to the superior quality of 
their products. The impact of the high technology content of EU products manifests itself in a 
possibility  to  compete  with  high-quality  products  even  if  they  are  more  expensive  than 
competing products made in North America or East Asia. 
MOVING TO THE HIGHER END OF THE VALUE CHAIN 
Having to compete mainly on price (in five of the six key enabling technologies) may not be 
an attractive growth model for EU manufacturers in the long run. Given its considerable 
knowledge production and the high technology content of EU products, a gradual shift away 
from the current portfolio of predominantly mature products – where firms compete more on 
price than quality – to more innovative and complex products could be an avenue to pursue. A 
step in that direction could be to focus on more integrated products than today, possibly 
combining more than one key enabling technology. Another idea could be to reinforce the 
cross-fertilisation of new technology developments between key enabling technologies. 
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  Chapter 1.  
THE COMPETITIVE PERFORMANCE OF EU 
MANUFACTURING 
This chapter overviews the competitive performance 
of  EU  manufacturing  vis-à-vis  established  and 
emerging global competitors. EU industries compete 
on  the  single  market  and  on  external  markets  by 
selling their products either at a lower price or with a 
higher  quality  than  competitors.
2  Their  ability  to 
compete depends on a number of “drivers”. Some of 
these drivers are necessary in order to compete with 
prices while other drivers are more essential for the 
development  of  products  with  characteristics  and 
qualities  that  differentiate  the  industries’  products 
from those of their competitors.
3 The analysis relies 
on a number of traditional indicators of international 
competitiveness,  such  as  revealed  comparative 
advantages, labour productivity and unit labour costs, 
but  employs  as  well  relatively  novel  indicators  of 
exports  in  value  added  and  complexity  and 
exclusivity of exports.  
The chapter is organised as follows. The first section 
presents  a  brief  overview  of  the  impacts  of  the 
recession  on  the  manufacturing  sector.  The  second 
section  focuses  on  the  export  performance  of  EU 
industries  on  world  markets.  The  third  section 
explains  the  export  performance  by  analysing  the 
drivers of EU price and non-price competitiveness. It 
looks at the dynamics of labour productivity and unit 
labour  costs  (ULC),  as  well  as  patenting  and 
innovation  output.  R&D  and  innovation  indicators 
however  are  not  readily  available  for  all  the 
comparator  economies.
4  Therefore  they  are  used 
mainly  for  comparisons  across  EU  industries  and 
Member States. 
1.1.  DELAYED RECOVERY 
EU manufacturing output decline reached its trough 
in  the  middle  of  2009.  Following  a  short-lived 
recovery  manufacturing  industries  fell  back  into  a 
double-dip recession at the end of 2011. Employment 
in  manufacturing  has  been  steadily  declining  for 
                                                            
2  
This  is  a  simplification  more  accurately  describing  the 
situation of firms selling just one product. Firms and industries 
also have other means of competing. Examples of other means 
to  compete  are  combinations  of  goods  with  services, 
combinations of goods that are complementary to each other, 
establishment of distribution networks.  
3   See European Commission (2010) for thorough analyses and 
discussions of price and non-price factors. 
4   Data for R&D expenditures, business expenditures on R&D 
(BERD), are unfortunately published with a long delay. At the 
time of drafting this report, a comprehensive data set for EU 
Member  States  and  OECD  countries,  is  not  available  after 
2008.  
decades. The decline accelerated with the onset of the 
financial crisis (Figure 1.1). 
Figure 1.1. Double-dip of EU manufacturing production 
 
Source: Own calculations using Eurostat data. 
Even  though  the  financial  crisis  had  global 
repercussions,  other  parts  of  the  world  have  been 
recovering faster. While the EU manufacturing hit the 
trough  and  began  a  rebound  earlier  than  US 
manufacturing,  since  late  2011  the  EU  has  been 
lagging  behind.  The  recovery  in  the  two  previous 
recessions since 1990 was also faster in the US than 
the EU. Asia is also recovering faster than Europe. 
South Korean manufacturing for instance reached its 
pre-crisis peak in less than 18 months.
5 Similarly, the 
initial rebound of Japan – which was hardest hit by 
the  financial  crisis  –  was  impressive,  but  was 
                                                            
5   A sharp depreciation of the won by 31% from the first quarter 
of 2008 may partly explain the 10% growth in exports in 2009. 
Close  relations  with  other  Asian  countries  is  another  factor 
accelerating Korea's recovery. Especially the Chinese stimulus 
programme in 2009 contributed significantly as Korean exports 
to China accounted for 87% of the increase of exports during 
2009.  Other  factors  explaining  the  rebound  of  Korean 
manufacturing  were  the  strong  domestic  demand  growth, 
including fiscal expansion, and a relatively limited impact of 
the global financial crisis on Korean financial markets (OECD 
2011)  
Figure 1.2. EU recovery in comparative perspective 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:    Own  calculations  using  Eurostat  and  OECD 
manufacturing output data.  
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interrupted  by  the  2011  Fukushima  earthquake  and 
tsunami (Figure 1.2). 
Recovery has been much harder across the EU. While 
Romania, Poland, Slovakia and the Baltic states have 
already surpassed their pre-recession peak levels of 
industrial output, most of the member states are still 
below, with some of those in the south still close to 
the trough or may have not even started their recovery 
(Figure 1.3). 
A sector breakdown shows that few industrial sectors 
(among  which  pharmaceuticals  and  other  transport 
equipment)  have  recovered  their  pre-crisis  level  of 
production  (Figure  1.4).  In  principle,  high-tech 
manufacturing industries were less severely impacted. 
Food,  beverages  and  non-durable  consumer  goods 
have fared relatively better than other industries since 
the outbreak of the financial crisis. The reason is that 
capital goods and intermediate goods industries are 
more  sensitive  to  business  cycle  fluctuations  than 
industries producing necessity goods and non-durable 
consumer goods, demand for which is less sensitive 
to  variations  in  income.
6  Some  medium-high 
technology  industries  produce  capital  and 
intermediate goods, which  is why they experienced 
larger output decline. 
Mining  and  construction  were  harder  hit  than  total 
manufacturing.  There  is  however  a  considerable 
variation within the aggregate mining and quarrying. 
Metal ores and mining support services have had a 
positive  development  since  2008.  Some  of  this 
development is due to a high demand from the world 
market.  On  the other hand,  some  mining industries 
have  been  in  decline  for  a  longer  period  of  time 
before  the  crisis.  This  is  also  true  of  some 
manufacturing  industries  such  as  furniture,  clothing 
and textiles.  
Since  manufacturing  was  hit  more  severely  than 
services  industries,  the  shares  of  manufacturing  to 
GDP fell in every Member State during the crisis.
7 
Figure  1.5  presents  the  shares  of  manufacturing  in 
GDP  by  country  in  2012.  The  declining  share  of 
manufacturing  output  and  employment  has  been  a 
long-term trend driven by shift in domestic demand 
due to growth in incomes on the one hand and lower 
prices  of  manufactures  due  to  higher  productivity 
                                                            
6   See the discussion in European Commission (2009, 2011). 
7   See for example European Commission (2013c) forthcoming 
on  the  developments  of  services  since  2008.  Total  services 
declined by some 9% between the first quarters of 2008 and 
2013 while the corresponding decline for total manufacturing 
amounted to some 12%. Certain services industries providing 
services  with  high  income  elasticities,  for  example 
transportation  services  and  package  holidays,  experienced 
much stronger declines. 
Figure  1.3.  EU  manufacturing  recovery  by  member 
state 
 
Source:    Own  calculations  using  Eurostat  manufacturing  output 
data as of March 2013. 
Figure 1.4. EU manufacturing recovery by sector  
 
Source:  Own calculations using Eurostat data. Developments are shown since the peak in EU aggregate manufacturing output in January 
2008 to March 2013. HT, HMT, LT and LMT denote high-tech, medium-high-tech, low-tech and medium-low-tech manufacturing industries 
(see the annex for definitions)  
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growth on the other (Nickell et al. 2008).
8 Increasing 
external  demand  for  EU  manufactured  goods 
however  can  counter  this  trend  provided  that  EU 
manufacturing  industries  compete  successfully  on 
world markets. 
1.2.  EU INDUSTRIES’ PERFORMANCES ON WORLD 
MARKETS 
The  recession  which  began  in  2008  had  a  global 
impact. While public and private debt problems have 
constrained domestic demand in many Member States 
and delayed a full recovery from the crisis, demand 
for EU exports has risen. During 2010-2011 exports 
contributed  more  to  GDP  growth  than  domestic 
demand in most EU member states (Figure 1.6). 
                                                            
8   See chapter 2 for detailed analysis 
Following  the  decline  in  trade  during  2009,  world 
demand recovered faster than in the EU and world 
imports  recovered  quickly.  A  particularly  strong 
import rise in China helped ease the recovery in East-
Asian  countries.
9  The  rebound  of  world  imports 
starting  in  2010  have  boosted  as  well  EU  exports 
(Figure 1.7).  
This question will be explored using an indicator for 
competitiveness  on  world  markets,  the  index  of 
revealed  comparative  advantage  (RCA).  The  RCA 
index compares the share of an EU sector’s exports in 
the EU’s total manufacturing exports with the share 
of  the  same  sector’s  exports  in  the  total 
manufacturing  exports  of  a  group  of  reference 
countries. RCA value which is higher than 1 means 
that  a  given  industry  performs  better  than  the 
reference  group  and  has  comparative  advantage, 
                                                            
9   European Commission (2012). 
Figure 1.5. Manufacturing shares of GDP in the EU 
2012 
 
Source: Own calculations using Eurostat data. Note: 2011 value 
for Romania No data available for Bulgaria and Ireland. 
Figure 1.6.  Contribution to GDP growth in per cent 2011-2012 
 
Source: AMECO database, Commission services. 
Figure 1.7. World imports and EU exports from 2000 
to 2012 
 
Source:  UN  COMTRADE  Note:  Trade  data  for  2012  is  still 
incomplete at the time of drafting this report. Imports and exports 
in current value. (EU imports excluded)  
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while  value  lower  than  unity  indicates  comparative 
disadvantage.
10  
According  to  the  RCA  indices,  some  15 
manufacturing industries had comparative advantages 
in  2009  and 2011.
11  Two  thirds of  these  are  either 
low-technology  or  medium-low-technology 
industries.  However,  the  EU  has  comparative 
advantages  in  most  medium-high-technology 
industries  as  well  as  the  high-technology  sector  of 
pharmaceuticals (Figure 1.8)  
A  comparison  with  major  global  competitors 
(including  BRIC)  in  sectors  grouped  according  to 
technology intensities in Table 1.1, shows that EU, 
Japanese  and  US  manufacturing  industries  have 
RCAs  in  medium-high-tech  sectors.  Only  Chinese 
high-tech manufacturing has RCA of 1, 56.
12  
                                                            
10   See Balassa (1965). A disadvantage with the measure is that it 
can assume values between zero and infinity. See European 
Commission  (2010a)  for  an  alternative  specification  that 
constrains  the  index  to  range  from  -1  to  +1  with  positive 
values indicating revealed comparative advantages. 
11   One should note that the manufacturing industries above are 
represented for the two-digit level NACE classification. This is 
a relatively high level of aggregation which includes a great 
many industries. 
12   These  aggregates  mask  significantly  differences  not  only 
between  the  industries  entering  the  aggregates  but  also 
between the different EU Member States.  
The indicators above are calculated from trade data. 
Even  though  the  industries  can  be  classified 
according  to  technology  intensities,  it  is  hard  to 
measure  the  real  sophistication  of  a  country's 
manufacturing using this kind of data, for at least two 
reasons.  The  first  reason  has  to  do  with  the 
difficulty of observing the quality or complexity of 
the export products of a country or an industry. 
Two products in the same sector or even two products 
with the same customs code can have different degree 
of complexity. Secondly, for any given good, trade 
statistics do not provide information on the share 
of  value  added  produced  domestically  (i.e.  the 
domestic  content  of  a  country's  exports).  That 
makes it difficult to tell for example if an industry in 
a specific country is developing high-tech products or 
merely assembles them. These limitations complicate 
measurements  and  comparisons  of  industrial 
competitiveness. They also require that the picture of 
EU  competitiveness  based  on  RCA  presented  in 
Figure  1.8  be  extended  to  account  for  these  two 
additional indicators of international competitiveness.  
Concerning the quality or complexity of a product, 
a  recent  strand  of  literature  interprets  the 
competitiveness  of  an  industry  in  a  certain  country 
through its ability to produce relatively sophisticated 
products.  Two  key  concepts  in  this  respect  are  the 
diversification of the export mix of a given country or 
industry;  and  the  sophistication  or  exclusiveness  of 
the  export  mix.
13  Diversification  by  itself  does  not 
indicate  strong  capabilities  in  an  economy  with 
complex productive structures. It could very well be 
that  a  country  whose  industries  produce  a  large 
number of products does so because the products are 
at the end of their life cycles, i.e. are standardised and 
can be produced at low costs. Countries with more 
complex  productive  structures  will  have  industries 
that  are  able  to  produce  more  sophisticated  and 
                                                            
13   See  Annex  1  for  a  description  of  the  methodology  for 
calculating complexity of products. The description is based on 
Reinstaller, A. et .al (2012). See also Felipe et. al. (2012 pp. 
36-68).  
Figure  1.8.  EU  comparative  advantages  in  2009  and 
2011 
 
Source: UN COMTRADE 
Table  1.1  –  Revealed  comparative  advantages  by 
technology intensities in manufacturing 2011 
  High 
tech 
Medium 
high tech 
Medium 
low tech  
Low 
Tech  
EU  0.85  1.14  0.89  1.01 
Japan  0.73  1.59  0.86  0.16 
US  0.88  1.22  0.96  0.68 
Brazil  0.32  0.76  0.87  2.50 
China  1.56  0.72  0.85  1.29 
India  0.40  0.49  1.93  1.33 
Russia  0.08  0.45  2.74  0.49 
 
Source: UN COMTRADE 
Figure  1.9.  Product  complexity:  comparison  of 
advanced  manufacturing  goods  with  non-Key 
Enabling Technologies 
 
Note: Product complexity is the average 2005-10. More density 
to the right means products in that category are more complex 
than average.  
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exclusive  products.
14  These  countries  have  a 
knowledge  base  or  critical  mass  large  enough  to 
produce sophisticated products. 
The  complexity  of  products  can  be  illustrated  by 
comparing  the  type  of  products  produced  by 
advanced  manufacturing  vis-à-vis  the  other 
manufacturing  sectors.  Figure  1.9  shows  how 
complexity  is  distributed  within  the  category 
advanced  manufacturing  technologies  and  in  those 
sectors  that  do  not  belong  to  key  enabling 
technologies. In the first category most products are 
more complex than average while the second shows a 
more  even  distribution  between  complex  and  less 
complex goods.
15 
Calculating  revealed  comparative  advantages  for 
products  according  to  different  degrees  of 
complexity,  across EU  manufacturing industries for 
2005-2010 average value, shows how successful EU 
manufacturing industries are in competing with goods 
of different degrees of complexity. 
The  figure  below  focuses  on  EU  products  with 
revealed  comparative  advantages  (values  of  RCA 
above 1).  The results show that quite a high share of 
products  with  RCA  in  the  categories  of  basic  and 
fabricated  metals  (NACE  27  and  NACE  28), 
machinery and equipment n.e.c. (NACE 29),  office 
machinery  and  computers  (NACE  30)  and  motor 
vehicles  (NACE  34)  are  products  of  higher  than-
                                                            
14   See  Hausmann  and  Hidalgo  (2011);  Hausman,  Hwang  and 
Rodrik (2007) 
15   See also the discussion in European Commission (2013a).  
average complexity. For example, more than 90% of 
the  products  for  which  the  manufacturing  industry 
medical,  precision  and  optical  instruments  (NACE 
33) have revealed comparative advantages are more 
complex  than  the  average  products  sold  on  world 
markets by the same industries in other countries. 
EU  manufacturing  industries  have  revealed 
comparative  advantages  also  for  low  complex 
products  such  as  tobacco  (NACE  16),  clothing 
(NACE 18), leather (NACE (19) and wood (NACE 
20) (Figure 1.10) 
Given that competitiveness is a dynamic state, it is 
interesting  to  see  how  the  EU  manufacturing 
industries’  products  change  in  terms  of  complexity 
over  time.  EU  manufacturers  producing  the  most 
complex items: chemicals (NACE 24), machinery and 
equipment (NACE 29), medical, precision and optical 
instruments (NACE 33) and motor vehicles (NACE 
34)  maintained  their  position  in  2010  compared  to 
1995. Industries producing electrical machinery and 
apparatus  n.e.c.  (NACE  31)  and  radio,  TV  and 
communication  equipment  (NACE  32)  managed  to 
upgrade  their  products,  while  industries  producing 
office machinery and computers (NACE 30) were not 
able  to  upgrade  their  average  complexity,  (Figure 
1.11.)
16 
                                                            
16   The  lines  crossing  zero  at  the  horizontal  and  vertical  axes 
denote the average complexity of industries’ products in 1995 
and 2010 respectively. A dot above the 45 degree line indicates 
that  an  industry  has  managed  to  increase  its  average 
complexity between 1995 and 2010. 
Figure  1.10.  Percentage  of  total  products  for  which  EU  manufacturing  industries  have  revealed  comparative 
advantages in different levels of complexity: averages 2005-2010  NACE Rev. 1 
 
Source: Reinstaller et. al. (2012). BACI database. Note: Products are sorted according to their complexity score on the horizontal axes. The 
average world market shares for each country’s products are shown on the vertical axes.    
20 
Larger  changes  have  taken  place  over  time  in 
products supplied by BRIC countries. Products from 
wood  industries  (NACE  20),  radio,  TV  and 
communication  equipment  (NACE  32),  medical, 
precision  and  optical  instruments  (NACE  33)  and 
furniture  industries  (NACE  36)  have  considerably 
improved the average  complexity of their products, 
(Figure 1.12)
17 
Even  though  industries  in  the  BRIC  countries 
managed  to  upgrade  their  products  considerably 
between 1995 and 2010, the majority of industries in 
these  countries  still  produce  less  complex  products 
than  their  counterparts  in  the  EU.  In  fact, 
manufacturing  industries  in  the  EU  have  a  high 
degree of  complexity.  This  is  further  confirmed  by 
the observation that the EU exported about 67% of 
products  with  revealed  comparative  advantage  in 
2010. In comparison, the US only has a comparative 
advantage  in  43%  of  products,  China  in  54%  and 
Japan in 24%.
18 
The EU is a highly diversified economic area, which 
is further confirmed by Figure A 2 to A6 in the annex 
to  this  chapter.  More  industries  in  the  EU  than  in 
Japan and South Korea are able to secure big market 
shares  in  a  larger  number  of  export  products. 
Manufacturing  industries  in  the  US  are  more 
advanced  competitors  in  this  respect.  China  has 
developed over time more industries able to produce 
relatively  complex  products  than  before.  Chinese 
manufacturing  industries  are  however  still 
predominantly competitive in product categories with 
lower complexity.
19 Reinstaller et al (2012) show that 
                                                            
17   The  lines  crossing  zero  at  the  horizontal  and  vertical  axes 
denote the average complexity of industries’ products in 1995 
and 2010 respectively. A dot above the 45 degree line indicates 
that  an  industry  has  managed  to  increase  its  average 
complexity between 1995 and 2010. 
18   See Reinstaller et al, 2012. 
19    ibid 
EU exporters, together with those in the US, Japan 
and  South  Korea  are  more  able  to  capture  larger 
shares  of  the  world  market  by  offering  more 
exclusive  products  which  rely  on  a  broader 
knowledge base.
20 
The  analysis  of  export  complexity  and  exclusivity 
feeds into the broader discussion of the upgrade of a 
country's  productive  structure  and  comparative 
advantages.  It  is  discussed  in  the  context  of  the 
differences  in  structural  change  across  countries  in 
chapter 2 of this report. 
The  issue  of  separating  the  domestic  content  of 
production  from  foreign  content  is  related  to  the 
increased  international  fragmentation  of  production 
which gives rise to increased intra-industry trade in 
intermediate goods. In traditional trade statistics the 
value of imported intermediate goods is included in 
the export value of the final product that is exported. 
One  possibility  is  to  adjust  gross  export  flows  for 
imported  intermediates  by  means  of  global  input-
output  statistics.  The  resulting  exports  only  capture 
the value added which is generated domestically in 
the  production  of  goods  destined  for  export  (see 
Johnson  and  Noguera,  2012;  Stehrer,  2012)  but 
exclude foreign value added associated with imported 
intermediates.  Value  added  export  also  exclude  the 
part of value added which is created domestically but 
is used in domestic production.
21 
A  related  concept  is  value  added  content  in  trade. 
This concept measures the domestic and foreign value 
added  embodied  in  a  country’s  gross  exports.  The 
measure  provides  information  on  how  much  value 
added  from  the  exporting  and  other  countries  is 
                                                            
20   Regression analyses show that increases of product complexity 
of EU manufacturing products are positively associated with 
increases of world market shares, employment and value added 
growth in the EU manufacturing sector. See Reinstaller et al, 
(2012 pp 32-33). 
21   See chapter 4 in this report. 
Figure 1.11. Development of product complexity at EU 
manufacturing industry level between 1995 and 2010 
NACE Rev. 1. 
 
Source: Reinstaller et. al. (2012). BACI database. Note: Products 
are sorted according to their complexity scores 1995 and 2010 
on the axes.  
Figure  1.12.  Development  of  product  complexity  at 
BRIC  countries’  manufacturing  industries’  levels 
between 1995 and 2010 
 
Source: Reinstaller et. al. (2012). BACI database. Note: Products 
are sorted according to their complexity scores 1995 and 2010 
on the axes.   
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embodied in a country’s gross exports. A large share 
of foreign value added content in a country’s exports 
is  indicative  of  a  less  sophisticated  part  of  the 
production  process,  such  as  the  assembly  of  a 
product.
22 Figure 1.13.compares foreign value added 
of exports from China, the EU, Japan, Korea and the 
US from 1995 to 2009. It shows that foreign value 
added  embedded  in  EU  manufacturing  exports  is 
lower than that of the other global competitors.  
The effects of the financial crisis on trade and global 
value chains are visible in the figure as the shares of 
foreign value added content ceased to increase after 
                                                            
22   See Stehrer (2012) for an extensive discussion of these two 
concepts. 
2007.  An  exception  is  Korea  which  hosts  a  large 
number of Japanese multinational firms.
23 
Foreign value added embedded in gross exports can 
be broken down by source. This will show whether 
countries  and  their  industries  succeed  in  selling 
intermediate inputs to be used in the gross exports of 
other  countries.  The  value  added  content  of 
manufactured  gross  exports  by  source  is  closely 
related  to  the  measure  of  vertical  specialisation 
(Hummels et al, 2001). Between 1995 and 2009 when 
Chinese  exports  increased  dramatically,  EU  value 
added  in  Chinese  manufacturing  exports  increased 
more than that of industries from other parts of the 
world (Table 1.2). Japanese, Korean value added in 
Chinese manufacturing exports decreased during the 
same time. The increased presence of inputs from the 
rest  of  the  world  in  Chinese,  Japanese  and  Korean 
manufacturing  gross  exports  suggest  that  there  is  a 
strong inter-Asian production network masked in this 
aggregate. 
One reason for a relatively lower foreign content of 
EU manufacturing gross exports is that most of the 
value  chains  in  which  EU  firms  participate  are 
regional,  i.e.  within  the  EU.  The  manufacturing 
aggregate  masks  differences  across  industries.  The 
value  chains  involving  EU  industries  producing 
chemicals,  electrical  equipment  and  transport 
equipment  are  more  global,  with  a  higher  foreign 
content of manufactured exports. 
                                                            
23   OECD (2011). See also previous OECD Economic surveys for 
Korea.  
Table 1.2. Domestic and foreign value added content of gross manufacturing exports by source country in 1995 and 
2009 (%) 
  EU  CHINA  JAPAN  KOREA  US 
  1995  2009  1995  2009  1995  2009  1995  2009  1995  2009 
Domestic  91.1  85.6  82.7  73.6  93.3  85.4  73.3  61.3  86.9  84.5 
Foreign  8.9  14.4  17.3  26.4  6.7  14.6  26.7  38.7  13.1  15.5 
EU  –  –  2.8  5.1  1.2  1.8  4.4  5.2  3.7  3.3 
CHINA  0.3  2.3  –  –  0.4  2.4  1.7  6.7  0.4  2.5 
JAPAN  1.0  0.7  3.8  3.3  –  –  6.3  4.7  2.2  0.9 
KOREA  0.3  0.4  2.0  1.8  0.5  0.5  –  –  0.6  0.4 
US  2.3  2.4  2.0  3.4  1.4  1.6  5.1  3.8  –  – 
AUSTRALIA  0.2  0.2  0.5  1.3  0.3  0.9  1.1  1.8  0.1  0.2 
BRAZIL  0.2  0.4  0.1  0.6  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.2  0.3 
CANADA  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.3  0.3  0.7  0.5  1.8  2.0 
INDONESIA  0.1  0.2  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.6  0.6  1.2  0.1  0.1 
INDIA  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.1  0.3 
MEXICO  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.7  1.2 
RUSSIA  0.8  1.5  0.3  0.7  0.1  0.4  0.4  1.0  0.2  0.3 
TURKEY  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1 
TAIWAN  0.2  0.2  1.8  1.8  0.3  0.4  0.6  0.9  0.5  0.3 
Rest of world  2.8  5.0  2.9  7.1  1.7  5.2  5.4  11.9  2.4  3.8 
Source: WIOD   
Figure  1.13.  Lower  extent  of  foreign  value  added 
embedded in EU manufacturing exports 
 
Source: WIOD.  
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Another reason for a lower foreign content of exports 
can be that the ability to produce most of the value 
added content of high-tech production – and exports – 
within  a  country  can  be  an  indication  of  complex 
productive structures. A look at the domestic value 
added content embedded in manufacturing high-tech 
exports  reveals  that  the  EU,  Japan  and  the  US  are 
better  able  than  Chinese  or  Korean  counterparts  to 
source most of the input factors necessary for high-
tech production at home (Figure 1.14). 
The analyses in European Commission (2011b) show 
that  Chinese  exports  of  high-tech  manufacturing 
depend  to  a  large  extent  on  high-tech  intermediate 
imports  from  other  countries.  This  is  evidenced  by 
relatively  low  values  per  unit  of  high-tech  export 
against  relatively  high  values  per  unit  of  imported 
intermediate goods.
24  
                                                            
24   High-tech  industries  here  include  NACE  30  to  33,  i.e.  it 
include also the medium-high-tech group NACE 31, as it is 
 
1.3.  DRIVERS OF SECTORAL COMPETITIVENESS 
This section assesses sectoral performance looking at 
drivers of external competitiveness. The development 
over  time  of  cost  and  price  competitiveness  is 
analysed  first.  This  is  followed  by  analysis  of 
indicators  of  determinants  of  non-price 
competitiveness. 
Labour cost and productivity 
Developments in labour costs should be assessed in 
relation to labour productivity. A common measure is 
unit labour cost (ULC), which is defined as the ratio 
of labour compensation to labour productivity. 
Labour compensation and labour productivity can be 
measured either relative to the number of workers or 
the number of hours worked. Increases in labour costs 
exceeding  labour  productivity  growth  imply  lower 
profits on markets where the competition is intense 
and  where  firms  are  price  takers.  Developments  in 
ULC can therefore be regarded as measures of cost 
competitiveness  on  markets  of  non-differentiated 
products. It should be noted that at given labour costs, 
ULC  developments  are  heavily  influenced  by 
business  cycle  fluctuations  impacting  labour 
productivity  growth  through  larger  variations  in 
production than in employment or hours worked. 
For firms which produce homogenous goods and face 
strong  competition  from  low-cost  countries,  labour 
costs are an important means to remain competitive. 
ULC may however not be a good indicator for firms 
which  produce  differentiated  goods  with  some 
characteristics  that  allow  the  firms  some  room  of 
                                                                                         
based  2-digit  NACE  Rev.  1.1  classification  and  the 
aggregation of industries in the World Input-Output Database 
(WIOD).  
Figure  1.14.  Lower  extent  of  domestic  value  added 
content  in  high-tech  manufacturing  exports  from 
China and Korea 
 
Source: WIOD. 
Figure 1.15. More favourable developments of unit labour costs in high- and medium-high-tech industries 2001-
2012 
 
Source: Own calculations using Eurostat data. Note:   Annual growth 2001-2012 in ULC based on employment (%). HT, HMT, LT and 
LMT denote high-tech, medium-high-tech, low-tech and medium-low-tech manufacturing industries respectively.  
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manoeuvre to set the prices themselves. Such firms 
producing goods with higher value added are more 
frequently found in high-tech and medium-high-tech 
manufacturing  industries.  Their  goods  are  often 
combined  with  some  kind  of  services  aiming  at 
satisfying  demand  for  differentiated  goods  in  high-
income  segments  of  different  markets.  Labour 
normally  constitutes  a  smaller  proportion  of  total 
costs and input factors for such firms, rendering the 
ULC less useful as a measure of competitiveness. 
ULC  based  on  the  number  of  employees  in 
manufacturing  and  mining  industries  are  compared 
below.  High-tech  and  medium-high  tech  industries 
display lower ULC growth rates. ULC growth rates 
for  manufacturing  are  considerably  lower  than  for 
mining  for  the  whole  period  and  for  different  sub-
periods (Figure 1.15). 
Comparisons of different industries in the EU provide 
some  insight  into  the  competitiveness  of  these 
sectors.  It is however more meaningful to compare 
developments  of  indicators  of  EU  competitiveness 
with  the  same  indicators  for  industries  from  other 
parts of the world which compete with EU firms. 
ULC  developments  for  aggregate  EU  and  US 
manufacturing are compared in Figure 1.16.
25 Figure 
1.19 shows that US unit labour costs advantages are 
driven mainly by labour productivity. As can be seen 
below, a larger fall in EU labour productivity growth 
following the outbreak of the crisis is reflected in a 
higher growth of unit labour costs (Figure 1.16). 
Most  of  the  recent  variations  in  EU  manufacturing 
unit  labour  costs  are  due  to  fluctuations  in  labour 
productivity  growth.  Taking  the  analysis  one  step 
further,  faster  decline  of  output  relative  to 
employment during the slump accounts for most of 
the losses in labour productivity in the EU at the start 
                                                            
25   It would be more interesting to compare ULC developments 
between  different  types  of  EU  and  US  manufacturing 
industries.    It  is  however  hard  to  make  these  comparisons, 
because of different industrial classifications. 
of the crisis. Between the first quarters of 2008 and 
2009,  production  decreased  by  19%  while  hours 
worked fell by 8% (Figure 1.17). This can partly be 
explained by labour market rigidities in Europe on the 
one  hand  and  labour  hoarding  on  the  other  (e.g. 
enterprises  avoid  the  higher  cost  of  recruiting  and 
retraining when demand picks up by keeping skills 
in-house in time of slump). 
Growth of labour productivity is important both for 
price  and  non-price  competitiveness.  Labour 
productivity, and especially multi-factor productivity, 
is often seen as indicator of technical progress. An 
increased labour productivity means  more output is 
produced  with  less  labour,  which  can  be  due  to 
technological  or  organizational  improvements  and 
other  non-observable  factors.  Labour  productivity 
growth is often used as an indicator of price or cost 
competitiveness  as  by  increasing  productivity  firms 
can lower their prices at given labour costs. 
Between  2000  and  2011  labour  productivity, 
measured as value added per employee, grew faster in 
high-tech  manufacturing  and  knowledge-intensive 
ICT  sector.  Some  low-tech  and  medium  low-tech 
industries such as textiles and rubber and plastics also 
performed  relatively  well  and  above  the 
manufacturing  average.  The  lowest  productivity 
growth rates are observed in labour intensive services 
(Figure 1.18) 
The relationship between labour productivity growth 
and market share gains is not straightforward. Firms 
in industries facing tough competition from low-cost 
producers (e.g. textiles and other low-tech sectors) are 
forced  to  rationalize  their  production  in  order  to 
survive. Productivity growth in such a case may occur 
together with a declining share of the world market.
26 
Therefore  it  is  more  informative  to  compare 
                                                            
26   In  the  worst  case,  firms  are  forced  to  close  down  non-
profitable  plants  and  reduce  the  labour  force  in  order  to 
rationalize.  This  would,  if  all  other  factors  are  equal,  bring 
about   all things equal yield and an increase in d industry 
productivity growth. 
Figure 1.16. Similar developments of ULC in EU and 
US manufacturing industries 
 
Source:  Own  calculations  using  Eurostat  and  Federal  Reserve 
data. Note: Growth rates in percent. ULC based on hours worked. 
Figure  1.17.  Fluctuations  in  EU  ULC  are  mainly 
caused by variations in labour productivity growth 
 
Source:  Own  calculations  using  Eurostat  data.  Note:  Growth 
rates in percent. ULC based on hours worked.  
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productivity  growth  rates  with  these  of  EU  major 
competitors. 
Labour productivity growth in US manufacturing in 
2000-2011 was 3.5% on average against 2.4% in EU 
manufacturing.
27  Large  part  of  this  difference  has 
occurred  in  the  beginning  of  the  millennium,  even 
though a larger decline of labour productivity in the 
EU  between  2008  and  2010  contributed  to  it  too. 
Figure  1.19  shows  that  during  recessions 
manufacturing employment (in hours worked) tend to 
decline more in the US than in the EU. Therefore at 
similar decline of demand and output manufacturing 
labour productivity declines more in the EU. 
                                                            
27   Measured as changes from a quarter in one year relative to the 
same quarter in the previous year. 
The  remainder  of  this  section  examines  non-price 
competitiveness  of  EU  manufacturing.  Accounting 
for  the  determinants  of  non-price  competitiveness 
however, is a challenging task. There is a rather large 
spectrum  of  factors  which  determine  the  good's 
quality and its value for the customer.
28 
Innovation activities of firms resulting in product and 
process  innovations  as  well  as  marketing  and 
organization innovations are often regarded as non-
price  competitiveness  factors.  The  discussion  in 
European  Commission  (2010a)  addresses  also  the 
quality  and  variety  of  inputs  such  as  intermediate 
goods,  service  inputs,  or  the  framework  conditions 
under  which  firms  operate.  The  analyses  here  will 
focus on human capital, physical capital, R&D and 
innovation and the use of services inputs.
29 
Skills 
Labour and skills are not perfectly mobile, i.e. they 
cannot  be  moved  across  sectors  without  cost.  The 
labour  force  consists  of  individuals  possessing 
different types of skills and levels of education. This 
heterogeneity makes hiring and firing costly as they 
entail search and transactions costs. Highly educated 
labour with a certain set of skills can be difficult to 
find  within  any  given  period  of  time.  This  makes 
firms reluctant to make this kind of labour redundant 
during recessions. Adding to this reluctance are the 
sometimes firm specific skills that the labour  force 
acquires within the firm. 
These characteristics of the labour force mean that it 
is necessary to discuss skills and human capital as 
an  input  factor  which  can  explain  differences  in 
growth  between  countries.  Human  capital  is  not 
easily  measured.  An  often  used  proxy  for 
                                                            
28   See the discussion of how to define and measure for example 
the quality of goods in NUTEK (1997). 
29   Some  of  these,  and  other,  non-price  competitiveness  factors 
are  analysed  by  means  of  regression  analysis  in  European 
Commission (2010a). 
Figure  1.18.  Highest  labour  productivity  growth  in 
ICT manufacturing and pharmaceuticals 
 
Source:  Own  calculations  using  Eurostat  data.  Note:  Annual 
growth in productivity per person employed 2000-2012 (%). 
Figure 1.19.  Manufacturing labour productivity in EU 
and US 
 
Source: Own calculations using Eurostat and OECD data. Note: 
Annual growth in labour productivity per hours worked (%).  
25 
accumulated knowledge is educational attainment. It 
is  an  imperfect  measure  since  it  is  not  capable  of 
taking  into  account  the  whole  stock  of  knowledge 
built up by skills and experience acquired after school 
from vocational or on-the-job training and learning by 
doing.
30 This indicator has however the advantage of  
being easily available. It is used here to analyse the 
distribution  of  employment  by  education  across 
                                                            
30   For  a  discussion  of  proxies  for  human  capital  in  empirical 
studies, see Greiner, Semmler and Gong (2005). On different 
ways  of  measuring  the  stock  of  human  capital,  including  a 
discussion  on  the  limitations  of  educational  attainment  as  a 
proxy for human capital, see OECD (1998). 
sectors  based  on  the  International  Standard 
Classification of Education (ISCED)
31. 
The  market  and  non-market  services  sectors  of 
education,  information  and  communication  and 
financial  activities  are  the  most  human-capital 
intensive.  Manufacturing  industries  which  produce 
goods  that  require  a  relatively  high  share  of  high-
skilled labour are pharmaceuticals, refined petroleum 
products  and  computer,  electronic  and  optical 
industries.  Around  50%  of  the  labour  force  in 
pharmaceutical  firms  has  tertiary  education.  The 
smallest  share  of  low-skilled  workers  is  found  in 
financial services where only 5% of the labour force 
have  no  educational  qualifications  beyond  primary 
level.  More  than  25%  of  the  workforce  in 
manufacturing industries producing chemicals, other 
transport  and  tobacco  are  also  classified  as  highly-
skilled. 
Low-technology  manufacturing  sectors  like  textiles, 
clothing  and  leather  have  small  shares  of  highly 
skilled labour, as do labour-intensive service sectors 
such  as  hotels  and  restaurants  and  agriculture  and 
forestry (Figure 1.20) 
Investment 
Investment  in  physical  capital  increases  output 
capacity of firms and their labour productivity. It also 
improves  total  factor  productivity  by  bringing 
technology,  innovation  and  intangibles,  thereby 
facilitating  reorganisation  and  adaptation  of  the 
production  process  to  shifts  in  consumer  demand. 
Conversely,  lower  investments  today  impacts 
negatively not only current growth performance, but 
also future growth prospects through a lower capital 
stock but also through a lower future innovation and 
productivity  growth,  as  much  of  the  R&D  and 
innovation is embedded in physical capital.
32 
The investment ratios presented in Table 1.3. below 
are  defined  as  the  ratio  of  gross  fixed  capital 
formation (GFCG) to value added.
33 Sectors with a 
high  share  of  large  capital  intensive  firms  such  as 
transport equipment, electricity and gas, water supply, 
transportation  and  storage  as  well  as  real  estate 
activities have high investment ratios. The statistical 
classification with aggregation of sectors sometimes 
distorts  the  picture.  The  tobacco  industry,  which  is 
capital  intensive  and  dominated  by  large  firms,  is 
grouped together with food and beverages industries.  
                                                            
31  ISCED identifies levels of education from 0 to 6 and is used to 
measure  the  proportions  of  low-skilled,  medium-skilled  and 
high-skilled labour for each sector (see annex 3 for definitions) 
32   See  for  example  the  discussion  in  European  Commission 
(2010a). 
33   Fixed  assets;  buildings,  machinery  and  equipment,  transport 
equipment,  office  machinery  and  hardware,  software  and 
intangible fixed asset are included in this aggregate.  
Figure 1.20.  Skill and knowledge intensities (% of total 
employment) 
 
Source:    Own calculations  using  Eurostat's  labour  force  survey 
data.  
26 
That  lowers  the  average  investment  ratio  for  this 
aggregation  of  sectors.  The  investment  ratios  are 
relatively  stable  over  time  with  some  significant 
exceptions. Following the financial crisis, production 
in  petroleum  industries  fell  by  some  40%  in  2009 
while investments remained as high as the previous 
year.  A  possible  reason  for  maintaining  a  high 
investment against drop in demand could be that the 
downturn was perceived as temporary, that the prices 
of investment goods declined, or the investment cycle 
in extracting industries has longer-term time horizon 
and  is  less  responsive  to  short-term  fluctuations  of 
demand, or for other strategic reasons. In any case, 
Table 1.3. Investment ratios in 20 Member States 
 
  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
TOTAL  Total  0.25  0.24  0.22  0.22  0.22 
A  Agriculture,  forestry and fishing  0.37  0.39  0.39  0.34  0.35 
B  Mining and quarrying  0.25  0.22  0.28  0.24  0.27 
C10-C12  Food, drinks and tobacco products  0.19  0.20  0.17  0.17  0.21 
C13-C15  Textiles, clothing, leather and footwear  0.12  0.12  0.10  0.11  0.15 
C16-C18  Wood, pulp and paper and printing  0.20  0.21  0.17  0.17  0.21 
C19  Refined petroleum products  0.35  0.36  0.61  0.41  0.27 
C20  Chemicals   0.19  0.21  0.19  0.16  0.26 
C21  Pharmaceuticals  0.15  0.15  0.14  0.13  0.18 
C22_C23  Rubber and plastics  0.20  0.20  0.16  0.16  0.21 
C24_C25  Basic metals and metal products  0.18  0.19  0.18  0.17  0.21 
C26  Computers, electronic and optical products  0.18  0.18  0.18  0.19  0.28 
C27  Electrical equipment  0.13  0.13  0.12  0.11  0.14 
C28  Machinery and equipment n.e.c.  0.12  0.13  0.12  0.10  0.13 
C29_C30  Transport equipment  0.20  0.23  0.23  0.18  0.32 
C31-C33  Furniture, repair and installation of machinery and 
equipment  0.11  0.11  0.10  0.11  0.13 
D  Electricity and gas  0.37  0.36  0.38  0.39  0.37 
E  Water supply  0.49  0.48  0.45  0.46  0.43 
F  Construction  0.16  0.15  0.10  0.11  0.10 
G  Wholesale and retail trade  0.12  0.12  0.10  0.10  0.10 
H  Transportation and storage  0.37  0.39  0.36  0.37  0.37 
I  Accommodation and food service activities  0.12  0.12  0.10  0.10  0.12 
J58-J60  Publishing, motion picture and broadcasting  0.23  0.23  0.21  0.22  0.26 
J61  Telecommunications  0.29  0.29  0.25  0.27  0.28 
J62-J63  Computer programming and consultancy activities  0.16  0.17  0.15  0.16  0.18 
K  Financial and insurance activities  0.11  0.14  0.12  0.11  0.10 
L  Real estate activities  0.73  0.68  0.61  0.60  0.58 
M69-M71  Legal  and  accounting  activities  and  architectural 
and engineering activities  0.09  0.09  0.08  0.08  0.10 
M72  Scientific research and development  0.27  0.26  0.26  0.28  0.29 
M73-M75  Advertising and market research, other professional 
services, scientific and veterinary activities  0.09  0.09  0.08  0.09  0.12 
N  Administrative and support service activities  0.35  0.34  0.26  0.28  0.31 
O  Public administration and defence  0.27  0.27  0.27  0.25  0.21 
P  Education  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.09 
Q86  Health care  0.12  0.12  0.11  0.11  0.10 
Q87-Q88  Residential care activities and social work activities  0.13  0.12  0.11  0.11  0.07 
R  Arts, entertainment and recreation  0.35  0.34  0.33  0.31  0.21 
S  Other service activities  0.09  0.09  0.08  0.08  0.07 
Source: Own calculations using Eurostat data.     
27 
the investment ratio in this industry increased to 0.61 
in 2009. It should be noted that data on gross fixed 
capital formation are not complete. Table 1.3 is based 
on data for only 20 Member States,
34 for 8 of which 
2011 data is missing.
35 
R&D and innovation 
R&D  and  innovation  are  indicators  of  non-price 
competitiveness describing attempts by producers to 
increase  their  competitiveness  by  improving  supply 
side conditions as well as trying to influence demand 
for their products. R&D expenditures can improve the 
supply by introducing technology which improves the 
production  process  and  lower  production  costs. 
Outcomes  of  R&D  can  also  be  innovations  in  the 
form  of  new,  improved  or  differentiated  products 
which can increase the competitiveness of firms by 
making demand for their products less price elastic.
36 
The adoption and use of technology determines how 
efficiently  input  factors  are  combined  in  order  to 
achieve growth in the long run. The indicators below 
describe  the  technology  in  the  EU  industries  from 
different  angles.  The  indicators  represent  different 
stages of the R&D&I process. R&D expenditures can 
be  regarded  as  input  indicators  while  patents  and 
firms introducing new and/or improved products to a 
higher  extent  measure  outputs  of  the  R&D&I 
processes. 
Due to insufficient coverage of R&D statistics across 
sectors  and  countries  since  2007,  the  discussion  in 
this section cannot include more recent period. This 
may not be as serious a drawback as it seems. The 
process  from  investing  in  R&D  to  developing  new 
products  can  be  very  long,  especially  in  industries 
such  as  pharmaceuticals  where  the  process  also 
includes  rigorous  and  carefully  regulated  testing  of 
the  products.  It  may  therefore  be  that  the  data 
represented  in  the  figures  below  more  accurately 
describes  the  situation  today  than  more  recent  data 
would  do.  Data  on  R&D  today  should  be  seen  as 
indication  of  future  technology  and  innovation 
results. 
EU R&D expenditures represented 1.85% of GDP in 
2007  against  2.7%  in  the  US.  The  bulk  of  the 
difference between the  EU and the  US is found in 
private enterprise R&D. An EU aggregate has been 
formed in order to analyse R&D intensities by sectors 
(i.e. R&D expenditures relative to value added). The 
aggregate  represents  more  than  80%  of  total  R&D 
expenditures  in  the  EU.  The  analysis  focuses  on 
Business  enterprise  R&D  expenditures  (BERD)  by 
                                                            
34   BE, CZ, DK, DE, EL, ES, FR, IT, CY, LT, LU, HU, NL, AT, 
PL, PT, SI, SK, FI and SE. 
35   DE, ES, CY, NL, AT, PL, PT and SI. 
36   See  European  Commission  (2010a),  p  123,  and  related 
references, for a discussion of firms' attempts to differentiate 
products in order to increase their competitiveness 
economic  activity.  Public  expenditures  in  terms  of 
sectoral R&D are not reflected in the data. 
Figure 1.21. US firms spend more on R&D in almost 
all sectors  
 
Note: The EU is represented by 17 countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary,  Ireland,  Italy,  Netherlands,  Poland,  Portugal,  Spain, 
Sweden and the UK. The industries are classified according to 
ISIC Rev 3.1. 
This  aggregate  for  EU  manufacturing  sectors  is 
compared with US manufacturing (Figure 1.21). The 
comparison  shows  that  R&D  intensity  in  US 
manufacturing  is  higher,  not  due  to  differences  in 
industrial  structures  but  to  an  overall  smaller 
investment in R&D in the EU across all sectors. 
Patent statistics are often used to compare countries’ 
and industries’ knowledge output. Even if indicators 
of patenting and the underlying statistics are subject 
to  uncertainty  and  even  bias,  the  information  is  of 
interest.
37  
                                                            
37   Griliches  (1990)  discusses  a  number  of  issues  related  to 
patents,  including  the  advantages  and  drawbacks.  See  also 
Pavitt (1985), Silverman (2002) and Griliches (1984).  
28 
Patent  statistics  reflect  the  output  of  the  research 
process  undertaken  by  firms.  The  statistics  provide 
information  on  a  large  number  of  manufacturing 
sectors and the coverage over time allows trends and 
correlations with other economic developments to be 
analysed. As data are available for many countries, it 
is  possible  to  calculate  the  performance  of  an  EU 
sector  relative  to  say,  global  performance.  The 
measure  is  calculated  in  the  same  way  as  RCA 
indices for manufacturing exports (see the annex for a 
complete definition of the measure).  
Values larger than 1 indicate that the EU industry has 
a  ‘patent  specialisation’  relative  to  the  world.  The 
indicator  shows  that  EU  manufacturing  industries 
perform  better  than  the  world  in  a  number  of 
industries.  However,  many  high  and  medium-high-
technology industries such as pharmaceuticals, office 
machinery  electrical  equipment  industries  perform 
relatively worse than the world (Figure 1.22)
38.  
                                                            
38   It  should  be  noted  that  the  indicator  is  based  on  patent 
applications  to  the  EPO.  The  indicator  might  therefore  be 
biased in favour of EU manufacturing industries as there is a 
 
Figure 1.22. Relatively lower patenting by EU high-tech industries 
 
Source: Own calculations using Eurostat data. Note: The aggregate “World” includes Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, 
Russia, South Africa, Canada, the US, Mexico, Brazil, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Israel, Taiwan, Singapore, Australia and New 
Zealand.  
29 
Other things equal, a lower-than-average patenting of 
EU  manufacturing  firms  implies  that  EU  industries 
are  less  able  to  develop  new  and/or  improved 
products or production processes. This could translate 
into future losses of competitiveness.  
Firms  engage  in  product  innovation  in  order  to 
develop  new  or  improve  existing  products.  The 
purpose  is  to  produce  products  that  have  certain 
qualities  that  differentiate  them  from  their 
competitors. If they succeed they will face less elastic 
demand  thus  having  some  ability  to  set  their  own 
                                                                                         
tendency  for  non-EU  industries  to  patent  relatively  less 
frequently at the EPO than at the USPTO. Triad patent families 
for industries which could take this bias into account were not 
available at the time of drafting of this report. 
prices and be less reliable on labour costs and input 
prices to compete. By engaging in process innovation 
firm aim at implementing new production processes 
that  increase  their  productivity  and/or  lower  their 
production costs. Firms also engage in organisational 
and marketing innovations to the same end.  
EU  manufacturing  industries  are  more  prone  to 
engage  in  innovation  activities  than  services 
industries.
39  This  is  confirmed  by  the  number  of 
innovative  enterprises  by  sector  as  well  as  by  the 
number  of  innovations  according  to  data  from 
Community  Innovation  Survey  (CIS).  Firms 
producing  pharmaceuticals,  tobacco,  computers, 
chemicals and beverages have relatively higher shares 
of innovative enterprises in all enterprises in the 2010 
CIS.  Pharmaceutical,  ICT  and  chemical  firms  were 
most  successful  in  bringing  new  or  improved 
products to market between 2008 and 2010 according 
to  the  Community  Innovation  Survey.  It  should 
however  be  noted  that  innovation  comes  easier  for 
firms  in  some  industries  than  others.  Improving  a 
beverage  or  tobacco  product  by  introducing  a  new 
flavour  is  probably  easier  and  less  costly  than 
developing a new car model.  
Few firms in low-tech manufacturing industries such 
as clothing, wood and leather, construction industries 
and in service industries (administration, hotels and 
restaurants)  are  engaging  in  innovative  activities 
(Figure 1.23) 
Services industries engage in process innovation to a 
higher  extent  than  product  innovation.  Market 
services engage in process innovation almost to the 
same extent as manufacturing firms (Figure 1.24) 
The use of services in manufacturing 
Manufacturing firms have increasingly used services 
over time. This shows up on the input side as well as 
the  output  side.  They  have  increased  their  services 
intensity in order to increase their productivity and 
thereby  also  their  competitiveness.  Manufacturing 
firms use services to differentiate their products from 
their competitors. 
On  the  input  side,  manufacturing  firms’  use  of 
intermediate  services  has  increased  over  time.  The 
increase  has  been  most  pronounced  for  services 
provided  by  knowledge-intensive  business  services 
firms  (European  Commission  2010).  But 
manufacturing firms are also producing more of the 
services in-house. This turns up in the increased share 
of employees with services-related occupations over 
                                                            
39   The  figures  are  calculated  as  averages  for  different  sectors 
across the EU countries. The interpretation of the figure should 
be treated with caution since there are gaps in the dataset. The 
averages for tobacco, administration, accommodation and food 
and  real  estate  activities  are  based  on  ten  or  fewer 
observations. 
Figure  1.23.  More  innovative  enterprises  in  manu-
facturing  industries  than  in  mining  and  service 
industries 
 
Source:  Own  calculations  using  Eurostat  data.  Innovative 
enterprises as a percentage of total enterprises in the 2010 CIS 
innovation survey.  
30 
time. Having access to this kind of labour makes it 
easier for manufacturing firms to provide their  
physical  goods  with  services  characteristics  and  to 
engage  in  services  innovations.  High-tech 
manufacturing  firms  producing  ICT  and  electronic 
and  optical  equipment  and  pharmaceuticals  are  the 
most frequent innovators in EU manufacturing. But 
firms in the refined petroleum and coke sectors are 
also responsible for a relatively high level of services 
innovations.
40  Low-technology  industries  engage  in 
services  innovation  much  less  than  the  EU 
manufacturing average (Figure 1.25)  
On the output side, services have increased over time 
as  a  share  of  manufacturing  output  (European 
Commission 2011). But manufacturing firms not only 
produce  more  “pure”  services  than  previously.  The 
contents  of  manufacturing  goods  have  changed  as 
more  and  more  services  are  embedded  in  physical 
products.  
The  latter  trend  is  a  natural  consequence  of 
manufacturing  firms  trying  to  differentiate  their 
products. This is a response not only to intensified 
competition  from  low-cost  producers  in  emerging 
countries  but  also  attempts  to  satisfy  increased 
demand  for  varieties  of  goods  which  increase  as 
incomes rise. Upgrading the products may also make 
customers willing to pay a premium for them if the 
products are perceived to be of high enough quality.  
This  makes  demand  for  these  products  less  price 
elastic.  EU  manufactured  exports  consist  to  an 
increasing  extent  of  embedded  services.  Domestic 
services account for most of the services value-added 
–  around  90%  across  all  industries,  except  in  coke 
                                                            
40   See also Lofalk (2013) for an analysis of the servicification of 
Swedish  manufacturing.  The  industries  producing  refined 
petroleum  and  coke  are  among  the  most  “servicified” 
manufacturing industries. 
and refined petroleum where 25% of services value-
added is imported.  The largest total share of services 
value added embedded in exports is also to be found 
in  industries  producing  coke  and  refined  petroleum 
(Figure 1.26).  
One  of  the  most  prominent  characteristics  of 
increased  globalisation  is  the  way  production 
processes are sliced up between  different locations, 
according  to  their  comparative  advantages. 
Technological  progress,  especially  in 
communications,  and  lower  transportation  costs  are 
major factors behind the emergence of global value 
chains (GVCs).  Firms participate in GVCs in order 
to  increase  their  competitiveness  or  better  satisfy 
demand in different foreign markets. Focusing on the 
first  of  these  motives,  engagement  in  GVCs  may 
increase a firm's competitiveness by enhancing access 
to  cheaper  or  higher-quality  intermediate  inputs 
(OECD 2013). Industries in OECD countries using a 
Figure 1.24. Pharmaceutical and ICT firms more successful in innovation 
 
Source: Own calculations using Eurostat data. Data from the 2010 Community Innovation Survey. 
Figure 1.25. Manufacturing firms’ services innovations 
in 2010 
 
Source:  Own  calculations  using  Eurostat  data.  Note: 
Manufacturing enterprises that developed services innovations as 
percentages of total enterprises in the CIS innovation survey 2010. 
Data are not available for Denmark, Germany, Greece and the 
UK.  
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higher share of imported intermediates display on 
average  a  higher  productivity.  The  effects  arise 
mainly in three ways. Firstly through lowering prices, 
as  more  intermediate  imports  lead  to  stronger 
competition among intermediate producers. Secondly 
through  increasing  the  supply  of  varieties  of 
intermediates  as  imports  grow.  Finally  through 
increased productivity as new imported intermediates 
may be more suited for the technology of final goods 
destined for  the foreign  markets. Gaining access to 
foreign  knowledge  by using  imported  intermediates 
may  also  lead  to  higher  innovation  as  the  firms’ 
knowledge bases increase (OECD 2013). 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This chapter uses a number of advanced indicators of 
international competitiveness to provide insights into 
the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  EU  manufacturing 
and to draw implications for EU industrial policy. It 
finds that the EU has comparative advantages in most 
of  its  manufacturing  sectors.  These  sectors  include 
such  vital  high  and  medium-high  tech  sectors  as 
pharmaceuticals,  chemicals,  vehicles,  machinery, 
other transport equipment (which includes airspace), 
but also low and medium low tech sectors such  as 
food,  beverage,  tobacco,  paper  and  plastic.  On  the 
downside,  in  the  high-tech  sectors  Europe  has 
comparative advantage only in pharmaceuticals while 
EU electrical equipment and computer, electronic and 
optical  products  lag  behind  in  international 
competitiveness.  
The  EU  has  comparative  advantage  in  the  broad 
category of medium-high tech industries (1.14), but it 
is smaller than that of Japan (1.59) and the US (1.22). 
The development of RCA overtime shows that China 
is quickly gaining ground. Actually only China has 
comparative  advantage  in  the  aggregate  broad 
category  of  high-tech  industries  (1.56)  leaving  far 
behind  in  high-tech  export  specialization  the  US 
(0.88), the EU (0.85) and Japan (0.73).  
This  is  the  state  of  play  of  competition  in  broad 
categories  of  industries  grouped  according  to 
technology  intensities.  Taking  the  analysis  further 
down to product level, however, presents Europe into 
much better position on the world market. In 2010 
67% of European exports have revealed comparative 
advantage, while China has comparative advantage in 
54%  of  products,  and  US  and  Japan  export 
respectively  43%  and  24%  of  their  products  with 
comparative advantage.  
Indicators of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) 
are  derived  from  trade  data.  They  do  not  provide 
information  about  the  sophistication  of  the  export 
product and how much of it is produced in the export 
country  (i.e.  the  domestic  share  of  export  value 
added).  Looking  at  the  complexity  of  EU  exports 
shows that the sectoral comparative advantages of EU 
industries  even  in  the  medium-high  tech  group  is 
based on higher complexity (knowledge intensity) of 
exports  than  the  average.  For  instance  in  medical 
precision  and  optical  instruments  90%  of  products 
with  RCA  are  more  complex  than  the  average 
products  exported  by  other  countries.  The  analysis 
shows that the present comparative advantages of the 
EU  industries  are  a  result  of  maintaining  and 
upgrading the sophistication of EU exports over the 
last  15  years.  At  the  same  time  the  emerging 
industrial  powers  (e.g.  BRIC)  have  achieved  much 
faster upgrade of their exports, but are still lagging 
behind the EU industries in sophistication of exports. 
Even  though  China  has  RCA  in  the  high-tech 
category,  it  is  still  based  on  products  with  lower 
complexity. 
The analysis of exports in value added provides new 
insights  to  the  international  performance  of  EU 
manufacturing.  It  shows  that  advanced  economies 
have higher domestic content of exports as thanks to 
their strong industrial base they can afford to supply 
domestically at competitive terms most of the inputs 
needed for their exports. Thus the domestic value of 
exports of EU, US and Japan is around 85 %, while 
that of China is 73.6% and that of Korea is 61.3%. 
Chinese high-tech exports for instance seem to rely 
heavily on high-tech imports of intermediates. For the 
sector  of  electrical  equipment  for  example  China's 
market share in gross exports is 9 p.p. higher than its 
market  share  in  exports  in  value  added.41  This  is 
evidenced  by  the  relatively  low  values  per  unit  of 
finished high-tech exports against the relatively high 
unit values of imported high-tech inputs.  
About 20% of the foreign inputs in Chinese exports 
comes  from  the  EU,  which  is  higher  than  US  and 
Japan  (about  13%  each).  This  is  a  result  of  faster 
growth  of  EU  share  during  the  last  15  years  of 
Chinese export boom.  
These indicators present the EU position in the global 
competition in manufacturing goods. They however 
cannot  inform  policy  about  why  EU  is  there  and 
                                                            
41  See Chapter 4 for details 
Figure  1.26.  Services  value  added  in  EU 
manufacturing gross exports 2009 
 
Source: WIOD.  
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whether and how it can perform better. Therefore the 
analysis  looks  at  those  factors  that  can  explain 
industrial  performance  and  if  properly  targeted  by 
policy can improve it. Competitiveness is above all a 
result of productivity gains. Accordingly, the analysis 
departs  from  labour  cost  and  productivity  of  EU 
manufacturing,  but  goes  further  to  explore  such 
determinants of total factor productivity as input of 
skills, R&D and innovation intensities, fixed capital 
formation  and  the  contribution  of  services  to 
manufacturing competitiveness. 
It  shows  that  between  2000  and  2011  labour 
productivity in the US has grown by 3.5% in average 
against 2.4% in the EU. This is largely explained by 
the fact that during downturns the US seems to do 
better  in  labour productivity  growth. One  reason  is 
that  employment  in  the  US  adjusts  faster  than 
employment  in  EU  to  shrinking  demand  for  goods 
and services. Productivity is the major driver of the 
US superior performance vis-à-vis Europe in terms of 
unit labour cost (ULC), which is one of the common 
explanatory  indicators  of  cost  and  price 
competitiveness.  A  possible  implication  of  this 
comparison  is  that  the  EU  labour  market  needs  to 
gain  flexibility  in  order  to  allow  faster  and  more 
efficient  adjustment  of  labour  to  shifts  in  demand. 
Labour  market  rigidities  are  often  explained  by 
employment  protection.  During  the  slump  however 
employment  adjustment  lagged  behind  drop  in 
demand not just because employers could not lay-off 
workers,  but  because  in  the  technology-intensive 
sectors they chose to keep them to avoid the cost of 
re-hiring  and  re-training  when  demand  picks  up. 
Therefore shortage of skills and resultant hoarding of 
labour  may  be  additional  reason  explaining  why 
labour demand response to decline in output is more 
sluggish  in  Europe  than  in  the  US.  Chapter  three 
looks  into  more  depth  at  the  efficiency  and 
productivity  deficits  of  EU  manufacturing  and  the 
relevant policy responses. 
Labour costs however have decreasing weight in EU 
manufacturing competitiveness for two reasons. First, 
the  analysis  shows  that  EU  exports  rely  mainly  on 
knowledge-intensive products rather than on low-tech 
labour  intensive  products.  On  the  other  hand 
emerging economies are catching up fast not only in 
the level of technology but also in terms of wages. 
Therefore  what  is  more  important  for  Europe’s 
competitiveness  in  the  present  day  global  supply 
chains is total factor productivity (TFP). It accounts 
for  that  part  of  GDP  growth  which  cannot  be 
attributed  to  measurable  factor  inputs,  and  is 
explained  by  skills,  technology  and  process 
innovation, and investment in intangibles. 
US private spending on R&D (as a share of GDP) is 
almost 1.5 times that of the EU (2.7% in the US vs. 
1.85% in the EU). A sector break-down indicates that 
this  is  not  a  result  of  differences  in  industrial 
structures  or  US  specialization  in  knowledge-
intensive sectors, but to an overall underperformance 
of EU sectors in terms of R&D investment across all 
sectors.42  The  output  of  research  is  new  products, 
new  technologies,  new  materials  and  processes.  A 
rough indicator of this output is patents. The chapter 
documents that in a number of high and medium-high 
technology  industries  (such  as  pharmaceuticals, 
optical equipment, electrical equipment, medical and 
surgical  equipment,  telecom  and  office  equipment, 
radio and TV and accumulators and batteries), the EU 
is lagging behind in patenting. As the RCA indicators 
show, EU export performance depends crucially on 
some of these sectors. It may be hard to preserve EU 
current comparative advantage in these industries if it 
loses its technology lead as indicated by patent data. 
Another problem is that the way of EU research from 
the lab to the market seems to be more difficult than 
that  of  major  competitors.  This  is  an  important 
problem which deserves a more detailed study. This 
report is trying to look for explanation in Chapter 4 
and Chapter 5. 
The  implications  of  EU  exports’  complexity  for 
industrial  policy  is  that  targeting  only  high-tech 
sectors might be less rewarding than increasing the 
share of knowledge intensive products in all tradable 
sectors including medium-low and medium-high tech 
sectors.  Moreover  some  of  the  labour  intensive 
sectors  with  lower  knowledge  intensities  may  be 
better suited to tackle EU's unemployment challenges 
than  the  high-tech  sectors.  About  40%  of  EU 
manufacturing  employment  is  in  low-tech  sectors. 
Therefore the policy priority attached to key-enabling 
technologies  which  leads  to  new  materials  and 
products  in  all  manufacturing  sectors  has  strong 
potential to upgrade EU competitiveness not only in 
the  high-tech  sectors  but  also  in  the  traditional 
industries.  Chapter  5  in  this  report  analyzes  EU 
performance  and  prospects  in  the  competition  in 
KET-based products. 
 
                                                            
42  See Chapter 4 of this report for further details.  
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ANNEX 1 
DIVERSIFICATION AND UBIQUITY OF PRODUCTS 
The analytical approach is based on Hidalgo et al. (2007) and Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009). This approach uses 
trade data to construct measures for the diversification of an economy and the sophistication of the products it 
exports.  Data from  the Base pour  l’Analyse du Commerce International (BACI)  database  developed  at the 
Centre d’Études Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) have been used. The dataset contains 
data for 232 countries and 5,109 product categories classified using the Harmonized System at the 6-digit level. 
The data cover the years 1995 till 2010. The methodological approach aims to capture, in a few indicators, the 
productive capabilities in an economy.
43 Figure A 1shows how these indicators are constructed. A country is 
linked to a product if the countries have revealed comparative advantage (RCA) in this product. The implicit 
assumption is therefore that a country disposes of capabilities or factor endowments that convey a competitive 
advantage in this product. 
Figure A 1. Diversification and ubiquity of countries and products 
 
 
If the matrix shown in the figure above is summed up column-wise over products p one obtains a measure for 
the diversification of a country c. 
       ∑      diversification
 
         
Where k is the measure of diversification. M is an indicator which assumes the value of one (1) if RCA >1 for a 
country c exporting a product p. 
If on the other hand the matrix is summed up row-wise one obtains a measure for the ubiquity of comparative 
advantage in the trade of a specific product p. This measure tells us how many countries c have a comparative 
advantage in trading this product. 
       ∑      ubiquity
 
          
By  combining  these  two  indicators  it  is  possible  to  calculate  through  recursive  substitution  how  common 
products are that are exported by a specific country, 
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        for                
and how diversified the countries are that produce a specific product 
        
 
    
∑    
 
        for               
                                                            
43  A  short  an  intuitive  description  of  the  methodology  is  available  in  European  Commission  (2013a) 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/industrial-competitiveness/competitiveness-analysis/index_en.htm.   
35 
n in (3) and (4) denotes the number of iterations in the computations. See also Table A 1. If formula (3) goes 
through  an  additional  iteration  the  indicator  now  tells  us  how  diversified  countries  are  that  export  similar 
products as those exported by country c. An additional iteration for formula (4) then tells us how ubiquitous 
products are that are exported by product p’s exporters. Table A 1 gives an overview on how the indicators can 
be interpreted.
44  Only the first three iterations of the indicator are presented below. The indicators k_(p,max) 
and k_(c,max) provide for any product p, (k_(p,max)), its level of complexity, and for any country c, k_(c,max), 
the level of complexity of the productive structures of its economy.  
These two indicators are calculated by going through as many iterations necessary until the ranking of the 
countries and the products in terms of the k_(p,max) and k_(c,max) values do not change anymore. The number 
of iterations necessary to obtain this convergence may thus vary from year to year. 
Table A 1. Interpretation of the indicators calculated using the Method of Reflections, first three pairs 
n  country  product 
0      : number of products exported by country c, 
diversification   
“How many products are exported by country c?” 
    :  number  of  counries  exporting  product  p, 
ubiquity   
“How many countries export product p?” 
1      :  average  ubiquity  of  products  exported  by 
country c   
“How  common  are  the  products  exported  by 
country c?” 
    :  Average  diversification  of  the  countries 
exporting product p   
“How  diversified  are  the  countries  exporting 
product p?” 
2      : Average diversification of countries with a 
similar  export  basket  as  country  c    “How 
diversified  are  countries  exporting  similar 
products as those exported by country c?” 
    : Average ubiquity of the products exported by 
countries exporting product p   
“How  ubiquitous  are  the  products  exported  by 
product p’s exporters?” 
Source: Abdon et al. (2010), p. 8, following Hidalgo -  Hausmann (2009),  Supplementary material p.8 
The assumption underlying this analytical framework is that countries need a large set of complementary and 
non-tradable inputs. Hausmann and Hidalgo refer to this as capabilities (see also Hausmann and Hidalgo 2011). 
If countries differ in these capabilities and products differ in the type of capabilities that are needed to produce 
and  successfully  trade  them,  countries  with  more  capabilities  will  be  more  diversified.  On  the  other  hand, 
products that require more capabilities will be successfully exported only by those countries that have these 
capabilities, and as a consequence they will be less ubiquitous. 
The indicators therefore capture on the one hand the variety of goods produced by an economy and to what 
extent this product mix represents a unique source of comparative advantage for the economy. They do so by 
conceiving these relationships as a network and by expressing the properties of each node in the network as a 
combination of the properties of all its neighbours.  This approach therefore exploits information from the global 
trade network to construct indicators that capture important aspects of the level of economic development and 
the competitiveness of economies by exploiting the fact that the economic fortunes of countries are intertwined 
via trade, foreign direct investment, and financial capital flows. 
The supply of products in one country is highly dependent on economic activities in multiple foreign countries 
and  changes  in  production  networks  spread  across  countries  and  continents.  When  countries  and  regions 
transform as a result of economic, technological, political, or institutional change, the nature of foreign trade 
changes as well, and trade data therefore capture such changes. 
   
                                                            
44   Higher iterations than those presented in the table are increasingly difficult to interpret.  
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ANNEX 2 
WORLD EXPORT SHARES AT PRODUCT LEVELS OVER 
PRODUCT COMPLEXITY BY NACE, EU27 AND 
COMPETING COUNTRIES
 
Figure A 2. World export shares at the product level over product complexity by NACE sector, EU 27 
 
Source: Reinstaller et. al. (2012). BACI database 
Figure A 3. World export shares at the product level over product complexity by NACE sector, US 
 
Source: Reinstaller et. al. (2012). BACI database  
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Figure A 4. World export shares at the product level over product complexity by NACE sector, Japan 
 
Source: Reinstaller et. al. (2012). BACI database 
Figure A 5. World export shares at the product level over product complexity by NACE sector, Korea 
 
Source: Reinstaller et. al. (2012). BACI database  
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Figure A 6. World export shares at the product level over product complexity by NACE sector, China 
 
Source: Reinstaller et. al. (2012). BACI database  
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ANNEX 3 
DEFINITIONS OF MEASURES AND CLASSIFICATIONS 
USED 
The patenting, i.e. the number of patent applications, of a given EU manufacturing industry relative to total EU 
manufacturing patent applications are compared to the number of patent applications of the same industry in the 
world relative to the number of total patent applications in manufacturing in the world.
45 The indicator, PAT, 
measures the EU manufacturing industries’ relative patenting performance: 
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where: 
PATi
EU: number of patents filed by EU industry ‘i’  
Σi  PATi
EU:  number  of  patents  filed  by  all  EU 
manufacturing industries 
PATi
World: number of patents filed by World industry 
‘i’ 
Σi  PATi
World:  number  of  patents  filed  by  all 
manufacturing industries in the World  
 
Box  A.1:  Using  International  Standard  Classification  of  Education  to  define  skill 
categories 
The International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) differentiates seven levels of education. 
Level 0: pre-primary  
Level 1: primary education  
Level 2: lower secondary  
Level 3: upper secondary  
Level 4: post-secondary non-tertiary  
Level 5: first stage of tertiary education  
Level 6: second stage of tertiary education. 
The publication has aggregated the levels in three categories so that total employment in each sector can be 
broken down in three skill categories instead of seven: 
Low skilled: Level 0, Level 1 and level 2  
Medium skilled: Level 3 and level 4 
High-skilled: Level 5 and level 6 
Manufacturing industries classified according to technological intensity (NACE Revision 2) 
High-technology manufacturing 
21   Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations 
26   Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 
Medium high-technology manufacturing 
20   Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
27 to 30   Manufacture of electrical equipment, Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c., Manufacture of 
motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers, Manufacture of other transport equipment 
                                                            
45   See Annex 1 for a more detailed description of the indicator  
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Medium low-technology manufacturing 
19   Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 
22 to 25   Manufacture  of  rubber  and  plastic  products,  Manufacture  of  other  non-metallic  mineral  products, 
Manufacture of basic metals, Manufacture of fabricated metal products except machinery and equipment 
33   Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 
Low-technology manufacturing 
10 to 18   Manufacture of food products, beverages, tobacco products, textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related 
products, wood and of products of wood, paper and paper products, printing and reproduction of recorded 
media  
31 to 32   Manufacture of furniture, other manufacturing  
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  Chapter 2.  
STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
Economic development is linked to major changes in 
the  structure  of  economies.  Changes  in  technology 
and  skills  enable  economies  to  produce  the  same 
goods at higher levels of productivity, and to develop 
new  products  and  services.  At  the  same  time, 
consumer  demand  and  derived  demand  for 
intermediate goods and services shift to different sets 
of goods. This process of long-lasting changes in the 
set  of  goods  and  services  produced  and  in  the 
composition  of  capabilities  –      the  physical  and 
human  capital  base  as  part  of  the  factors  of 
production – is called structural change. This long-
term  process  should  be  distinguished  from  shorter-
term changes in the structure of economies that may, 
for  example,  be  induced  by  economic  bubbles  and 
their  collapse.  In  this  regard,  the  chapter  does  not 
focus on sector changes occurring during the current 
financial crisis. 
Structural change is not only related to changes in the 
composition of economies associated with economic 
development. The growth potential of economies is 
also  affected  by  the  sectoral  composition  of  output 
and  employment.  Some  sectors  experience  higher 
long-term growth than others, leading to shifts in the 
shares of these industries in the economy. However, it 
is important to note that the structure of the economy 
can also change with no positive impact on economic 
growth,  if  structural  change  increases  the  share  of 
sectors with low growth potential. Thus, the structural 
composition of economies and structural change are 
important  elements  to  be  addressed  by  economic 
policy  making  in  order  to  ensure  that  the  positive 
growth enhancing structural change is facilitated. For 
this  reason,  this  chapter  deals  with  the  pattern  of 
structural change observed over recent decades. The 
driving forces of structural change are technological 
change  and  its  impact  on  productivity,  as  well  as 
changes in the structure of demand associated with 
changes in the prices of goods and aggregate income. 
These  determinants  are  interrelated  and  difficult  to 
disentangle,  but  they  explain  a  large  part  of  the 
observed trends in structural change. 
The primary aim of this chapter is to explore broad 
patterns of structural change and its determinants with 
a look at the policy relevance of structural change for 
European  policymaking.  Europe  is  currently 
experiencing an economic crisis the impact of which 
on individual EU Member States varies. Within this 
context,  the  importance  of  economic  structure  is 
amplified  when  international  trade  and  the  sectoral 
distribution  of  employment  and  output  across  the 
production  of  tradable  and  non-tradable  output  are 
taken  into  account.  International  trade  can  modify, 
deepen and relax patterns of structural-change across 
countries (McMillan and Roderick 2011). 
The  chapter  covers  the  main  trends  of  structural 
change,  the  drivers,  and  the  role  of  policies  and 
institutions in the process. 
Broad trends of structural change are associated with 
economic  developments  that  are  quite  robust  and 
homogenous  over  time  in  the  countries  under 
consideration. The share of agriculture is declining, 
while the share of manufacturing displays a hump-
shaped pattern and the share of services is increasing 
for  almost  all  industrialized  countries.  The  primary 
drivers  are  productivity  improvements  based  on 
technical  change  and  innovation,  and  changing 
patterns in demand due to income effects and price 
changes.  International  trade  also  has  an  important 
influence on differences in economic structure across 
countries. 
Growth-enhancing  structural  change  is  associated 
with the upgrading of capabilities, as well as with a 
process of “creative destruction”. This process can be 
observed by analysing a country’s export basket. In 
more advanced economies, industries producing more 
sophisticated  and  complex  products  are  replacing 
other  industries.  However,  more  sophisticated  and 
complex  products  require  specific  knowledge-bases 
and  specialisation  patterns.  The  process  of 
reconfiguring capabilities and the range of products 
produced by an economy is thus an important part of 
the  interaction  between  structural  change  and  the 
international division of labour.  
The  analysis  of  the  relationship  between  broad 
policies  and  institutions  within  the  process  of 
structural  change  reveals  that  policies  can  guide 
structural  change,  but  that  there  are  also  important 
limits  to  the  impact  of  policies  due  to  the  existing 
structure of economies. Because of international trade 
and the associated specialisation patterns, economies 
have different industrial structures. Therefore, policy 
intervention should aim to support growth-enhancing 
structural  change  by  developing  and  building  upon 
existing  strengths,  rather  than  taking  a  completely 
open approach.  
2.1.  BROAD TRENDS IN STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
Structural  change  originates  from  microeconomic 
changes  which  affect  economic  sectors  in  different 
ways and with different magnitude. The changes at 
the  microeconomic  level  are  important  at  the 
aggregate  level,  because  they  are  systematic  and 
affect  the  long-run  performance  of  economies.  The 
result  is  that  some  sectors  experience  higher  long- 
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term growth rates than others, leading to shifts in the 
shares  of  these  industries  in  the  aggregate.  This 
process  unfolds  over  longer  periods  of  time.  This 
chapter  looks  at  the  long-run  changes  between 
sectors.  These  changes  are  best  outlined  using  a 
simple sectoral disaggregation which breaks down the 
economic aggregates into three sectors: 
1.  Agriculture, fishery and forestry; 
2.  Industry in a broad sense covering manufacturing, 
mining, construction and public utilities, and 
3.  Services, covering the different business, personal 
and public service sectors. 
In presenting the broad trends, results are given for 
the  manufacturing  sector  as  a  whole,  as  much 
discussion  of  industrial  policies  focuses  on  the 
manufacturing sector. In a subsection of the chapter, 
services  are  examined  in  greater  detail,  as  services 
have  become  the  dominant  sector  in  terms  of 
employment  and  production  in  all  advanced 
economies. 
The broad trends in structural change are quite similar 
across  countries  in  the  course  of  their  economic 
development. As  economic  development gets under 
way, the share of agriculture in national employment 
and value added falls, while there is a rapid increase 
in  the  share  of  manufacturing  and  services.  The 
resource  reallocation  process  associated  with 
structural  change  shifts  economic  activities  from 
agriculture to industry and services. 
This pattern can be easily identified using historical 
value-added  shares  for  six  European  countries 
(Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain 
and  Sweden)  over  the  19th  and  20th  centuries. 
Unfortunately, information is only available for these 
six  countries.    Figure  2.1  plots  the  current  value 
added  shares  over  the  past  150  years.  In  order  to 
make  the  patterns  comparable  across  countries, 
nominal  sectoral  shares  (nominal  value  added  of  a 
sector in proportion to total nominal value added) are 
plotted  against  the  level  of  economic  development 
measured as the logarithm of per capita GDP in 1990 
dollars (Bolt and van Zanden 2013). The line in the 
figure is a polynomial prediction that does not take 
into account country weights. The prediction provides 
a better perspective of the association of the sectoral 
value-added  shares  with  economic  development 
(measured in GDP per capita at constant prices). 
This historical pattern is quite similar to the pattern 
identified in the cross section of a large number of 
countries. Indeed, the historical patterns of structural 
change would be of much less interest if findings for 
the  broad  patterns  of  structural  change  were  very 
different  for  countries  that  are  currently  becoming 
wealthier,  in  which  case  information  on  historical 
patterns of structural change would not be very useful 
for policymaking today.  Figure 2.2 shows that the 
patterns are quite similar if a very different dataset is 
used,  which  has  broader  country  coverage  and 
comparatively  short  time  coverage.  The  National 
Figure 2.1. Structural change in a historical perspective: Value-added shares for six European countries  
 
Source: WIFO calculations based on data from University of Groningen and EU Klems  
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Accounts  Dataset  collected  by  the  United  Nations 
Statistics  Division  provides  information  on  value 
added shares for 164 countries over the period from 
1960 to 2010. 
Figure  2.2  plots  the  current  sectoral  value  added 
shares against GDP per capita from the UN National 
Accounts  dataset.  The  sectoral  breakdown  is  again 
agriculture,  manufacturing, industry (manufacturing, 
mining, utilities and construction) and services. The 
line  in  the  Figure  2.2  corresponds  to  a  polynomial 
prediction  without  country  weights.  The  prediction 
makes  it  possible  to  see  the  point  estimate  of  the 
association between sectoral value added shares and 
economic development (measured in GDP per capita 
in constant prices) which is independent of individual 
countries. 
Figure  2.2  confirms  the  basic  regularities  for 
structural  change  found  in  the  historical  data. 
However,  the  country  coverage  is  much  more 
heterogeneous in terms of sector development. There 
are  countries  in  the  sample  that  have  a  share  of 
agriculture  of  around  80%  at  very  low  levels  of 
economic  development.  A  few  countries  even have 
service shares as low as 10% of GDP. In addition, 
there are countries that have very high value added 
shares in manufacturing and industry. The results for 
industry are often driven by countries with important 
natural resources and a high share of mining in GDP, 
such as oil-producing countries. 
A visual inspection of the figures for manufacturing 
shows that at a value of log real GDP per capita in 
2005 of around 9, which corresponds to USD 8,100 in 
2005  prices,  the  manufacturing  share  begins  to 
decline on average. This is broadly in line with the 
evidence from the historical time series. 
Figure 2.2 reports the results from a more rigorous 
test  using  regression  analysis.  The  sector  share  in 
nominal value added is regressed on log real GDP per 
capita  (RGDP)
46  using  a  fixed-effects  regression  in 
order  to  control  for  unobserved,  country-specific 
factors affecting the composition of country shares. 
Real per capita GDP of USD 8,100 (in 2005 prices) is 
used to divide the country-year observations into two 
sub-samples. For agriculture, it is observed that the 
negative  relationship  between  the  agricultural  share 
and economic development is less strong for the sub-
sample covering the country-year observations with a 
real GDP per capita above US$ 8100. This may be 
related to the fact that for these countries, the value 
added share of agriculture is already very small (4% 
on average) for the more  
                                                            
46   Whilst Figure 2.2 displays a degree of non-linearity for certain 
sectors,  a  linear  relationship  was  modelled  to  illustrate  the 
direction  and  strength  of  the  relationships  in  the  two  sub-
samples. 
Figure 2.2. Structural change in the cross section: evidence from value added shares for 164 countries, 1960–2010 
 
Source: WIFO Calculations based on national accounts statistics from the UN.  
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developed economies in the upper sub-sample while 
it is still substantial (an average of 23%) for the sub-
sample covering the poorer countries. For the service 
sector,  an  acceleration  of  the  service  share  value-
added  for  the  second  sub-sample  (country-year 
observations with a real GDP per capita above USD 
8100) can be seen. This finding corresponds to the 
stylised facts reported by Buera and Kaboski (2012a) 
for  historical  time  series  covering  a  larger  set  of 
countries.  Different  relationships  are  found  for  the 
manufacturing  and  industry  shares  in  the  two  sub-
samples. There is a positive relationship for the first 
sub-sample (real GDP per capita below US$ 8100) 
and a negative relationship for the second sub-sample 
(real GDP per capita above USD 8100) is observed. 
The  negative  relationship  between  economic 
development  and  the  manufacturing  share  in  the 
second  sub-sample  is  stronger  than  the  negative 
relationship between the industry share and economic 
development for the same sample. This is partly due 
to oil-exporting countries which have a high industry 
share and a high level of real GDP per capita with a 
low manufacturing share (e.g. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
United Arab Emirates) and partly due to the fact that 
utilities and construction – which are also part of the 
industry share – do not show a very strong association 
with the level of economic development as services 
and the manufacturing sector. 
It  is  important  to  note  that  these  patterns  are  not 
restricted  to  nominal  value-added  shares  but  also 
show up in employment shares. Figure 2.3 shows this 
process  in  a  stylised  way.  It  shows  that  economic 
development  has  consisted  of  a  gradual  shift  from 
agriculture  to  manufacturing  and  services,  followed 
by  a  shift  from  manufacturing  towards  the  service 
sector. In other words, when the market economy first 
emerged, a vast majority of workers were employed 
in agriculture, which accounted for the largest share 
of production. The production of goods was limited to 
handicrafts while market services played even less of 
a role. Successive industrial revolutions, exemplified 
by  the  creation,  diffusion  and  use  of  new 
technologies, led to a gradual increase in productivity 
in both the primary and secondary sectors. The share 
of income spent on food decreased and employment 
in  the  primary  sector  declined  relative  to  the  other 
sectors. In manufacturing the increase in productivity 
has  led  to  lower  prices.  In  the  course of  economic 
development this has resulted in lower factor demand 
(demand for  labour, for  instance) once productivity 
outstrips  the  growth  in  demand  for  manufactured 
goods.  Over  time,  the  tertiary  sector  has  gained  in 
importance, both in terms of employment and output, 
as  enterprises  have  demanded  support  services  and 
consumption patterns have shifted towards services, 
and productivity gains in manufacturing have become 
much higher than those in service sectors. 
 
 
 
Table 2.1. Value-added share regressions for cross-section data, UN National Accounts data for 164 countries, 1960–
2010 
   all observations 
y<US$8100 
sample 
y>=US$8100 
sample     all observations  
y<US$8100 
sample 
y>=US$8100 
sample 
 
Agriculture share  
 
Service share 
RGDP  –0.0869***  –0.117***  –0.0623*** 
 
0.0543***  0.0655***  0.106*** 
 
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
 
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.007) 
               
Observations  5872  4505  1367 
 
5830  4463  1367 
R
2  0.866  0.835  0.758     0.690  0.651  0.691 
 
Manufacturing share  
 
Industry share 
RGDP  0.00816***  0.0257***  –0.0828*** 
 
0.0343***  0.0553***  -0.0436*** 
 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
 
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.006) 
               
Observations  5838  4471  1367 
 
5872  4505  1367 
R
2  0.720  0.738  0.821     0.644  0.689  0.723 
Source: WIFO Calculations     
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significant estimate. 
Figure  2.3.  Stylised  broad  patterns  of  structural 
change 
 
Source: WIFO   
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2.2.  PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENTS AND CHANGES 
IN DEMAND AS DRIVERS OF STRUCTURAL 
CHANGE  
The need to understand the mutual interdependency 
between  economic  growth  and  structural  change 
requires  analyses  that  enrich  the  general  one-sector 
macroeconomic  perspective  with  multi-sectoral 
perspectives,  in  order  to  understand  the  main 
economic  mechanisms  that  drive  broad  patterns  of 
structural change. 
There  are  two  central,  possibly  complementary, 
explanations  of  the  observed  patterns  of  structural 
change in the literature. The first explanation relates 
to  differential patterns of  technical  change  between 
different industries. The second explanation relates to 
the  different  income  elasticity  of  demand  between 
products  of  different  sectors.  From  a  conceptual 
standpoint,  the  potential  significance  of  these 
mechanisms  in  explaining  the  broad  trends  of 
structural  change  has  long  been  recognized.  For 
instance, a pioneer in the theory of structural change, 
Fourastié  (1949),  explained  economic  development 
based on the combination of differential productivity 
growth rates across agriculture, industry and services, 
and  the  differential  income  elasticity  of  demand. 
Technological  progress  was  the  main  driving 
mechanism  behind  structural  change  in  his  theory, 
while  the  income  elasticity  of  demand  provides 
something  like  a  sorting  mechanism  that  gave  new 
weights to the sectors. Fourastié  maintained  that in 
the  long  run,  the  sorting  mechanism  of  demand 
dominates supply-side forces in shaping the economic 
structure of countries. As income rises, the demand 
for  primary  products  will  become  saturated  first, 
followed by the growth of demand for manufactured 
goods,  which  become  eventually  saturated,  and  an 
increase in demand for products in the tertiary sectors 
take  place.  Fourasti￩’s  vision  of  the  three-sector 
hypothesis  is  one of  the  most  elaborate  theories  of 
structural  change,  but  his  explanation  of  why 
products from industry can become saturated neglects 
the role of intermediate inputs from industry that are 
used in all sectors of the economy. A decline in the 
demand for consumer goods in manufacturing does 
not  necessarily  imply  a  declining  share  of  the 
secondary sector in total value added. 
Other  economists  held  such  views  at  the  time.  For 
example Kaldor (1981, 1996) argued that expanding 
domestic  and  international  markets  engendered  a 
process  of  cumulative  causation  in  which 
manufacturing growth played a central role as many 
growth-enhancing  learning  activities  such  as  R&D 
and the mechanisation of activities are closely related 
to  manufacturing.  This  allows  a  higher  rate  of 
productivity  growth  in  the  manufacturing  sector. 
Today manufacturing is an important sector, but it is 
also  recognised  that  manufacturing  industries  are 
heterogeneous,  and  that  there  are  important 
production  and  demand  linkages  which  play  a 
significant  role  in  the  process  of  economic 
development. More recently, the theoretical literature 
has  examined  the  conditions  under  which  the  two 
determinants  of  different  productivity  growth  (e.g. 
Ngai  and  Pissarides  2007)  and  differential  income 
elasticities  of  demand  (e.g.  Echevarria  1997, 
Kongesamut  et  al.  2001)  can  lead  to  an  aggregate 
balanced growth path. Herrendorf et al. (2013) claim 
that  the  conditions  under  which  these  theories  can 
simultaneously  generate  balanced  growth  and 
structural  change  are  rather  strict.  Theories  of 
balanced growth, which constitute the workhorse of 
growth theory, may not provide the right analytical 
tools to explain the broad set of empirical regularities 
of structural change. 
2.2.1.  Interaction of supply and demand factors 
Pasinetti (1981, 1993) emphasised the importance of 
the interaction of supply and demand side influences 
in  determining  the  outcome  of  the  process  of 
structural change. Pasinetti stresses the influence of 
income elasticity on the pattern of demand – Engel's 
law
47 – and technological progress as the main drivers 
of structural change and long-term economic growth. 
Hölzl  and  Reinstaller  (2007)  identify  two 
mechanisms  linking  the  inter-industry  and  intra-
industry dynamics: sorting and selection. Sorting is 
based on the idea that the industrial composition of 
demand varies with income growth. This captures the 
observation  that  the  consumption  of  agricultural 
products  rises  proportionally  less  than  aggregate 
income.  Consumer  preferences  and  the  demand 
derived by other firms for intermediate goods have an 
impact  on  the  relative  growth  patterns  of  sectors 
within  an  economy.  Selection  in  turn  reflects  price 
competition  within  and  between  sectors:  firms  or 
sectors able to produce the best value for money will 
be able to increase their demand and grow faster. 
Pure  demand-side  explanations  of  structural  change 
emphasise  that  changes  in  consumption  associated 
with income effects are a central driving force behind 
the process of structural change. Rising income leads 
to  demand  shifts  from  necessities  towards 
manufactured goods and then towards services (e.g. 
Echevarria 1997, Kongsamut et al. 2001). However, 
pure  demand-side  explanations  do  not  take  into 
account  the  observed  persistent  differences  in 
technical  change  and  productivity  across  sectors. 
Baumol’s  (1967)  theory  of  imbalanced  economic 
growth  is  perhaps  the  most  important  supply-side 
explanation  for why the tertiary sector will gain  in 
importance over time. Baumol divides the economy 
                                                            
47   Strictly  speaking,  Engel’s  law  refers  to  the  low  income 
elasticity  of  food  but  in  the  literature  on  structural  change 
Engel’s  law  is  used  to  refer  to  structural  change  driven  by 
nonlinear income effects that affect  demand for all types of 
goods (e.g. Pasinetti 1981, 1993, or Iscan 2010).  
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into  two  types  of  activities:  ‘technologically 
progressive  activities  in  which  innovations,  capital 
accumulation, and economies of large scale all make 
for  a  cumulative  rise  in  output  per  man  hour  and 
activities  which,  by  their  very  nature,  permit  only 
sporadic increases in productivity’ (Baumol 1967, p. 
415-416). Baumol contends that productivity growth 
in  progressive  activities  drives  wage  growth  in  the 
economy as a whole, causing relative costs in non-
progressive activities to rise. This leads to a fall in the 
relative weight of the non-progressive sectors or, if 
the relative outputs are maintained, to a slowing of 
the aggregate growth rate, as an increasing proportion 
of resources must be channelled into these activities. 
Little is known about the relative importance of these 
two mechanisms in the process of structural change 
and  economic  development  from  the  empirical 
perspective. Part of the difficulty in understanding the 
relative importance of the supply-side and demand-
side drivers of aggregate growth is the paucity of data 
on  the  services  sector.  There  are  still  significant 
measurement issues with service sector output, value 
added and productivity growth. It is also very difficult 
to establish the importance of preference parameters 
governing  the  income  elasticity  of  demand  for 
services in a rigorous way.  
A  closer  look  at  the  empirical  broad  patterns  of 
structural  change  reveals  that  both  processes  are 
relevant.  The  gradual  shift  in  value  added  and 
employment  shares  from  agricultural  to 
manufacturing  and  onwards  to  the  services  sector 
seems to be mainly due to changes in market demand. 
However,  this  account  of  the  shift  of  demand  also 
needs  to  take  into  account  big  productivity 
improvements  in  agriculture  over  the  past  decades. 
Thus the mechanics of Engel’s law –that as income 
rises, the proportion of income spent on a good falls, 
even if actual expenditure on it rises – needs to be 
complemented  by  an  account  of  productivity 
improvements. Up to now, there is no clear evidence 
as  to  whether  technological  progress  or  changes  in 
demand is the driver of structural change. Baumol et 
al.  (1989)  and  more  recently  Nordhaus  (2008) 
provide  empirical  evidence  favouring  the 
technological  explanation.  In  contrast,  Dietrich  and 
Krüger  (2010)  find  empirical  evidence  for  the 
demand  story  for  the  rise  of  the  service  sector  in 
Germany. Additionally, results by Curtis and Murthy 
(1998),  Rowthorn  and  Ramaswamy  (1999)  and 
Peneder  et  al.  (2003)  suggest  that  the  income 
elasticity  is  greater  than  unity  for  most  service 
branches as well as for aggregate services, and below 
unity for manufacturing branches.  
Productivity  and  growth  decompositions  generally 
lead to a view that structural components appear to be 
largely dominated by the intra-industry and intra-firm 
effects of productivity growth (Isaksson 2009). The 
empirical literature confirms that the broad patterns of 
structural change are driven by both demand-side and 
supply-side  dynamics.  It  confirms  that  structural 
change  can  generate  both  positive  and  negative 
contributions  to  aggregate  productivity  growth.  If 
structural  change  reallocates  resources  towards 
sectors with higher potential of productivity growth, 
structural  change  is  growth-enhancing,  and  if 
structural  change  shifts  resources  and  employment 
towards  sectors  with  below-average  productivity 
gains, structural change may be growth-reducing. In 
many cases the effects of structural change net out, 
and structural change on average appears to have only 
a weak impact on aggregate growth over short time 
periods. Hence, if certain types of industries achieve 
higher rates of productivity growth and  
Table 2.2. Dynamics in value added shares 1975 to 2005 
between EU-15 Member States and the US 
   Agriculture  Industry  Services 
EU-15  avg.  value 
added share 2005  
2.3  26.2  71.5 
US  avg.  value  added 
share 2005  
1.8  23.8  74.4 
           
EU-15 change in share 
1975-2005  
–5.3  –11.1  16.5 
US  change  in  share 
1975-2005  
–3.7  –7.8  11.5 
           
EU-15  change  in 
inequality 1975-2005  
1.6  1.9  –1 
US  change  in 
inequality 1975-2005  
–5.6  2.1  –1.4 
Source: WIFO calculations, EUKLEMS for the EU-15, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) for US states.   
Note:  Differences  in  the  industry  classifications  limit  the 
comparability  of  the  data  across  regions  (EU-15  and  US).  For 
European data NACE 1 is used, while US data follow the NACIS 
classification. The change in shares between 1975 and 2005 refers 
to  the  difference  in  the  value  added  shares  between  the  two 
periods. Inequality is measured using the Gini coefficient within 
the broad regions (US, EU-15).  
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expansion in output than others, structural change in 
favour of specific industries might still be conducive 
to economic growth. However, this might not be seen 
at  the  aggregate  level.  The  comparison  between 
patterns of structural change in the EU-15 and in the 
US shown in Box 2.1 confirms that structural change 
has  been  quite  similar.  Both  have  experienced  a 
dramatic growth in the value added share of services 
across all constituent EU countries and US states, and 
this shift towards services has been associated with a 
relative decline in industry and agriculture.  
2.3.  THE EXPANSION OF THE SERVICES SECTOR  
The analysis of broad changes has revealed that the 
biggest shift experienced by industrialised countries 
over  the  past  decade  has  been  the  reallocation  of 
resources  and  employment  linked  to  the  growth  in 
services.  All  highly  industrialised  countries  have 
become service economies, in terms of the share of 
value-added  generated  in  the  services  sector  and 
when  employment  shares  are  considered.  This 
structural change is uneven as it has not affected all 
services  in  the  same  way.  In  fact,  the  rise  of  the 
services sector taken as a whole has mainly been due 
to the expansion of business services and some non-
market services. 
For a long time, the shift towards services was seen as 
growth-reducing  structural  change.  The  rates  of 
productivity  growth  in  manufacturing  and  services 
are very different and can to some extent explain the 
large-scale  labour  reallocation  in  favour  of  the 
services  sector.  However,  more  recent  economic 
research  clearly  shows  that  many  knowledge-
intensive services are important factors in economic 
growth. For example, Pugno (2006) emphasises the 
importance of education and human capital formation 
for economic growth. 
Buera  and  Kaboski  (2012b)  emphasise  the  skill 
intensity  of  many  service  sectors  and  propose  a 
theory of the rise of the service economy based on an 
increasing  importance  of  specialised  highly-skilled 
labour at high levels of productivity. Thus the rise of 
Box 2.1. A comparison between patterns of structural change in EU-15 Member States and US states  
The fact that the majority of industrialized economies experienced a shift from manufacturing to services in recent 
decades illustrates the similarity in the change in contributions of agriculture, manufacturing and service sectors to 
total value added in the US and the EU. Between 1975 and 2005, the shares of services saw double-digit increases in 
both the US and the EU-15. The increase of the services sector has taken place largely at the expense of industry 
(mining, utilities, construction and manufacturing). On average across the US states, the share of services has 
increased by 11.5 percentage points. This shift has been even more pronounced in the EU, where the share of services 
increased by 16.5 points to 71.5 % in 2005. During this time, some member states (notably Greece, Spain and 
Portugal) experienced a substantial catch-up. The share of manufacturing in the EU fell by 11.1 percentage points on 
average. The decline has been slightly less (7.8 percentage points) in the US states. The comparatively small shares of 
agriculture decreased further, more so in the EU than in the US.   
One important question is whether structural change leads economies to become more similar over time or magnifies 
regional and interregional disparities in the composition of aggregate output. This question is important for several 
reasons. The tradability of agricultural and manufacturing commodities coupled with positive agglomeration effects 
in their production foster regional specialisation, yet there are limits to specialisation in the production of some 
services,  which  may  not  be  tradable.  Increasing  structural  disparities  between  the  regions  together  with  stark 
differences in productivity developments across the three sectors have the potential to reduce or increase income 
inequality within the regions. Economic policies aimed at attaining or maintaining a certain composition of output 
also need to take into account regional inequalities and the underlying specialisation trends.   
To answer this question in a simplified way, the inequality of the shares of agriculture, manufacturing and services 
between the 15 EU Member States and the 50 US states relative to their aggregate economies (US and EU-15) is 
considered. The preferred measure of structural cohesion is the difference between the values of the ubiquitous Gini 
coefficient of inequality, calculated across the member states and federal states of both regions for the years 1975 and 
2005 (Table 2.2).   
Negative differences mean that regional (country/state) differences have decreased. This is the case for the share of 
services, as the nationwide rise in the contribution of services has been due in part to their low tradability and local 
character. On the contrary, as expected, disparities in the structure of manufacturing have increased.   
An apparent difference between the 15 Member States and 50 US states lies in the evolution of the inequality in the 
contribution of agriculture. Regional inequality has increased in the EU-15, while it has decreased in the US. This 
may be related to the fact that the US has had a common agricultural market since its early days, with regional 
differences and specialisation in agriculture taking place long before 1975. In the EU this process started around this 
time. This may explain why differences appear to have decreased in the US, while they have increased in the EU. 
Interestingly, quite similar patterns in inequality are observed for the industry and services sectors for the US states 
and the EU-15. Industry shares have become more unequal across Member States and US states, and services shares 
(almost by nature) have become more similar across the two regions.  
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the  service  economy  is  a  growth  in  the  range  of 
services  that  are  market-produced  relative  to  those 
that are home-produced. Buera and Kaboski (2012b) 
provide an explanation of the rising level of skills and 
“skill  premium”  that  goes  in  hand  with  the  rising 
relative  level  of  prices  for  services,  which  is 
associated  with  changes  in  demand  towards 
knowledge-intensive  services  in  the  process  of 
economic development. In particular, the application 
of  modern  information  and  communication 
technology to the production of services has changed 
the perception of services as low productivity and low 
skill sectors of the economy. Eichengreen and Gupta 
(2013) and Jorgenson and Timmer (2011) show that 
more traditional services like lodging, housecleaning, 
distribution, education and healthcare are increasingly 
complemented by modern services such as banking, 
insurance, communication and business services. 
Figure 2.4 provides evidence on the heterogeneity of 
services  sector  expansion  in  the  most  advanced 
economies,  including  most  EU  Member  States.  In 
these  figures  EUKLEMS  data  are  used  and  four 
different types of services are distinguished:  
-  Distribution  
-  Personal services 
-  Business services  
-  Non-market  services  (education,  health  and 
government services) 
 
Figure  2.4  reports  both  the  value-added  and  the 
hours-worked  shares.  While  the  share  in  hours 
worked  is  almost  constant,  the  value  share  of 
distribution  decreases  with  economic  development. 
The expansion of business services is more dynamic 
in  terms  of  valued  added  shares  than  for  hours-
worked  shares.  However,  the  opposite  seems  to  be 
true  for  non-market  services.  This  shows  that  the 
expansion of the service share is mainly driven by the 
expansion of two quite different service subsectors: 
business services and non-market services. While the 
pattern  of  expansion  of  non-market  services  – 
government  services, health  and  education  to  name 
the most important – could be explained by a supply-
side ‘cost disease’ argument, the same argument does 
not  apply  for  the  expansion  of  business  services, 
because for many countries the increase in economic 
weight is  more substantial in terms of value  added 
than hours worked. 
This evidence shows that services are heterogeneous 
and  is  compatible  with  the  argument  provided  by 
Peneder et al. (2001) and Buera and Kaboski (2012b), 
indicating  that  the  rise  of  the  service  economy  has 
primarily been driven by the growth of knowledge-
based services. 
Even  if  the  shift  in  structure  towards  services  has 
reached unprecedented proportions, the understanding 
of the factors accounting for the shift to services is 
still partially contested. This is related to a number of 
issues. Different mechanisms have been proposed to 
explain  the  shift  of  economic  activities  towards 
services.  The  thesis  of  marketization  or  de-
marketisation of home production proposed by Buera 
and  Kaboski  (2012a)  is  one  that  combines  the 
differential  development  of  technology  with  a 
mechanism of a shift in demand. 
Schettkatt  and  Yocarini  (2006)  emphasise  the 
importance of demand-side explanations. They argue 
that shifts in demand associated with income effects 
have  been  the  driving  force  of  the  expansion  of 
services employment in past decades. However, the 
different productivity developments between services 
and manufacturing are also important. Price trends in 
some services support this view (e.g. Schettkat and 
Yocarini 2006): prices of services generally rise more 
than  prices  for  manufactured  output.  However,  as 
emphasised by Peneder (2001) some services sectors 
are obviously technologically progressive. Jorgenson 
and  Timmer  (2012)  clearly  show  that  price  and 
productivity developments in distribution sectors are 
very different from other service sectors. 
Table  2.3  gives  an  indication  by  using  the  relative 
price development of sectoral prices compared to the 
GDP  deflator  as  a  measure  of  sectoral  price 
developments.  Values  below  1  indicate  that  price 
developments  were  below  the  aggregate  price 
development  (GDP  deflator).  Conversely,  a  value 
above 1 indicates that prices rose faster than average. 
The  table  displays  average  values  for  the  EU27 
Member  States  and  the  associated  standard 
deviations.  Across  Member  States,  agriculture  and 
manufacturing  have  had  a  below-average  price 
development. The price development in distribution 
was  on  average  approximately  the  same  as  for 
aggregate  prices.  For  personal  services,  business 
services and non-market services, an above-average 
price development is observed. These price trends are 
consistent with the view of differential productivity 
developments across services and manufacturing and 
higher productivity dynamics in manufacturing.
48 The 
associated  standard  deviations  show  that  these 
differences are statistically significant. Nevertheless, 
it is also important to note that these price series are 
themselves  subject  to  a  considerable  composition 
bias, as it is very unlikely that the structure of these 
quite  aggregate  sectors  remained  identical  over 
time.
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48   Price  developments  of  manufacturing  products  would  be 
further  below  the  aggregate  price  development  if  they  were 
corrected for increases in the quality of finished products (see 
Cummins and Violante (2002). 
49   This remark is important for the comparison of real shares over 
time. Structural change is a process that changes the weights of 
economic  activities  in  the  aggregate.  Moreover,  structural 
change  is  driven by  differences  in demand  and  productivity 
that react to or determine prices. Therefore these data not only 
identify a price effect but also a quantity effect associated with 
the changing weights of economic activities.  
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Figure 2.4. Service shares and economic development 
 (a) Value added shares 
 
 (b) Shares in hours worked 
 
Source: WIFO calculations, EUKLEMS  
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2.3.1.  Interaction of manufacturing and services 
Another important explanation that has been brought 
forward  is  the  hypothesis  of  the  inter-industry 
division  of  labour.  It  is  sometimes  claimed  that 
outsourcing jobs from manufacturing to services is a 
primary  driver  of  the  rise  of  service  sectors  (see 
Schettkatt  and  Yocarini  (2006)  for  a  discussion). 
However,  most  of  the  studies  using  input-output 
analysis come to the conclusion that outsourcing from 
manufacturing to services took place at a very modest 
rate
50. According to Gregory and Russo (2004), the 
                                                            
50   The methodological limitations of using input-output analysis 
to examine the outsourcing process are discussed in Montesor 
and Vitucci (2007). 
rise  of  business  services  is  largely  explained  by 
outsourcing  from  other  service  sectors.  This  shows 
that  the  trend  towards  an  increasing  services  share 
cannot be understood without considering changes at 
the  microeconomic  level.  The  interaction  between 
manufacturing  and  services  has  become  more 
complex. Services and manufactured goods are used 
as intermediary inputs to produce a larger number of 
final products (goods and services). 
 
Box 2.2. Household production and structural change 
It has been widely recognised that income and wealth generated by household production could introduce a bias in 
the measurement of the economic structure. Kuznets (1944) and Clark (1958) already indicated that the neglect of 
home  production  leads  to  a  significant  underestimation  of  national  income  in  general  and  the  contribution  of 
agriculture,  construction,  and  services  to  national  income  in  particular.  These  missing  activities  contribute  to 
economic welfare and can be ‘marketised’ to different degrees across countries, thereby affecting the measurement of 
sector shares, since only market services are taken into account in the official statistics. 
Hill (1977) defined household production as economically productive households or do-it-yourself activities that can 
be provided through the market by choice. Home-produced and market-produced services are gross substitutes. 
Cooking and cleaning are productive activities because the market can provide them, whereas eating and sleeping are 
non-productive activities because the market cannot provide them.  Unfortunately, no systematic data are available 
which would allow differences in structural change to be quantified across EU Member States. The results for the US 
suggest that incorporating the value of non-market home production increases the level of nominal GDP. Bridgman 
et al. (2012) estimate that in 1965 household production increased GDP by 39%, and by 26% in 2010. The relative 
decline in home production is almost solely due to the reduction of hours spent in home production by women. Their 
contribution declined from 40 to 26 hours during this period, whereas the number of hours spent by men increased 
from 14 to 17 hours. Thus the allocation of hours between market and home production can also be considered in the 
context of structural change. Yet Freeman and Schettkat (2005) and Rogerson (2008) suggest that it is not a driver of 
structural change but part of the increase in leisure deriving from the reallocation of labour from home production to 
the market production of services. 
It is also important to take into account the impact of technical change on home production. A good example is the 
contribution of  the  mechanisation  of home  production, namely  the  growth of  the  manufacturing of  household 
appliances. The spread of washing machines, dryers, vacuum cleaners, microwaves, and other home appliances was 
accompanied by declines in domestic servants, laundries and drycleaners. Buera and Kaboski (2012a) emphasise that 
innovations which change the scale economies of productive activities are an important determinant of the boundaries 
between home and market production of goods and services over time. They argue that scale economies are a driving 
force in the process of marketisation of services, but that this process can also be reversed if technological change and 
mechanisation lowers the cost of producing services and scale economies, as households value the flexibility of home 
production. Their result suggests that the spread of manufactured goods into the home leads to a ‘demarketisation’ of 
services and a growth of manufacturing relative to services. Technical change that leads to an increase in the 
economies of scale of services will lead to the marketisation and relative growth of the service sector. However, it is 
important to note that the empirical verdict on the importance of the thesis of the marketization and demarketisation 
of home production for structural change is still not settled. 
It should also be noted that the de-marketization of certain activities, because they can be done at home at a low 
cost in terms of time, can potentially increase labour supply and reinforce the tertiarization of the economy 
because services are labour-intensive. 
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The increasing contribution of the service industry at 
the expense of manufacturing can in part be explained 
by  an  increasing  service  content  of  manufacturing 
final output, reflecting the total value of the services 
required  for  the  development,  production  and 
marketing of a modern manufacturing product. The 
service content of manufacturing has been growing in 
the EU and elsewhere in the world. In 2011, the share 
of  value  added  embodied  in  manufacturing  final 
output that was created in the service industry ranged 
from  above  40%  in  Belgium,  Ireland  and 
Luxembourg  to  below  30%  in  Romania,  United 
Kingdom  and  Greece  (see  Figure  2.5).  This  means 
that  more  than  a  third  of  the  value  of  a  European 
manufacturing  product  that  is  sold  to  final  users  is 
created in the services sector. Whereas manufacturing 
products  are  also  used  for  producing  services,  the 
manufacturing content of services is about three times 
smaller than the service content of manufacturing and 
has increased much less over time. 
These results explain that there is a high degree of 
complementarity  between  manufacturing  goods  and 
services,  but  that  this  complementarity  is  biased 
towards  the  increasing  importance  of  services  as 
inputs  to  manufacturing.  Services  such  as 
maintenance and training are very important elements 
in the delivery of complex manufactured products. At 
the same time the importance of specialised services 
such  as  financial  intermediation,  communications, 
insurance and knowledge-intensive business services 
(KIBS)  are  becoming  important  inputs  in  the 
production  of  sophisticated  manufacturing  output. 
This  process  is  one  of  several  explanations  for  the 
increasing  contribution  of  services  to  the  overall 
output  of  an  economy.    Figure  2.5  shows  that  an 
increasing  share  of  intermediate  services  used  in 
modern manufacturing  is being imported, reflecting 
the fragmentation of production processes within and 
across national borders which was made possible by 
the  ICT  revolution  (Guerrieri  and  Meliciani  2005). 
The  relocation  of  business  processes  from  one 
country  to  another  also  affects  the  structure  of  an 
economy and its services share. However, the degree 
of  offshoring  and  outsourcing  is  dependent  on  the 
particular industry and activity.  
In the discussion of the rise of services, two issues 
have so far been neglected. The first issue relates to 
the  quality  of  data  on  services.  There  are  still 
measurement  issues  associated  with  services  sector 
Table  2.3.  Relative  price  developments  at  the  sector 
level, 1995–2007 
  Average 
 
Standard deviation 
Agriculture  0.77 
 
0.18 
Manufacturing  0.82 
 
0.13 
Construction  1.22 
 
0.20 
Distribution  0.97 
 
0.09 
Personal services  1.17 
 
0.16 
Business services  1.13 
 
0.13 
Non-market services  1.18 
 
0.16 
Source: EUKLEMS   
Figure 2.5. Value added decomposition for manufacturing production in per cent, 2011 
 
Note:  Countries  are  ranked  according  to  their  domestic  value  added  share  (i.e.  Domestic  non-services  +  domestic  services) 
Source: WIOD, wiiw calculations  
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output,  value  added  and  productivity.
51  Griliches 
(1992), for example, documented that services sectors 
with hard-to-measure outputs, such as health services, 
experienced the largest labour productivity slowdown 
after 1973. In many services there are  
conceptual  and  empirical  problems  in  measuring 
output and prices. Therefore, there are still substantial 
differences  in  the  measurement  of  productivity  in 
manufacturing and in services, and thus major limits 
in the comparability of its growth rates across these 
sectors.  These  problems  primarily  affect  the  value 
added  shares  in  GDP  and  the  identification  of 
productivity developments, while employment shares 
are  unaffected  by  these  issues.  However,  the 
importance  of  human  capital  and  education  for 
economic growth in developed economies (e.g. Lucas 
1988,  Pugno  2006)  leaves  an  additional  question 
mark concerning the usefulness of comparing sectoral 
productivity differences. If human capital is essential 
for  economic  growth  and  the  educational  sector 
provides most of the human capital used in the form 
of  capabilities  in  the  manufacturing  and  services 
sectors  to  develop  new  products  and  to  improve 
productivity, then the reallocation of resources to a 
low-productivity  activity  such  as  education  may  be 
the reason why productivity improves in other sectors 
of  the  economy.  Pugno  (2006)  explicitly  takes  this 
situation into account, concluding that not only can 
the expansion of business services support long-term 
                                                            
51   There is a literature on problems with measuring productivity 
in  services.  One  of  the  best  overviews  on  measurement 
problems  in  the  services  sector  in  general  is  provided  by 
Triplett and Bosworth (2004). Diewert, Fixler and Zieschang 
(2012)  cover  banking  services  and  Diewert  (2011)  cover 
public services. 
economic growth but also the expansion of some non-
market activities such as education. In this case the 
productivity and quality of the educational system are 
of  primary  importance.  The  productivity  of  the 
education system needs to be measured in terms of its 
quality  in  providing  the  right  competences  and 
capabilities. 
2.4.  HETEROGENEITY OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN 
EUROPE 
The discussion so far has shown that broad trends in 
structural  change  are  quite  homogeneous  across 
countries.  
Table  2.4  summarises  developments  between  1995 
and 2011 for the EU27 countries. There has been a 
decline in most production sectors, both in terms of 
employment shares and nominal value-added shares. 
The  biggest  reductions  are  for  agriculture  and  the 
manufacturing  sector.  In  the  period  2005  to  2011, 
construction  also  shows  a  negative  trend  for 
employment as well as value- added shares, reflecting 
its sensitivity to aggregate downturns (cf. Hölzl et al. 
2011).  These  declines  have  been  offset  primarily 
through the expansion in business services and non-
market services. Overall, these results are consistent 
with  a  view  suggesting  that  labour  productivity 
growth  has  been  especially  strong  in  agriculture, 
manufacturing, distribution, mining and utilities. 
Of  greater  interest  is  the  development  in  the 
dispersion within the EU27.  
Table  2.4  provides  descriptive  statistics  of  this 
dispersion, in terms of Gini indices. The Gini index is 
a  widely  used  measure  of  relative  inequality.  The 
coefficient takes values between zero and one, or, as 
Figure 2.6. Share of value added created in non-services sectors embodied in services production (%)  
 
Note: Services sectors are NACE Rev. 1 50 to 95.   
Source: WIOD, wiiw calculations  
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in  Table  2.4,  between  0  and  100  on  the  percentile 
scale. A value of 0 corresponds to total equality. This 
would be the case if all sectors had equal shares.  The 
higher  the  value  of  the  Gini  coefficient,  the  more 
unequal  the  distribution.  A  value  of  100  expresses 
maximum inequality, for example if all countries had 
different sectors. The formula for computing the Gini 
coefficient is: 
where y_i are the sector shares sorted in an ascending 
order and n the number of sectors. 
Table  2.4  shows  that  the  disparity  is  highest  for 
agriculture and for mining and utilities. The lowest 
inequality  ratings  are  for  construction,  distribution 
and non-market services for the employment share, 
and for distribution, non-market services and business 
services  for  the  value-added  share.  The  changes  in 
inequality  show  that  most  services  sectors 
experienced  a  reduction  in  inequality  during  the 
longer  period  1995  to  2005.  For  the  shorter  time 
horizon  inequality  increased  for  personal  services, 
probably  due  to  a  transitory  divergence  in  the 
consumption  of  personal  services  across  countries. 
However,  for  manufacturing  we  observe  a  rising 
disparity across the EU27, for both the employment 
and value-added shares. 
Table  2.5  displays  the  heterogeneity  of  structural 
change  for  the  EU-15  over  the  longer  time  period 
between 1975 and 2005 using EU KLEMS data. The 
results  confirm  the  earlier  picture  of  the  EU-15 
experiencing  a  reduction  in  disparity  of  services 
shares,  along  with  an  increase  in  disparity  for  the 
production sectors, especially manufacturing both in 
terms of employment and the value added share.  
Overall  these  results  suggest  that  there  was 
considerable heterogeneity in economic development. 
The  trends  of  structural  change  are  quite  similar 
across  countries,  but  we  observe  some  divergent 
developments,  especially  for  the  manufacturing 
sector. The results in Box 2.2 (US EU Comparison) 
also show an increasing inequality between the value-
added shares in manufacturing across Member States 
and  US  states.  The  similarity  in  broad  trends  of 
economic  development  is  also  compatible  with 
important heterogeneity at the country level. Further 
analysis  for  the  EU  Member  States  shows  that 
common  trends  in  structural  change  are  able  to 
explain  a  large  part  of  the  development  of 
employment  and  value-added  shares  over  time,  but 
also  that  idiosyncratic  and  contrasting  elements  are 
important in determining the development of sectoral 
shares across countries.  
The same patterns of structural change emerge from a 
more  detailed  look  at  structural  adjustments  in  the 
EU-12
52 economies during the transformation from a 
planned  economy  to  a  market  economy,  and  then 
during  the  process  of  integration  into  the  Single 
Market (see Box 2.3). The broad trend of a decrease 
in production activities, especially manufacturing and 
agriculture,  and an  increase in services sectors was 
quite uniform across these countries. However, at the 
level  of  individual  countries  important  differences 
can be observed. 
2.5.  INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND SPECIALISATION 
AS DRIVERS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
What explains these differences in economic structure 
across  countries?  The  differences  for  the 
manufacturing  sector  are  the  most  interesting, 
showing  a  polarisation  process  with  an  increasing 
disparity across Member States. One important factor 
is  international  trade.  Openness  and  international 
specialisation  patterns  clearly  have  an  impact  on 
observed structural change. Connolly and Yi (2008) 
claim  that  up  to  30%  of  South  Korea’s  catch-up 
between 1962 and 1995 can be traced to its openness. 
Matsuyama (2009) and  Yi and Zhang (2010)  show 
that differences in the structure of economies can be 
related  to  differences  in  international  trade, 
specialisation,  and  differences  in  economic 
development, which is partly path-dependent. 
Two important drivers of specialisation and structural 
change  are  innovation,  i.e.  the  creation  of  new 
varieties  of  products,  and  the  selection  of  new 
products through the process of market competition 
or changes in demand that affect the economic weight 
of products and may even lead to the replacement of 
products.  The  replacement  mechanism  is  very 
important as it captures the key  mechanism behind 
Schumpeter’s vision of economic development driven 
by  the  process  of  “creative  destruction”.  This 
perspective of qualitative change is closely related to 
a  view  of  economic  development  as  a  process  of 
structural change, where resources are  continuously 
reallocated  from  activities  with  low  productivity  to 
activities with higher productivity.  
This  view  has  been  emphasised  in  a  series  of 
contributions by Hidalgo et al. (2007), Hidalgo and 
Hausmann (2009) and Felipe et al. (2012) – see also 
Reinstaller et al. (2012) – which linked the process of 
economic  development  of  a  country  to  the  idea  of 
changes in the space of its exported products. In such 
a  perspective,  the  overall  complexity  and 
sophistication of a country’s productive structure is  
                                                            
52   Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
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Table 2.4. Dynamics and heterogeneity of structural change in the EU27, 1995–2011 
 
Employment shares 
 
Share 
2011 
Change 1995–
2005 
Change 2005–
2011 
 
Inequality 
2011 
Change 1995–
2005 
Change 2005–
2011 
Agriculture  5.8  –2.6  -0.6     39.6  2.9  1.1 
Mining and Utilities  1.3  –0.5  0.0     31.8  –2.1  –0.2 
Manufacturing  15.3  –3.2  –1.9     16.6  4.0  1.4 
Construction  7.1  0.8  –0.7     9.6  2.2  –5.0 
Distribution  26.6  1.1  0.5     7.5  –0.3  1.5 
Personal Services  6.1  0.5  0.3     18.3  –0.9  1.1 
Business Service  14.6  3.0  1.7     18.9  –1.8  –1.4 
Non-market Services  23.1  1.0  0.7     10.1  –1.5  –0.6 
               
 
Value added shares 
 
Share 
2011 
Change 1995-
2005 
Change 2005-
2011 
 
Inequality 
2011 
Change 1995-
2005 
Change 2005-
2011 
Agriculture  2.7  –2.2  –0.1     30.3  –1.5  0.9 
Mining and Utilities  3.7  –0.5  0.5     26  2.4  1.7 
Manufacturing  16.8  –3.0  –0.8     18.2  5.2  1.7 
Construction  5.6  0.6  –0.9     14.4  2.8  1.1 
Distribution  23.3  0.9  –1.1     8.9  2.0  –1.1 
Personal Services  4.3  0.4  0.4     20  –0.1  8.1 
Business Service  25.3  3.3  1.3     11.7  –0.3  –1.4 
Non-market Services  18.3  0.6  0.6     10.3  1.2  0.5 
Source: WIFO calculations, Eurostat, National Accounts.   
Note: unweighted averages; inequality is measured using the Gini Index across countries. 
Table 2.5. Heterogeneity of structural change in the EU-15, 1975–2005 
 
Employment share 
 
Value added share 
 
Inequality 2005  Change in inequality 
1975-2005 
 
Inequality 2005 
Change in 
inequality 1975-
2005 
Agriculture  38.5  1.8     29.4  –0.6 
Mining and Utilities  32.0  9.2     24.3  1.0 
Manufacturing  15.2  7.6     16.5  7.8 
Construction  14.6  7.0     13.3  5.4 
Distribution Services  6.0  1.7     10.0  3.9 
Personal Services  17.2  –2.3     11.9  –3.1 
Business Services  20.3  –2.4     13.1  –2.7 
Non-Market Services  10.7  –5.8     9.8  –3.5 
Source: WIFO calculations, EU KLEMS  
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the  key  indicator  to  explain  its  economic 
development. 
Different  abilities  to  accumulate  capabilities  to 
produce  new  improved  products  can  explain 
differences  in  their  performance.  This  literature 
provides  a  novel  way  to  study  the  differences  in 
structural change across countries.
53    
                                                            
53   Some recent contributions argue that the hump-shaped pattern 
of development observed for the shares in value added of the 
manufacturing  sector  over  time  can  only  be  explained  by 
taking  an  open  economy  perspective  and  in  the  context  of 
international specialisation in trade (Reyes-Heroles 2012; Uy 
et al. 2012). 
The  processes  of  variety  creation  and  creative 
destruction  can  be  made  visible  by  the  appearance 
and  disappearance  of  exported  products  or  product 
classes.  Exporting  new  products  changes  the 
composition  of  the  product  basket  of  countries. 
Therefore the structural change in one country may 
affect the economic structure in other countries. The 
analysis  of  changes  in  the  composition  of  export 
baskets of countries using trade data at the four-digit 
product  level  for  232  countries  covering  the  years 
1995 to 2010 (cf. Gaulier and Zignago 2010) allows 
the  study  of  structural  change  and  what  is  termed 
“creative  destruction”.  We  use  the  product  space 
indicators proposed by (Hidalgo et al. 2007; Hidalgo 
and Hausmann 2009) that capture trade specialisation, 
Box 2.3. Structural change in the EU-12 during transformation and integration into the Common 
Market  
In general, the Member States which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 had oversized and inefficient industrial sectors. 
At the start of the transformation process, the high degree of industrialisation was a drawback. It implied, among 
other problems, the underdevelopment of important services sectors. Due to comparative disadvantage, industry in all 
the former communist countries suffered disproportionately from the 'transformational’ recession in the early 1990s. 
The relative decline of industry went hand in hand with a rapid expansion of services sectors.  By 2011, only the 
Czech Republic and Romania had a manufacturing sector with a share in GDP of more than 20% – about the same as 
in two of the more industrialised older Member States: Germany and Ireland.  In Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the 
Baltic states, manufacturing industry managed to retain at least part of its previous position, thanks largely to active 
restructuring and privatisation efforts, fostered in particular by FDI inflows. At the beginning of the 2010s, the shares 
of manufacturing to GDP in the majority of EU-12 Member States were higher than in EU-15 economies. However, 
this is in line with many developing economies. 
The changes in employment shares in the EU-12 countries was even more dramatic during the last two decades.  
Employment declined more than output and millions of jobs were lost during the transition from central planning to 
market economies. Nevertheless, the manufacturing sector remains an important job provider, with the highest 
employment shares in the manufacturing industry recorded in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia. With the 
exception of Latvia, Cyprus and Malta, manufacturing accounts for more than 15% of total employment in all EU-12 
Member States. Similarly high shares of manufacturing employment are recorded for only a few EU-15 countries: 
Portugal, Italy, Austria, Germany and Finland. 
Structural change has been more pronounced in Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia and Lithuania than in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Estonia or Poland.  Furthermore, the ‘earlier’ transition period 1995-2000 was more profound than the 
integration period immediately before EU accession (2000-2005). The most recent period, 2005-2011 is characterised 
in several countries by more restructuring than before EU accession (for instance in the Czech Republic, Slovakia 
and Slovenia). This period was also affected by the recent economic crisis which hit manufacturing, construction and 
tradable services much harder than other economic sectors.  Among the EU-15, Sweden, Austria and Germany 
experienced only small adjustments, whereas structural adjustments were more pronounced in Ireland and Finland. 
Despite varying country-specific restructuring patterns, several stylised facts common to most countries can be 
observed for the EU-12: the output shares of agriculture and manufacturing have declined whereas those of real 
estate, renting and business activities, information and communication, financial and insurance services, as well as 
public administration have increased.  However, it must be said that the patterns of structural change were quite 
different across individual countries. It is especially interesting that a number of new distinct features of structural 
adjustment emerged during the relatively short crisis period between 2008 and 2011. Apart from a certain revival of 
manufacturing (Hungary, Romania and the Baltic states) it was construction and trade which suffered most from 
declining value-added shares during the crisis in a number of EU-12 countries. Structural adjustments were less 
pronounced in the Czech Republic during this period (as in a number of EU-15 Member States, such as Austria, 
France, Germany, Belgium, Italy and Sweden).  In Poland – the only EU Member State which did not experience a 
decline in GDP during the crisis period – a certain return to a ‘traditional’ structural pattern occurred as a number of  
‘productive’ sectors (energy, construction and trade) managed to increase their shares in GDP while the shares of 
information, communication services and especially financial services showed some declines.  
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product  complexity,  and  appearance  and 
disappearance of traded products across countries. 
Figure 2.7 provides a summary of these indicators by 
relating  them  to  per  capita  income  levels  of  the 
countries. The upper panels (product complexity and 
trade specialisation) show values for 2010; the lower 
panels  (change  of  trade  specialisation  and  co-
appearance  and  disappearance  of  products)  show 
differences between 1995 and 2010. 
The product complexity score (PCS) is shown in the 
upper left panel. This indicator can be interpreted as 
capturing  latent  information  on  both  the  depth 
(capability to produce exclusive products due to high 
levels of accumulated knowledge) and the breadth of 
the  knowledge  base  (capability  to  make  many 
products with different knowledge bases) needed to 
be active in a specific product class (cf. Reinstaller et 
al. 2012).
54 It is constructed using information on how 
many  countries  produce  a  specific  product  and  on 
how diversified these countries are. The plot in the 
figure shows that more developed countries produce 
more  sophisticated  products  which  require  higher 
                                                            
54  The  empirical  range  of  the  product  complexity  scores  lies 
between  –4  and  2.  These  figures  correspond  to  standard 
deviations from the mean product complexity score normalised 
to  zero.  Hence  an  indicator  value  of  2  indicates  that  the 
complexity score of a product or product class is two standard 
deviations away from the mean. A product with a complexity 
score of zero indicates that – relative to the entire sample – it 
has just average complexity. 
capabilities and suggests that economic development 
goes along with a perpetual structural change in the 
export basket towards more complex products. 
The  upper  right  panel  shows  the  product 
neighbourhood density
55. This indicator is a proxy for 
the  trade  specialisation  of  countries.  It  exploits  the 
fact that similar products are related to each other by 
drawing  on  common  knowledge  bases  and  similar 
factors of production. It is therefore also a measure 
for the factor substitutability across products. Higher 
scores imply a higher specialisation. In order to plot 
this indicator it has been averaged over products in 
the product basket of a country. The plot shows that 
countries at higher levels of economic development 
tend to become more specialised in their exports. The 
products they export are more closely related to each 
other in terms of similar factor input requirements. 
The lower left panel of Figure 2.7 shows the change 
of  the  neighbourhood  density  between  1995  and 
2010. It is plotted against GDP per capita levels in 
2010.  The  figure  suggests  that  trade  specialisation 
seems to be a fast process at lower levels of economic 
development, while it starts to slow down at a GDP 
per capita corresponding to about USD 3000 (or e
8), 
in a hump-shaped relationship. 
                                                            
55   At the product level, the indicator takes on values between 0 
and 1, where 0 indicates no relation and 1 a perfect relation of 
a  product  to  the  productive  structures  of  a  country  the 
specialisation pattern of a country. 
Figure 2.7. Average product complexity, density and co-appearance across income levels. Predicted values on the 
basis of fitted fractional polynomials, 2010 
 
Source: WIFO calculations; BACI dataset (Gaulier and Zignago 2010);   
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The lower right panel plots the co-appearance index 
of  the  products  countries  export.  This  measure 
captures the presence of ‘temporal clustering’, where 
products appear in the export basket across countries 
at the same time. A higher value indicates a temporal 
clustering  and  shows  whether  countries  start 
exporting  these  products  simultaneously.  The  plot 
shows  that  the  co-appearance  index  follows  an 
inverted  U-shape  over  levels  of  per  capita  income, 
with  a  predicted  maximum  at  an  income  level 
corresponding to about USD 8000 per capita (=e
9). 
While  a  more  thorough  examination  of  the 
relationship between the co-appearance index and the 
change  in  neighbourhood  density  (specialisation)  is 
necessary, a first glance at the results suggests that 
the co-appearance of products is closely related to the 
dynamics  of  related  specialisation.  Increases  in 
specialisation appear to go along with bursts in the 
export activity of products. 
Figure  2.8  displays  the  export  share  weighted 
displacement index. This index measures the number 
of disappearances of some product classes within a 
specified  time  window  after  a  country  has  started 
exporting another product.
56 It captures the creative 
destruction  induced  in  a  productive  system  when  a 
country  starts  making  a  specific  product.  Negative 
values indicate that a country exports mostly products 
                                                            
56  The variable takes on values between -1 and 1. See Klimek et 
al. (2012) for details on the indicator. 
which  across  all  countries  tend  to  be  displaced  by 
other products. Positive values indicate that products 
which tend to displace other products have a higher 
weight  in  the  export  basket  of  a  country.  Such 
products  can  be  considered  to  be  more  innovative, 
high-end products. Beyond a threshold income level 
close to USD 3,000  per  capita, displacing products 
start to dominate the export basket of countries. This 
figure gives a clear indication that the characteristics 
of traded products change in countries with levels of 
income per capita in the range between USD 3,000 
and USD 8,000. 
As Figure 2.9 shows, the export baskets of the EU-27 
consist  by  and  large  of  products  with  positive 
displacement scores. This indicates that most of the 
exports of the Member States are products from the 
upper end of the quality ladder. The data also shows 
that  inside  this  group  of  products  with  positive 
displacement  scores,  some  Member  States  have  a 
higher export share in products with above-average 
complexity scores whereas others have a higher share 
of  products  with  average  or  below-average 
complexity  scores.
57  The  product  complexity  score 
can be taken as a measure that captures the difficulty 
of  imitating  exported  products.  For  Member  States 
with  average  or  below-average  complexity  scores, 
                                                            
57   Unreported results show that the export basket of catching-up 
countries  such  as  Brazil  is  dominated  by  products  with 
negative  displacement  scores  and  a  relatively  high  share  of 
products  with  below-average  complexity  scores  inside  this 
product class. 
Figure 2.8. Specialisation of productive structures and changes over the 1995–2010 period across income levels, 
predicted values on the basis of fitted fractional polynomials 
 
Source: WIFO calculations; BACI dataset (Gaulier and Zignago 2010)  
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this  evidence  implies  that  they  produce  up-market 
products that are easier to imitate. As a consequence, 
they  are  also  subject  to  more  intense  price 
competition  from  lower-income  countries  than 
Member  States  producing  innovative  products  that 
rely  on  a  more  complex  knowledge  base  and 
therefore are also more difficult to imitate. 
Further  results  show  that  across  manufacturing 
sectors,  product  classes  with  negative  and  positive 
displacement  indices  co-exist.  In  the  chemical 
industry  for  instance,  the  share  of  the  two  product 
categories  is  almost  equal.  By  contrast,  in  the 
machinery  and  equipment  industry  the  share  of 
displacing  products,  i.e.  products  with  a  positive 
displacement  index,  outweighs  the  number  of 
products  that  tend  to  be  displaced,  whereas  the 
opposite  situation  exists  in  the  textile  and  apparel 
industries.  Sectors  thus  undergo  a  permanent 
restructuring process which is driven by changes at 
the level of products or product classes. These results 
show that more sophisticated products both in terms 
of  complexity  and  displacement  scores  are  more 
frequent  in  medium-high  and  high-tech  industries. 
Therefore, in the more advanced economies, sectors 
producing more sophisticated products drive out other 
sectors.  However,  it  is  important  to  stress  from  a 
policy perspective the considerable path dependence 
in the development paths of the productive structures 
of  economies  (e.g.  Reinstaller  et  al.  2012).  This 
implies  that  the  diversification  into  economic 
structures characterised by innovative products which 
are  difficult  to  imitate  is  harder  to  achieve  by 
countries  lacking  specific  knowledge  bases  and 
specialisation  patterns  than  by  countries  that  have 
these  capabilities.  Thus  an  important  limit  to  the 
change in the export basket of countries is the path 
dependency of industrial structure. 
The  path  dependency  of  industrial  structure  also 
suggests that it might be easier to lose some products 
and  competences  in  the  process  of  international 
competition  than  to  build  up  different  capabilities 
which allow the differentiation of the product space 
of a country. This dynamic process of reconfiguring 
capabilities,  competencies  and  the  national  product 
space is part of the interaction between manufacturing 
share and international competiveness. 
While it is true that for  most countries agricultural 
and  manufactured  goods  are  the  most  important 
tradables, the discussion should not be reduced to the 
size  of  the  manufacturing  share  alone.  The 
composition  of  the  manufacturing  share  itself, 
whether manufacturing consists of sophisticated and 
complex products with unique features or mainly of 
products  which  compete  with  goods  from  many 
countries,  is  very  important  as  this  determines  the 
long-run position of countries. 
2.5.1.  The role of institutions in structural 
change 
The product space literature suggests that capabilities 
are  crucial  in  explaining  differences  in  structural 
change  and  economic  development.  On  the  other 
hand, economic development is closely linked to the 
institutional quality of countries. For example, Knack 
and Keefer (1995) and Dollar and Kraay (2001) argue 
that rule of law is an important driver of economic 
growth. 
The  literature  on  institutions  and  economic 
development  suggests  that  many  institutional 
indicators  are  highly  correlated  with  economic 
development (e.g. Langbein and Knack 2010). A few 
studies have provided evidence of causality running 
from  institutions  to  economic  performance 
(Acemoglu  et  al.  2001,  Rodrick  et  al.  2004). 
Reinstaller et al. (2012) confirm that product space 
indicators  capturing  the  complexity  of  the  export 
basket are closely correlated with institutional quality 
and  high  knowledge  intensity.  However,  in  this 
literature the relationship between structural change 
and institutional quality is not made very explicit, as 
it is not possible to measure structural change in an 
unambiguous  way.  The  problem  is  that  structural 
change  can  be  growth-enhancing  and  growth-
reducing.  In  the  presence  of  international  trade  the 
reallocation of resources (e.g. labour and capital) can 
lean  towards  high-productivity  sectors  or  in  the 
opposite direction. Latin America has been cited as an 
example  of  a  larger  region  which  in  the  past 
experienced growth-reducing structural change. In the 
1960s  and  1970s  in  particular,  economic  policy 
driven by macroeconomic populism and protectionist 
import-substitution policies provided the basis for this 
outcome  (e.g.  McMillan  and  Rodrick  2011).  This 
suggests that two different types of institutions and 
policies  are  central  to  fostering  growth-enhancing 
structural change: institutions and policies to promote 
the efficient reallocation of resources across sectors 
and  institutions,  and  policies  to  encourage  the 
development of capabilities which allow enterprises 
to innovate. 
The literature on market frictions in structural change 
emphasises that aggregate outcomes not only depend 
on rationalisation and reorganisation processes within 
firms and industries, but also on the reallocation of 
resources  across  sectors.  Restuccia  and  Rogerson 
(2013) survey the evidence and show that structural 
change can be limited by the existence of regulations 
and  other  frictions  that  inhibit  the  reallocation  of 
resources across sectors and firms. This can be costly 
in  a  static  sense,  as  the  resources  
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Figure 2.9. Composition of the export basket in terms of product complexity and displacement indices: shares in total exports, EU27 
 
Source: WIFO calculations; BACI dataset (Gaulier and Zignago 2010) 
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are not used in the most efficient way. However, even 
more importantly, the dynamic impact may affect the 
adoption of new technology and further development 
of capabilities. McMillan and Rodrick (2011) provide 
evidence  that  countries  with  more  flexible  labour 
markets  experience  growth-enhancing  structural 
change.  Many  factors  can  be  identified,  such  as 
certain types of taxes, labour market regulation, size-
dependent  policies  or  trade  barriers,  in  addition  to 
regulations and myriad costs of doing business in the 
formal  sector.  Bartelsman  et  al.  (2013)  provide  an 
overall  analysis  that  compares  the  United  States  to 
seven  European  economies  for  the  period  1992  to 
2001 and find that idiosyncratic distortions play an 
important  role  in  the  allocation  of  resources  across 
establishments. Their results suggest that output could 
be increased by up to 15% in some countries if the 
allocation of resources was improved. However, it is 
very  difficult  to  identify  the  sources  of  the 
misallocation. One of the biggest impediments to the 
reallocation  of  resources  is  financial  frictions. 
Financial  markets  are  an  important  selection 
mechanism  for  entrepreneurial  projects  and  a  well-
developed financial system is therefore important to 
fostering  entrepreneurial  activity,  structural  change 
and economic growth (Aghion et al. 2007, Buera et 
al.  2011).  Microeconomic  evidence  suggests  that 
credit market imperfections are important sources of 
differences  in  productivity  across  countries.  An 
inefficient  financial  sector  can  significantly  impede 
the  creation  of  new  businesses  and  the  growth  of 
enterprises. In particular, sectors with a larger scale 
(e.g.  manufacturing)  and  industries  that  have  high 
costs of product development (e.g. biotechnology) are 
disproportionally  affected  by  financial  frictions. 
However,  financial  repression  that  directs  finance 
towards certain sectors is not a force which supports 
growth-enhancing  structural  change  (Johansson  and 
Wang 2011). Institutional aspects such as government 
effectiveness, low corruption and the efficiency of the 
legal  system  are  important  to  competitiveness  in 
terms  of  foreign  direct  investment  (Alfaro  et  al. 
2008).  Thus,  institutional  quality  is  likely  to  affect 
specialisation patterns. 
Here  the  capabilities  that  affect  specialisation  and 
structural  change,  which  are  associated  with  the 
knowledge  base  of  countries,  are  of  greater 
importance.  The  national  innovation  system 
perspective  also  provides  a  useful  view  on  these 
issues  as  systemic  failures  are  significant  in 
explaining the innovative performance of firms and 
countries.  The  national  system  of  innovation  is 
defined as a ‘network of institutions in the public and 
private  sectors  whose  activities  and  interactions 
initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies’ 
(Freeman 1987). Systemic failures such as the lack of 
interaction  between  the  actors  in  the  innovation 
system,  mismatches  between  basic  research  in 
universities  and  applied  research  in  industry, 
malfunctioning  technology  transfer  institutions,  and 
deficiencies in the absorptive capacity of enterprises 
may  all  contribute  to poor  innovation performance. 
Powell  and  Grodal  (2005)  show  that  innovation 
networks  have  a  positive  impact  on  innovation 
activity,  but  network  failures  can  cause  barriers  to 
innovation. Other evidence suggests that differences 
in the patterns of technology diffusion may account 
for  a  sizable  part  of  the  divergence  in  incomes 
between  rich  and  poor  countries  (e.g.  Comin  and 
Mestieri Ferrer 2013).  
Differences in the time scales of the adoption of new 
technologies  and  the  penetrations  rates  once  new 
technologies are adopted are important in determining 
differences in economic structure. Here the lesson of 
the  literature  on  systems  of  innovation  clearly 
indicates  that  successful  technology  support  policy 
must consider arguments of systemic and institutional 
failures. Growth traps and catch-up failures are most 
often  related  to  failures  to  select  the  right  set  of 
institutions.  For  example,  Acemoglu  et  al.  (2006) 
emphasise  the  different  need  for  policy  institutions 
(educational  systems,  firm  dynamics,  innovation 
policies) in countries that are close to or far from the 
world  technological  frontier.  Catching-up  does  not 
depend on a particular institutional configuration, but 
on  the  interlocking  complementarities  within  the 
institutional arrangements of the national innovation 
system, an aspect that von Tunzelmann (2004) calls 
network  alignment.  Structural  change  is  thus 
dependent  on  growth-enhancing  policies  and 
institutions  that  allow  the  efficient  allocation  of 
resources within economies. Policies and institutions 
that  hinder  such  reallocation  processes  are  a  prime 
source of inefficiency and economic backwardness. 
The recent crisis in Europe has shown that short-term 
cyclical developments can lead to mispricing of assets 
and  a  misallocation  of  economic  resources,  for 
example  with  respect  to  the  expansion  of  the 
construction  sector  in  the  lead  up  to  current  crisis. 
However, the evidence shows that the changes in the 
manufacturing share are mainly related to the broad 
trends of structural change mediated by international 
specialisation documented earlier. For example, there 
is  nothing  in  the  analysis  of  the  inequality  of 
employment and value added shares, in Table 2.4 and 
Table 2.5 that suggests that the divergence between 
European countries increased substantially during the 
crisis period (the drop in 2009 was symmetric across 
countries and the manufacturing share normalised for 
most countries in 2010 and 2011). Nevertheless, it is 
known that some sectors such as manufacturing and 
construction  are  very  responsive  to  demand 
downturns.  The  production  of  capital  goods  and 
consumer  durables  are  central  industries  in 
manufacturing  that  are  sensitive  to  changes  in  the 
economic climate. Investment falls during recessions 
as  does  business  R&D  (e.g.  Aghion  and  Banerjee 
2005, Hölzl et al. 2011). Thus fiscal policy measures 
which  aim  at  demand  management  should  also  
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consider the structure of the economy and the pro-
cyclical behaviour of business R&D and innovation 
activities over the business cycle. Supporting business 
R&D and innovation during times of economic crisis 
can  support  the  ability  of  countries  to  achieve 
economic  growth  in  the  long  run  and  support 
economic restructuring. Policies that aim at reducing 
the  openness  of  countries  to  international  trade,  in 
contrast,  are  likely  to  be  counterproductive.  The 
experience  with  financial  repression  and  protection 
from international competition is more often negative 
than positive. 
2.6.  SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
There  are  clearly  identifiable  broad  patterns  of 
structural  change  that  are  quite  homogenous  across 
countries and associated with the level of economic 
development. The agriculture share is declining with 
the  process  of  economic  development.  The 
manufacturing share is declining, both in terms of its 
employment  share  and  its  value  added  share  at  a 
certain  point  of  economic  development,  while  the 
shares  of  services  in  employment  and  output  are 
increasing over time. These patterns can be broadly 
explained in terms of the impact of technical change 
and  productivity  improvements  together  with 
changing patterns of demand due to higher income 
(the ‘Engels curve’). 
New  technologies  and  new  skills  change 
productivities,  while  demand  patterns  change  with 
changing income. The decline in the economic weight 
of  agriculture  is  associated  with  the  increasing 
mechanisation of agriculture which still leads to a rise 
in  labour  and  total  factor  productivity  even  in  the 
richest  countries  of  the  world.  The  increase  in 
productivity  leads  to  lower  prices  and  to  a  lower 
factor  demand  (e.g.  labour)  if  productivity 
developments  outstrip  the  growth  in  demand  for 
sectoral products. The same mechanism characterises 
manufactured  output,  with  the  important  difference 
that the products (and the product characteristics) in 
manufacturing  are  changing  much  faster  than 
products  in  agriculture.  A  hundred  years  ago  there 
was  no  computer  industry  and  the  output  of  the 
electronics industry was very different. 
However, if we look at shorter time periods, such as 
the  15  years  considered  in  the  sectoral  growth 
decompositions,  it  can  be  seen  that  most  growth 
comes  from  processes  of  economic  growth  within 
industries.  It  is  a  well-known  stylised  fact  that 
aggregate  productivity  improvements  are  mostly 
related  to  within-sector  (and  even  within-firm) 
productivity  improvements.  Reallocation  between 
sectors  and  between  industries  becomes  more 
important the longer the time period of the analysis. 
These patterns are almost the inevitable outcome of 
the  basic  mechanisms  underlying  structural  change. 
Similar patterns are not only found using historical 
data for European countries or cross-sectional data for 
a large number of countries; these patterns are also 
very  similar  for  US  states  and  EU  members. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  equally  important  to  realise  that 
there  is  some  heterogeneity  in  the  structure  of 
economies across countries. The working of structural 
change is also mediated through international trade, 
institutions,  and  international  and  domestic 
competition. 
On-going  reallocations  in  economic  weight  across 
different sectors should not be assessed only in terms 
of  reallocation  of  sector  shares  towards  more 
productive sectors. That would completely neglect the 
linkages  between  sectors  that  are  essential  in 
generating  productivity  improvement.  Structural 
shifts towards education-intensive activities (business 
services and especially non-market services) do not 
necessarily impact on growth potential in a negative 
way,  even  if  they  apparently  reduce  aggregate 
productivity.  The  education  sector  generates  skilled 
labour inputs for manufacturing and R&D. 
International competitiveness is inter alia about trade 
balances  at  the  aggregate  level;  but  “creative 
destruction”  at  the  product  level  is  likely  to  be  a 
major driver of developments at the aggregate level. 
Thus, international trade is an important determinant 
of  the  development  of  sectoral  shares  in  countries. 
The successful catch-up stories of Germany in 19th 
century  and  Japan  and  South  Korea  in  the  20th 
century  cannot  be  explained  without  taking  into 
account international trade, comparative advantage in 
tradables and specific competencies and capabilities 
in  the  production  of  new  and  high-value  added 
products.  Here  it  is  important  to  acknowledge  that 
structural change shaping the economic development 
of countries is highly path-dependent and cumulative. 
Any change is rooted in present knowledge bases and 
constrained  by  existing  specialisation  patterns. 
Complementary  capabilities  need  to  be  built  up. 
Therefore policies to support structural change should 
always  start  by  taking  into  account  the  existing 
production structures of countries and regions, as well 
as  the  knowledge  base  of  supporting  institutions. 
Appropriate policies to foster structural change may 
therefore also be country-specific and region-specific, 
and depend on existing specialisation patterns. Skills 
and  technology  are  essential  for  achieving  growth-
enhancing  structural  change.  Structural  change  is 
generally  associated  with  the  emergence  of  new 
products  and  industries  and  the  disappearance  of 
other  products  and  occupations  at  the  micro-
economic level which have a macroeconomic impact. 
Producing  more  complex  product  classes  and 
upgrading  existing  products  requires  technological 
competencies,  skilled  labour  and  administrative 
capabilities at the business and government levels. It 
should therefore not come as a surprise that the share  
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of  services  (non-government  services  such  as 
education  and  business  services)  starts  to  rise  once 
countries achieve income levels where the nature of 
international competition changes from a purely cost-
driven  to  a  more  resource-intensive  quality 
competition.  For  the  most  successful  exporting 
countries it is crucial to develop new products that are 
not  produced  by  many  other  countries.  Upgrading 
possibilities are not distributed evenly: they seem to 
be  concentrated  in  high  technology  sectors  and 
complex  products.  Given  the  path-dependent 
development of economic structures and comparative 
advantage  (as  indicated  by  the  product  space 
literature), countries seeking to shift their industrial 
production up the technology ladder are likely to also 
need  to  increase  and  improve  non-government 
services, such as education and business services. 
The  fact  that  upgrading  structures  is  a  cumulative 
process  makes  it  difficult  to  develop  new 
specialisation patterns out of the blue. This presents a 
problem for countries where industrial restructuring is 
necessary. The centrality of institutions and policies 
in the process of structural change leads to a view that 
the  general  quality  of  institutions  is  important  to 
structural  change.  Policies  that  foster  structural 
adjustments should therefore be conceived in a broad 
way  and  cover  such  different  areas  as  education, 
research,  technology  and  innovation  policies,  while 
also focusing on the general quality of governance.  
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ANNEX 1 
DEFINITION OF PRODUCT SPACE INDICATORS 
Product space indicators 
Hidalgo et al. (2007) define the product space as a bi-partite network linking countries to products. To construct 
this network, they define a proximity measure,     , between two products i and j as the pairwise conditional 
probability P of a country exporting one good given that it exports another. This measure is defined as follows:  
          { (    |    )  (    |    )}  (proximity) 
where RCAi  means that a country has a revealed comparative advantage (RCA) for product i and is therefore a 
significant exporter of that product.  The RCA is taken in order to ensure that marginal exports do not introduce 
noise into the data. The minimum is taken to avoid that if a country would be a sole exporter of a good the 
conditional probability would take on the value 1. By taking the minimum of the reciprocal relationship this 
problem is avoided. Proximity is therefore a measure that links any product to any other product traded in the 
world. In terms of a network, the proximity can be conceived as the edges of the network with the products being 
its nodes.  
In order to assess the likelihood that a product becomes a significant export in a country Hidalgo et al. (2007) 
define a measure called “density”. We refer to this indicator as “neighbourhood density” to distinguish it from 
the statistical notion of density. It measures the average proximity of a product to a country’s current productive 
structure. For products for which the country is not a yet a significant producer this measure therefore indicates 
how embedded the product would be and by implication to what extent complementary capabilities are already 
available in a country. It therefore captures the likelihood that a country develops a comparative advantage in 
any product. The neighbourhood density   
  is calculated as follows:  
  
    ∑          ∑          ⁄  (neighbourhood density) 
where    is unity if product i has an RCA>1 in country k. The neighbourhood density takes on the value 1 if a 
country produces all i products to which product j is connected in the product space. The neighbourhood density 
is therefore normalised between 0 and 1 and takes on the maximum when a product is connected to all other 
products in the product mix of a country.  
The product complexity scores (PCS) have been calculated using the method of reflections advanced by  Hidalgo 
- Hausmann (2009). It exploits information on the diversification of a country and the ubiquity of the products 
(i.e. in how countries have an RCA>1 for a given product).      is the matrix linking product to countries and 
has an entry of 1 if country c has an RCA for product p. Then the matrix can be summed up row wise over 
products p one obtains a measure for the diversification of a country c. 
       ∑                     
 
         
If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  matrix  is  summed  up  column  wise  one  obtains  a  measure  for  the  ubiquity  of 
comparative advantage in the trade of a specific product p, i.e. this measure tells us how many countries c have a 
comparative advantage in trading this product.  
       ∑              
 
          
By  combining  these  two  indicators  it  is  possible  to  calculate  through  recursive  substitution  how  common 
products are that are exported by a specific country,  
        
 
    
∑    
 
                           
and how diversified the countries are that produce a specific product 
        
 
    
∑    
 
                          
If formula (3) goes through an additional iteration the indicator now tells us how diversified countries are that 
export similar products as those exported by country c. An additional iteration for formula (4) tells us then how 
ubiquitous products are that are exported by product p’s exporters. Each additional iteration n adds information 
on the neighbour of a country or product that is n steps away from country c or product p.  Higher iterations than  
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those presented in the table are increasingly difficult to interpret. The indicator      standardised relative to all 
products at iteration n gives the product complexity score PCS. 
It is possible to calculate the simultaneous or slightly lagged appearance and disappearance of products using 
product space metrics. In this way a dynamic view is introduced in the product space analysis. We follow the 
method  proposed  by  Klimek  et  al. (2012).  To  calculate  the  co-appearance and  displacement  indices  define 
appearance and disappearance events as follows: 
  Appearance:                                                                              .  
  Disappearance:                                                                              , 
where t defines a specific point in time and c a specific country,        is the value of exports a country has in 
any product class i. The product index i,j runs from 1 to n, where n corresponds to the number of product classes 
in the analysis. Hence, the empirical number of co-appearances between any pair of product classes i and j is 
given by 
        ∑∑              
   
                               
whereas the empirical number of displacements over period   after the appearance of a product class i is given 
by 
      
      ∑∑ ∑                
   
          
                                   
The period   was set to 3 such that all displacements of a product class j three years after the appearance of 
product class i have been taken into account.  
The co-appearance index AI follows then from equation (1) if on the one hand we control for the fact that 
products with a high number of appearance are likely to have also a higher number of co-appearances, and if on 
the other hand the resulting factor is normalised to lie in the interval[   ]. 
     
 
 
∑
     
   [       ]
 
                             
where         ∑ ∑                is the number of appearances of each product class i and j across countries c and 
over all observation periods t, and   is the normalisation factor rescaling the sum to the established range.  
The displacement index DI is instead defined as 
     
 
 
∑[      
             
   ]
 
                                    
Clearly, if the sum in equation (4) is negative, then product class i is on average displaced more often by 
appearances of the other product classes j during the period  . A positive indicator value instead means that i 
displaces on average more often any other product class j than j replaces i after its appearance.   is again the 
normalisation factor rescaling the sum to the established range. 
In order to analyse the displacement across NACE sectors we have aggregated the displacement scores       
    
as follows: 
       
      
 
 
∑   ∑         
   
         
                                    
where weights   represent the share in total export value of sectors k and l of products i and j in Sector S. The 
weights therefore give higher importance to product class displacements that have a higher value in total exports 
of a NACE sector than those that have a lower value. For all calculations period   has been set to 3, i.e. we 
include all disappearance events three years after the appearance of a product in the counts. 
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  Chapter 3.  
REDUCING PRODUCTIVITY AND EFFICIENCY GAPS:   
THE ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE ASSETS, ABSORPTIVE 
CAPACITY AND INSTITUTIONS 
 
From the mid-1990s productivity growth in the EU 
slowed down compared to the US, which in contrast 
was  experiencing  rapid  productivity  acceleration 
(O’Mahony and van Ark, 2003). As a result, the US-
EU  productivity  gap  widened.  While  the post-1995 
productivity  slowdown  was  felt  across  all  EU 
countries,  productivity  trends  have  differed  and 
economic  disparities  have  amplified  since  the 
economic  and  financial  crisis,  which  hit  countries 
with different intensities (Mas, 2010). Understanding 
the reasons underlying productivity differentials has 
become  a  priority  for  policy  makers  so  that  useful 
policies to promote and restore long-lasting economic 
growth in Europe, beyond the traditional models of 
catch-up and convergence, can be implemented.   
Productivity, a key source of economic growth and 
competitiveness, is defined as the amount of output 
that  can  be  produced  per  unit  of  input.  The  term 
productivity, however, is used to describe two related 
concepts:  labour  productivity  and  total  factor 
productivity (TFP). Labour productivity, which refers 
to the amount produced per each unit of labour, can 
be improved through either a greater use of capital 
relative to labour (capital deepening),  or through an 
increase in TFP growth.  TFP measures the part of an 
output increase not accounted for by increases in the 
quantity and quality of inputs.  TFP movements are 
mainly  due  to  technical  efficiency  increases,  which 
imply catching up to the existing technology frontier, 
or due to technological improvements as the frontier 
shifts outwards over time. 
Prior  to  the  financial  and  economic  crisis  which 
started during 2007-2008, the debate on the European 
labour productivity slowdown pointed to ICT capital 
accumulation  as  a  major  reason  for  the  under-
performance of EU labour productivity. This largely 
reflected  the  significantly  slower  adoption  of  ICT 
technologies  in  the  EU  compared  to  the  US,  in 
particular  in  services  sectors.  Moreover,  industry-
based  studies  revealed  that  the  US  productivity 
advantage  was  concentrated  in  specific  services 
sectors, mainly trade, finance and business services 
(Timmer  et  al.  2010).  In  these  ICT-intensive  using 
sectors, the  large ICT investment flows during the 
second  half  of  the  1990s  together  with 
complementary investments in organizational capital 
led to a rapid TFP growth during the first half of the 
2000s  (Van  Ark  et  al,  2008;  Brynjolfsson  and 
Saunders 2010). 
The  initial  hypothesis  was  that  Europe  was  merely 
lagging  behind  the  US  in  the  adoption  of  ICT 
technologies, and therefore, it would take some time 
for  its  benefits  to  materialise.  Now,  it  has  become 
apparent that high levels of investment alone do not 
produce  faster  economic  growth  and  better 
productivity  performance.  Several  years  after  the 
‘ICT  revolution’,  the  EU  is  not  only  still  lagging 
behind the US, but the productivity growth gap has 
recently widened. 
Empirical  findings  show  that  in  the  EU  there  was 
insufficient  investment  in  the  skills  and 
organizational changes necessary to reap the benefits 
of  ICT  technologies  (Brynjolfsson  and  Hitt  2000; 
O’Mahony and Vecchi 2005). Lower investments in 
intangible  assets  broadly  conceived  (R&D,  human 
capital, etc.) are likely to explain a portion of the US-
EU  productivity gap as these factors affect countries' 
absorptive capacity, i.e. their ability to take advantage 
of the technology developed elsewhere (international 
technology transfers).  
Most of the leading technologies available worldwide 
are  developed  by  a  few  frontier  countries  which 
dominate  the  entire  global  market.  Technological 
laggards can benefit by imitating such technologies 
through  international  trade.  However,  in  order  to 
assimilate and exploit the foreign knowledge in the 
production of their own goods, it is indispensable for 
laggard  countries  to  develop  a  certain  degree  of 
absorptive  capacity,  i.e.  to  reach  a  minimum 
threshold  of  technological  competence.  Absorptive 
capacity is considered essential to close the gap with 
the  technology  leaders  and  spur  economic  growth 
(Griffith et al. 2004). 
Another factor that has recently been identified as a 
cause of the lower TFP performance in the EU, is the 
more rigid regulatory framework compared to that in 
the US (Nicodème and Sauner-Leroy 2004, Bourlés 
et al. 2012). For example, it has been shown that low 
levels  of  competition  and  strict  employment  laws 
prevent the necessary optimal adjustments to factor 
allocation  in  order  to  take  full  advantage  of  new 
technologies  (Conway  et  al.  2006;  Bassanini  et  al. 
2009; Arnold et al. 2011).  
An issue largely unexplored, and to which this study 
wishes  to  contribute,  is  whether  the  regulatory 
environment  determines  the  efficiency  with  which  
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resources  are  used  in  production  (technical 
efficiency). This has become a major issue in recent 
years  as  the  ability  to  exploit  existing  resources 
emerges  as  one  of  the  most  important  sources  of 
productivity gains in the most mature economies (van 
Ark et al., 2012).  
Although the recent downturn has shifted the focus 
on  the  functioning  of  markets  as,  a  possible 
mechanism  driving  productivity  differentials  across 
areas  of  the  world,  understanding  the  channels 
through which the regulatory environment determines 
TFP growth, remains a challenge.  
The main contribution of this chapter is to provide a 
comprehensive  analysis  of  the  determinants  of 
productivity growth, focusing on the role played by 
the  restrictions  in  the  product,  labour  and  financial 
markets as well as,  the role of  intangible assets (e.g. 
ICT, R&D) and absorptive capacity (e.g. skills). The 
use  of  Stochastic  Frontier  Analysis,  is  used  to 
investigate  the  main  factors  affecting  changes  in 
technical efficiency for  a large sample of countries 
and industries in the EU, an issue largely unexplored 
in the literature to date.  
Specifically,  this  chapter  addresses  the  following 
questions: 
-  What are the recent trends in productivity growth 
in  the  EU  and  the  US?  Which  areas  of  the 
economy  are  driving  the  most  recent  growth 
patterns? What is the relative role of the various 
factors inputs? 
-  Do  the  institutional  framework  and  laws 
governing  the  functioning  of  the  factor  and 
product markets shape the EU’s ability to benefit 
from  technology  originated  in  the  frontier 
countries? 
-  Does  the  EU  regulatory  setting  influence  the 
level of production efficiency, i.e. the ability of 
firms/industries to use factor inputs in the most 
technically  feasible  way?  What  are  the  main 
institutional  factors  that  explain  the  efficiency 
gap with the US? To what extent do these factors 
interact  with  the  use  of  ICT  and  with  the 
technology characteristics of EU industries?  
 
Section  3.1  of  this  chapter  highlights  the  main 
productivity  and  growth  trends  in  the  EU  in 
comparison with other major world economies for the 
period from 1995 to 2012. A decomposition of labour 
productivity growth into its main components, and a 
detailed  up-to-date  account  of  sectoral  productivity 
developments  are  provided.  Section  3.2  reports 
econometric  evidence  on  the  factors  affecting 
international  diffusion  of  R&D  focusing  on  the 
institutional  determinants  of  a  country’s  absorptive 
capacity. Section 3.3 quantifies the extent to which 
ICT and institutional factors have had an impact on 
the  efficient  use  of  resources.  Assessing  both  the 
economic  and  institutional  drivers  of  technical 
efficiency is helpful to understand the sources of the 
productivity  gap  and  to  design  policies  that  might 
reduce  it.  Section  3.4  integrates  the  analysis  by 
presenting evidence on firm behaviour at the outset of 
the  crisis,  focusing  on  firms’  strategic  decisions 
regarding  investments  in  tangible  and  knowledge 
assets and their impact on productivity. Section 3.5 
concludes  the  analysis  and  outlines  the  policy 
implications. 
3.1.  GROWTH ACCOUNTING AND THE EFFECT OF 
THE CRISIS AT COUNTRY AND SECTOR LEVEL 
3.1.1.  Economic  performance  of  the  EU  and 
other  major  economies:  overview  of 
aggregate  output  and  productivity 
trends 
This  section  presents  an  overview  of  recent  output 
and  productivity  trends  in  the  EU,  highlighting  the 
main  convergence  and  divergence  patterns  from  a 
comparative perspective. From the mid-1990s the US 
economy has grown at a higher rate than the EU and 
Japan (see Figure 3.1). During the period 1995-2004, 
the average GDP
58 growth rate in the US was 3.3%, 
around  0.85  percentage  points  higher  than  that 
experienced  by  the  EU-27.    This  trend  reversed 
briefly  during  the  period  2004-2007,  as  the  EU-27 
started to grow faster than the US (3% versus 2.5%). 
This  performance  was  partly  driven  by  the  newest 
Member  States,  as  GDP  growth  in  the  EU-27  was 
higher than the EU-15. Japan performed considerably 
worse  than  Europe  during  the  period  1995-2007, 
achieving only moderate GDP growth rates (between 
1 % and 1.5%). 
At  the  outset  of  the  crisis,  in  2008,  output  growth 
slowed  down  across  all  areas,  and  in  2009  output 
levels  fell  globally.  By  2010,  however  growth  had 
resumed  across  the  US,  EU  and  Japan.  The  US 
exhibited the strongest recovery. Performance in the 
EU  improved  during  2010  and  2011;  however,  the 
sovereign debt crisis caused a fall in GDP growth in 
2012. Japan’s output level has remained largely flat 
since 2010. 
                                                            
58   The source for the Gross Domestic Product data is the Total 
Economy  database,  The  Conference  Board,  January  2013 
release.   
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Figure 3.1. GDP growth in the EU, US and Japan. 1990-2012 (1995=100) 
 
Source : The Conference Board Database and own calculations. 
Figure 3.2. GDP per hour growth in the EU, US and Japan. 1990-2012 (1995=100) 
 
Source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database and own calculations. 
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Figure 3.2 illustrates trends in productivity, measured 
as GDP per hour, in the EU, US and Japan.  From the 
mid-1990s to the early 2000s productivity accelerated 
in  the  US  but  not  in  Europe  or  Japan.  In  a  period 
characterised  by  the  widespread  diffusion  of 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), 
the US productivity lead was amplified thanks to its 
greater  ability  to  invest  and  benefit  from  the  new 
technology. While EU productivity showed signs of 
catching up towards US levels during 2004-2007 (see 
Figure 3.1), the onset of the crisis has worsened the 
EU position. Although slower than in the pre-crisis 
period, the US labour US labour productivity growth 
rate  fluctuated  around  1%  per  annum,  even  at  the 
height of the global downturn.  In contrast, in the EU 
and  in  Japan,  labour  productivity  levels  fell  in  the 
aftermath of the crisis, only to recover from 2010. As 
a result, the gap in labour productivity between the 
US  and  the  EU  widened  again.  Between  2007  and 
2012,  the  US  labour  productivity  growth  was 
approximately  2  percentage  points  higher  than 
Europe and 3 percentage points higher than Japan.  
From  2010  onwards  Japan  experienced  a  strong 
productivity recovery, outperforming the EU and the 
US.  This  contrasts  with  the  slowdown  in  output 
growth  shown  in  Figure  3.1.  This  finding  is  a 
consequence  of  the  large  reduction  in  the  total 
number  of  hours  worked,  which  testifies  the 
flexibility of the Japanese wage system and its labour 
hoarding tradition (Darby et al. 2001).  In the case of 
the EU, which is characterised by a large degree of 
heterogeneity  in  the  institutional  and  policy 
environment,  labour  market  responses  were  largely 
country-specific. While some countries were able to 
adjust  to  worsening  demand  conditions  via  a 
reduction  in  hours  worked  (e.g.  UK,  Germany, 
France, Netherlands) others carried out major labour 
shedding,  mostly  concentrated  in  low-skill  sectors, 
resulting  into  an  overall  increase  in  productivity 
levels (e.g. Spain and Ireland).  
3.1.2.  Growth accounting analysis: Sources of 
productivity growth at aggregate level 
The objective of this section is to explore the role of 
inputs  to  production  and  Total  Factor  Productivity 
(TFP)  in  explaining  aggregate  labour  productivity 
developments,  measured  by  GDP  per  hour.  The 
inputs considered are capital assets, distinguished into 
ICT  and  non-ICT  assets,  and  labour  composition, 
which  represents  the  contribution  of  skilled  labour. 
The  TFP  component,  which  is  derived  using  the 
neoclassical  growth  accounting  methodology, 
quantifies the part of the output growth not accounted 
for by growth in the quantity and quality of inputs; 
TFP captures the influence of unmeasured factors on 
productivity,  such  as  efficiency  improvements, 
technological  change  and  spillovers.  The  different 
factors contributing to labour productivity growth are 
shown in Figure 3.3 for Europe and Figure 3.4 for the 
US. 
During  the  period  1995-2004,  the  most  important 
contributor to labour productivity in the EU
59 was the 
accumulation of capital assets. TFP gains in the EU 
were significant during this period but growth rates 
were considerably lower than in the US.  In the US, 
the  main  factor  driving  labour  productivity  growth 
during  the  period  1995-2004  was  ICT  capital.  The 
growth contribution of ICT was substantially slower 
in the EU.  
The  EU  experienced  significant  TFP  acceleration 
during  the  subsequent  period,  2004-2007.  Non-ICT 
capital accumulation and TFP were the main factors 
contributing to labour productivity growth and to the 
catching  up  process  towards  the  US,  shown  in  the 
main output trends.  During the same period, the US 
experienced a productivity slowdown, mainly caused 
by  a  decrease  in  the  speed  of  ICT  capital 
accumulation  and  a  lower  contribution  of  TFP 
growth.   
                                                            
59   The EU includes the following eight countries: AT, BE, DE, 
ES, FR, IT, NL, UK.  
Figure 3.3. Growth accounting in the EU: Decomposition 
of labour productivity growth, 1995-2012 
 
Source: EUKLEMS and own calculations. 
Figure 3.4. Growth accounting in the US: Decomposition 
of labour productivity growth, 1995-2012 
 
Source: EUKLEMS and own calculations.  
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After 2007, the effect of the crisis was particularly 
strong  in  Europe  and  negatively  affected  the 
contribution of all factors of production, with the sole 
exception of labour composition. The latter finding is 
consistent  with  prior  evidence  of  labour  quality 
growth  in  many  European  countries.  For  example, 
Kang et al. (2012) find that the average skill level of 
the  workforce,  which  mainly  reflects  qualifications 
achieved through the general education system, rose 
during the recession years. TFP growth was mostly 
affected  by  the  financial  crisis  as  its  contribution 
turned negative. The contribution of capital, although 
still positive, declined substantially compared to the 
pre-crisis  period,  reflecting  the  consequences  of 
tightening credit conditions for European firms. 
Goodridge  et  al.  (2013)  observed  that  in  the  UK, 
while capital investment decreased considerably with 
the  recession,  investments  in  intangible  assets 
increased,  particularly  investments  in  R&D  and 
software. This, together with a higher proportion of 
skilled  workers,  increases  future  growth  potential, 
facilitating recovery.   
In the US, the crisis also affected the contribution of 
TFP  and  non-ICT  capital,  although  neither  turned 
negative. The contribution of ICT capital decreased 
slightly  compared  to  the  2004-2007  period,  while 
labour  composition  increased  slightly.  This  testifies 
that,  as  in  the  UK,  US  firms  prioritised  the 
employment of highly skilled workers. 
The analysis of growth trends at the aggregate level is 
consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  the  US 
productivity lead in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
resulted from a first mover advantage in ICT. Large 
TFP  gains  at  the  time  of  rapid  ICT  investment 
suggests  that  ICT  may  have  had  an  impact  on 
productivity  beyond  that  of  ICT-capital  deepening 
(O’Mahony  and  van  Ark  2003);  this  has  been 
attributed, for instance, to the existence of spillovers 
related to knowledge assets and to large investments 
in organizational capital (Bryonjolffson and Saunders 
2010).  The  EU  experience  reveals  that  TFP 
movements may have followed the US productivity 
developments,  albeit  with  a  time-lag.  Basu  et  al. 
(2004)  argue  that  the  `missing’  TFP  growth  in  the 
United Kingdom, compared to the US,  in the second 
half of the 1990 is likely to have been caused by  a 
delay  in  undertaking  investments  that  would 
complement the adoption of the new technology.   
In  the  EU,  substantial  declines  in  TFP  have  been 
recorded since 2007. TFP appears to have behaved in 
a highly pro-cyclical way and existing contributions 
suggest  that  this  reflects  a  decline  in  the  overall 
efficiency of the production process. However, these 
results should be treated cautiously as it is too soon to 
draw  conclusions  based  on  the  most  recent  TFP 
movements (OECD, 2012). 
3.1.3.  Productivity developments in the EU and 
the United States: a sectoral perspective 
A more detailed explanation of the nature of the EU-
US  productivity  gap  is  provided  by  looking  at  the 
contribution of each sector in the economy. Labour 
productivity growth trends are examined for specific 
industries  (Figure  3.6.  and  Figure  3.5.).  While  the 
analysis  of  these  sectoral  productivity  trends  are 
informative,  offering  an  interesting  snapshot  of 
pockets of growth, the relative industry contribution 
to  the  overall  EU-US  productivity  gap  will  be 
determined  by  the  size  of  each  sector  and  by  the 
differences in industrial structure. 
Due to limited data availability
60, the focus here is on 
a  group  of  eight  EU  countries
61  (Austria,  Belgium, 
Spain, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands  and the 
UK). Industry productivity data are drawn from the 
latest release of the EUKLEMS database (O’Mahony 
and  Timmer  2009)  and  follow  the  NACE  Rev.  2 
classification of economic activities.  
During  the  period  1995-2004,  the  sectors 
experiencing  the  highest  growth  rates  in  the  US 
include  the  ICT-producing  sector  electrical  and 
optical equipment, with an average growth of almost 
21%,  followed  by  coke  and  refined  petroleum 
products
62,  with  a  rate  of  15%.  Then  come 
information  and  communication  activities
63  and 
wholesale  and  retail  activities,  which  experienced 
productivity growth rates of around 4%. 
In  the  EU,  the  best  performing  sectors  during  the 
same  period  included  coke  and  refined  petroleum, 
with a rate of labour productivity growth rate of 8%, 
finance and insurance activities, and electricity, gas 
and water supply, both with rates of around 6%.  Next 
were chemicals and chemical products, with a rate of 
5%. During that period in the EU the lowest labour 
productivity  growth  rates  were  observed  in  retail 
trade,  professional,  scientific,  technical, 
administrative  and  support  services;  community, 
social and personal services; and arts, entertainment, 
recreation and other service activities.   
                                                            
60   EUKLEMS most recent updates, covering up to year 2010 are 
only available for a limited number of European countries. 
61   These economies represented in 2012 approximately the 80% 
of EU output. 
62   Care  needs  to  be  taken  in  interpreting  these  results  as 
measurement issues in this sector may be important. 
63   The Information and Communication sector (J code in Nace 
Rev.  2)  comprises  the  following  activities:  publishing, 
audiovisual  and  broadcasting  activities;  telecommunications; 
IT and information services activities.   
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Between  1995  and  2004,  the  European  failure  to 
match the US acceleration in output and productivity 
has largely been attributed to developments in market 
services  (Timmer  et  al.  2010).  The  analysis  in  this 
section reveals that the sector which most contributed 
to amplify the US productivity advantage was in fact 
wholesale  and  retail  distribution,  due  to  its  strong 
productivity  performance  and  its  relatively  large 
share  in  the  economy.  Other  services  sectors  with 
sizeable  contributions  include  the  professional, 
scientific,  technical,  administrative  and  support 
services, and finance and insurance activities. These 
findings  are  consistent  with  previous  evidence  (EC 
2008).  The  electrical  and  optical  equipment  sector 
also  made  a  key  contribution  with  its  outstanding 
growth performance. 
Throughout the period 2004-2007, two factors jointly 
contributed  to  the  reduction  of  the  EU-US 
productivity gap: the acceleration of productivity in 
most  EU  manufacturing  industries  relative  to  the 
productivity performance in US manufacturing, and a 
robust performance of many EU services sectors.  
The  highest  productivity  growth  rates  in  the  EU 
manufacturing  sector
64  were  achieved  in  chemicals 
and  chemical  products,  with  a  rate  of  13%;  in 
contrast,  the  US  electrical  and  optical  equipment 
sector continued to show impressive growth while in 
the EU growth remained modest. 
In services, labour productivity slowed significantly 
between  2004  and  2007  in  the  US  wholesale  and 
retail sector compared to the exceptional performance 
observed in the earlier period. On the other hand, the 
EU  performance  in  the  same  sector  improved 
substantially,  reaching  a  3%  productivity  growth, 
nearly doubling the growth rate achieved in previous 
periods.    The  information  and  communication 
activities  sector  experienced  robust  labour 
productivity growth in both the US and the EU; in the 
latter area, this meant a considerable improvement as 
labour  productivity  had  previously  followed  a 
deteriorating  trend.  In  most  EU  services,  labour 
productivity  improved,  particularly  in  the 
professional,  scientific,  technical  activities,  and 
community, social and personal services. This is in 
contrast to the poor performance of both sectors in the 
period  1995-2004.  Overall  the  evidence  shows  that 
those sectors which contributed to narrowing the EU 
productivity gap relative to the US between 2004 and 
2007,  were  those  responsible  for  the  stagnant  EU 
productivity in the previous decade.  
                                                            
64   The coke and refined petroleum products sector (code 19 in 
Nace Rev.1) is excluded from this picture. 
During  the  financial  crisis  (2007-2010),  labour 
productivity stalled in the EU, while it continued to 
improve  in  the  US.  The  majority  of  manufacturing 
sectors in the EU-8 experienced a fall in productivity 
levels, probably reflecting a higher exposure to global 
demand fluctuations compared to the services sectors. 
Manufacturing productivity as a whole decreased by 
more than 1% annually, with chemicals, decreasing 
by  more  than  4%  annually.  Productivity  in  the 
construction sector also deteriorated considerably as 
well as in some services activities, such as wholesale 
and information and communications. Those sectors 
that  showed  the  most  resilience  to  the  weakening 
economic conditions in the EU-8 were financial and 
insurance  activities  growing  by  6%  annually, 
professional, scientific, technical activities and retail 
trade growing by around 2% per annum.  
In the US, manufacturing productivity grew by over 
4%  annually  during  2007-2010.  One  of  the  few 
sectors that experienced a worsening in productivity 
levels  was  chemicals.    The  majority  of  services 
activities  though  experienced  robust  growth,  in 
particular telecommunications, finance and insurance 
and IT and information services. Productivity growth 
in the electrical and optical equipment sector did not 
show signs of slowing down.  
Other  interesting  lessons  can  be  drawn  from  the 
analysis  of  post-crisis  industry  trends.  In  summary, 
the sectors which contributed to further increase the 
US productivity advantage are electrical and optical 
equipment and the majority of manufacturing sectors, 
as  well  as  construction,  and  telecommunications 
(which had shown an outstanding performance in the 
EU prior to the crisis). Those sectors which helped 
the EU to narrow the gap in the most recent period 
include  financial  activities  and  business  services, 
accommodation and food, some public services and 
other  services  activities.    Many  of  the  ICT-using 
services  sectors  that  had  improved  their  labour 
productivity  in  the  pre-crisis  years  continued  to 
perform well; the exception was wholesale and retail, 
greatly affected by weak consumer demand.  
A  further  extension  of  the  industry  level  analysis 
based on growth accounting allows the identification 
of those factors that played a major contribution in 
determining  productivity  growth  performance  in 
selected industries. The results, discussed in detail in 
the background study, reveal that up to 2007 TFP was 
the main driver of productivity growth in the EU and 
US manufacturing. In the EU, TFP was also the main 
source of declining productivity trends after the crisis, 
next to physical capital contributions. In services the 
picture  is  more  heterogeneous.  In  wholesale  and 
retail, the contribution of TFP in Europe is delayed 
compared  to  the  US,  and  it  particularly  affects 
productivity in the latest years before the financial   
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crisis.  In  information  and  communication  services, 
the contribution of TFP was particularly large since 
the mid-1990s in both countries. Despite a declining 
productivity performance since the crisis, this sector 
continues to fare considerably well. 
 
Figure 3.5. Sectoral labour productivity growth rates, US, 1995-2010 
 
Source: EUKLEMS and own calculations. 
Figure 3.6. Sectoral labour productivity growth rates, EU-8, 1995-2010 
 
Source: EUKLEMS and own calculations. 
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3.2.  THE ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER, 
ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY AND INSTITUTIONS FOR 
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 
One way to better understand possible causes of the 
productivity  gap  is  to  consider  the  impact  of 
investments  in  intangible  assets  such  as  R&D.  The 
importance  of  investing  in  innovation  activity  has 
long been recognised in the theoretical and empirical 
literature  (Romer  1990,  Aghion  and  Howitt  1992, 
Park  2008,  Nishioka  and  Ripoll  2012).  What  is 
perhaps less often acknowledged is that resources for 
such innovations tend to be highly concentrated in a 
small number of advanced OECD countries
65, which 
have the  required  skills and institutions in place to 
invest heavily in R&D. This implies that for countries 
whose firms are not at the technological frontier, the 
diffusion of technology from the frontier is likely to 
be  an  important  source  of  productivity  growth, 
through both imitation and follow-on innovation and 
adaptation  (Evenson  and  Westphal,  1995). 
Knowledge transfers can occur via different channels, 
such as FDI, joint ventures, reverse engineering, and 
collaborations.  A  survey  of  the  biggest  EU  R&D 
investing companies shows that knowledge transfer is 
more  important  among  companies  than  between 
companies and the public sector. Knowledge transfer 
is  especially  relevant  for  companies  in  high  R&D 
intensity sectors
66. In this section the focus is on the 
diffusion of technology via intermediate goods trade 
an  approach  consistent  with  existing  theoretical 
models (e.g. Grossman and Helpman 1991). The first 
objective of the analysis is to assess how knowledge 
transfers  affect  productivity  growth;  secondly,  the 
role of absorptive capacities and barriers to diffusion 
is taken into account, as these can make an important 
difference  to  the  extent  to  which  countries  benefit 
from innovations carried out elsewhere. 
The methodology used to study the impact of foreign 
R&D spillovers follows closely the contribution by 
Nishioka and Ripoll (2012), which requires data on 
R&D stocks by country and industry and input-output 
tables  capturing  inter-industry  and  inter-country 
linkages.  This  is  carried  out  using  data  on  R&D 
                                                            
65   The  share  of  R&D  financed  by  enterprises  in  advanced 
countries  was  98%  in  the  1980s  and  94%  in  the  1990s 
(UNIDO,  2002).  Even  within  developed  countries  however 
R&D is concentrated, with Eaton and Kortum (1999) noting 
that in the late 1980s, 80 percent of OECD research scientists 
and  engineers  were  employed  in  five  countries  (US,  UK, 
Germany, Japan and France). 
66   See: www.jrc.es: Tübke, A.; Hervás, F. and Zimmermann, J.: 
"The 2012 EU Survey on R&D Investment Business Trends", 
European  Commission,  Joint  Research  Centre,  EUR  25424 
EN, pp.21. 
expenditure  from  the  OECD  ANBERD  database
67, 
from  which  a  R&D  stock  for  ten  manufacturing 
industries  and  20  countries  is  calculated  using  the 
perpetual  inventory  method.  Information  on 
intermediate flows required for the calculation of the 
R&D  stock  of  intermediates  is  taken  from  the 
recently  compiled  World-Input-Output-Database 
(WIOD),  which  reports  data  on  socio-economic 
accounts,  international  input-output  tables  and 
bilateral  trade  data  across  35  industries  and  41 
countries  over  the  period  1995-2009  (see 
Dietzenbacher et al. 2013)
68.  
Though R&D stocks could only be calculated for a 
limited  number  of  countries  and  industries,  two 
interesting stylised facts emerge: firstly, over 80% of 
the R&D stock is concentrated in a small number of 
industries (electrical and optical equipment, transport 
equipment and chemicals and chemical products and 
in particular  the pharmaceutical sector which plays a 
key  role  among    highly  innovative  industries); 
secondly, the US and Japan dominate R&D stocks in 
the sample of countries considered, with respectively 
40%  and  28%  of  the  total,  followed  by  Germany 
(11%), France (8%) and the UK (7%). This indicates 
that  these  five  countries  account  for  80%  of  the 
overall  R&D  stock,  consistent  with  Eaton  and 
Kortum (1999).  
Using these R&D stocks and the information on inter-
industry and inter-country linkages makes it possible 
to  calculate  the  variables  capturing  the  ‘direct  and 
indirect  R&D  content’  of  intermediate  input  flows: 
First,  the  R&D  stocks  divided  by  gross  output 
provides  a  vector  containing  the  direct  R&D 
requirements  by  sector  and  country.  This  vector  is 
then  multiplied  with  the  global  Leontief  inverse, 
derived from the WIOD and the global inter-industry, 
transaction  matrix.  The  latter  only  includes  the 
foreign  inter-industry  flows  therefore  capturing  the 
role of international R&D spillovers.
69 
As  expected,  those  countries  and  industries  which 
dominate  R&D  expenditures  also  tend  to  have  the 
highest shares in the direct and indirect use of R&D
70. 
                                                            
67   It is important to stress that the BERD data are territory based. 
Alternatively,  attention  might  be  paid  to  this  issue  at  the 
company level (e.g. Cincera and Veugelers, 2010). 
68   Some of the associated data have been updated to 2011. 
69   Technical details are provided in the background study to this 
chapter. 
70   It  should  be  stressed  here  that  these  results  are  confined  to 
those countries and industries for which reliable R&D data are 
available.  As  R&D  is  concentrated  in  a  few  industries  and 
countries, the computation of direct and indirect R&D stocks 
provide good proxies for international R&D spillovers that can 
be used in empirical econometric analysis. However, no more 
detailed inference on source and use country and industries can 
be  made  without  having  better  knowledge  of  R&D  stocks 
across all countries and industries.  
 
77 
 
Relatively  large  shares  are  also  found  for 
construction, suggesting that there are strong linkages 
between manufacturing and this sector. With respect 
to  countries,  large  increases  in  the  indirect  use  of 
R&D can be found for the US, Japan and the rest of 
the  world  between  1995  and  2010.  China  has  also 
experienced  a  large  increase  in  both  direct  and 
indirect R&D usage over time. This increase is solely 
due  to  increased  flows  of  R&D  intensive 
intermediates  into  China  over  this  period  (China  is 
excluded from the list of R&D source countries given 
the limited industry data). 
The assessment of the role of absorptive capacity and 
barriers  to  diffusion  requires  the  inclusion  of 
additional variables. Absorptive capacity is measured 
using information from the 2013 release of Barro and 
Lee’s  dataset  on  the  average  years  of  secondary 
schooling  in  the  population  over  15  years  of  age 
(Syr)
71. As additional indicator of absorptive capacity, 
the analysis includes the level of R&D taken in logs 
(Cohen  and  Levinthal  1989).  Data  on  R&D  are 
extracted from the OECD ANBERD dataset. The role 
of  absorption  barriers  is  assessed  by  using  several 
OECD indicators. A first set describes regulation in 
the  labour  market  and  includes:  an  indicator  on 
strictness  of  regulation  of  employees  on  regular 
contracts  (EPR),  an  indicator  for  strictness  of 
regulations  for  temporary  forms  of  employment 
(EPT), and an indicator of strictness of regulation and 
specific requirements for collective dismissal (EPC). 
These variables are on a scale of 0 to 6, with 0 having 
the least and 6 the most restrictions. To be consistent 
with  the hypotheses of  Parente  and  Prescott  (1994, 
1999) R&D spillovers are expected to be weaker in 
countries  with  higher  values  for  these  indices.  To 
examine whether R&D spillovers are affected by the 
power  of  labour  unions  in  limiting  the  take-up  of 
potentially  labour-saving  technology,  further 
information on trade union density from the OECD is 
included (Union). A further indicator employed is the 
OECD indicator of product market regulation (PMR). 
The  indicator  captures  the  stringency  of  product 
market  regulatory  policy,  with  higher  values  being 
associated  with  policies that are  more restrictive to 
competition
72. A further variable that is included is an 
indicator  of  the  strength  of  Intellectual  Property 
Rights  (IPR).  IPRs  are  a  policy  tool  to  encourage 
innovative activities. By preventing the copying and 
imitation  of  a  patent,  IPRs  may  reduce  technology 
diffusion. However, since information on patents is 
                                                            
71   See http://www.barrolee.com/. These data have been used as a 
measure  of  absorptive  capacity  in  similar  studies  (see  for 
example Falvey et al. 2007). 
72   This  indicator  ranges  on  a  scale  from  0  to  6.  The  data  is 
available  at  the  country-level  only  and  for  three  years  (i.e. 
1998,  2003,  2008).  Missing  years  are  imputed  using  linear 
interpolation. For further details see Wölfl et al. (2009). 
made  public,  stronger  IPRs  may  encourage 
technology diffusion (Breitwieser and Foster 2012). 
The index of IPRs used is developed by Ginarte and 
Park (1997) and updated by Park (2008). This index 
uses  information  on  the  coverage  of  patents, 
membership  in  international  treaties,  enforcement 
mechanisms,  and  restrictions  on  patent  rights  and 
duration,  with  higher  numbers  indicating  stronger 
protection
73.  
Finally, information from the Heritage Foundation’s 
Index  of  Economic  Freedom  is  used  for  additional 
variables. In particular, the sub-indices on investment 
freedom (invest) and financial freedom (finance) are 
included,  where  higher  numbers  imply  more 
restrictions
74. 
3.2.1.  Empirical model and estimation 
To  study  the  impact  of  foreign  R&D  content  of 
intermediates  on  labour  productivity  the  following 
production function is used: 
                                               
                      
 (3.1)     
The  growth  rate  of  labour  productivity        is 
dependent  on  the  growth  rate  of  foreign  R&D 
spillovers      , the growth rate of the capital-labour 
ratio      and the initial lagged value of output per 
worker to allow for conditional convergence. Further 
industry   ,  country     and  time     fixed  effects  are 
included, while  is an error term. The inclusion of 
fixed  effects  controls  for  unobserved  heterogeneity 
across the respective dimensions. Results are reported 
in Table 3.1.  The negative and significant coefficient 
on initial output per worker confirms the presence of 
conditional convergence.  
The coefficient on the capital-labour ratio is positive 
and  significant  in  all  specifications,  indicating  that 
greater capital intensities are associated with higher 
labour productivity growth. With respect to the main 
variable of interest, the coefficient estimates indicate 
that  a  1%  increase  in  the  growth  of  foreign  R&D 
content of intermediates is associated with a higher 
growth rate of labour productivity of between 0.15% 
and 0.19%. Thus, these results suggest that the R&D 
stock  of  intermediates  is  positively  associated  with 
output per worker. 
                                                            
73   The index takes on a value between zero and five. 
74   The raw data are on a scale of zero to 100, with 100 implying 
no restrictions. To be consistent with the other measures of 
absorption  barriers  this  variable  is  redefined  to  be  equal  to 
                      .  For  further  details  on  the 
construction of these indicators see the background study.  
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The  second  question  to  address  is  whether  the 
relationship  between  the  foreign  R&D  stock  of 
intermediates and labour productivity is affected by 
the indicators of absorptive capacity and absorption 
barriers  described  above.  The  econometric  strategy 
involves estimating a model of the following form: 
 (3.2) 
where     is  the  indicator  of  absorptive  capacity  or 
absorption  barriers  and     is  the  indicator  function 
taking the value one if the term in brackets is true. 
The  model  differs  from  a  standard  linear  model  in 
that the elasticity of labour productivity with respect 
to foreign R&D (i.e.  ) is allowed to differ depending 
upon whether absorptive capacity is above or below 
some threshold value ( ). In particular, the elasticity 
of  labour  productivity  is  given  by      if  absorptive 
capacity is below (or equal to) the threshold and is 
given  by      if  absorptive  capacity  is  above  the 
threshold.  The  actual  threshold  value  is  calculated 
endogenously  following  Hansen  (1996,  1999  and 
2000) with significance of the thresholds determined 
by  bootstrapping  (see  Annex  2c).  When  estimating 
this  model  the  threshold  variable,   ,  is  included 
linearly.  The  set  of  threshold  variables  capturing 
absorptive  capacity  and  absorption  barriers  also 
includes  the  initial  values  of  labour  productivity 
(       ). This allows for the examination of whether 
an indicator of relative backwardness impacts upon 
the  relationship  between  foreign  R&D  and  labour 
productivity.  While  being  further  behind  the 
technological  frontier  usually  means  that  there  is 
more scope for technological catch-up it could also 
imply  that  a  country  or  sector  does  not  have  the 
ability  to  make  use  and  benefit  from  advanced 
technology  (see  Falvey  et  al.  2007).  As  such,  the 
impact of backwardness measures on the relationship 
between foreign R&D and labour productivity growth 
is ambiguous from a theoretical point of view. 
Results  from  estimating  a  single  threshold  are 
presented in Table 3.2. where each column presents 
the threshold estimates for the variable indicated in 
the  header  line  as  motivated  in  the  text  above. 
Coefficients  on  initial  output  per  worker  and  the 
growth of the capital-labour ratio are consistent with 
the results in Table 3.1.  In terms of the threshold 
results,  a  variety  of  outcomes  appears.  The 
backwardness  measure  shows  that  the  lower  the 
labour productivity the larger the spillover effects.
75 
                                                            
75   Alternatively one might use interaction terms between R&D 
and absorptive capacities and barriers. However, the use of the 
threshold model rather than interaction terms has a number of 
 
The  coefficient  in  the  low  regime  (0.264)  is  more 
than twice the coefficient in the high regime (0.105) – 
though both are significant – indicating that foreign 
R&D spillovers appear to be significantly stronger in 
countries  and  industries  that  are  further  away  from 
the frontier.  
The  indicators  of  absorptive  capacity  (i.e.  average 
years  of  secondary  schooling,  Syr,  and  lnR&D), 
produce consistent results. The  coefficients indicate 
that  foreign  R&D  spillovers  are  larger  in  countries 
with a higher number of average years of secondary 
schooling and in countries and industries which are 
more  R&D  intensive.  While  the  difference  in 
coefficients (0.11 versus 0.27) in the case of Syr is 
significantly different, the differences in the case of 
lnR&D (0.15 versus 0.17) are not significant, i.e. the 
linear model is preferred.  
When  labour  market  indicators  are  used  as  a 
threshold  variable,  results  vary  across  the  different 
indicators. When using indicators of the strength of 
regulation  on  regular  contracts  and  collective 
dismissal,  spillover  effects  are  larger  in  the  low 
regime (i.e. in countries with less regulations). The 
coefficient estimates imply that a 1% increase in the 
growth  of  the  foreign  R&D  stock  has  a  0.13% 
increase in labour productivity growth for countries 
with a value of the EPR below the threshold and a -
0.001% decrease for countries above the threshold. A 
similar change increases labour productivity growth 
by  0.21%  for  countries  with  EPC  below  the 
threshold, and by just 0.04% for countries above the 
threshold.  The  strength  of  regulation  on  temporary 
contracts produces the opposite result.  In particular, 
while  a  1%  increase  in  the  growth  of  the  foreign 
R&D stock is associated with an increase in labour 
productivity of 0.24% for countries with EPT above 
the  threshold,  the  change  for  countries  below  the 
threshold  is  just  0.03%.  Finally,  when  using  union 
                                                                                         
advantages. Firstly, using threshold models doesn’t impose a 
monotonic change in the effect of the explanatory variable as 
the threshold or interaction term increases (i.e. the impact of 
the explanatory variable on the dependent variable can switch 
signs and change size at different points on the distribution of 
the threshold variable). Secondly, the coefficients are easier to 
interpret.  The  impact  of  the  explanatory  variable  on  the 
dependent  variable  is  given  by  a  fixed  parameter  for  all 
observations within a particular regime. With interaction terms 
it is more difficult to identify the overall impact of a change in 
the  explanatory  variable,  with  researchers  often  resorting  to 
graphing  the  relationship  for  different  values  of  the 
threshold/interaction  variable.  Thirdly,  when  the 
threshold/interaction variables are bound as in our case (e.g. 
between  zero  and  six)  the  threshold  model  is  less  open  to 
misinterpretation (e.g. extrapolating beyond the range of the 
threshold/interaction variable). 
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density as threshold variable results show that foreign 
R&D spillovers are larger in the low union density 
regime. A 1% increase in the growth of foreign R&D 
is  associated  with  a  0.19%  increase  in  labour 
productivity growth in the low regime, and a 0.03% 
increase in the high regime. 
In terms of the remaining indicators, one finds that, in 
the  cases  of     ,          and         ,  the 
relationship between foreign R&D growth and labour 
productivity  growth  is  stronger  in  the  high  regime, 
that  is,  in  the  regime  with  more  stringent  product 
market,  investment  and  financial  regulation.  In  the 
case  of        the  coefficient  in  the  low  regime  is 
negative and significant. For        the difference in 
the coefficients on the foreign R&D variable between 
the  two  regimes  is  relatively  small  –  though  still 
significantly  so  (0.149  versus  0.172),  while  for 
        the differences are much larger (0.08 versus 
0.237). Though this might be an unexpected result, it 
should  be  noted  that  these  indicators  could  also 
reflect  institutional  quality  in  a  broader  sense.  As 
countries  with  higher  institutional  quality  might 
attract  more  R&D  intensive  firms  or  have  tighter 
cooperation  in  R&D  activities,  etc.  these  results 
would be in line with the literature stating that the 
quality of institutions matters.  
Summarising,  the  results  confirm  those  from  the 
simple  model  reported  in  Table  3.1.  whereby  the 
foreign  R&D  content  of  intermediates  is  positively 
associated with labour productivity growth. However, 
the  size  of  these  spillovers  depends  on  absorptive 
capacities  and  barriers;  countries  and  industries 
further  behind  the  technological  frontier  enjoy 
stronger foreign R&D spillovers, in line with Falvey 
et  al.  (2007).  The  results  also  support  Falvey  et  al 
(2007)  as well as Crespo-Cuaresma et al (2008) in 
finding that foreign R&D spillovers are stronger in 
countries  with  greater  absorptive  capacity  (as 
measured  by  average  years  of  secondary  schooling 
and R&D spending). In terms of absorption barriers, 
the  results  are  mixed.  With  the  exception  of 
regulations  on  temporary  workers,  stronger  labour 
market  regulation  and  greater  union  density  are 
associated  with  lower  foreign  R&D  spillovers, 
consistently with Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2008) and 
Parente  and  Prescott  (1994,  1999  and  2003). 
Concerning  the  other  absorption  barriers  related  to 
product market, financial and  investment regulation 
there  is  no  evidence  that  lower  anti-competitive 
barriers  encourage  foreign  R&D  spillovers.  Indeed, 
the  reverse  appears  to  hold  though  these  indicators 
might reflect the overall institutional quality, which is 
conducive to growth. Finally, one finds that stronger 
levels of IPR protection can limit the extent of foreign 
R&D  spillovers,  possibly  by  limiting  the  ability  to 
replicate and borrow technology from abroad. 
 
 
Table 3.1. Foreign R&D and labour productivity growth 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
                   
       
         -0.0104***  -0.0106***  -0.0142*** 
  (0.000741)  (0.000797)  (0.00289) 
      0.482***  0.422***  0.465*** 
  (0.0278)  (0.0301)  (0.0334) 
       0.190***  0.176***  0.150*** 
  (0.0180)  (0.0192)  (0.0202) 
Time F.E.  No  Yes  Yes 
Country F.E.  No  No  Yes 
Industry F.E.  No  No  Yes 
       
Observations  15,850  15,850  15,850 
R-squared  0.372  0.419  0.455 
F-stat  289.2***  338.2***  87.04*** 
Notes: ***, **, * significant at 1, 5 and 10%.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 3.2. Single threshold results 
Threshold  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
variable           Syr         EPR  EPT  EPC  Union  PMR  IPR  Invest  Finance 
                       
         -0.011***  -0.014***  -0.014***  -0.00488  -0.00430  -0.00452  -0.00488  -0.00428  -0.013***  -0.0143***  -0.0142*** 
  (0.00226)  (0.00225)  (0.00226)  (0.00305)  (0.00304)  (0.00325)  (0.00300)  (0.00292)  (0.00234)  (0.00226)  (0.00224) 
      0.457***  0.465***  0.465***  0.629***  0.632***  0.664***  0.631***  0.621***  0.467***  0.465***  0.454*** 
  (0.00587)  (0.00586)  (0.00587)  (0.0104)  (0.0104)  (0.0115)  (0.00993)  (0.00999)  (0.00611)  (0.00589)  (0.00588) 
     
     0.264***  0.111***  0.149***  0.126***  0.0307***  0.208***  0.191***  -0.0291**  0.211***  0.139***  0.0807*** 
 
(0.0107)  (0.00766)  (0.00631)  (0.0110)  (0.00999)  (0.0239)  (0.0129)  (0.0121)  (0.00759)  (0.00732)  (0.00792) 
     
      0.105***  0.212***  0.174***  -0.000967  0.241***  0.0357***  0.0339***  0.156***  -0.057***  0.172***  0.237*** 
 
(0.00705)  (0.00952)  (0.0226)  (0.0145)  (0.0182)  (0.0104)  (0.00963)  (0.0108)  (0.0127)  (0.0103)  (0.00904) 
  
 
0.00358  9.47e-05  -0.00574  -0.026***  -0.072***  0.000722  -0.00141  -0.00102  -0.00041***  0.000384*** 
 
 
(0.00754)  (0.000390)  (0.0131)  (0.00347)  (0.0111)  (0.000475)  (0.00830)  (0.00376)  (0.000133)  (0.000126) 
                        Threshold  1.566  3.958  12.270  2.470  3.444  1.959  16.498  1.737  4.180  49.506  32.222 
Percentile  21  66  50  64  79  13  18  47  70  90  46 
P-value  0.000***  0.000***  0.297  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.008***  0.000*** 
Observations  15,850  15,850  15,850  9,559  9,559  8,061  10,372  9,742  14,200  15,850  15,850 
R-squared  0.461  0.458  0.455  0.448  0.453  0.471  0.461  0.479  0.468  0.455  0.462 
F-stat  158.4***  154.6***  153.0***  98.60***  100.5***  93.59***  120.8***  119.9***  151.5***  153.3***  157.7*** 
Notes: ***, **, * significant at 1, 5 and 10%.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include unreported time, industry and country fixed effects  
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3.3.  EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS AT THE INDUSTRY 
LEVEL  
This section provides an analysis of the determinants 
of technical efficiency in Europe, the US and Japan, 
using  stochastic frontier analysis (SFA).   Technical 
efficiency  in  this  study  refers  to  the  ability  of  a 
firm/industry to achieve the maximum output using 
the set of available resources. The growth accounting 
and  the  regression  analysis  framework  used  in  the 
previous sections are based on the assumption that all 
resources,  i.e.  capital  and  labour  inputs,  are  fully 
utilised and therefore it cannot account for changes in 
productivity  originating  from  efficiency 
improvements. Technical efficiency analysis relaxes 
this  assumption  and  assumes  that  only  the  top 
performing  industry  is  able  to  use  resources  in  the 
most efficient way. The other industries will lie below 
the  frontier  and  the  distance  to  the  frontier  output 
defines  the  efficiency  gap.  Identifying  which 
industry/country is at the frontier and how efficiency 
levels have changed over time is important to direct 
policies  towards  the  correct  tool  to  promote 
performance. In fact, the best performing industry in 
terms of productivity might not be the most efficient 
one,  and  higher  productivity  could  be  achieved  by 
improving the allocation and usage of the available 
resources.  On  the  other  hand,  a  highly  efficient 
industry might not be the most productive because of, 
for example, low investments in strategic assets such 
as ICT and R&D capital; in this case, policies should 
be directed towards promotion of investments. 
The  most  intuitive  way  of  understanding  frontier 
analysis is to assume that the actual output produced 
can  be  lower  than  the  maximum  output,  given  the 
level of available resources. By defining actual output 
in industry i at time t as YAit and the maximum output 
as YFit, technical efficiency can be expressed as: 
(3.3)                                     
Efficiency  levels  in  each  industry  range  between  0 
and 1, with higher scores indicating higher efficiency. 
The derivation of technical efficiency levels requires 
the estimation of a production function where output, 
measured  by  value  added,  is  produced  with  a 
combination of inputs. The most basic model includes 
the total number of hours worked (H) and total capital 
(K)  as  factor  inputs.  Below,  a  more  extended 
specification will also be considered that accounts for 
different types of capital (ICT and non-ICT capital) 
and  intangible  assets  (labour  quality  and  R&D 
capital).  
The analysis is carried out using industry-level data, 
extracted  from  the  EUKLEMS  database.  The  total 
sample  includes  16  countries.  Of  these,  14  are 
European (AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, HU, IE, 
IT NL, SE and UK); the other two being Japan and 
the US. For each country, data are available for 21 
industries,  including  manufacturing  and  services
76. 
The  analysis  is  conducted  between  1995  and  2007 
outlining  industry  performance  in  the  pre-financial 
crisis  period.  The  exclusion  of  the  downturn  is 
motivated not only by data availability, but also by 
the consideration that technical efficiency relates to 
the structure of the industry, and this is less likely to 
be affected by cyclical factors or exogenous shocks.  
Results from the estimation of a frontier production 
function,  expressed  in  log-levels,  are  presented  in 
Table 3.3
77. The first column (1) displays estimates 
for  total  capital  services,  while  column  (2) 
distinguishes  between  ICT  and  non-ICT  capital 
services.  Results  are  robust  across  the  two 
specifications and, with the exception of ICT capital, 
all coefficient estimates are positive and statistically 
significant. They are consistent with prior knowledge 
of  factor  shares.  Human  capital,  measured  by  the 
labour quality variable, has a positive, albeit small, 
effect on productivity. In column (2), the impact of 
ICT is positive with an elasticity of 0.04%, which is 
consistent  with  the  existing  evidence  (Kretschsmer 
2012).  However,  the  coefficient  is  not  statistically 
significant at conventional levels. It is possible that 
the  model  specification  needs  to  account  for 
additional  complementary  assets  (Diedrick  et  al. 
2003).  In  fact,  when  R&D  is  included,  the 
significance  of  the  ICT  variable  improves  as  in 
column (4). Another possible explanation is that the 
impact  of  ICT  is  highly  heterogeneous  across 
countries and industries, and its effect is likely to be 
higher  in  the  most  ICT  intensive  users.  More 
importantly,  further  developments  of  this  analysis 
will  show  that  ICT  exerts  an  indirect  effect  on 
productivity,  via  the  reduction  of  technical 
inefficiencies. 
Results in Table 3.3. columns (3) and (4), confirm the 
importance  of  R&D  in  increasing  productivity, 
consistently with  the reference literature, where this 
value  generally  ranges  between  0.04  and  0.18 
(Griliches  and  Mairesse  1984;  Kumbhakar  et  al. 
2010; Bloom et al. 2013).  
                                                            
76   Industries included in the analysis are: Food and Beverages, 
Textile and Leather, Wood & Cork, Pulp, Paper and Printing, 
Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel, Chemicals, Rubber 
and  Plastic,  Other  non-metallic  minerals,  Basic  metals, 
fabricated  metal  products,  Machinery  NEC,  Electrical 
Equipment,  Transport  Equipment,  Manufacturing  NEC, 
Transport and Storage, Post and Telecommunication, Business 
Services, Electricity, Gas and Water, Construction, Wholesale 
and  Retail,  Financial  Intermediation,  Other  Community  and 
Social Services. This classification is based on NACE Rev. 1 
and differs from the one used in the Section 3.1.3.  
77   The  estimation  of  the  production  function  in  the  panel 
dimension requires the introduction of fixed effects to control 
for  cross-sectional  time-invariant  heterogeneity.  Along  with 
country- and industry-specific intercepts, the specification also 
includes  a  set  of  time  dummies  to  control  for  unknown  or 
unobserved  factors  that  are  likely  to  affect  all  industries  at 
different points in time.  
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The inclusion of R&D does not significantly affect 
the  coefficient  estimates  for  labour  quality,  and 
generates  only  a  marginal  increase  in  the  effect  of 
total capital – see column (3) and non-ICT capital in 
column  (4)
78.  This  is  a  consequence  of  the 
complementary  relationship  between  R&D  and 
capital assets
79.  
                                                            
78   Diagnostic statistics are presented at the bottom of Table 3.3. 
The Gamma parameter measures how important inefficiencies 
are in each model. A value of 1 indicates that all deviations 
from the frontier are due to inefficiency, while a value of 0 
implies that there are no inefficiencies; in the latter case, SFA 
does not provide any additional information compared to OLS. 
In this study, the Gamma parameter is approximately equal to 
0.4 meaning that inefficiencies are important and explain 40% 
of the total residual variation. The presence of inefficiencies is 
also  assessed  via  the  Likelihood  Ratio  test,  which  confirms 
that this component is statistically significant. 
79   The  impact  of  the  total  number  of  hours  worked  is 
significantly lower in regressions 3 and 4, compared to the first 
two columns of Table 3.3. This is related to the fact that a large 
 
The SFA modelling framework allows the derivation 
of  technical  efficiency  (TE)  for  each  industry/time 
period.  Estimates  of  technical  efficiency  can  be 
derived from  any of the specifications presented in 
Table 3.3. , hence a choice needs to be made to carry 
out the analysis. The last row of the table shows that 
the number of observations drops substantially when 
including  R&D,  as  information  on  this  asset  is 
missing  for  several  service  industries  in  various 
countries.  Given  that  the  main  objective  of  this 
section is to analyse efficiency trends across the full 
spectrum  of  manufacturing  and  services,  the 
specification in column (2) is used to derive technical 
efficiency scores
80.  
                                                                                         
proportion  of  R&D  costs  is  composed  of  the  wages  of 
employees involved in R&D activities. This 'double counting' 
is  a  well-known  phenomenon  in  productivity  studies 
(Schankerman1981, Guellec and van Pottelsberghe 2004). 
80   The  correlation  of  TE  scores  arising  from  the  four 
specifications  is  very  high,  ranging  between  0.97  and  0.99. 
 
Table 3.3. Estimation of stochastic frontier production function 
Dependent variable: Value added 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
    Total number of hours worked  0.790*** 
(0.031) 
0.755***  0.632***  0.612*** 
 
(0.031)  (0.036)  (0.037) 
         
Tangible assets 
        Total capital  0.351***    0.446***   
  (0.024)    (0.028)   
         
Non-ICT capital 
 
0.394*** 
 
0.445*** 
    (0.024)    (0.029) 
   
(0.024) 
 
(0.029) 
ICT capital 
 
0.019 
 
0.026 
   
(0.017) 
 
(0.020) 
Intangible assets 
        Labour quality  0.011***  0.010***  0.008***  0.007*** 
 
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
R&D capital 
   
0.061***  0.061*** 
     
(0.008)  (0.008) 
Constant  1.418***  1.154***  1.246***  1.248*** 
 
(0.168)  (0.171)  (0.189)  (0.189) 
          Gamma  0.401  0.343  0.394  0.433 
Likelihood ratio test  11.025  5.176  7.434  9.663 
(P-value)  (0.000)  (0.011)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations  4532  4519  3650  3488 
Notes: ***, **, * significant at 1, 5 and 10%.  Gamma is the proportion of the total error variance due to inefficiencies. The Likelihood 
ratio test is a test of the null hypothesis that there are no technical inefficiencies in production.    
Source: EUKLEMS and OECD ANBERD  
83 
Figure 3.7. presents average efficiency scores for the 
EU,  the  US  and  Japan.  Although  actual  efficiency 
levels  do  not  differ  greatly  across  economies,  their 
variation over time shows some interesting patterns. 
In the mid-1990s, the US had lower efficiency levels 
than Japan and Europe, but then TE increased rapidly 
placing  the  US  at  the  frontier  since  2002.  Existing 
evidence dates the resurgence of US productivity to 
1995,  around  seven  years  before  the  aggregate 
increase  in  efficiency.  This  difference  can  be 
explained  by  the  presence  of  lags  in  the  full 
implementation  of  the  new  technology  and  the 
reorganisation  of  production,  emphasised  in  the 
General  Purpose  Technology  (GPT)  literature 
(Hornstein  and  Krusell  1996,  Aghion  2002).  While 
the  existing  evidence  mainly  refers  to  the  direct 
impact  of  ICT  on  productivity,  here  the  analysis 
provides  new  results  supporting  the  GPT  nature  of 
new  digital  technologies.  From  2002  to  2005  the 
efficiency  gap  between  the  US  and  the  other  two 
economies widened. However, from 2005 efficiency 
levels  fell  in  the  US,  while  the  EU  trend  remains 
virtually unchanged. Japan was the frontier country in 
1995 but its efficiency declined from 1996, and since 
2000  its  efficiency  has  been  below  the  European 
average. These patterns are not dissimilar from trends 
in  TFP  levels  discussed  in  Jorgenson  and  Nomura 
(2007).  Similarly  to  the  US,  in  Japan  changes  in 
efficiency follow changes in productivity with a lag 
of about five years. 
A look at average TE in selected groups of industries 
provides insights on the ones performing better. Panel 
A of Figure 3.8. presents mean efficiency trends in 
manufacturing and services. This shows that services 
have experienced a declining efficiency performance 
over  time,  while  in  manufacturing  efficiency  has 
remained  fairly  stable  over  the  period.  Figure  3.8. 
panel B and Figure 3.9. panel A show that efficiency 
                                                                                         
Hence, the exclusion of R&D does not affect the estimation of 
TE. 
has been increasing over time in the most innovative 
sectors,  namely  ICT  producing  and  high-tech 
industries. This suggests that increases in productivity 
went hand-in-hand with increases in efficiency until 
2007.  The  efficiency  in  the  ICT-producing  sector 
increased by 5%, from 0.75 in 1995 to 0.80 in 2007, 
while  improvements  were  more  moderate  in  high-
tech industries (approximately 2%).  
Panel  B  of  Figure  3.9.  focuses  on  services, 
distinguishing between knowledge-intensive and non-
knowledge  intensive  industries.  While  the  overall 
performance of the tertiary sector has been declining 
over time, this figure reveals that the average picture 
is  influenced  by  the  dynamics  of  low  knowledge-
intensive  services,  as  they  are  characterised  by  a 
steady decrease in TE. On the other hand, the most 
knowledge  intensive  industries,  after  a  dip  in 
efficiency  in  2000,  performed  relatively  well,  with 
increasing efficiency throughout the period. 
Figure 3.7. Average technical efficiency (TE) in the EU, 
US, and Japan 
 
Source: EUKLEMS Database and authors’ computations. 
Figure 3.8. Technical efficiency  
Panel A. Manufacturing and services              
 
Panel B. ICT producing and using industries 
 
Source: EUKLEMS Database and authors’ computations. 
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3.3.1.  Reducing efficiency gaps: discussion of the 
main determinants 
Understanding  why  industries  vary  in  the  extent  to 
which  they  use  resources  effectively,  and  what 
policies might be more suitable to foster efficiency 
performance,  requires  the  extension  of  frontier 
analysis to account for the factors that might cause 
industries  to  fall  below  the  frontier  and  therefore 
widen efficiency gaps. This study focuses on the role 
played by ICT capital and the business environment 
where  industries  operate.  The  assessment  of  the 
impact  of  these  factors  on  technical  efficiency  is 
obtained by the empirical estimation of the following 
relationship: 
 (3.4)   
γ  is  a  simple  time  trend  that  captures  how  an 
efficiency  gap  is  determined  by  exogenous 
technological  changes
81.  it  is  the  error  term.  The 
inclusion  of  a  large  number  of  indicators  naturally 
causes  co-linearity  problems,  hence  the  researcher 
needs to deal with the trade-off between efficiency of 
the  estimator  (which  is  reduced  in  the  presence  of 
collinearity)  and  omitted  variable  bias.  To  address 
this  issue,  the  estimation  will  sequentially  include 
different indicators, checking for the presence of ICT 
and  the  degree  of  competitiveness  in  all 
specifications
82.  The  decision  to  include  these  two 
factors  is  driven  by  the  existing  evidence  that 
suggests the presence of complementarities between, 
for  example,  product  market  regulation  and 
employment  protection  legislations  (Griffith  et  al. 
2007, Fiori et al. 2012)
83. The analysis uses a wide 
range of indicators that have been rescaled so that all 
vary between 0 and 1, with larger values indicating 
more stringent regulation. 
Table 3.4. to Table 3.6 present the sign of the impact 
for each of the factors affecting technical efficiency, 
and  the  related  statistical  significance.  Table  3.4. 
presents  a  summary  of  the  results  based  on  a 
specification that includes ICT and a set of indicators 
capturing the degree of market competitiveness. The 
latter includes the Upstream Regulation Index (RI), 
which  assesses  the  impact  of  anti-competitive 
legislation in the tertiary sector on the performance of 
downstream sectors that use services as a production 
input (Conway et al. 2006); Enforcing Contract Time 
(ECT),  which  is  based  on  the  number  of  days  to 
enforce  a  contract  in  each  country  (World  Bank 
2012);  and  two  alternative  measures  of 
competitiveness, the Herfindal index and the degree 
of industry fragmentation
84. The coefficient for ICT is 
negative  and  statistically  significant  in  all 
specifications, indicating that this asset plays a very 
important role in lowering inefficiencies in the use of 
resources.  Although ICT did  not have  a significant 
effect in the estimation of the production function, it 
plays an important role in reducing efficiency gaps, 
which will also affect productivity but in an indirect 
way.  This  result  is  particularly  interesting  when 
compared with the existing industry-level evidence, 
which usually fails to find significant effects of ICT 
on  TFP  growth  (Stiroh  2002,  Basu  et  al.  2004, 
Acharya  and  Basu  2010).  This  implies  that 
                                                            
81   The  estimation  of  the  efficiency  gap  is  carried  out 
simultaneously with the estimation of the productivity frontier, 
using Maximum Likelihood methods. This one-step procedure 
guarantees consistency in the coefficient estimates. 
82   The authors also tried to include intangible assets (R&D and 
labour  quality)  as  determinants  of  both  productivity  and 
efficiency.  However,  these  estimates  were  highly  unstable, 
hence such factors were only included in the specification of 
the production function (see Table 3.3). 
83   The impact of the latter factor is always accounted for with the 
use  of  the  upstream  Product  Market  Regulation  index  (RI), 
unless otherwise specified.   
84   The  Herfindal  index  and  the  indicator  of  industry 
fragmentation  are  derived  using  information  from  the 
Amadeus database, made available via EUKLEMS. 
Figure  3.9.  Technical  efficiency  in  high-tech  and  low-
tech industries 
Panel A.  High-tech and low-tech  
 
Panel  B.  Knowledge  and  non-knowledge  intensive 
services 
 
Source: EUKLEMS Database and authors’ computations. 
                ∑                        
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distinguishing  between  TFP  and  TE  can  provide 
important insights on the role of ICT. Up to now, this 
issue has been unexplored by the economic literature. 
Consistently  with  the  existing  evidence  on  the  link 
between  the  lack  of  competition  and  productivity 
(Buccirossi et al. 2012, Conway et al. 2006), Table 
3.4.  indicates  that  higher  values  of  upstream 
regulation significantly increase the efficiency gap. In 
other  words,  administrative  restrictions  on 
competition in the services market have widespread 
negative  effects  on  production  efficiency,  well 
beyond the tertiary sector. This effect is robust to the 
use of alternative variables that describe the degree of 
competitiveness of the market, such as the Enforcing 
Contract  Time  (ECT),  the  Herfindal  index  and 
industry fragmentation. Note that the sign of the latter 
is  negative  as  higher  values  indicate  higher 
fragmentation,  which  is  associated  with  more 
competition.  Hence,  results  in  Table  3.4.  provide 
strong  support  for  the  hypothesis  that  a  more 
competitive  business  environment  reduces  the 
efficiency gap. 
Table 3.5. reports results based on a specification that 
includes  indicators  of  employment  protection 
legislation.  Three  of  these  (EPR,  EPT,  EPC)  are 
described in Section 3.2. The EPL burden indicator is 
an  industry  level  variable  based  on  the  notion  that 
EPL, although it applies uniformly to all industries 
within a country, is more binding in those industries 
that rely on lay-offs than in industries characterised 
by a higher degree of voluntary turnover (Bassanini et 
al. 2009). NMW stands for National Minimum Wage 
and  it  is  only  available  for  those  countries  where 
NMW  is  prescribed  by  law  (Visser  2011). 
Considering  the  role  of  NMW  is  interesting  in  the 
light of the political and economic debate concerning 
its  effect  on  employment  outcomes  (Card  and 
Krueger 1995, Neumark and Washer 2008). Results 
in  Table  3.4.  show  that  more  stringent  EPL  for 
regular  workers  and  collective  dismissals 
significantly  increases  the  efficiency  gap.    On  the 
other hand, regulation on temporary workers has the 
opposite effect, indicating that stronger protection on 
this  kind  of  contracts  decreases  inefficiencies.  This 
finding is not unexpected as existing evidence shows 
that  the  legal  discipline  on  regular  and  temporary 
workers  can  have  opposite  effects  on  performance. 
For  example,  Damiani  et  al.  (2013)  document  that 
deregulation  of  temporary  contracts  negatively 
influences TFP growth in European industries. These 
findings suggest that excessive flexibility in the use 
of temporary workers leads firms to use this category 
of  workers  to  buffer  cyclical  demand  movements 
(Gordon  2011),  rather  than  attempting  to  find  the 
most  efficient  way  to  combine  factor  inputs
85.  The 
introduction  of  minimum  wage  legislation  also 
constrains  the  efficient  use  of  labour  input  by 
increasing  the  efficiency  gap,  through  reducing 
competitiveness in the labour market, a claim that is 
frequently  used  by  those  scholars  who  opose  the 
introduction  of  the  minimum  wage  (Currie  and 
Fallick 1996)
86.  
The final set of indicators accounts for the effect of 
financial market regulation, property right protection 
and regulation of FDI on the efficiency gap. Financial 
market regulation is measured using three indicators: 
the financial reform index, constructed by combining 
liberalisation scores on seven  different areas of the 
financial  market  (Abiad  et  al.  2008);  the  financial 
freedom index, as defined in Section 3.2; and the ratio 
of product market capitalisation over GDP (Beck et 
al. 2009). The indicator of property rights regulation 
is defined in Section 3.2. The FDI regulation index 
summarises  information  on  four  forms  of  legal 
intervention  (equity  restrictions,  screening  and 
approval  requirements,  restrictions  on  foreign  key 
personnel  and  other  operational  restrictions;  see 
Kalinova  et  al.  2010).  Results  including  these 
indicators  are  presented  in  Table  3.6.  Both  the 
financial reform and the financial freedom indicators 
consistently show that lower levels of regulation in 
this market increase the  
                                                            
85   This result is also consistent with those in section 3.3 of this 
chapter, where countries with higher employment protection 
for temporary workers enjoyed higher spillovers from foreign 
R&D stocks. 
86   In the basic textbook model of labour demand an increase in 
the  minimum  wage  reduces  the  employment  in  the  covered 
sectors of those workers whose wage rates would otherwise 
fall below the minimum” (Currie and Fallick 1996; p. 405). 
Table 3.4. Reducing the efficiency gap: the role of product market competition 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
ICT capital  -0.623***  -0.636***  -0.693***  -0.004 
Upstream regulation (RI)  3.081***  3.111***     
Enforcing contract time    0.639***     
Herfindal      0.747**   
Industry fragmentation        -1.097*** 
         
Observations  3648  3648  2454  2256 
 
Note: ***, **, * significant at 1, 5 and 10%.  All specifications include a time trend. A negative sign implies that the variable decreases the 
efficiency gap  
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efficiency  gap.  Conversely,  access  to  alternative 
sources of finance, like the bond market, significantly 
improves  TE  performance.  This  follows  the  main 
results of the literature, where a positive relationship 
between financial development and growth is usually 
found (Rajan and Zingales 1998, Maskus et al. 2012), 
but where it is also suggested that excessive financial 
liberalisation  may  be  detrimental  for  performance 
when  it  discourages  savings  or  triggers  financial 
instability (Ang 2011, Ang and Madsen 2012). The 
recent  financial  crisis  has  shown  that  excessive 
freedom in the financial market can have catastrophic 
consequences.  
Results  also  show  that  increasing  protection  of 
intellectual  property  reduces  the  efficiency  gap, 
although the effect is not statistically significant. This 
suggests that property rights regulations might not be 
relevant for efficiency improvements. The measure of 
openness to external markets, summarised by the FDI 
regulation  index,  shows  that  stricter  FDI  rules 
decrease  the  efficiency  gap.  Although  this  goes 
against the extensive literature on the positive relation 
between trade openness and growth, there are several 
reasons that might explain this result in the sample 
used in this study. Firstly,  the countries considered 
have  very  low  levels  of  regulations,  hence  trade 
openness is not a major issue (note that the coefficient 
is  only  significant  at  the  10%  significance  level). 
Additionally, next to the literature which emphasises 
the importance of trade openness for growth, there are 
also  contributions  that  support  the  positive  role  of 
protectionist  measures.  For  example,  estimates  in 
Yanikkaya (2003) predict a positive and significant 
relationship  between  trade  barriers  and  growth. 
Although  these  results  are  driven  by  developing 
countries,  they  nevertheless  imply  that  the 
relationship  between  trade  and  growth  is  quite 
complex. Moreover, the present analysis deals with 
the  specific  issue  of  technical  efficiency  and  it  is 
possible that the impact of FDI openness on growth 
differs  from  the  effect  of  this  factor  on  technical 
efficiency.  Additionally,  product  market  and  labour 
market  regulations  might  prevent  or  delay  the 
necessary adjustments in the combination of inputs, 
which  would  allow  countries  to  fully  benefit  from 
globalisation.  Hence,  it  is  possible  that  increasing 
international openness may lead to higher levels of 
production efficiency only over a relatively long time 
horizon.  Further  investigation  of  this  issue  goes 
beyond the scope of the present analysis but suggests 
an interesting development for future research.  
Table 3.5. Reducing the efficiency gap: the role of employment protection legislation 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
ICT  -0.574***  -0.559***  -0.557*** 
Upstream regulation (RI)  4.304***  2.926***  3.141*** 
EPL burden indicator  0.142***     
EPL regular    4.351***  3.513*** 
EPL temporary    -2.173***  -3.007*** 
EPL collective dismissal      2.716** 
NMW      1.372*** 
       
Observations  3146  3648  3021 
Note: ***, **, * significant at 1, 5 and 10%. All specifications include a time trend. 
Table 3.6. Reducing the efficiency gap: financial regulation, intellectual property rights protection, openness 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
ICT capital  -0.626***  -0.545***  -0.496***  -0.502*** 
Upstream Regulation (RI)  3.057***  2.441***  2.204***  2.255*** 
Financial Reform Index  -1.451  -1.849**     
Private Bond Mkt Cap/GDP    -0.307***  -0.317***  -0.288*** 
Financial Freedom      -2.650***  -2.776*** 
IPR        -0.080 
Regulation of FDI        -1.303* 
         
Observations  3648  3648  3648  3648 
Note: ***, **, * significant at 1, 5 and 10%. All specifications include a time trend.   
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3.4.  EU PRODUCTIVITY PERFORMANCE AT THE 
FIRM LEVEL: EVIDENCE FROM EU-EFIGE 
SURVEY ON MANUFACTURING FIRMS 
This section complements the industry level analysis 
with evidence based on a newly available firm level 
dataset  (EU-EFIGE)  which  collects  information  on 
14,759  manufacturing  firms  across  seven  EU 
countries (Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, 
Spain and the UK)
87, over the period 2007-2009. The 
analysis  focuses  on  how  the  financial  crisis  has 
affected performance and innovation strategies at the 
micro level. The focus is on productivity (TFP) rather 
than efficiency, as data constraints prevent the use of 
Stochastic Frontier methods.  
The financial crisis of 2008-2009 was a watershed for 
the European Union as it widened growth disparities 
among the Member States.  
Figure  3.10.  (Panel  A)  describes  TFP  changes 
between  2008  and  2009  compared  to  the  average 
annual rate of growth in the pre-crisis period (2001-
2007). The average rate of TFP growth was negative 
in the early 2000s, i.e. before the crisis, in France, 
Italy  and  Spain.  With  the  downturn,  productivity 
performance worsened in all countries, but remained 
positive in Austria, Germany and Hungary. The UK 
is  the  country  where  the  deceleration  in  TFP  was 
most dramatic between  the two sub-periods, falling 
from a positive rate of 16.5% to -15%. In absolute 
values, Italian firms registered the worst rates of TFP 
change  in  the  downturn  (-29%).  There  are  some 
important  regularities  in  productivity  dynamics  in 
firm-level  performance.  On  average,  those  firms 
performing better in terms of TFP growth before the 
downturn, as measured by the average rate of change 
between 2001 and 2007, also presented higher rates 
of productivity growth during the period 2008-2009.  
Panel B in Figure 3.10. provides a breakdown of TFP 
performance, distinguishing among size classes and 
industry categories. Confidentiality issues prevent the 
use  of  detailed  industry  information,  hence  the 
analysis  will  follow  the  Pavitt  (1984)  taxonomy  to 
control for major industry characteristics. 
Small-sized  companies  (fewer  than  50  employees) 
were diffusely characterised by negative productivity 
                                                            
87   The  number  of  firms  varies  across  countries,  with 
approximately  3,000  firms  in  France,  Germany,  Italy  and 
Spain,  2067  firms  in  the  UK,  443  in  Austria  and  488  in 
Hungary.  The  sample  was  originally  designed  to  be 
representative of the manufacturing sector and, to this aim, was 
stratified along three dimensions: industries (11 NACE-CLIO 
industry codes), regions (at the NUTS-1 level of aggregation) 
and  size  class  (10-19;  20-49;  50-250;  more  than  250 
employees). The dataset does not provide information on firms 
exiting the market due to the crisis. 
dynamics.  Large  companies  (over  249  employees) 
outperformed other types of firms in all productions
88. 
After  a period  of  moderately  positive  rates  of  TFP 
growth,  medium-sized  firms  (50-249  employees) 
faced  a  severe  drop  during  the  crisis.  A  relevant 
exception  is  in  the  science-based  firms  whose 
productivity  growth  was  positive  although  slightly 
reduced  during  the  crisis  with  respect  to  the  early 
2000s.  The  collapse  of  the  market  in  2008-2009 
severely hit traditional industries, which experienced 
a fall in TFP levels of almost 30%, especially because 
of small firms’ performance. 
                                                            
88   Small  firms  (less  than  50  employees)  make  up  73%  of  the 
overall  sample,  medium  firms  (between  50  and  249 
employees) account for 20% and large firms (more than 249 
employees) accounts for 7% of the sample. This implies that 
large  firms  are  over-represented,  due  to  their  relevance  in 
aggregate  competitiveness  dynamics  (Altomonte  and 
Aquilante 2012; p. 5).  
Figure  3.10.  TFP  growth  2001-07  and  2008-09  (by 
country, size class and Pavitt) 
 
 
Note:  S=small  firms.  M=medium  firms.  L=large  firm,  Source: 
EFIGE dataset  
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Firm-level productivity is pro-cyclical as, in the short 
term,  it  reflects  shocks  to  demand  conditions. 
Therefore,  to  better  understand  cross-country 
differentials in TFP dynamics, it is necessary to look 
at how the 2008-2009 crisis affected the performance 
of EU firms in terms of turnover fall. In Europe, sales 
declined in 72% of the companies in 2009 compared 
to  the  pre-crisis  values.  This  share  is  considerably 
higher for Spain (82%), Hungary and Italy (around 
75%).  In  Germany,  the  percentage  of  the  sample 
facing a turnover fall is 63%. As Table 3.7. shows, 
the financial turmoil caused a real downturn that was 
very pervasive involving all types of firms.  
The  industry  breakdown  provided  by  Table  3.8.  
illustrates that specialized suppliers were hit by the 
crisis as 75% of companies experienced a decrease in 
sales.  From  this  perspective,  the  crisis  looks  more 
severe  in  Spain,  Italy,  and  Hungary  where  the 
proportion of firms facing a turnover reduction was 
above  the  EU  average.  Scale-intensive  firms  were 
also considerably affected by the crisis, particularly in 
Spain where almost 90% of the total sample  reduced 
sales.  On the other hand, the fall of turnover was less 
pervasive among high-tech firms. 
Rates  of  investment  fluctuate  remarkably  along  the 
business cycle, reflecting firms' expectations of future 
sales and profitability. In the recent downturn, the fall 
in investment was exacerbated by the credit crunch. 
Along with the intensity of the business cycle, cross-
country differentials in firms' capital formation reflect 
disparities in the structure of the domestic financial 
systems.  In  Europe,  43%  of  firms  reduced  planned 
investment  in  equipment  between  2008  and  2009 
(ICT and non-ICT assets). This proportion rises with 
firm size, from 42% for small firms to 47.6% of large 
firms  (Table  3.9.  ).  The  greater  sensitivity  of 
investment in large companies probably depends on a 
wider  exposure  to  the  international  market,  and 
therefore to the collapse of foreign demand. 
Table 3.7. Percentage of firms experiencing a turnover reduction in 2009 compared to 2008 (by size class) 
   AUT  FRA  GER  HUN  ITA  SPA  UK  Total 
Small firms  60.3  69.6  61.6  75.4  74.3  82.2  66.7  71.5 
Medium firms  72.2  73.4  68.9  82.2  80.0  80.8  64.7  72.9 
Large firms  67.4  73.8  56.9  68.9  80.0  84.3  65.7  69.7 
Total  63.7  70.7  63.1  76.4  75.4  82.1  66.1  71.7 
Source: EFIGE dataset 
Table 3.8. Percentage of firms experiencing a turnover reduction in 2009 compared to 2008 (by Pavitt groups) 
   AUT  FRA  GER  HUN  ITA  SPA  UK  Total 
Economies of scale  66.7  71.9  64.5  77.4  75.3  87.4  68.4  73.0 
High-tech  65.2  49.2  48.0  73.3  54.5  69.8  49.5  53.9 
Specialised  74.2  72.2  71.9  76.4  77.5  83.9  68.1  74.8 
Traditional  61.4  71.9  59.7  75.7  76.5  80.8  65.1  71.9 
Source: EFIGE dataset 
 
Figure  3.11.  Firms  reducing  product/process 
innovation in 2009 (by country, size class and Pavitt) 
 
Source: EFIGE datase  
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However, there are big differences among countries, 
as large firms performed relatively better in Germany, 
Austria and, to a lesser extent, in the UK.  
The  decrease  in  investment  was  quite  diffuse 
throughout the economy in France and Spain, where 
between 55% and 60% of the sample reduced their 
commitments.  Conversely,  the  effect  of  the  credit 
crunch  and  the  demand  fall  appears  less  severe  in 
Austria, Germany and Italy, where only 30-35% of 
manufacturing  firms  cut  investment  plans.  The 
analysis of investment dynamics following the Pavitt 
groupings provides additional insights (Table 3.10). 
Although the overall average is similar for traditional, 
specialised  suppliers  and  scale  intensive  industries, 
there  is  large  heterogeneity  across  countries. 
Supplier-dominated  (traditional)  firms  performed 
relatively better  in Germany, Italy and Austria,  but 
struggled in France. Among high-tech firms, Austria 
is  the  country  with  the  smallest  decrease  in 
investments, followed by Germany, the UK and Italy. 
Spain  and  France  show  a  parallel  performance  in 
specialised providers and scale- intensive firms.  
Innovation  performance  of  EU  firms  is  examined 
using  a  large  spectrum  of  indicators.  The  most 
comprehensive measure at hand from the EU-EFIGE 
dataset is the percentage of companies introducing a 
process or/and product innovation between 2007 and 
2009 (Table 3.11.).  
In Europe, 65% of companies were engaged in such 
activities.  The  breakdown  is  61%  for  small  firms, 
73%  for  the  medium-sized  firms  and  79%  for  the 
largest ones. Austria leads in terms of the proportion 
of firms involved in innovation, followed by Spain 
and Italy. It is well known that this kind of qualitative 
indicator  is  more  suited  to  describe  the  innovative 
capacity in less technologically advanced production, 
which explains why Germany is at the bottom of the 
ranking.  Germany  recovers  in  the  ranking  when 
looking at proxies for formal innovation such as the 
proportion of R&D-performing firms, R&D intensity 
over sales and patenting.  
On average, one out of two EU firms declares that it 
carries out R&D projects. Again, Austria shows the 
largest proportion of innovators, closely followed by 
Germany and Italy. Engagement in formal research is 
rather low in Spain and in Hungary
89. 
The  financial  crisis  and  the  consequent  downturn 
caused a drop in firm demand and severely clouded 
expectations of future sales. These issues, combined 
with  tighter  credit  conditions,  led  one  third  of  EU 
firms  to  postpone  their  programmes  for  product 
or/and process innovation (Figure 3.11 Panel A). The 
share  of  firms  reducing  their  engagement  in 
innovation  activities  reaches  50%  among  Spanish 
SMEs. A larger heterogeneity emerges when looking 
at how  firms  changed  their innovation  programmes 
because  of  the  deepening  crisis  across  industry 
groupings (Figure 3.11, Panel B). Half of the Spanish 
firms  postponed  product/process  innovation;  this 
proportion is similar among Pavitt categories. Apart 
from  Spain,  innovation  activities  of  high-tech 
companies were less affected by the turmoil. 
 
                                                            
89   For a comparison of the EU with non-EU R&D performance 
see Moncado-Paternò-Castello et al. (2010). This study shows 
that the US has a stronger sectoral specialisation in the R&D 
intensive (especially ICT related) sectors, compared to the EU. 
Furthermore,  the  population  of  R&D  investing  firms  within 
these sectors is relatively larger. 
Table 3.9. Percentage of firms reducing investment in 2009 compared to 2008 (by size class) 
 
AUT  FRA  GER  HUN  ITA  SPA  UK  Total 
Small firms  32.3  55.1  26.8  46.4  35.8  52.0  39.5  42.0 
Medium firms  45.5  54.9  36.0  41.5  36.0  55.5  43.2  44.2 
Large firms  40.6  62.6  31.5  60.5  50.4  58.6  43.0  47.6 
Total  35.8  55.7  29.8  46.6  36.7  52.9  40.6  42.9 
Source: EFIGE dataset 
Table 3.10. Percentage of firms experiencing a turnover reduction in 2009 compared to 2008 (by Pavitt groups) 
 
AUT  FRA  GER  HUN  ITA  SPA  UK  Total 
Economies of scale  37.8  52.8  29.1  46.6  38.2  56.7  40.8  43.0 
High-tech  21.1  43.7  22.7  41.7  29.4  42.4  24.7  31.3 
Specialised  41.7  55.0  37.4  39.3  40.2  57.8  40.9  44.9 
Traditional  37.2  58.8  26.7  50.6  35.6  51.1  41.9  43.2 
Source: EFIGE dataset 
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3.4.1.  Analysis of the productivity effect of the 
crisis: econometric evidence  
This  section  investigates  how  the  financial  crisis 
affected  firms’  productivity  performance  by 
developing  an  empirical  model  where  the  rate  of 
growth  of  TFP  between  2008  and  2009 
(                     is  explained  by  a  large  set  of 
company  characteristics,  all  defined  as  dummy 
variables
90.  The  analysis  is  based  on  the  following 
specification:  
                                
                                      
                                                   
               
(3.5) 
To  allow  for  the  dynamic  profile  of  productivity 
performance,  the  level  of  TFP  in  2008  is  included 
among the regressors. A negative coefficient on this 
variable  would  indicate  the  presence  of  a  catch-up 
effect, whereby lower productivity firms fill the gap 
with the best performing ones. The first set of dummy 
variables (CRISIS in eq. 3.5) seeks to check for the 
effect of the financial crisis on TFP. This set includes 
information on the reduction of turnover, investment 
and innovations. These are all expected to negatively 
impact  on  TFP  growth.  A  second  set  of  dummies 
(INTANG)  captures  firms’  decisions  in  relation  to 
invest in intangible assets and provides information 
on whether the firm has conducted R&D investments 
over the period
91,  employed a higher proportion of 
educated workers compared to the national average 
(human  capital)  or  implemented  some  relevant 
organisational  changes.    Extensive  evidence  at  the 
micro  economic  level  shows  that 
                                                            
90   The  cross-sectional  regression  model  is  estimated  by  OLS, 
using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. 
91   R&D-performing firms is the preferred measure of innovation 
effort among those available as its effect is more robust across 
specifications. 
intangible  factors  concur  to  build  the  knowledge 
stock  of  the  company,  enhancing  its  productivity 
performance  and,  more  generally,  the  degree  of 
competitiveness  (Hall  et  al.  2009,  O’Mahony  and 
Vecchi 2009). 
Another set of controls looks for firms’ engagement 
in  the  international  market  (OPENESS).  These 
include firms’ decision to import material or service 
intermediate  inputs  in  2008  or  before,  and  the 
decision  to  carry  out  FDI.  An  additional  dummy 
variable for companies belonging to foreign groups is 
also considered to assess whether there is a positive 
relationship  between  firms’  participation  in 
international networks and productivity growth. The 
existing literature generally supports the evidence that 
international  firms  are  more  productive  than  those 
less  prone  to  undertake  foreign  activities  (Wagner 
2012).  However,  little  is  known  about  the 
performance of these firms during particularly critical 
economic conditions.  
The model also accounts for the role of institutional 
settings on firms’ productivity, consistently with the 
analysis  in  previous  sections  of  the  chapter.  The 
information on the EFIGE data set makes it possible 
to check how companies adjusted their activities as a 
result  of  the  changes  in  labour  market  regulations 
throughout  the  2000s  (LABOUR  variable  in  the 
econometric model 3.5). The impact of such reforms 
is  captured  by  a  dummy  variable  which  identifies 
companies  resorting  to  temporary  and  part-time 
contracts. Existing evidence shows that a high share 
of  temporary  workers  is  negatively  associated  with 
productivity growth, due to the low experience and 
low  endowments  of  firm-specific  human  capital  of 
such employees (Daveri and Parisi 2010). 
Table 3.11. Firm innovation performance in 2007-2009: summary of results (% of total) 
   AUT  FRA  GER  HUN  ITA  SPA  UK  Total 
Product/process innovation   75.9  56.3  64.6  55.7  67.5  69.6  67.3  64.9 
Reduction product/process innovation (in 2009)   29.4  30.2  30.4  34.8  35.8  50.1  30.3  35.4 
Doing R&D   55.5  50.7  54.6  26.8  55.0  46.0  53.2  51.2 
R&D intensity on turnover   6.5  6.2  7.8  5.7  7.3  7.1  6.9  7.0 
Patent an innovation   19.4  11.7  15.8  4.3  14.2  11.2  14.0  13.2 
Source: EFIGE dataset 
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Table 3.12. Determinants of TFP growth 2008-2009: OLS regression (by total sample, size classes and Pavitt groups) 
Dependent variable: TFP change 2008-2009 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  
Total 
sample 
Small 
firms 
Medium 
firms  Large firms 
Scale 
intensive 
High- 
tech 
Specia- 
lized 
Traditional 
Log TFP 2008  0.881***  0.880***  0.903***  0.843***  0.898***  0.900***  0.886***  0.868*** 
 
(0.010)  (0.012)  (0.017)  (0.043)  (0.017)  (0.054)  (0.019)  (0.016) 
Crisis effect                 
Turnover reduction  -0.063***  -0.065***  -0.048***  -0.079***  -0.063***  -0.074***  -0.055***  -0.063*** 
 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.021)  (0.010)  (0.021)  (0.011)  (0.006) 
Investment reduction  -0.019***  -0.013**  -0.034***  -0.025  -0.019**  -0.013  -0.032***  -0.013** 
 
(0.004)  (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.019)  (0.009)  (0.026)  (0.011)  (0.006) 
Innovation reduction  -0.006  -0.008  -0.003  0.018  -0.018**  0.030  0.008  -0.007 
 
(0.004)  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.018)  (0.009)  (0.023)  (0.010)  (0.006) 
Intangibles                 
R&D-doing firm  0.011**  0.011**  0.009  0.014  0.031***  -0.010  -0.004  0.005 
 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.021)  (0.010)  (0.024)  (0.010)  (0.006) 
Human capital  0.008*  0.011**  -0.006  0.010  0.006  -0.034  -0.002  0.015** 
 
(0.005)  (0.006)  (0.010)  (0.025)  (0.010)  (0.021)  (0.010)  (0.007) 
Organizational change  0.003  -0.002  0.003  0.019  0.003  -0.016  -0.007  0.007 
 
(0.004)  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.017)  (0.009)  (0.026)  (0.009)  (0.006) 
Controls                 
Openness                 
Importer of materials  0.005  0.009  -0.009  0.005  0.003  0.030  0.010  0.002 
 
(0.004)  (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.020)  (0.010)  (0.023)  (0.010)  (0.006) 
Importer of services  0.013**  0.011  0.013  0.020  0.017  0.047**  -0.001  0.012 
 
(0.005)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.019)  (0.011)  (0.023)  (0.010)  (0.007) 
FDI active  0.012  0.009  0.019  0.010  0.056**  0.006  0.003  -0.013 
 
(0.011)  (0.031)  (0.015)  (0.019)  (0.024)  (0.033)  (0.019)  (0.018) 
FDI passive (foreign group)  0.022***  0.032**  0.012  0.045**  0.017  0.037  0.014  0.029* 
 
(0.008)  (0.016)  (0.011)  (0.020)  (0.014)  (0.033)  (0.015)  (0.016) 
Labour input                 
Flexible contracts  -0.003  0.002  -0.036**  0.018  0.006  0.001  -0.037***  0.002 
 
(0.006)  (0.007)  (0.017)  (0.028)  (0.014)  (0.034)  (0.012)  (0.008) 
Financial input                 
Rationed credit  -0.017  -0.027*  0.026  0.011  0.010  -0.028  -0.041  -0.020 
 
(0.012)  (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.051)  (0.023)  (0.045)  (0.032)  (0.015) 
Other firm characteristics                 
Family management  -0.013***  -0.012**  -0.023  0.052  -0.004  -0.007  -0.031**  -0.013** 
 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.020)  (0.040)  (0.011)  (0.030)  (0.014)  (0.006) 
Quality certification  0.009**  0.009*  0.007  0.007  -0.005  0.032  0.032***  0.009 
 
(0.004)  (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.021)  (0.009)  (0.028)  (0.010)  (0.006) 
Young (less than 6 yrs)  -0.001  0.008  -0.026***  -0.032  -0.008  -0.057**  0.014  0.000 
 
(0.004)  (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.025)  (0.009)  (0.027)  (0.009)  (0.006) 
                 
Constant  0.081***  -0.005  0.083**  0.150***  0.055*  0.123  0.126***  0.046* 
 
(0.021)  (0.043)  (0.036)  (0.047)  (0.031)  (0.082)  (0.031)  (0.025) 
     
       
    Size dummies  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pavitt dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
     
       
    Observations  7,077  4,852  1,641  584  1,844  273  1,349  3,611 
R-squared  0.878  0.844  0.882  0.867  0.883  0.900  0.872  0.865 
Notes: Robust Standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* significant at 1,5, and 10%.  
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Due to the financial nature of the downturn, it is also 
important to check whether worsening conditions in 
the  credit  market  affected  firms’  performance 
(variable ‘FINANCE’ in the econometric model 3.5). 
This is captured by the inclusion of a dummy variable 
that takes value of 1 if the firm required credit during 
the crisis but did not obtain it. There is considerable 
evidence that EU SMEs were severely hampered in 
accessing  credit  but  the  issue  of  whether  this 
translated into lower rates of productivity growth is 
less explored (Houlton et al. 2012). Firms’ decisions 
to  invest  in  intangible  assets  and  to  compete  on 
international markets are related to their managerial 
abilities  (Castellani  and  Giovannetti  2010).  The 
analysis accounts for this issue by including a family 
management variable (a dummy equals 1 if the share 
of managers of the controlling family is higher than 
the national mean) and a quality certification dummy, 
which equals 1 if the firm has received some quality 
equivalent certification. Managerial practices explain 
large variation in firm productivity growth, negatively 
affecting aggregate productivity growth (Bloom and 
Van Reenen 2007, 2010). 
Other control variables include the age of the firm, 
country,  size  and  industry  (Pavitt)  dummies.  The 
productivity  impact  of  firms’  age  is  captured  by  a 
dummy variable taking the unit value if the firm is 
less  than  six  year  old.  This  controls  for  possible 
differences  in  performance  between  young  and 
relatively old firms. The former have higher growth 
potential, but they are not necessarily as productive 
(or  efficient)  as  the  incumbents.  During  the  1990s, 
highly  innovative  start-ups  were  found  to  make  an 
important  contribution  to  aggregate  productivity 
growth in the US, whilst their role in the EU was less 
clear (Bassanini and Scarpetta 2002).  
Regression  results  are  presented  in  Table  3.12. 
Estimates  are  provided  for  the  overall  sample,  and 
then split according to size classes and Pavitt groups. 
Overall,  results  corroborate  most  of  the  trends 
highlighted  in  the  earlier  sections.  The  positive 
coefficient on the level of TFP in 2008 suggests that 
there  has  been  no  productivity  catch-up  among 
companies during the crisis. This feature is common 
across size classes and industry groups.  This implies 
that,  within  any  single  country,  those  firms  which 
were most productive at the outset of the downturn 
accommodated better the negative shock, with above-
average  outperformance  in  terms  of  TFP  growth 
during 2008-2009. 
Firms  which  experienced  a  turnover  and  an 
investment  reduction  underperformed  compared  to 
those less affected by the crisis. The significance of 
both variables indicates that the downturn impacted 
distinctly  on  these  two  dimensions  of  firm 
performance and this, in turn, negatively affected TFP 
growth.  The  effect  of  turnover  reduction  was 
relatively  more  severe  among  large  and  high-tech 
firms,  while  the  decline  in  investment  particularly 
affected  productivity  growth  in  medium  firms  and 
specialised  producers.  On  average,  firms  endowed 
with  intangible  assets  performed  better,  especially 
when  these  factors  were  the  outcome  of  research 
activities or resulted from the employment of highly 
educated workers. Results in Table 3.12 indicate that 
intangible assets are important drivers of productivity 
growth,  particularly  for  small  firms  and  those 
specialised  in  scale-intensive  production.  The  fact 
that intangible inputs were not associated with better 
productivity  performance  in  more  technologically 
advanced  productions,  such  as  science-based 
industries,  may  be  due  to  the  low  variation  among 
these firms in R&D engagement and human capital 
endowment.  Interestingly,  companies  that  had 
undertaken  organisational  changes  before  the  crisis 
did not display a different productivity performance 
from the rest of the sample during the downturn.  
This may reflect the long time necessary before these 
changes  affect  productivity  (Rincon  et  al.  2012). 
International firms were more productive with respect 
to  those  active  solely  in  the  domestic  market,  in 
particular  those  affiliated  to  a  foreign  group.  This 
feature  is  common  to  both  small  and  large  firms. 
Conversely,  the  industry  breakdown  does  not  offer 
insights  on  the  role  of  this  variable  among  Pavitt 
categories,  apart  from  the  weakly  significant  effect 
found for traditional firms. Among high-tech firms, 
productivity  grew  faster  in  those  importing  service 
intermediate  inputs;  scale  intensive  firms  that  had 
previously carried out some production tasks abroad 
also  experienced  higher  productivity  growth  (FDI 
active).  In  accordance  with  the  literature  on  the 
regulation governing the labour market, firms relying 
upon  flexible  contracts  experienced  lower 
productivity growth.However, this effect is confined 
to  medium-sized  firms  and  specialised  suppliers. 
Results also provide evidence on the negative impact 
of  worsening  credit  conditions  on  productivity  for 
small firms (Houlton et al. 2012). Concerning other 
firm  characteristics,  results  show  that  family 
management is another condition which hampered the 
productivity  growth  of  smaller  firms,  traditional 
companies and specialised suppliers. Apart from this 
last group of firms, going through quality certification 
does not signal better managerial practices and, as a 
consequence, faster productivity growth. Looking at 
the  age  profile,  productivity  did  not  grow  at  a 
differential speed among young firms; rather, young 
medium-sized  and  high-tech  firms  underperformed 
compared  to  more  mature  firms.  Probably,  young 
companies were not sufficiently structured to tackle 
the collapse of the market between 2008 and 2009, or 
were not able to fully exploit their growth potential 
due to the worsening in demand conditions.   
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3.5.  SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This chapter has described the main features of recent 
EU aggregate and industry productivity performance 
from an international perspective, and has provided 
empirical  evidences  on  the  key  forces  behind  the 
productivity growth differentials with respect to the 
US. Identifying these factors is crucial for designing 
policies  able  to  reduce  the  gap  and  to  restore 
sustained  growth  in  Europe.  In  the  late  1990s, 
characterised by the emergence of ICT technologies, 
market  services  were  the  main  culprit  of  the  EU 
productivity disadvantage. In the years leading to the 
financial crisis, however, the EU experienced strong 
ICT-related  labour  productivity  growth  in  these 
sectors, mirroring earlier developments in the US, and 
boosting convergence towards US productivity levels. 
Since  the  crisis,  however,  the  EU-US  productivity 
gap has widened again.  
The  responses  to  the  downturn  have  been 
heterogeneous across the different sectors in the EU. 
Overall, service sectors appear to have been relatively 
less affected by the global economic crisis compared 
to manufacturing. Some key sectors, such as business 
services, have helped  in narrowing  the productivity 
gap  with  the  US  in  recent  years.  A  plausible 
explanation  is  that  these  sectors  are  usually  more 
sheltered  from  international  competition  than 
manufacturing sectors, and therefore, less exposed to 
global economic shocks. It is also possible that these 
sectors have continued to reap the benefits of strong 
tangible and intangible investments undertaken over 
the past decade.    
This  positive  outlook  for  labour  productivity 
expansion  in  some  EU  services  sectors,  however, 
contrasts with a poor TFP performance.  This finding 
suggests that the EU continues to experience lower 
levels of efficiency, with which inputs are used in the 
production process, than the US. These results call for 
a  more  in-depth  analysis  of  factors  affecting  TFP 
since, this is one of the main engines for increasing 
income levels in the long run.  
The  econometric  analysis  has  considered  two  main 
channels  through  which  it  is  possible  to  raise  the 
productivity growth potential and close the gap with 
technology  leaders.  First,  consideration  has  been 
given  to  the  role  of  absorptive  capacity  and 
knowledge-base  (intangible)  assets  –  i.e.  R&D  and 
human  capital  – in activating,  and benefiting from, 
international  technology  transfers.  This  mechanism 
has  been  found  in  the  literature  to  be  highly 
conducive to productivity growth through spillovers. 
However,  its  growth-enhancing  effect  is 
heterogeneous  and  it  requires  the  ability  to 
accommodate  the  inflow  of  new  technological 
knowledge  by  re-allocating  factors  or,  for  instance, 
expanding  new  product  lines.  The  set  of  rules  that 
regulate  the  functioning  of  internal  markets  is 
important in process of checking for the productivity 
effects of technology transfers. This analysis has not 
found  convincing  evidence  that  more  restrictive 
regulations  on  the  labour,  product  and  financial 
markets  significantly  hamper  the  capacity  of  a 
country to reap the benefits of knowledge developed 
elsewhere.  
The  second  channel,  is  the  role  of  production 
efficiency  as  a  possible  driving  force  behind  the 
widening productivity gaps between the EU and the 
US.  The  analysis  has  shown  that  productive 
efficiency is significantly higher in countries with less 
restrictive product market regulations or employment 
protection  laws.  However,  when  there  are  few 
restrictions on the use of temporary contracts and in 
financial markets, the efficiency gaps with respect to 
the  frontier  are  likely  to  increase,  as  these  might 
encourage firms to adopt cost-cutting strategies rather 
than  the  most  efficient  methods  of  production. 
Investment in ICT assets, on the other hand, is one of 
the crucial factors that help in reducing the distance 
from the most efficient country and/or industry. 
Broadly  consistent  evidence  also  emerges  from  the 
analysis of firm-level performance at the outset of the 
financial crisis. The analysis undertaken for seven EU 
economies provides strong micro foundations to the 
observed  widening  productivity  differentials  at  a 
more aggregate level. This study shows that the most 
productive  firms,  prior  to  the  crisis,  which 
experienced  faster  TFP  growth  afterwards.  This 
finding confirms that, even within the EU, the recent 
downturn  seems  to  have  reinforced  the  trend  of 
diverging productivity patterns which emerged in the 
earlier period. 
Overall,  the  analysis  carried  out  in  this  chapter 
provides  insights  into  which  policies  may  be  more 
effective in raising productivity performance within 
the EU and closing the gap with the US. A common 
finding throughout the chapter is that intangible assets 
(R&D,  human  capital,  organizational  change)  are 
important sources of TFP growth and sustained long-
run  competitiveness.    From  this  perspective, 
initiatives aimed at stimulating such investments may 
be particularly useful.  
Albeit EU countries represent an important share of 
R&D at a worldwide level, they are less specialized 
in  high-tech  sectors  compared  to  the  US.  The 
different structural specialisation of the EU countries 
explains why they have fewer young firms among its 
leading  innovators  and  their  young  firms  are  less 
innovative  than  in  the  US  (Cincera  and  Veugelers 
2010). Also, in Europe the proportion of R&D-doing 
firms  is  considerably  lower  than  the  US.  These 
factors  can  explain  the  discussed  research  gap 
(Moncada-Paternò-Castello et al. 2010).  
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Ample  evidence  can  be  found  in  the  literature,  for 
example, about the effectiveness of tax incentives to 
raise research effort. This policy instrument does not 
distort market incentives because; it reduces the cost 
of R&D without influencing firms’ choices regarding 
specific projects (David et al. 2000)
92. In the OECD 
area,  public  policies  to  directly  sustain  R&D  have 
also  been  implemented  through  a  combination  of 
measures favouring a large spectrum of knowledge-
intensive  sectors  (ICT,  pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnologies,  etc.).  In  this  way,  these  countries 
have sought to shift their industrial structures towards 
high-tech  productions  and  increase  thus  their 
international competitiveness. 
Specific policy initiatives may also be put in place to 
increase a firm’s endowment of qualified workers, for 
instance facilitating hiring of highly qualified workers 
(such  as  professional  managers)  or  to  sustain 
workforce  training  to  enhance  the  endowment  of 
firm-specific  human  capital.  Other  sound  policies 
could be directed towards raising investment in inputs 
such as ICT, which can assist in the reorganisation of 
production.  Specific  ICT  applications,  such  as 
enterprise  software  systems,  have  been  related  to 
increasing  productivity  at  the  firm  level  in  the 
existing  literature  (Engelstatter  2009).  These 
measures  would  also  be  viable  for  smaller  firms 
which do not always have the necessary resources to 
embark  on  formal  R&D  activities  and  need 
                                                            
92   A possible drawback is that it influences the composition of 
research project favouring those with a higher profitability in 
the short run. 
alternative ways of increasing their competitiveness 
(EC 2012 and 2013). It should be borne in mind that 
ICT may spur productivity performance by increasing 
efficiency  in  production  tasks  and  this  effect  may 
occur with some lags. These measures may therefore 
be  accompanied  by  other  policies  targeted  to 
facilitating factors. Policies aimed  at improving the 
functioning  of  product  and  factor  markets  may  be 
particularly  effective.  Reducing  the  strictness  of 
product  market  regulations,  largely  concentrated  in 
key  service-providing  industries,  is  likely  to  be 
conducive  to  higher  levels  of  efficiency  across  the 
whole  economy,  by  allowing  input  re-allocation, 
outsourcing of marginal tasks, and the adoption of the 
best production and managerial practices. Changes in 
the regulatory setting of the labour market should also 
be tailored to restore an optimal mix of regular and 
temporary workers, bearing in mind that  an excessive 
liberalisation  of  temporary  workers’  contracts  may 
hinder productivity and efficiency performance.  
Given  the  role  of  financial  input  on  productivity 
performance,  it  appears  useful  to  promote  policies 
designed  to  increase  firms’  access  to  external 
funding, such as bank credit and private bonds. These 
measures should be conceived and applied within an 
appropriate  regulatory  framework  which  will 
safeguard the stability and facilitate the reduction of 
productivity and efficiency gaps. 
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ANNEX 1 
ABBREVIATIONS 
ECR   Enforcing Contract Time 
EPC        Employment Protection Legislation for collective dismissals. 
EPL  Overall Employment Protection Legislation 
EPR     Employment Protection Legislation for regular contracts 
EPT  Employment Protection Legislation for temporary contracts 
EU-15    Austria, Belgium,  Denmark, Finland, France,  Germany, Greece, Ireland,  Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
EU-27       Austria,  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Finland,  France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg,  Latvia, Malta, Netherlands,  
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, UK. 
EU-8  Austria, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Spain, Germany, Italy, UK.   
FDI   Foreign Direct Investment 
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
GPT   General Purpose Technology 
ICT   Information and Communications Technologies 
IPR    Intellectual Property Rights 
JP  Japan 
LC  Labour Composition 
LP     Labour Productivity 
NACE      National Classicisation of Economic Activities  
NMW      National Minimum Wage 
NUTS    The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics 
OECD    Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development  
OLS  Ordinary Least Squares 
PMR        Product Market Regulation 
R&D    Research and Development 
RI  Regulation Impact 
SFA   Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
SME  Small and Medium-sized Enterprise 
TE  Technical  Efficiency 
TFP   Total Factor Productivity 
US  United States 
 
    
100 
ANNEX 2 
METHODOLOGIES 
2.A. METHODOLOGY TO 
AGGREGATE PRODUCTIVITY DATA 
The  Conference  Board  Total  Economy  Database 
(TED) and the EUKLEMS database contain a wide 
range  of  economic  performance  measures  on  a 
country-by-country  basis.  This  information  is 
however  of  limited  use  if  one  wants  to  establish 
meaningful comparisons of growth and productivity 
trends between the whole of the EU and other world 
economies. In this study, the methodology set out in 
Timmer  et  al,  2007  is  followed  to  construct  EU 
aggregate  (e.g.  the  EU-27  or  EU-15)  measures  of 
output, input and productivity.   
This methodology is based in the use of a Tӧrnqvist 
quantity  index,  which  is  a  discrete  time 
approximation to a Divisia index. A Divisia index 
defined as a  continuous-time weighted sum of the 
growth  rates  of  various  components,  where  the 
weights are the component's shares in total value; in 
the Törnqvist index, the growth rates are defined as 
the difference in the natural logarithm of consecutive 
observations of the components, and the weights are 
equal  to  the  mean  of  the  factor  shares  of  the 
components  in  the  corresponding  pair  of  time 
periods (e.g. years).  
Aggregation over countries 
The  derivation  of  an  aggregate  measure  of  labour 
productivity for the  EU-27 is outlined  in practical 
terms here. First of all, annual growth rates of labour 
productivity  for  each  of  the  EU-27  countries  are 
computed for the time period under consideration (as 
the differences in the natural logarithms). Secondly, 
the  annual  shares  of  each  country  in  EU  nominal 
output  are  calculated  using  PPP-converted  values, 
which  adjust  for  purchasing  power  parities  price 
differentials across countries 
93 (Inklaar and Timmer, 
2008).  
The calculation of nominal output shares for each of 
the  EU  countries  is  given  by  the  following 
expression:  
        
[
        
        
]
         
 
                                                            
93   Purchasing  Power  Parities  (PPP),  which  are  available  for 
economy level and for detailed industries, are usually given 
for a benchmark year. Here the PPPs are given for 1997 (See 
Inklaar and Timmer, 2008).   
where   denotes PPP-adjusted nominal output;    
denotes nominal output;   denotes country,   denotes 
industry, and   denotes year.  
The overall labour productivity for the EU-27 is then 
calculated  as  a  weighted  average  of  country 
productivity growth rates, as set out below:   
              ∑  ̅                
 
 
 
 
where   ̅      denotes the two-year average shares of 
each  country  in  total  nominal  output.  Once  the 
annual growth rates for the EU country grouping are 
obtained,  it  is  feasible  to  construct  an  aggregate 
index  of  labour  productivity  in  relation  to  a  base 
year (for example, assuming that labour productivity 
is equal to 100 in year 1995).  
Aggregation over industries 
A similar procedure to the one outlined above can be 
applied  to  calculate  aggregate  performance  for  a 
specific group of industries. For instance, to measure 
productivity  growth  in  the  high-technology 
manufacturing  sector  of  a  particular  country. 
Moreover,  if  productivity  in  the  high-technology 
manufacturing sector of the EU as a whole wants to 
be computed, a double aggregation procedure has to 
be followed. First an aggregation is performed over 
countries,  and  then,  over  industries,  following 
recommendations in Timmer et al (2007).   
            ∑  ̅                    
 
 
 
2.B. GROWTH ACCOUNTING 
METHODOLOGY  
The growth accounting methodology (Jorgenson and 
Griliches,  1967;  Jorgenson  et  al,  1987)  has  been 
widely  used  to  assess  the  contribution  of  the 
different  factors  of  production  to  aggregate 
economic  growth.  According  to  this  methodology, 
which is rooted in neoclassical theory, the part of 
output growth that is not accounted by the growth in 
inputs, usually capital and labour can be attributed to 
TFP,  a  proxy  measure  for  technological  progress. 
Assuming  a  Cobb-Douglas  production  function, 
output   (i.e. value added) is a function of capital 
(   , labour (    and technology (   in the following 
terms:   
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Assuming that factor markets are competitive, full 
input  utilisation  and  constant  returns  to  scale,  the 
growth of output can be expressed as the cost-share 
weighted growth of inputs and technological change 
(A), using the translog functional form common in 
such analyses: 
          
           ̅       ̅          
where   ̅ and  ̅ are the two-period average share of 
labour and capital input in nominal output.  
With the use of this empirical approach it is possible 
to identify and quantify the role of labour and capital 
in  aggregate  growth.  More  recent  contributions 
extended  the  framework  to  allow  for  the  separate 
analysis  of  ICT  assets  (computers,  software  and 
communications)  and  non-ICT  capital  assets 
(machinery,  transport  equipment,  residential 
buildings, infrastructure), as well as for changes in 
workforce  composition,  in  terms  of  labour 
characteristics such as educational attainment, age or 
gender (Jorgenson et al, 2005). Growth in output can 
be decomposed into the following elements:   
        ̅       ̅             ̅           
        
where the contribution of each factor input is given 
by  the  product  of  its  share  in  total  costs  and  its 
growth rate;  
  ̅
    is the two-period average share of ICT assets in 
total  capital  compensation;  and   ̅
      is  the  two-
period  average  share  of  non-ICT  assets  in  total 
capital compensation.  
The growth in labour input can be split into growth 
of hours worked and changes in labour composition. 
Labour  composition  in  EUKLEMS  is  derived  by 
dividing labour into types and multiplying growth in 
each type by wage bill shares. 
              . 
To analyse productivity it is useful to divide output 
and inputs by the number of hours.  The following 
expression  can  be  derived  for  labour  productivity 
growth:  
 (
 
 
)    ̅     
    
 
     ̅      
     
 
 
    ̅  
  
 
         
Based on the above formulae, the EUKLEMS and 
The  Conference  Board  Total  Economy  Database 
provide a full decomposition of output and labour 
productivity  growth  into  the  contributions  of  the 
various factor inputs and TFP growth.  
2.C. THRESHOLD REGRESSIONS 
Threshold  models  have  in  recent  times  received  a 
great  deal  of  attention  as  a  means  of  modelling 
parameter  heterogeneity  and  non-linearities.  In  a 
series  of  papers  Hansen  (1996,  1999  and  2000) 
develops a technique that allows the sample data to 
jointly  determine  both  the  regression  coefficients 
and the threshold value for OLS and (non-dynamic) 
fixed effects panel models. 
The threshold model for a single threshold can be 
written as: 
                                   
           
where     is  the  indicator  function  and      is  the 
threshold variable. Here the observations are divided 
into  two  regimes  depending  on  whether  the 
threshold variable is smaller or larger than   . The 
two  regimes  are  distinguished  by  different 
regression  slopes,      and    .  Chan  (1993)  and 
Hansen (1999) recommend estimation of    by least 
squares. This involves finding the value of    that 
minimises the concentrated sum of squared errors. In 
practice this involves searching over distinct values 
of    for the value of    at which the sum of squared 
errors is smallest, which is then our estimate of the 
threshold.  Once  we  have  an  estimate  for  the 
threshold it is straightforward to estimate the model. 
Hansen (2000) extends this method to the case of 
non-dynamic fixed-effects panel models. 
Having  found  a  threshold  it  is  important  to 
determine  whether  it  is  statistically  significant  or 
not, that is, to test the null hypothesis;           . 
Given that the threshold    is not identified under 
the null, this test has a non-standard distribution and 
critical  values  cannot  be  read  off  standard 
distribution  tables.  Hansen  (1996)  suggests 
bootstrapping to simulate the asymptotic distribution 
of the likelihood ratio test allowing one to obtain a 
p-value for this test. Firstly, one estimates the model 
under  the  null  (i.e.  linearity)  and  alternative  (i.e. 
threshold  occurring  at    ).  This  allows  one  to 
construct the actual value of the likelihood ratio test 
    : 
    
          
          where  
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Here    and    are the residual sum of squares from 
the linear and threshold models respectively. Using a 
parametric  bootstrap  (see  Cameron  and  Trivedi, 
2005) the model is then estimated under the null and 
alternative and the likelihood ratio    is calculated. 
This  process  is  repeated  a  large  number  of  times. 
The bootstrap estimate of the p-value for    under 
the  null  is  given  by  the  percentage  of  draws  for 
which the simulated statistic    exceeds the actual 
one. 
The  approach  is  also  easily  extended  to  consider 
more than one threshold. While it is straightforward 
to  search  for  multiple  thresholds,  it  can  be 
computationally  time-consuming.  Bai  (1997)  has 
shown,  however,  that  sequential  estimation  is 
consistent, thus avoiding this computation problem. 
In the case of a two-threshold model, this involves 
fixing the first threshold and searching for a second 
threshold. The  estimate  of  the  second  threshold  is 
then  asymptotically  efficient,  but  not  the  first 
threshold because it was estimated from a sum of 
squared errors function that was contaminated by the 
presence of a neglected regime. Bai (1997) suggests 
estimating a refined estimator for the first threshold, 
which  involved  re-estimating  the  first  threshold, 
assuming that the second threshold is fixed. The test 
of  significance  of  the  second  threshold  proceeds 
along the same lines as described above, with the 
null and alternative hypotheses being of a one and 
two threshold model respectively. 
2.D. STOCHASTIC FRONTIER 
ANALYSIS (SFA) 
Frontier  Analysis,  initially  developed  in  Farrell 
(1957) and successively extended by Aigner et al. 
(1977), Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) and Greene 
(2005) among others, aims to identify the production 
frontier, i.e. the maximum level of output that can be 
achieved by using the available inputs. Compared to 
regression  analysis,  the  estimation  of  the  frontier 
production function implies fitting a regression line 
over the units (industries in our case) that produce 
the  most  output.  The  difference  between  the  two 
techniques can be easily seen in the following figure, 
where Y indicates output and X denotes a generic 
input: 
Countries/industries at the frontier are those that are 
making  the  most  efficient  use  of  their  resources. 
Those  below  the  frontier  have  some  level  of 
inefficiency, which can be directly estimated by the 
distance  between  each  industry  and  the  frontier 
industry. 
It  is  possible  to  distinguish  between  two  frontier 
methods,  Deterministic  Frontier  (DEA)  and 
Stochastic  Frontier  (SFA).  DEA  (Farrell  1957, 
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes 1978) provides a non-
parametric  approach  for  estimating  production 
technologies  and  measuring  inefficiencies  in 
production.  It  relies  on  the  assumption  that  all 
deviations from the frontier are caused by technical 
inefficiency,  without  making  allowanced  for 
measurement  errors  and/or  random  components. 
This  implies  that  not  only  the  method  is  very 
sensitive to the presence of outliers, but also lacks 
the necessary diagnostic to help the user determine 
whether  or  not  the  chosen  model  is  appropriate, 
which variables are significant and which are not. 
These shortcomings are overcome by using the SFA. 
Here the identification of the frontier technology is 
based on the econometric estimation of a production 
function, usually a Cobb-Douglas or a semi-translog 
function.  Differently  from  standard  regression 
analysis, frontier analysis allows for the presence of 
a  composite  error  term,  which  includes  a  random 
component  and  an  inefficiency  term.  The  random 
component allows for the presence of measurement 
errors and other effects not captured by the model. 
The  inefficiency  term  measures  technical 
inefficiencies,  i.e.  the  distance  of  each 
country/industry  from  the  frontier.  This  ranges 
between  0  and  1,  with  higher  values  identifying 
 
Y 
                   *    *          
                *        *  * 
            *         * 
      *    *     * 
         *    * 
    
 
   
                                           X 
 
 
Y 
                             *    *          
                       *        *  * 
                   *         * 
              *    *     * 
                   *    * 
    
 
   
                                           X 
 
A:   Regression analysis  B:   Frontier analysis 
  
103 
more  efficient  units.  Technical  efficiency  scores 
derived for each unit/industry can then be analysed 
across  different  dimensions  to  pinpoint  areas 
characterised by low/high inefficiencies. 
The performance of an industry depends not only on 
the inputs used in the production process but also on 
other  external  or  environmental  factors  that  can 
affect  the  efficient  use  of  resources.  These  are 
usually  factors  that  are  outside  the  control  of  an 
industry, even though it is possible that some factors 
play a dual role, i.e. they affect both frontier output 
and  inefficiency  (Kneller  and  Stevens  2006).  The 
SFA  framework  can  easily  account  for  this  by 
modelling the mean level of the inefficiency term as 
a  function  of  these  additional  factors.  Production 
frontier  and  determinants  of  inefficiency  are 
estimated  simultaneously  by  maximum  likelihood 
(ML) (Battese and Coelli 1995).  
2.E. PAVITT TAXONOMY (1984) 
Using industry-specific characteristics of innovative 
UK  firms  Pavitt  (1984)  identifies  some  major 
technological  trajectories  in  manufacturing,  on  the 
basis of which it is possible to identify some specific 
patterns  of  sectoral  innovation.  The  Pavitt  (1984) 
taxonomy maps industries according to the source of 
innovation activities made by the firms (internal vs 
external),  the  nature  of  innovation  (informal  vs 
formal,  or  learning  vs  R&D),  firm  size  (small, 
medium,  or  large),  appropriability  of  innovation 
(low  vs  high  returns  to  innovation),  method  of 
protection  (secrecy  vs  patents)  etc.  Industries  or 
firms can be grouped into the following categories: 
Scale-intensive:  They  are  large  firms  exploiting 
increasing  returns  to  scale  and  learning-by-doing 
associated with the size of the reference market, or 
of their own plant. The source of innovation may be 
both external and internal. In the former case, these 
firms  acquire  production  technologies  from 
specialised  suppliers.  In  the  latter  case,  in-house 
R&D activities are performed to develop new types 
of  products;  in  this  case,  patenting  is  effective  to 
protect innovation. The main economic activities of 
such  firms  are  basic  metals  or  the  production  of 
durable goods. 
Science  based:  They  are  mainly  large  firms  using 
internal  sources  of  knowledge  to  produce 
innovations  (R&D).  Their  knowledge  base  is 
complex  and  relies  upon  scientific  advances. 
Sometimes,  innovations  are  developed  between 
private  firms  and  universities  and  other  research 
institutes. Patents are the major, but not exclusive, 
tools  to  protect  innovations.  Small  firms  may  be 
very competitive in certain technologically advanced 
niches. The main economic activities of such firms 
are pharmaceuticals, electronics, etc. 
Specialised suppliers: They are small- and medium-
sized  firms  manufacturing  sophisticated  equipment 
and/or precision machinery. They strongly rely upon 
internal  sources  of  innovation  (engineering  and 
design  capabilities  are  pivotal),  developing  new 
products  by  continuously  interacting  with  their 
customers,  i.e.  downstream  firms  using  in  their 
production  the  equipment  developed  by  this 
category. The nature of innovation of this type of 
firms is therefore informal and based on learning. 
Supplier  dominated:  They  are  traditional  firms, 
representing  the  least  technologically  advanced 
branch  of  the  manufacturing  sector.  Their  main 
source  of  innovation  is  external  and  consists  in 
introducing  cost-saving  process  innovations,  or 
implementing  advanced  technologies,  equipment 
and materials, developed in other sectors. The only 
internal  source  of  innovation  is  the  learning 
associated with the usage of acquired inputs. Given 
the  low  level  of  appropriability  of  internal 
innovation,  patenting  is  not  very  developed.  The 
main  economic  activities  of  such  firms  are  food, 
textile, footwear, etc.  
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  Chapter 4.  
A ‘MANUFACTURING IMPERATIVE’ IN THE EU: THE ROLE 
OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
The economic crisis changed the perceptions of the 
role  of  the  manufacturing  sector  in  the  economy. 
Manufacturing  has  redeemed  its  reputation  in  the 
sense that a comparatively large manufacturing sector 
is  no  longer  considered  to  reflect  an  outdated 
economic structure, inadequate for a post-industrial, 
services-dominated  economy  like  the  EU.  Rather, 
nurtured  by  the  observation  that  within  the  EU, 
countries  which  have  maintained  a  larger 
manufacturing base fared better during and after the 
crisis  (Reiner,  2012;  Fürst,  2013),  a  dynamic 
manufacturing  sector  is  again  considered  a 
prerequisite  for  an  innovative  and  fast-growing 
economy. In a recent Communication, the European 
Commission,  emphasises  that  a  ‘vibrant  and highly 
competitive  EU  manufacturing  sector’  is  a  key 
element  for  solving  societal  changes  ahead  and  a 
‘more  sustainable,  inclusive  and  resource-efficient 
economy’ (European Commission, 2010a).  
This  altered  perception  of  manufacturing  raised 
concerns that manufacturing production had declined 
too much (Warwick, 2013) in some Member States 
leading  to  a  loss  of  knowledge,  capabilities  and 
supplier networks which have been referred to as the 
‘manufacturing commons’ (Pisano and Shih, 2009)
94. 
Earlier  arguments  for  a  ‘manufacturing  imperative’ 
(Rodrik,  2012)  were  re-discovered  and  the  current 
structural  shift  out  of  manufacturing  in  advanced 
economies,  including  most  EU  Member  States, 
started  to  look  less  advantageous.  The  urge  felt  by 
policy  makers  and  the  business  community  to 
maintain a broad manufacturing base in Europe also 
led  to  a  renewed  interest  in  industrial  policy  in 
Europe and elsewhere (including the United States).  
The  importance  of  industrial  structures  is  widely 
accepted. The potential for economic policy to shape 
that  structure,  however,  remains  highly  disputed, 
particularly  in  Europe  where  the  track  record  of 
interventionist  industrial  policy  experiments  in  the 
1960s  and  1970s  was  rather  disappointing  (Crafts, 
2010; Owen, 2012). Industrial policy, understood as 
selective  government  interventions  seeking  to  alter 
the structure of production towards industries that are 
                                                            
94   The industrial commons are a reference to the commons which 
is the land belonging to a (village) community as a whole and 
which could also be used by each member of the community 
(typically for grazing of animals). They can be described as the 
general  stock  of  knowledge,  competences  and  skills  (often 
embodied in the workforce) and institutions (including supplier 
networks)  relevant  for  modern  manufacturing  activities  that 
can be shared and accessed by the manufacturing sector as a 
whole (Pisano and Shih, 2009). 
expected to offer higher growth prospects (Pack and 
Saggi, 2006), can in principle try to foster structural 
change  towards  any  sector  or  industry  that 
government  authorities  consider  to  be  ‘strategic’ or 
potential carrier of growth. Viewed through the lenses 
of  a  ‘manufacturing  imperative’,  the  particular 
characteristics  of  manufacturing  industries  (such  as 
externalities and increasing returns to scale
95) call for 
industrial  policies  that  re-direct  the  European 
economy towards manufacturing activities and aim at 
strengthening or restoring the industrial commons.  
Despite this renewed debate about the objectives and 
instruments of EU industrial policy, it remains deeply 
rooted  in  the  principles  of  competition,  favouring 
general  framework  policies  (such  as  the  proper 
functioning  of  the  Internal  Market  and  competition 
rules)  and  ‘horizontal’  policies  over  sector-specific 
interventions
96. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the 
economic crisis the European Commission’s focus on 
framework policies has been supplemented with more 
sector-specific policy objectives such as the definition 
of  key  priority  areas  which  include  inter  alia  the 
development of clean vehicles and vessels and smart 
grids (European Commission, 2012a). Sector-specific 
action may indeed be warranted in cases where the 
market is not able to bring about a resource allocation 
that  is  efficient  and  conducive  to  solving  societal 
challenges. A potential reason for that is the existence 
of  path  dependency  in  technological  trajectories  as 
documented  for  example  in  an  under-provision  of 
clean technologies (Aghion et al., 2010). A corollary 
of this is that the state has an important coordination 
role,  helping  to  remove  lock-in  effects  in 
technological developments.  
Against this background, this chapter revisits some of 
the  main  arguments  in  favour  of  a  manufacturing 
imperative and discusses them in a European context. 
It  also  shows  the  limitations  and  caveats  of  these 
arguments in a world of strong inter-linkages between 
the  production  of  manufactures  and  the  services 
which  enter  the  production  process  (Sections:  4.1-
                                                            
95   Increasing  returns  to  scale  can  also  arise  from  network 
externalities which play a role in a number of sectors that can 
be  referred  to  as  utilities  such  as water,  gas  and  electricity, 
telecommunication or rail services.  
96   Among  economists  it  is  highly  disputed  whether  horizontal 
measures  are  necessarily  less  distortive  than  sectoral 
interventions. De facto, horizontal policies are hardly neutral 
with regards to structure and sectors. Therefore, the dichotomy 
between  horizontal  measures  and  vertical  measures  may  be 
blurred or even meaningless (Pelkmans, 2006; Cohen, 2006; 
Midelfart and Overman, 2002; Chang, 2006).  
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4.6). Sections: 4.7-4.10, identify the main challenges 
ahead  for  European  manufacturing  given  the 
structural changes that occurred in the EU over the 
period  1995  to  2011.  Sections: 4.11-4.15  analyse  a 
number of industrial policy measures that are related 
to  these  structural  challenges.  Given  the  still 
prevalent use of State aid by EU Member States and 
the unique institutional framework which empowers 
the  Commission  to  restrict  the  use  of  State  aid,  a 
quantitative analysis of State aid and its relationship 
with competitiveness and value added is undertaken. 
Due  to  the  great  importance  that  the  European 
Commission attaches to innovation-related industrial 
policy,  the  study  of  public  support  measures 
continues  with  a  firm-level  study  of  the  impact  of 
public R&D support for firms on innovativeness and 
innovation output. The section 4.16 discusses policy 
implications of the use of State aid and R&D support 
measures in the context of the structural challenges.  
4.1.  THE MANUFACTURING IMPERATIVE IN A 
EUROPEAN CONTEXT 
This section lays the ground for the analysis of the 
structural shifts in the European manufacturing sector 
and  the  challenges  ahead.  In  particular,  it  revisits 
some of the main arguments in favour of maintaining, 
re-building or creating – as the case may be – a strong 
manufacturing  base  in  EU  Member  States  while 
bearing  in  mind  that  modern  manufacturing 
production is increasingly dependent on innovations 
and specialised services inputs. The latter have gained 
importance  for  product  differentiation  and  quality 
improvements of manufactures which allow firms to 
charge higher prices and increase the value-added of 
their  activities.  Therefore  the  discussion  of  the 
particular role of manufacturing for the economy has 
to be  considered  in the context of increasing inter-
linkages between manufacturing and services.  
Many arguments have been brought forward for why 
a thriving manufacturing sector is a prerequisite for 
any  economy  aiming  for  high  growth  and 
employment rates.  
4.2.  THE MAIN SOURCE OF INNOVATION AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS 
One  principle  argument  in  favour  of  a  strong 
manufacturing base is that the manufacturing sector is 
the  major  source  of  technological  progress  (e.g. 
Baumol,  1967;  Kaldor,  1968;  UNIDO,  2002; 
Aiginger  and  Sieber,  2006;  Helper  et  al.,  2012). 
Inspection of firms’ business expenditure on research 
and  development  (BERD)  in  the  EU  and  other 
countries  clearly  supports  this  claim  (Figure  4.1). 
Manufacturing firms are more inclined to undertake 
R&D than firms in the rest of the economy, resulting 
in higher shares of the sector compared to its share of 
value-  added.  On  average  the  share  of  the 
manufacturing sector in business R&D exceeds that 
of the value-added share by a factor close to four in 
the EU Member States; the same holds for the United 
States,  Japan  and  South  Korea.  Despite  marked 
variations  in  the  business  R&D  share  of 
manufacturing  firms,  ranging  from  almost  90%  in 
Germany to 29% in Estonia
97,  it exceeds  the value 
added share of manufacturing in all Member States. 
Consequently the R&D expenditures of firms indicate 
that  the  overwhelming  majority  of  R&D  activities 
take  place  in  the  manufacturing  sector  which  can 
therefore  be  identified  as  the  main  source  of 
innovation and technological progress.  
While the essential role of manufacturing firms for 
innovation  and  technological  progress  is  generally 
accepted, an important question is whether a thriving 
European  manufacturing  sector  requires  innovative 
European firms to keep their production facilities in 
the  EU.  For  Member  States  at  the  technological 
                                                            
97   The median value of the business R&D share of manufacturing 
firms is 70.5% for the EU Member States. 
Figure 4.1. Share of manufacturing in value added and in business expenditure on R&D (BERD), 2005-2009 
 
Note: Business Expenditure on R&D includes R&D  by foreign enterprises. Averages over the period 2005-2009 of available data. 
Source: WIOD, WIPO, OECD ANBERD, wiiw calculations.  
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frontier  it  would,  in principle,  suffice  if  firms  kept 
headquarter  functions  and  in  particular  R&D 
activities  in  the  domestic  economy  but  move 
manufacturing  production  to  low-wage  locations  in 
order to reduce costs and increase productivity. Such 
a vertical specialisation strategy could lead to a ‘high-
powered’  manufacturing  sector  in  Europe 
characterised  by  highly  productive  domestically 
innovating  but  internationally  producing 
manufacturing firms.  
While  a  successful  vertical  specialisation  strategy 
supports firms’ competitiveness and offshoring may 
also  be  seen  as  a  necessity  to  survive  international 
competition,  a  potential  risk  in  this  high-powered 
manufacturing strategy is a continuous ‘leakage’ of 
more complex activities to offshore destinations. The 
stepwise offshoring of more sophisticated production 
and engineering activities is the result of the building-
up of capabilities in offshore destinations as well as 
communication  and  co-ordination  failures.  From  a 
European  perspective,  the  fact  that  offshoring  is 
mainly  taking  place  between  EU  Member  States 
could be an advantage, as in this context, and in this 
case competences would not risk being shifted out of 
the region. 
4.3.  INCREASED LINKAGES BETWEEN 
MANUFACTURING AND SERVICES 
R&D and innovation are not the sole ingredients for a 
highly  productive  and  internationally  competitive 
manufacturing  sector.  In  order  to  differentiate 
products  and  charge  higher  price-cost  mark-ups 
manufacturing  firms  depend  increasingly  on 
sophisticated  services  inputs.  The  mirror-image  of 
this is that the manufacturing sector is an important 
source  of  demand  for  many  services.  Both  aspects 
highlight  the  fact  that  goods  and  services  often 
complement  each  other  (Nordås  and  Kim,  2013). 
Moreover,  evidence  of  the  strong  interdependences 
between manufacturing and services in the European 
economy is provided by the fact that manufacturing 
firms generate a growing amount of their sales from 
services. This ‘servicisation’ of manufacturing seems 
to be more developed among producers of complex 
manufactures (Dachs et al. 2013). 
On returning to the issue of supply linkages between 
services  and  manufacturing  sector,  an  interesting 
indicator is the service intensity of the manufacturing 
sector,  measured  as  the  cost  share  of  services  in 
manufacturing gross output. During the period 1995-
2011  the  service  intensity  of  the  European 
manufacturing sector increased from 22% in 1995 to 
24% in 2011 with an interim high in 2009 (Figure 
4.2). 
Figure  4.2.  Service  inputs  into  the  manufacturing 
sector relative to manufacturing gross output for the 
EU-27, 1995-2011 
 
Figure  4.3.  Service  inputs  into  manufacturing 
(relative to manufacturing gross output) sourced from 
domestic economy, intra-EU and extra-EU, 1995-2011 
 
Note: Calculations based on EU Member States and aggregated 
to the EU-27. Intra-EU includes the services sourced from EU 
Member  States  other  than  the  Member  States  in  question.  
Source: WIOD, wiiw calculations 
This  increase,  which  is  discernible  in  low-tech, 
medium-low-tech  as  well  as  medium-high-tech 
industries,  reflects  the  intensified  linkages  between 
manufacturing and services. It is noticeable that, in 
contrast to R&D efforts and innovation which tend to 
be  concentrated  in  advanced  industries  such  as 
pharmaceuticals,  the  electronic  industry,  machinery 
and  transport  equipment  industries  (particularly  the 
aircraft industry), there is no systematic relationship 
between  services  intensity  and  the  technology 
intensity  of  industries  (see  also  Nordås  and  Kim, 
2013). The reason for this is that transport and sales 
services  are  more  intensively  used  by  low-tech 
industries. It is true, however, that business services 
are  most  intensively  used  by  the  medium-high-
technology industries, although the differences across 
the three groups of industries are not very large. This 
could mean that precisely because innovation plays a 
less  important  role  or  international  competition  is 
fiercer,  low-tech  industries  must  strongly  rely  on 
business  services  (such  as  marketing)  in  order  to 
differentiate  their  products  from  competitors.  An 
important  feature  of  the  inter-linkages  between 
manufacturing and services is that EU manufacturing 
firms source intermediate services almost exclusively 
nationally.  On  average,  the  share  of  domestically 
sourced services amounted to 87% in 2011  (Figure  
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4.3).  Another  4%  were  sourced  from  other  EU 
Member States and 9% from third countries.  
4.4.  THE ‘CARRIER FUNCTION’ OF MANUFACTURES 
Another  important  structural  feature  is  that 
manufactures are highly tradable whereas this is only 
true for a subset of services. The higher tradability of 
manufactures combined with the increasing services 
intensity  of  manufactures  imply  that  manufactures 
assume an  important ’carrier function’  for services. 
Just  as  many  chemical  processes  require  carrier 
substances, many services require manufactures to be 
‘carried’ to foreign customers. This carrier function 
stems from the fact that many services by themselves 
are not easily tradable as evidenced by the relatively 
small (though growing) share of intermediate services 
sourced  from  abroad.  The  high  tradability  of 
manufactures  and  the  carrier  function  this  provides 
for services are of course highly relevant for the EU’s 
external balance of payments. 
While the share of services in the EU’s gross exports 
to  third  countries  has  grown  considerably  over  the 
past decades to about a third, it still falls far short of 
the (equally growing) share of services in both GDP
98 
and  value-added  exports
99.  This  can  be  seen  by 
comparing the share of services in gross exports, i.e. 
33%, to the share of services in extra-EU value added 
exports which amounted to 57%. Hence, in terms of 
value-added  exports  the  share  of  services  exceeded 
that  of  manufactures  which  amounted  to  37%  in 
2011. The rising importance of services in terms of 
value-added exports results from the fact that more 
services  are  embodied  in  exports  of  the 
manufacturing  sector  than  vice-versa
100.  Hence,  for 
non-tradable  services  an  internationally  competitive 
manufacturing  sector  is  needed  in  order  to  make 
services  exportable  and  to  create  comparative 
advantages in services
101. At the same time, services 
have become an essential factor in underpinning the 
competitiveness of manufactures.  
4.5.  PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH  
Another  common  argument  for  the  special  role  of 
manufacturing  –  which  is  strongly  related  to  the 
innovation  argument  but  distinct  from  it  –  is  that 
productivity growth is higher in manufacturing than 
in the rest of the economy. The productivity argument 
                                                            
98   Typically, the share of services account for about 60-70% of 
GDP in advanced economies. 
99   Value  added  exports  are  a  measure  based  on  input-output 
methodology that reflects the value-added created domestically 
in an industry or sector in order to satisfy foreign demand (see 
also Box 4.1). 
100   Another  factor  is  that  vertical  specialisation  and  trade  in 
intermediates in general is more developed in manufacturing 
which ‘inflates’ the gross amounts of exports. 
101   An  alternative  way  to  sell  services  internationally  is  by 
establishing  a  foreign  subsidiary  (Mode 3  of  cross-border 
services trade in WTO terminology). 
is related to the innovation argument because R&D 
and innovation feed into technological progress and 
productivity growth. It is distinct because the sector 
of  origin  of  technological  progress  need  not 
necessarily be the sector that benefits most strongly 
from new technologies
102. 
Irrespective of this distinction, it turns out that total 
factor  productivity  (TFP)  growth  in  the 
manufacturing sector outperforms TFP growth in the 
total  economy  as  well  as  that  of  business  services 
across a sample of EU Member States and also the 
US  (Figure  4.4).  Within  the  EU,  the  TFP  growth 
differential between the manufacturing sector and the 
total economy is particularly large in Austria and in 
Germany, but is also present in the service-oriented 
British economy. The sole exceptions to this EU-wide 
pattern  are  Spain  and  Italy  which  actually  did  not 
experience any TFP growth between 1995 and 2007. 
The  result  remains  unchanged  if  TFP  growth  in 
manufacturing  is  compared  to  TFP  growth  in  the 
market services sector instead of the total economy. 
Hence,  the  superior  TFP  growth  trajectory  in  the 
manufacturing sector between 1995 and 2007 is not 
due to low productivity performance in typically low 
productivity services such as health care or personal 
services.  
TFP growth in the manufacturing sector also exceeds 
that of the total economy in the United States
103.  
The  reason  for  higher  productivity  growth  in  the 
manufacturing sector is partly related to technological 
aspects of manufacturing (increasing returns to scale, 
externalities,  learning  effects)
104.  An  additional 
reason  is  that  manufactures,  being  more  tradable 
compared  than  services,  are  exposed  to  fiercer 
international  competition  which  sets  further 
incentives  to  increase  productivity.  This  does  not 
exclude the possibility of high productivity pockets 
within the services sector which is of course a very 
heterogeneous sector, comprising a number of high 
productivity industries like telecommunications.  
                                                            
102   The  relationship  between  innovation  and  productivity  at  the 
industry or sectoral level is blurred by the fact that in the case 
of product innovations the productivity gains (depending on 
market structures) may not accrue to the innovating industry 
but to downstream industries sourcing cheaper inputs or inputs 
of higher quality. By contrast, productivity gains from process 
innovation  typically  accrue  in  the  innovating  sector  though 
they may spread to other sectors later on. 
103   In  the  case  of  the  United  States,  however,  real  productivity 
growth  of  manufacturing  may  be  overstated  due  to  strongly 
decreasing price deflators in the electronic equipment industry. 
104   Another issue is the problem of measuring and comparing TFP 
across industries, but lacking alternatives this analysis relies on 
the  best  data  source  available  which  is  the  EU  KLEMS 
database.  
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Figure  4.4.  Comparison  of  total  factor  productivity 
(TFP) growth in the manufacturing sector, the total 
economy and market services, 1995-2007 
 
Source: EU KLEMS, wiiw calculations. 
An implication of these differentiated patterns of TFP 
developments  is  –  in  accordance  with  Baumol’s 
arguments  of  structural  change  (see  Baumol,  1967) 
outlined in more detail below - that in the longer term 
prices  of  manufactures  will  decline  relative  to 
services which – ceteris paribus - is leading to a lower 
share  of  manufactures  in  value  added  in  nominal 
terms. Therefore a declining value added share of the 
manufacturing  sector  per  se  is  not  a  reason  for 
concern but the logical consequence of a European 
manufacturing  sector  that  is  constantly  becoming 
more efficient.  
To  sum  up,  the  comparison  of  TFP  growth  rates 
supports the view that the manufacturing sector is not 
only  the  most  important  source  of  innovation  and 
technological  progress  but  also  the  sector  where 
innovations  and  new  technologies  are  primarily 
implemented and turned into total factor productivity 
growth.  
4.6.  DOES MANUFACTURING OFFER HIGHER WAGES 
IN EUROPE? 
A final argument in the context of a manufacturing 
imperative is that the manufacturing sector is capable 
of  providing  a  large  amount  of  well-paid  jobs 
(Rodrik, 2012). This claim is typically put forward in 
the context of emerging economies but it could also 
be relevant for the cohesion countries among the EU 
Member States.  
From a theoretical perspective, the argument that the 
manufacturing  sector  offers  higher  wages  typically 
states  that  the  production  of  manufactures  is 
characterised  by  imperfect  competition  (e.g.  due  to 
learning  effects  or  static  economies  of  scale  in 
production), combined  with imperfect inter-industry 
labour mobility within a country
105. For the EU-27, 
                                                            
105   From a theoretical perspective differences in wages between 
industries  will  always  depend  on  some  limitations  to  inter-
 
however,  there  is  no  evidence  of  higher  wages  in 
manufacturing  compared  to  the  services  sector  – 
neither at the general wage level, nor for wages set by 
educational  attainment.  Considering  the  EU  as  a 
whole,  hourly  wages  have  been  lower  in  the 
manufacturing  sector  (EUR  13.39)  than  in  the 
services  sector  (EUR 14.34)
106.  At  the  level  of  EU 
Member  States  the  results  are  mixed,  with 
manufacturing  wages  being  higher  in  some  EU-15 
countries.  But wages in the services sector are higher 
in all central and eastern European Member States as 
well  as  Malta  and  Cyprus  (EU-12).  The  same 
comparison but taking the educational attainments of 
workers into account, suggests that in general wage 
differentials  between  the  services  and  the 
manufacturing sector are small. The finding is in line 
with the results found for other countries, such as the 
United  States  (McKinsey  Global  Institute,  2012). 
According to economic theory, factor rewards should 
in  the  long  run  reflect  factor  intensities.
107  Simple 
correlations between wages in different sectors could 
therefore be misleading. 
4.7.  STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE EU ECONOMY  
A  general  feature  of  the  European  economy  (and 
advanced economies in general) is the structural shift 
to the services sector. This shift is observable for both 
value-added and employment and has been discussed 
in Chapter 2 of this report. The mirror image of the 
‘move  into  services’  in  Europe  is  a  decline  in  the 
relative  importance  of  manufacturing  industries 
(Table  4.1)  for  which  there  is  a  whole  series  of 
explanations.  
As shown above, productivity growth in the European 
manufacturing sector outpaces productivity growth in 
services and the economy in general. 
This  is  a  major  reason  why  relative  prices  of 
manufactures decline relative to those of services. As 
a  consequence,  the  nominal  value  added  share  of 
manufacturing  declined  by  4.2 percentage  points 
between 1995 and 2011 (and by 5.3 percentage points 
between 1995 and 2009) as shown in Table 4.1.  The 
relative  decline  in  real  terms  was  more  moderate, 
amounting to 2.6 percentage points between 1995 and 
2009 (see for example also Aiginger, 2007). In real 
terms, the value added share of the EU manufacturing 
sector is higher than in nominal terms amounting to 
17.5% in 2009. The share of the manufacturing sector 
in terms of employment declined to a similar extent 
                                                                                         
industry  labour  mobility.  Differences  in  wages  can  be 
motivated by a number of economic models, e.g. a specific-
factor  model  of  trade.  The  differences  in  wages  between 
industries depend on a number of factors including the capital 
intensity or whether one looks at the short or the long run.  
106   This  result  is  based  on  2010  Eurostat  data  of  hourly  gross 
earnings of employees working in companies with ten or more 
employees. 
107   Norman, V, D. & Orvedal, L. (2010).  
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as  the  nominal  value  added  share  (4.3 percentage 
points between 1995 and 2009).  
This suggests that technological progress which lies 
behind the changes in relative prices is mainly labour-
saving. 
A second factor for the observable structural trend is 
rigid  demand  structures  characterised  by  low  price 
elasticities of demand and high income elasticities for 
some  services,  e.g.  education,  tourism,  health, 
cultural  activities  (see  Baumol,  1967).  This  factor 
helps  to  explain  why  the  relative  importance  of 
manufacturing in value added terms has declined over 
time.  Besides,  outsourcing  processes  and  vertical 
disintegration (with more service activities provided 
by  external  firms  rather  than  produced  internally) 
might be an additional cause for declining industry 
shares. 
The structural shift out of manufacturing (both in the 
EU  and  globally)  encompasses  basically  all 
manufacturing industries, implying that the aggregate 
decline of the manufacturing value-added share is the 
result  of  widespread  trends  across  industries  rather 
than driven by only a part of them.  
Against  the  background  of  these  general  structural 
trends  at  the  global  and  European  level,  important 
changes in the global economy such as the emergence 
of new players in international production and trade 
and  the  growing  importance  of  ideas,  skills  and 
technology  for  international  competitiveness,  poses 
major challenges for European manufacturing. 
To offset the effects of cyclical consumption patterns 
and  sectoral  relative  productivity  growth  rates  on 
manufacturing shares of GDP and total employment, 
manufacturing firms and industries in the EU need to 
Table 4.1. Nominal and real valued added shares and employment shares in the EU and the global economy 2009 and 
2011 (in %); changes 1995-2009 and 1995-2011 in percentage points 
    EU-27      World 
    Nominal value 
added 
Real value added    Employment      Nominal value 
added 
Real value added    Employment 
Industry    2011  change 
1995-
2011 
  2009  change 
1995-
2009 
2009  change 
1995-
2009 
2011  change 
1995-
2011 
  2009  change 
1995-
2009 
2009  change 
1995-
2009 
                                       
Primary Industries    2.7  -1.21    3.1  -0.79    5.9  -3.73      9.6  3.29    4.9  0.22    32.2  -8.76 
Manufacturing    15.8  -4.24    17.5  -2.55    15.6  -4.33      17.2  -2.43    18.3  -1.53    15.2  0.20 
Food    1.9  -0.54    2.0  -0.45    2.2  -0.46      2.4  -0.20    2.1  -0.40    1.9  -0.20 
Textiles    0.5  -0.55    0.6  -0.43    1.1  -1.04      0.8  -0.27    0.8  -0.25    2.6  0.29 
Leather    0.1  -0.09    0.1  -0.11    0.2  -0.20      0.1  -0.02    0.1  -0.04    0.5  0.15 
Wood    0.3  -0.15    0.4  -0.11    0.6  -0.21      0.4  -0.13    0.3  -0.15    1.0  0.27 
Pulp & Paper    1.2  -0.64    1.5  -0.38    1.1  -0.42      1.1  -0.53    1.3  -0.37    1.0  0.22 
Ref. Petroleum    0.3  0.00    0.3  -0.04    0.1  -0.06      0.9  0.27    0.7  0.04    0.1  -0.02 
Chemicals    1.7  -0.39    2.2  0.12    0.8  -0.30      1.8  -0.17    2.0  0.06    0.8  -0.11 
Plastics    0.7  -0.20    0.9  0.00    0.8  -0.04      0.7  -0.15    0.7  -0.11    0.9  0.28 
NM Minerals    0.6  -0.34    0.7  -0.24    0.7  -0.23      0.7  -0.15    0.7  -0.19    0.9  -0.37 
Metals    2.4  -0.29    2.2  -0.53    2.3  -0.40      2.4  -0.23    2.2  -0.48    1.3  -0.24 
Machinery    2.0  -0.14    1.9  -0.30    1.7  -0.42      1.5  -0.20    1.7  -0.14    1.1  -0.19 
Electrical Eq.    1.7  -0.56    2.6  0.27    1.7  -0.30      2.3  -0.18    3.3  0.78    1.4  0.22 
Transport Eq.    1.7  -0.18    1.8  -0.16    1.4  -0.13      1.6  -0.36    1.9  -0.16    0.9  -0.01 
Manufacturing n.e.s.    0.6  -0.17    0.6  -0.20    1.0  -0.12      0.5  -0.11    0.5  -0.12    1.0  -0.09 
Electricity, gas, water    2.4  -0.29    2.2  -0.48    0.8  -0.25      2.1  -0.20    2.2  -0.28    0.5  -0.02 
Construction    5.9  -0.10    4.8  -1.19    7.2  0.16      5.5  -0.38    4.4  -1.48    6.9  1.36 
Services    73.2  5.84    72.4  5.01    70.5  8.15      65.6  -0.29    70.1  3.07    45.1  7.22 
Note:  Industry  classification  based  on  NACE  Rev.  1.1.  Food=15t16;  Textiles=17t18;  Leather=19;  Wood=20;  Pulp  &  Paper=21t22; 
Refined  Petroleum=23;  Chemicals=24;  Plastics=25;  Non-Mineral  Metals=26;  Metals=27t28;  machinery=29;  Electrical 
equipment=30t33; Transport equipment=34; Manufactures n.e.s.=36t37. World includes EU-27.   
Source: WIOD, wiiw calculations.   
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become  more  competitive  on  the  world  markets. 
Given  the  importance  of  service  inputs  in 
manufacturing  production,  the  completion  of  the 
single market for services is expected to advance the 
level of services tradability. By raising their market 
shares,  the  production  and  employment  in  EU 
manufacturing can increase.
108 
Industrial  policy  also  has  a  role  to  play  here,  by 
providing  the  rules  and  instruments  necessary  to 
increase  the  competitiveness  of  EU  manufacturing 
industries.  
4.8.  TRENDS WITHIN EU MANUFACTURING 
Over  the  period  1995-2009  almost  5  million  jobs 
were  lost.  From  2009  to  2011  manufacturing 
employment in the EU-27 fell by another 1 million 
jobs
109. 
To some extent the loss of manufacturing jobs may be 
offset  by  new  jobs  created  in  services  sectors 
providing intermediate services to manufacturing.  
An  important  explanation  for  the  negative 
employment  developments  in  European 
manufacturing is the increase in productivity that – as 
                                                            
108   The effects on employment could however be negative if the 
main  way  to  become  more  competitive  is  to  increase 
productivity growth. 
109   Development 2009-2011 based on Eurostat data. 
mentioned before – tends to be labour-saving
110. In 
addition the structural shifts within the manufacturing 
sector  are  going  in  the  direction  of  a  mild  but 
persistent  shift  towards  more  technology-intensive 
industries  (chemicals,  machinery,  electrical 
equipment and transport equipment) which also tend 
to  be  less  labour-intensive.  These  ‘advanced 
industries’  also  registered  negative  employment 
trends between 1995 and 2009 (with the exception of 
transport  equipment)  but  job  losses  were  more 
pronounced  in  the  low-tech  industries  (3.5  million) 
which  accounted  for  70%  of  total  losses  in 
manufacturing employment (Table 4.2. ).  
This  trend  towards  advanced  manufacturing 
industries reflects international specialisation patterns 
of EU Member States because in general technology-
intensive  industries  offer  more  possibilities  for 
building  comparative  advantages  by  product 
differentiation and quality aspects. At the same time 
low-technology-intensive  industries  still  accounted 
for  almost  40%  of  manufacturing  employment  in 
2009. Overall, the EU manufacturing sector is well 
diversified.  In  order  to  maintain  diversity,  the 
structural  upgrading  should  proceed  at  a  moderate 
pace in order to ensure that the manufacturing base in 
the EU remains broad, encompassing all industries. In 
low-tech  and  medium-low-tech  industries  this  will 
                                                            
110   This has to be considered in conjunction with the structures of 
price and income elasticities of demand which tend to work 
against compensating demand shifts towards relatively cheaper 
manufactures. 
Table 4.2. Employment developments within the manufacturing sector, EU-27, 1995-2009 
    1995    2009    changes 1995-2009 
industry    number of jobs  
(in '000)  share    number of jobs  
(in '000)  share    number of jobs  
(in '000) 
percentage 
points 
low-tech     17,257  43.1    13,795  39.3    -3,462  -3.78 
medium-low tech  3,778  9.4    3,493  10.0    -285  0.52 
metals    5,419  13.5    5,155  14.7    -264  1.16 
chemicals    2,258  5.6    1,864  5.3    -394  -0.33 
machinery    4,227  10.6    3,786  10.8    -441  0.23 
electrical eq.    3,958  9.9    3,758  10.7    -200  0.83 
transportation eq.  3,142  7.8    3,235  9.2    93  1.37 
manufacturing    40,038  100.0    35,084  100.0    -4,954   
Note: Value added price deflators for the electrical equipment industry of Finland, France, Sweden, Japan, South Korea and the US 
replaced  by  respective  German  deflation  in  each  year.  Industry  classification  based  on  NACE  Rev.  1.1.  Low-tech:  Food=15t16, 
Textiles=17t18,  Leather=19,  Wood=20,  Pulp  &  Paper=21t22,  Manufactures  n.e.s.=36t37;  medium-low-tech:  Refined  Petroleum=23, 
Plastics=25, Non-metallic mineral products=26; Metals=27t28; Chemicals=24; Machinery=29; Electrical equipment=30t33; Transport 
equipment=34;    
Source: WIOD, wiiw calculations.  
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require a high degree of specialisation within these 
industries  and  the  occupation  of  niche  markets. 
Existing evidence suggests that many European firms 
follow  such  a  ‘premium  strategy’  within  their 
respective  industry.  Within  industries  and  product 
categories  featuring  a  low  degree  of  complexity, 
European  firms  typically  operate  in  the  top  quality 
segments (Reinstaller et al., 2012)
111. 
Maintaining  a  broad  and  well-diversified 
manufacturing base in Europe is important in order to 
preserve manufacturing capabilities which, once lost 
are hard to develop again. Manufacturing capabilities 
specific to particular industries may at a later stage 
turn out to be important inputs for fast growing new 
products. It is argued that the United States has made 
this  experience  in  several  industries  such  as  shoe 
production  where  the  entire  supply  chain  has  been 
lost (Helper et al., 2012).
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Having  stressed  the  diversification  of  the  EU 
manufacturing sector and the specialisation into the 
premium  segments  within  industries  it  is  also 
important  to  note  the  high  degree  of  heterogeneity 
across Member States. Figure 4.5 illustrates this with 
respect to the value added share of manufacturing and 
changes thereto between 1995 and 2011. While this is 
an  imperfect  indicator  of  the  role  of  the 
manufacturing  sector  for  the  economy,  the  cross-
country  comparison  still  indicates  which  countries 
may have reason to be worried about their industrial 
commons. There is cause for concern either because 
the value added share of manufacturing is declining 
very strongly – as in the United Kingdom or Latvia – 
or because it was very low initially (i.e. in 1995) as in 
the case of France or Greece.  
In principle, a declining share of manufacturing in the 
economy’s value-added  may  be  of little concern  in 
Member  States  whose  manufacturing  industries 
produce sophisticated products with a high premium 
on world markets. Such Member States, e.g. Finland 
(despite  some  problems  faced  recently  in  the  high-
tech  manufacturing  sector)  or  the  United  Kingdom 
are  potentially  left  with  a  high-powered 
manufacturing sector. The developments could be of 
more concern  in countries such as Cyprus,  Greece, 
Latvia  or  Malta  where  industries  produce  less 
sophisticated  products  and  are  therefore  more 
vulnerable  to  competition  from  low-cost  producers. 
(see Reinstaller et al., 2012). In contrast, there is a set 
of  countries  including  Germany,  Austria  and  a 
number of central and eastern European countries that 
have maintained a rather high-value added share of 
                                                            
111   See also Chapter 2 of this Report. 
112   Maybe  more  important  is  the  case  of  thin-film-deposition 
which  has  moved  from  the  US  to  South  East  Asia  together 
with  semiconductor  production  which  turned  out  to  be 
important for producing solar panels. 
manufacturing. This shows that there is considerable 
dispersion among Member States. 
4.9.  EXTERNAL COMPETITIVENESS 
Figure 4.6. not only shows the competitive positions 
of the EU-27 as measured by shares in global value-
added exports compared to major competitors among 
advanced  economies  –  the  US,  Japan  and  South 
Korea  –  but  also  compared  to  large  emerging 
economies  like  Brazil,  China  and  India  (for  the 
concept  of  value-added  exports  see  Box  4.1). 
Technological leadership and quality upgrading have 
become  increasingly  important  to  ward  off 
competition from emerging economies. 
Given  the  structural  upgrading  in  emerging 
economies,  competitive  pressures  from  these 
countries are not limited to low-technology-intensive 
industries but are also felt in advanced manufacturing 
industries  where  emerging  economies  have  also 
gained  a  foothold.  Brazil,  India  and  China  all 
considerably increased their market shares in global 
value-added exports of manufactures. However, it is 
the outstanding performance of China, whose market 
share  quadrupled  between  1995  and  2011,  which 
basically  drives  the  reshuffling  of  competitive 
positions in the global economy.  
By 2011 China had almost caught up with the EU-27 
in terms of value added exports of manufactures, with 
both economies having a market share of about 20%. 
China’s rise to a first-class exporter of manufactures 
can be seen in the way it gained export market shares 
across all industries, with extremely strong positions 
in the export of textiles and leather as well as in the 
electrical  equipment  industry.  While  China  is  still 
specialised  in  the  relatively  more  labour-intensive 
stages of production within the electrical equipment 
industry, the impressive gains in market shares also 
reflect  a  remarkable  upgrading  of  industrial 
structures. The same holds true for other industries 
and also other emerging economies, e.g. the Indian 
pharmaceutical and automotive industries.  
A  factor  that  facilitated  structural  upgrading  in 
emerging  economies  is  the  relative  ease  of 
international technology transfer in a global economy 
(through trade, FDI, labour mobility in the high-skill 
segment  of  the  labour  force  and  knowledge 
diffusion).  This  is  particularly  true  for  the 
manufacturing sector because the required technology 
and  industrial  know-how  are  to  a  large  extent 
embodied  in  physical  products  which  makes  them 
more prone to imitation.  
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Figure  4.5.  Developments  of  the  value-added  share  of  manufacturing  (nominal)  across  EU Member  States  and  selected 
competitor countries, 1995-2011 
 
Source: WIOD, wiiw calculations. 
Figure 4.6. Shares in global value added exports of manufactures (in %), 2011 (upper panel) and changes thereto (in p.p.), 
1995-2011 (lower panel), extra-EU exports 
   
 
 
Note:  Industry  classification  based  on  NACE  Rev.  1.1.  Food=15t16;  Textiles=17t18;  Leather=19;  Wood=20;  Pulp  &  Paper=21t22;  Refined 
Petroleum=23;  Chemicals=24;  Plastics=25;  Non-metallic  mineral  products=26;  Metals=27t28;  Machinery=29;  Electrical  equipment=30t33; 
Transport equipment=34; Manufactures n.e.s.=36t37. Global market shares in value-added exports and changes thereto exclude intra-EU value-added 
exports. Source: WIOD, wiiw calculations 
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As a result emerging economies like China not only 
have  large  export  market  shares  in  low-tech  and 
medium-low-tech  industries  (where  they  can  be 
expected  to  possess  comparative  advantages  due  to 
lower  labour  costs)  but  also  increasingly  in  more 
technology-intensive industries. 
The  mirror  image  of  the  entry  of  China  and  other 
emerging economies into the global trade arena is a 
decline in market shares of the EU, the US– both lost 
about a fifth of their export market shares between 
1995 and 2011 – and Japan, whose market share was 
halved. Even if the gains in market shares of China 
levels  off  in  coming  years  as  wages  rise  and  the 
technology gap narrows
113, these industries in China 
will remain major competitors. Arguably, competition 
may become fiercer as the catch-up process of major 
                                                            
113   Gains  in  market  shares  in  Chinese  value  added  exports  in 
manufactures seems to have levelled off somewhat since the 
mid-2000s  although  they  continued  to  increase  (by  4.2 
percentage  points  between  2007  and  2011  compared  to  5.3 
percentage points between 2002 and 2006).  
emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil 
continues and these countries expand their skills and 
capabilities in the manufacturing domain. 
In  any  case,  the  shifts  in  competitive  positions 
discernible in Figure 4.8.  suggest that the EU’s losses 
of  export  market  shares  in  manufacturing  were 
primarily due to the integration of emerging countries 
into  the  global  economy  and  to  a  lesser  extent  to 
competition from other advanced economies with the 
exception  of  South  Korea,  which  made  substantial 
inroads  into  the  production  and  export  of  transport 
equipment (mainly the automotive industry). 
Given these trends in market shares in global value 
added exports, further shifts towards these emerging 
economies can be expected.  
From  a  European  perspective,  however,  the  rise  of 
China  and  other  emerging  economies  not  only 
constitutes  a  formidable  competitive  challenge  but 
also  means  new  and  enlarged  markets.  Equally 
important is the fact that the benefits from new export 
Box 4.1. Why is it important to look at value-added exports? 
International trade has not only expanded spectacularly over the past 25 years, it has also become increasingly 
complex. One important dimension in this complexity is the fact that the specialisation patterns have become 
more granular. Supported by declining trade costs, the ever finer specialisation on individual components of a 
product or steps in the production process – also referred to as fragmentation of production – makes the 
analysis of trade flows more demanding. International fragmentation of production heightens the importance 
of trade in intermediate goods. This in turn poses some difficulties for traditional trade statistics which record 
trade flows according to a gross concept thereby inflating trade figures.  
One possibility to adjust gross export flows for imported intermediates is provided by global input-output 
statistics.  The  present  Report  relies  on  the  World  Input-Output  Database  (WIOD)  which  provides  such 
statistics for a set of 40 countries including EU Member States. The WIOD is used to calculate the value- 
added exports at industry level for each country or country groups. These value added exports capture  only 
the value added that is generated domestically in the production of goods that are destined for export (see 
Johnson  and  Noguera,  2012;  Stehrer,  2012)  but  exclude  foreign  value-added  associated  with  imported 
intermediates.  
The figures above illustrate how the differences between gross exports and value-added exports can be quite 
significant,  particularly  in  industries  characterised  by  intensive  intra-industry  trade  such  as  electrical 
equipment. According to gross exports, China’s market share in the electrical equipment industry for example 
rose from 5.27% in 1995 to 33.6% in 2011. Looking at value added exports, China’s market share still rose 
but  reached  only  24.5%  in  2011.  While  this  is  still  a  spectacular  development,  the  resulting  difference 
between China’s market share in gross exports and value added exports is equal to about 33.6% and 24.5% in 
2011, respectively.  
For the EU and the United States the opposite is true. The EU’s share in global value added exports in the 
electrical equipment industry is 2.2 percentage points higher than in terms of gross exports in 2011 and in the 
US  the  difference  even  reaches  9  percentage  points.  The  figures  above  also  indicate  that  the  difference 
between gross exports and value added exports has increased between 1995 and 2011 due to the emergence of 
international production networks and more fragmented global production.  
In the presence of international production sharing the value added exports probably give a more accurate 
picture of export market shares of the trading partners involved 
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opportunities and the potential costs of a deteriorating 
international  competitiveness  are  not  distributed 
evenly  across  EU  Member  States.  This  leads  to 
another main challenge for European manufacturing 
which consists of the agglomeration of manufacturing 
activities. 
4.10. R&D AS MEANS TO MEET COMPETITION 
The gap between the innovation activities of firms in 
the EU and the United States has been a concern for 
European  policymakers  for  decades.  Indeed,  the 
comparison of R&D intensity in manufacturing as an 
indicator  of  the  intensity  of  innovative  activity, 
measured  as  the  business  expenditure  of 
manufacturing  firms  on  R&D  relative  to 
manufacturing  value-added,  suggests  that  European 
manufacturing  is  characterised  by  lower  R&D 
intensity in comparison to US and Japan.  
Figure  4.8.  Decomposition  of  differences  in  manu-
facturing R&D intensity in EU Member States, the US 
and Japan, average 2007-2008 
 
Note: R&D intensity is Business expenditure on Research and 
Development in per cent of value added. Global average is the 
average of the nine countries. R&D intensity differential is the 
difference of the manufacturing-level R&D intensity to the mean 
of the nine countries. Methodology following Eaton et al. (1998). 
Industry classification based on NACE Rev. 1.1. For industry 
groupings and decomposition see Appendix   
Source: WIOD, OECD ANBERD, wiiw calculations 
These  differences  in  R&D  intensity  at  the 
manufacturing level can be split into a composition 
effect which reflects differences across countries in 
industry  structure,  and  an  intensity  effect  which 
reflects differences in the R&D intensity at the level 
of manufacturing industries, as well as an interaction 
effect  (see  Eaton  et  al.,  1998  and  European 
Commission (2011)). This decomposition shows that 
the differences in the R&D intensity of firms across 
EU  Member  States,  the  US  and  Japan  at  the 
manufacturing  level  are  mainly  driven  by  the 
intensity effect. The industry structure (composition 
effect)  plays  a  role  in  some  Member  States  but  is 
never the primary factor
114.  
This  gap  in  R&D  activities  of  the  manufacturing 
sector in the seven EU Member States, characterised 
by the largest R&D intensities across Member States 
for which data are available, is partly compensated by 
higher  public  R&D  expenditure  in  these  countries. 
R&D intensity in the seven EU Member States with 
the relatively highest R&D intensities across the EU 
(Figure 4.8) is only 62% that of the United States.  
However,  there  are  also  research  findings-based  on 
BERD territorial official statistics and also company 
data  that  conclude  on  the  lower  overall  corporate 
R&D  intensity  for  the  EU  as  a  result  of  sector 
specialisation  (structural  effect).  In  these  cases,  the 
US seems to have a stronger sectoral specialisation in 
the  high  R&D  intensity  (especially  ICT-related) 
                                                            
114   The  relative  importance  of  the  composition  effect  and  the 
intensity effect in such a decomposition exercise depends on 
the  level  of  aggregation  of  the  industries.  A  more  detailed 
industry break-down would assign greater importance to the 
composition  effect.  The  EU  R&D  Scoreboard  2012  also 
identifies an R&D intensity gap which is particularly strong in 
the high-tech industries when using ANBERD data which are 
territory based. When using a more elaborate analysis based on 
company-level  data,  it  is  argued  that  industry  composition 
becomes  an  important  agent  (see 
http://iri.jrc.ec.europa.eu/scoreboard12.html  for  details, 
particularly Chapter 7). 
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Source: WIOD, wiiw calculations. 
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sectors than the EU does, and also has a much larger 
population  of  R&D  investing  firms  within  these 
sectors
115. This issue, call for policy makers to pay 
further  attention  to  the  industrial  structures 
differences  and  the  need  for  Europe  to  favour  the 
growth  and  emergence  of  new  world  leading 
innovative companies
116. 
At the same time, it seems that the concern about a 
deterioration  of  relative  positions  in  advanced 
manufacturing industries vis-à-vis the US and other 
economies  at  the  technological  frontier;  should  be 
limited to the electrical components industry. In all, 
other  advanced  manufacturing  sectors,  the  market 
shares in global value-added exports of the EU are 
still much higher than those of the US. The EU is still 
the world’s largest exporter of chemicals, machinery 
and  transport  equipment,  with  the  latter  two 
constituting  the  major  strongholds  of  European 
manufacturing. Despite a 6 percentage points decline 
in  its  market  share  of  global  value  added  exports 
between 1995 and 2011
117, the EU still accounts for 
more than a third of global machinery valued-added 
that  is  exported,  putting  it  far  ahead  of  the  United 
States
118.  The  EU-27  also  has  considerable  export 
market  shares  in  low-technology  industries  such  as 
the  food  industry  or  the  pulp  and  paper  industry 
which supports the claim that EU firms often occupy 
premium  segments  within  industries  to  remain 
internationally  competitive.  An  example  for  such 
high-quality specialisation in low-technology sectors 
is the production of protective textiles or extra-long 
hardened  rail  tracks.  Figure  4.8  suggests  that  EU 
firms  are  more  successful  in  this  type  of 
specialisation than their US rivals. 
Offshoring  implies  that  part  of  the  value-added 
created  by  EU  firms  is  generated  in  low-cost 
locations.  The  offshoring  activities  of  EU 
multinationals were predominantly regional in scope, 
meaning that labour-intensive parts of the production 
process  were  re-located  to  central  and  eastern 
European  Member  States,  which  also  still  have 
relatively  low  labour  costs  by  EU  standards.  It  is 
worth  mentioning  that  offshoring  does  not 
predominantly  affect  labour-intensive  industries  (as 
opposed to advanced manufacturing industries). The 
dividing  line  is  rather  the  skill  level  of  employees 
with  low-skill  (though  often  medium-paid)  jobs  in 
manufacturing being more prone to offshoring. This 
points towards a major role for education and training 
                                                            
115   See  Moncada-Paternò-Castello;  Ciupagea,  C.;  P.,  Smith,  K; 
Tübke,  A.  and  Tubbs,  M.:  "Does  Europe  perform  too  little 
corporate R&D? A comparison of EU and non-EU corporate 
R&D performance", Research Policy 39 (2010) pp. 523–536 
116   See Cincera, M. and Veugelers, R.: Young Leading Innovators 
and EU’s R&D intensity gap. JRC-IPTS Working Papers on 
Corporate R&D and Innovation, nº11/2010. 
117   These figures exclude intra-EU value added exports. 
118   These figures exclude intra-EU value added exports. 
of  the  labour  force,  in  particular  in  high-wage 
countries, in order to remain an attractive location for 
manufacturing activity.  
The  next  section  will  investigate  the  effects  of 
industrial  policies  in  the  form  of  State  aid  and 
innovation support.  
4.11. INDUSTRIAL POLICY MEASURES IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 
Few people will doubt that the main responsibility for 
mastering  the  challenges  facing  the  European 
manufacturing  sector  rests  with  firms.  However,  a 
recent  survey  of  the  top  1000  EU  R&D  investing 
companies  has  shown  that  public  policies  may 
constitute  an  important  stimulus  for  company 
innovation
119.  According  to  that  survey,  national 
public support in terms of fiscal incentives and public 
grants had a positive effect on company innovation, 
as well as EU policies in terms of direct public aid 
and public private partnerships. In this sense, another 
question  is  whether  the  EU  and  its  Member  States 
have fully exploited the potential of industrial policies 
to  support  firms  in  mastering  these  challenges  and 
ensuring a strong manufacturing base in Europe.  
After  a  brief  overview  of  industrial  policies  at  the 
Union  level  and  by  Member  States,  this  section 
provides  a  quantitative  analysis  of  State  aid  by 
EU Member  States  which  constitutes  an  important 
industrial policy tool. Since R&D is a key aspect in 
EU's industrial policy mix and it is directly linked to 
the  challenges  of  European  manufacturing,  this 
section also investigates the impact of public funding 
for R&D on innovation activity and innovation output 
at firm level.  
4.12. INDUSTRIAL POLICIES AT THE UNION LEVEL 
AND BY MEMBER STATES 
With  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  the  EU  enshrined  its 
industrial policy approach in primary law, stipulating 
that the ‘Union and the Member States shall ensure 
that the conditions necessary for the competitiveness 
of  the  Union’s  industry  exist’
120.  However,  by 
defining  industrial  policy  in  a  very  broad  sense 
including flanking measures, the EU had set a major 
industrial  policy  objective  well  before  Maastricht. 
The creation of the European single market embedded 
the  EU’s  competition  rules,  which  were  previously 
part of the earlier common market. The particularity 
of EU competition rules is that besides controlling the 
anti-competitive  behaviour  of  firms  (abuse  of  a 
dominant position, market and price rigging and later 
                                                            
119   See Tübke, A.; Hervás, F. and Zimmermann, J.: "The 2012 EU 
Survey  on  R&D  Investment  Business  Trends",  European 
Commission,  Joint  Research  Centre,  EUR  25424  EN, 
www.jrc.es, pp.22. 
120   Article  173(1)  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the 
European Union (TFEU).  
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merger control), the European Commission was also 
empowered to control the State aid provided to firms 
by EU governments. Still today this is a quite unique 
feature in competition rules.
121 The control of State 
aid of sovereign governments is obviously a delicate 
issue  and  the  Commission  has  exercised  a  large 
degree of pragmatism in this respect (Doleys, 2012). 
The  Commission  has  tried  to  shift  State  aid  by 
Member  States  from  sector-based  schemes  to 
horizontal objectives such as aid to SMEs or support 
for R&D, or aid for employment and worker training. 
The  European  Commission’s  preference  for 
horizontal  State  aid  stems  from  the  belief  that 
horizontal aid distorts competition less than sectoral 
aid (Friederiszick et al. 2006), and that it contributes 
to  the  Commission’s  own  market-correcting  or 
redistributive  policy  goals  which  links  it  to  an 
objective of ‘common interest’ (Blauberger, 2008)
122. 
The  latest  revision  of  State  aid  policy  (State  Aid 
Modernization)  favours  a  shift  towards  block-
exempted  aid.  This  aid  is  less  likely  to  distort 
competition, due to lower levels of aid intensities and 
it is in line with the most prominent EU initiatives. 
While  at  the  Union  level,  the  focus  remained  on 
general framework conditions, there were also early 
attempts  to  implement  a  kind  of  technology  policy 
(Owen,  2012).  Over  time,  the  support  for  R&D, 
innovation  and  technology  funded  from  the  EU 
budget  has  become  quite  substantial,  leading 
prominent  economists  to  conclude  that  at  the  EU 
level industrial policy is essentially R&D policy (Van 
Pottelsberghe, 2007).  
The EU’s ambitions in the field of industrial policy 
(European Commission 2010a) have intensified in the 
aftermath  of  the  economic  crisis  of  2008  with  the 
focus largely remaining on framework measures and 
innovation. Hence, in the EU’s new growth strategy, 
the Europe 2020 strategy adopted in 2010 (European 
Commission,  2010b),  the  ‘Innovation  Union’ 
(European  Commission, 2011c) figures prominently 
among  the  flagship  initiatives.  Moreover,  the  2020 
strategy also confirms the EU’s horizontal industrial 
policy  approach.  This  policy  communication  also 
proposes  a  fresh  approach  to  industrial  policy  that 
                                                            
121  Only EFTA has a comparable competition authority. 
122   For  the  various  types  of  horizontal  state  aid  there  exist  so-
called  block  exemptions.  These  block  exemptions  specify  a 
number  of  criteria  that  aid  programmes  must  fulfil  (e.g. 
maximum subsidy amount typically expressed in percentage of 
eligible costs). If the criteria are fulfilled the aid programme is 
considered  to  be  compatible  with  state  aid  rules.  The  block 
exemptions constitute a major simplification of the state aid 
procedure as they exempt eligible aid programmes from the 
requirement  of  prior  notification  and  Commission  approval. 
For Member States this means that they are able to grant aid 
that  meets  the  conditions  laid  down  in  these  regulations 
without the formal notification procedure. However, ex post 
information  sheets  on  the  implemented  aid  have  to  be 
submitted. 
complements its market-oriented horizontal approach 
with  sector-specific  elements.  The  Commission 
characterises  its  approach  as  ‘bringing  together  a 
horizontal basis and sectoral applications’ (European 
Commission,  2010a,  p. 4).  The  mention  of  sectoral 
application of horizontal measures seems to take into 
account the claim that infrastructure and other public 
inputs tend to be highly context-specific, calling for a 
sector-specific  definition  of  industrial  policy 
(Hausmann and Rodrik, 2006). In the specification of 
the  sectoral  dimension  of  industrial  policy,  the 
European Commission identifies the development of 
clean and energy-efficient vehicle technologies as a 
priority area for industrial policy. The Commission’s 
update of the industrial policy communication from 
October  2012  (European  Commission,  2012a) 
contains  six  priority  action  lines  which  aim  at 
improving  the  competitiveness  of  European 
manufacturing.  
These  priority  lines  highlight  once  more  the 
importance  of  new  technologies  for  a  thriving 
manufacturing sector. At the same time these action 
lines are directly or indirectly related to the protection 
of  the  environment  and  the  mitigation  of  climate 
change. 
The  priority  action  lines  are  accompanied  by  a 
number  of  additional  objectives,  such  as  the 
establishment of a European patent, and new elements 
such  as  the  ‘green public  procurement’,  a  demand-
side  policy  instrument  which  has  not  previously 
featured  among  the  main  concerns  of  industrial 
policy. 
The  industrial  policy  approach  at  Union  level  is 
highly relevant for the industrial policies applied by 
Member  States.  The  interdependence  between 
policies at EU level and Member State level is most 
obvious in the field of competition policy including 
State  aid  where  the  Commission  is  responsible  for 
controlling the activities of Member States. But the 
two layers are also linked by the fact that most of the 
projects paid from EU funds have to be co-financed 
by Member States.  
During the 1980s, State aid to industry and services 
provided  by  EU  Member  States  amounted  to 
approximately  2%  of  EU  GDP  and  went  down  to 
about  1%  in  the  following  decade  (European 
Commission, 2011b). The general downward trend in 
State  aid  in  the  EU  continued  until  2007  where  it 
reached an all-time low of 0.4% of GDP.  
State aid also has a counter-cyclical component, i.e. 
the amount of state  aid  spent increases in times of 
recessions. This was the case in the economic crisis 
of 2008. As shown in Figure 4.9., state aid increased 
to 0.6% in 2008, which is still a very low amount by 
historical  standards  but  represented  a  50%  increase 
from the year before. These figures include state aid  
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granted  under  the  Temporary  Framework  which 
allowed a temporary adjustment of state aid rules and 
was intended to encourage investment and ease the 
access  to  finance  for  firms  facing  tightening  credit 
conditions. It was targeted at the real economy.
123  
The Temporary Framework provided new measures 
specifically targeted to facilitate companies’ access to 
finance
124. 
Figure 4.9. State aid to industry and services in the EU-
27, 1992-2011, in % of GDP 
 
Note: Figures exclude crisis-related aid to the financial sector. 
The value for France in 1997 excludes the EUR 18 billion state 
aid  to  Crédit  Lyonnais.  Amounts  refer  to  the  aid  element  (or 
gross  grant  equivalent  in  the  case  of  guarantees  and  loans) 
contained in the state aid measure.   
Source: European Commission State Aid Scoreboard, Eurostat, 
wiiw calculations. 
Due to the crisis, state aid by Member States rose to 
0.5%-0.6%  of  GDP  in  the  years  2008-2010  but  in 
2011  the  amount  dropped  to  0.44%  of  EU  GDP, 
which equals the pre-crisis levels of aid intensity.
125 
Setting aside the crisis-related state aid, the amount of 
state aid in 2011 was back at the 2007 level. These 
very  low  figures  are  interesting  for  a  number  of 
reasons.  First  of  all,  they  show  that  the  amount  of 
                                                            
123   Crisis-related aid measures to the financial sector were subject 
to a different set of rules and the amounts involved were much 
higher, reaching 1.9% of EU GDP in 2008 and 2.9% of GDP 
in 2009. These amounts are not included in Figure 4.9. 
124   The  measures  of  the  Temporary  Framework  included  the 
possibility to grant direct subsidies to individual firms up to an 
amount of EUR 500,000; the provision of state guarantees at 
reduced  premia;  additional  interest-rate  support  for  loans 
financing investments in green products; and the possibility for 
official  export  credit  agencies  (ECAs)  to  provide  cover  for 
short-term transactions which were previously considered to be 
‘marketable risk’. 
125   The Temporary Framework expired by the end of December 
2011. In the period 2008-2011 about EUR 4.8 billion of state 
aid (0.04% of EU GDP) was paid out under the Temporary 
Framework, mainly in the form of subsidies and direct grants 
(European Commission, 2012b). The Temporary Framework 
was open to all industries and sectors but de facto the majority 
of the aid was allocated to car producers which were hit hard 
by the crisis due to the crisis-related slump in car sales. 
state  aid  provided  by  Member  States  has  become 
relatively  small.  Secondly,  the  renewed  interest  in 
industrial policy both at the Member State and the EU 
level has not so far resulted  in a substantial increase 
in  state  aid  figures
126.  Thirdly,  the  impact  of  even 
small amounts of state aid is potentially very large. 
The total of state aid measures under the Temporary 
Framework by the 27 Member States sums up to EUR 
4.8 billion over the period 2008-2010 but it consists 
of  a  large  number  of  measures,  including  multi-
billion  loans  to  car  producers.  The  aid  elements 
implicit  in  such  measures  seem  low  but  they  can 
nevertheless  have  a  great  impact  on  individual 
companies (in particular when the state aid comes in 
the  form  of  a  rescue  operation)  but  also  at  market 
level for the industry
127. So the leverage of state aid 
measures may be quite high. EU governments have a 
great potential to affect market outcomes and also the 
position  of  EU  companies  in  global  competition 
without large fiscal implications.  
The  next  sections  analyses  use  of  state  aid  by  EU 
Member  States  in  more  detail  by  investigating  the 
relationship between various types of state aid on the 
one hand and competitiveness and value added of the 
manufacturing sector on the other hand. 
 
                                                            
126   The  priority  for  a  fiscal  consolidation  affected  considerably   
state aid measures in several Member States. 
127  Note that so-called de minimis aid provided by Member States 
is not included in the state aid figures because de minimis aid 
need  not  be  notified  to  the  Commission.  De  minimis  aid 
represents all aid  measures with an aid amount below EUR 
200,000 (this threshold applies since December 2006 when it 
was raised from EUR 100,000). 
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4.13. QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF STATE AID 
AND EXPORT ORIENTATED MANUFACTURING 
Three different specifications have been implemented 
with  the  objective  to  quantitatively  assess  in  what 
way  different  types  of  state  aid  provided  by  EU 
Member  States,  impact  on  the  export-oriented 
manufacturing  sector  in  the  EU.  The  state  aid 
variables used are explained below in Box 4.2. The 
strategy  follows  recent  empirical  literature  on  the 
development  of  the  internationally  competitive 
manufacturing sector, this proxied with three different 
indicators. The three base  specifications (see annex 
for  details)  deal  with  the  explanation  of  extra-EU 
export shares (following Aghion et al., 2011), value-
added per capita in export-orientated manufacturing 
(following Haraguchi and Rezonja, 2011) as well as 
real  value  added  growth  of  export-oriented 
manufacturing  industries  (following  Rajan  and 
Subramanian, 2011). The three approaches are used 
in  order  to  cover  different  aspects  of  the  export-
oriented  manufacturing  sector  (value  added  export 
share,  per  capita  level  and  real  growth).  Here  we 
present selected results of the first two approaches. 
Table 4.3. Internationalisation measures and competitiveness   
Dependent variable: Member States’ share in total extra-EU exports 
Specification  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)   
                 
internationalisation measures  0.024 ***    0.020  ***  0.025  ***  0.022  *** 
                (0.005)    (0.006)   (0.008)   (0.006)  
internationalisation measures²  -0.001    -0.001    0.000    -0.001   
                (0.001)    (0.002)   (0.001)   (0.001)  
loans to GDP  0.071                                                        
                (0.072)                                                        
loans to GDP²  -0.269 ***                                                        
                (0.033)                                                        
loans to GDP * internationalisation measures  -0.009                                                        
                (0.007)                                                        
governance                    0.437                                       
                                  (0.356)                                      
governance²                    -0.105                                       
                                  (0.981)                                      
governance * internationalisation measures                    0.142  ***                                     
                                  (0.017)                                      
wage share                                     0.179                     
                                                   (0.422)                    
wage share²                                     2.224                     
                                                   (1.957)                    
wage share * internationalisation measures                                     0.108  **                   
                                                   (0.045)                    
tariff rate                                                       0.071  * 
                                                                     (0.040)  
tariff rate²                                                       -0.026   
                                                                     (0.030)  
tariff rate * internationalisation measures                                                       0.066  *** 
                                                                     (0.012)  
                 
R²  0.993    0.990    0.989    0.990   
adjusted R²  0.992    0.988    0.987    0.989   
Observations  373    380    341    391   
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%; 5% and 10% level respectively. 
Regressions include country and year fixed effects as well as a constant term which are not reported. The standard errors are robust. All 
the data was logarithmised (observations of the value zero were changed to 0.01 in order to make the taking of logarithms possible) and 
centred in order to make the estimated coefficients interpretable.    
Source: WIOD, European Union State Aid Scoreboard, Eurostat, UNCTAD-TRAINS, World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) database. 
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The full set of results is available in background study 
of this chapter. 
The  other  positive  and  significant  result  in  this 
specification  is  the  interaction  term  between 
internationalisation  measures  and  the  governance 
effectiveness  rank.  More  internationalisation 
measures is correlated to even bigger export shares in 
countries with a higher level of domestic competition 
(i.e. a higher wage share or, in other words, a smaller 
profit  share,  such  as  in  the  Nordic  and  core  EU 
countries),  as  can  be  seen  from  specification  (3). 
Finally, countries with both more internationalisation 
measures and more tariff protection have on average 
higher extra-EU export shares (see specification (4)). 
Ceteris  paribus  a  higher  tariff  protection  might 
support the development of domestic manufacturing 
capacity  and  induce  additional  exports.  In  fact,  the 
positive coefficient is in line with the classical infant 
industry argument (which is based on the existence of 
externalities) if such tariff protection were assumed to 
be temporary.
128  The effects of sectoral state aid that 
directly  targets  the  manufacturing  sector  were  also 
analysed. In none of the estimated specifications did 
the  conditional  main  effect  of  manufacturing  aid 
appear  to  be  significantly  different  from  zero  (see 
Table A.7 in the annex).  
                                                            
128   It  should  be  noted  however,  that  Member  States  do  not  set 
tariffs themselves because trade policy is a competence of the 
European Commission. Any differences in the tariff rate across 
Member States is therefore due to differences in their export 
structures. 
In a second attempt the methodology put forward in 
Haraguchi  and  Rezonja  (2011)  is  applied  to  the 
provision of state aid by EU Member States. The aim 
here  is  to  specify  better  the  relationship  by  adding 
more control variables and to test for the determinants 
of  the  single  manufacturing  industry’s  importance 
separately, using a model that tries to explain the real 
value-added  per-capita  of  the  respective 
manufacturing sector.  
Explanatory  variables  are  the  per  capita  gross 
domestic  product,  population  density  and  natural 
resource endowment as well as different types of state 
aid  per  capita.  The  control  variables  which  feature 
prominently  in  the  growth  literature  account  for 
developmental impact on manufacturing while other 
variables  control  for  demographic  and  geographic 
conditions.  In  order  to  check  the  robustness  of  the 
estimated  results,  additional  variables  such  as  the 
private  loans  to  GDP  indicator  have  been  included 
but  the  main  results  do  not  change  very  much. 
Moreover  in  the  regression approach  the  individual 
manufacturing industries have been aggregated in two 
groups  –  export-oriented  industries  and  industries 
focusing  on  the  domestic  market,  based  on  an 
exportability measure.  
Box 4.2.  Categories of state aid in the European Union 
Non-crisis state aid granted by the Member States to industry and services broadly splits into two types: horizontal 
and sectoral.  
The concept of horizontal aid, which is aid that is not granted to specific sectors of the economy, derives from the EU 
Treaty.  It  leaves  room  for  the  Commission  to  make  policy  judgements  whereby  state  aid  can  be  considered 
compatible with the internal market if it provides effective support for common policy objectives. Most prominent 
here is aid earmarked for research, development and innovation, safeguarding the environment, fostering energy 
saving and promoting the use of renewable energy sources; Those categories are followed by regional development, 
aid to SMEs, job creation and the promotion of training (European Commission, 2012b). 
Research, development and innovation: R&D&I lies at the heart of the Europe 2020 strategy as one of its flagship 
initiatives because of its potential to contribute to strengthening the competitiveness of the EU economy and to ensure 
sustainable growth, with a target of spending 3% of EU GDP on R&D by 2020. 
Environmental protection: State aid here can include aid measures to support energy saving and waste management 
or to improve production processes, which have a direct benefit to the environment. 
Regional development and cohesion: The aim of regional aid is to develop the economic, social and territorial 
cohesion of a Member State and of the EU as a whole. The Commission encourages Member States to grant regional 
aid on the basis of multi-sectoral schemes which form part of a national regional policy. 
Commerce, export and internationalisation: This is a less used measure that however showed some importance in the 
quantitative analysis. It consists of a number of different aid measures such as the promotion of brand image or sales 
networks but also officially supported export credits to the extent that they contain an aid element. 
State aid earmarked for specific sectors, or sectoral aid  includes a number of measures targeting for instance: rescue 
and restructuring of firms in difficulty; Sectors covered include shipbuilding; steel; coal; land, sea and air  transport; 
agriculture; fisheries and aquaculture.  
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The  main  findings  are  reported  in  Table  4.4.    The 
level  of  export-oriented  manufacturing  value-added 
per  capita  is  not  affected  by  sectoral  specific 
manufacturing aid. It is rather  a few horizontal aid 
spending  items  which  show  signs  of  correlation, 
Regional aid is found to be positively correlated with 
the  value-added  level.  Somewhat  surprisingly,  risk 
capital  aid  tends  to  target  economies  with  lower 
levels of per capita export-oriented value added. One 
explanation may be that regional aid is more likely to 
be absorbed by large, internationally operating firms, 
while environment and energy saving aid can more 
easily be absorbed by domestically operating smaller 
firms.
129 However, the negative sign found for risk-
capital aid is not straight forward to be explained. A 
possibility might also be that firms in manufacturing-
orientated countries such as Germany or Austria rely 
more  on  banks  to  finance  their  needs,  and 
consequently risk capital and risk capital aid is less 
important. In contrast, risk capital is more important 
                                                            
129   As  shown  in  the  background  study,  regional  aid  and  risk 
capital  aid  has  no  impact  on  value  added  for  domestically 
oriented  firms  while  coefficients  for  energy  saving  aid  and 
training aid are significantly positive. 
in  countries  were  the  manufacturing  sector 
development was less dynamic over the past one and 
a half decades (e.g. the United Kingdom). This sign 
possibly  illustrates  a  correlation  pattern  existing 
restrictively in the specific sample for this exercise. 
4.14. COMPANY-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF 
COMMERCIALISATION PERFORMANCE  
Innovation has been placed at the heart of the Europe 
2020 agenda as one of the main drivers of economic 
growth. In a globalised world, innovative ideas and 
products  stimulate  exports  and  sales  in  general, 
thereby securing growth and future jobs (Harrison et 
al., 2008). As the EU-27 is still behind other major 
economies  when  looking  at  simple  innovation 
indicators  such  as  overall  R&D  expenditures,  the 
impact  of  innovation  policies  on  firms’  innovative 
behaviour has been a major concern of policy-makers. 
Instruments to address shortage of funding for firms 
still differ greatly in the EU. Venture capitalists are 
more  active  in  Scandinavian  and  Anglo-Saxon 
countries  and  public  funding  is  on  average  more 
pronounced  in  EU-15  countries  compared  to  the 
EU-12  countries.  When  looking  at  the  different 
Table 4.4. State aid and value-added per capita – export orientated industries   
Dependent variable: manufacturing value added per capita of export industries 
Specification  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)   
                 
per capita GDP  1.537  ***  1.455  ***  1.343  ***  1.615  *** 
                (0.206)   (0.191)   (0.199)   (0.182)  
per capita GDP²  0.443  ***  0.483  ***  0.458  ***  0.491  *** 
                (0.086)   (0.090)   (0.083)   (0.087)  
population density  -4.376  ***  -4.305  ***  -5.095  ***  -4.416  *** 
                (1.026)   (1.030)   (0.949)   (0.981)  
resource endowment  -0.006    0.008    -0.035    0.003  *** 
                (0.046)   (0.047)   (0.041)   (0.047)  
energy saving aid  0.009               
                (0.008)               
regional aid      0.023  ***         
      (0.007)          
risk capital aid          -0.027  ***     
          (0.005)      
training aid              0.008  * 
              (0.004)  
                 
R²  0.969    0.969    0.972    0.969   
adjusted R²  0.964    0.964    0.968    0.964   
Observations  286    286    286    286   
Note:  Standard  errors  appear  in  parentheses.  ***,  **,  *  indicate  statistical  significance  at  the  1%;  5%  and  10%  level  respectively. 
Regressions include country and year fixed effects as well as a constant term which are not reported. The standard errors are robust.   
Source: European Union State Aid Scoreboard, Eurostat, UN Comtrade  
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settings, an essential question that arises is about the 
effectiveness  of  public  innovation  support.  In  this 
section, the effects of public innovation support on 
the  commercialisation  of  R&D  effort  will  be 
evaluated.  
To that end, the effect of public funding on private 
R&D  intensity  and  innovation  output  is  estimated, 
using  data  from  the  Community  Innovation  Survey 
(CIS)
130. Focusing on the commercialisation of R&D 
efforts, innovation output will be measured in terms 
of innovative sales. 
The  EU  is  usually  perceived  as  less  effective  at 
bringing research to the market compared to its main 
competitors such as the US, Japan, and South Korea. 
The  relative  underperformance  in  research 
commercialisation in the EU has been attributed to a 
number  of  factors  including  the  absence  of  an 
entrepreneurial culture and a less developed venture 
capital  sector
131.  The  discussion  about  the  main 
factors explaining the European innovation gap dates 
back to the Dosi et al. (2006) much-cited criticism on 
the  concept  of  the  European  paradox,  a  widely 
accepted opinion that Europe does not lag behind the 
US  in  terms  of  scientific  excellence,  but  lacks  the 
entrepreneurial  capacity  of  the  US  to  effectively 
commercialise  inventions  and  step  thereby  on  an 
innovation-driven growth path. In the literature there 
are a number of publications that investigate whether 
Europe’s  weak  commercialization  performance  can 
explain  the  paradox  and  whether  other  explanatory 
factors are identified (examples of recent overviews 
can be found in Conti and Gaule (2011) and Carlsson 
et al. (2009)).  
This  section  focuses  on  which  specific  innovation-
related factors and which types of public funding can 
be  identified  as  relevant  for  commercialization 
performance.  By  doing  so,  a  firm-level  analysis  is 
provided  with  a  particular  focus  on  the 
commercialisation  of  R&D  efforts.  Among  the 
activities  examined  are  the  actual  R&D  performed 
internally and/or acquired from external sources, the 
research collaboration activities with different players 
(such  as  customers,  suppliers,  public  research 
institutions  and  other  firms),  and  the  firm’s  use  of 
particular types of public funding for innovation.  
                                                            
130   Following  to  the  Community  Innovation  Survey,  public 
funding or public innovation support is defined as credits or 
deductions, grants, subsidised loans, and loan guarantees for 
innovative  activities.  The  support  may  come  from  three 
authorities:  the  EU,  national  governments  and  regional 
authorities. 
131   In this report ‘research commercialisation’ is defined as a sub-
set  of  the  innovation  trajectory.  Similarly,  the 
‘commercialisation  gap’  is  understood  as  a  sub-part  of  the 
‘innovation  gap’,  focusing  here  on  the  latest  stages  of  the 
innovation trajectory.  
The analysis of the market uptake of innovation at the 
firm-level  is  based  on  the  Community  Innovation 
Survey  (CIS)  micro-data.  The  CIS  survey  is  a 
European-wide,  harmonized  data  collection  on 
innovation  according  to  the  guidelines  of  the  Oslo 
Manual (Eurostat/OECD,  2005). The  CIS survey is 
organized  bi-annually  and  collects  information  on 
enterprise’s innovation activities. For consistency and 
timing  reasons,  the  anonymized  CIS2008  and 
CIS2006  surveys  were  used  which  cover  the  time 
span 2006-2008 and 2004-2006 respectively. 
The CIS2006 covers three countries from the EU-15, 
namely Greece, Spain and Portugal and 9 countries 
from the EU-12. The CIS2008 covers 15 countries. 
Germany, Spain, Italy, Ireland and Portugal are EU-
15 countries. The other 10 countries represented in 
the  CIS2008  are  EU-12  countries  which  joined  the 
EU after 2004. Additionally to differences in country 
coverage  the  two  waves  also  differ  with respect  to 
sectoral classifications as the CIS2006 is based on the 
NACE Rev. 1.1 whereas the CIS2008 on the NACE 
Rev.  2  classification.  Results  reported  below 
distinguish  broader  industry  aggregates  by  broad 
technology intensity when considering manufacturing 
firms only.
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As  a  key  variable  for  assessing  a  firm’s 
commercialization performance, this analysis uses the 
firm’s answers on the innovation commercialization 
question in the CIS survey; firms were asked about 
“the  percentage  of  total  turnover  from  new  or 
significantly improved goods and services introduced 
that were new to your market”.  
The  theoretical  rationale  of  the  contextual  variable 
choices comes from to firm-level innovation analysis 
literature  which  also  uses  the  CIS  data.  The 
importance of collaborative R&D for innovation and 
general  firm  performance  is  illustrated  by  among 
others Laursen and Salter (2006) and Belderbos et al. 
(2004). Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) confirm the 
importance  of  innovation  activities.  More 
specifically,  they  show  that  internal  knowledge 
production as well as external knowledge acquisition 
is important for a firm to introduce products new to 
the market. The combination of internal and external 
R&D activities is often referred to in the literature as 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal (1990)).  
                                                            
132   The industry class dummies have been defined based on the 
post-anonymization NACE codes. These codes differ between 
the  CIS2006  (derived  from  NACE  Rev.  1)  and  CIS2008 
(derived  from  NACE  Rev.  2)  waves  of  the  survey.  For  the 
CIS2006  data  the  following  industry  class  definitions  were 
used: low-tech (nace_pro codes DA, DB, DC, 20_21, 22, DN), 
medium-tech (nace_pro DF_DG, DH, DI, 27, 28), high-tech 
(nace_pro  DK,  DL,  DM).  For  the  CIS2008  wave:  low-tech 
(nace_pro  C10_C12,  C13_C15,  C16_C18,  C31_C33), 
medium-tech  (nace_pro  C19_C23,  C24_C25),  high-tech 
(nace_pro C26_C30).  
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The  literature  concerning  the  introduction  of  new 
products into the market illustrates that it is important 
to  take  into  account  the  firm’s  marketing  efforts 
(market  introduction  activities)  in  the 
commercialisation  model.  As  such,  public  funding 
plays a role not only in stimulating the R&D efforts 
of  firms,  but  also  in  promoting  successful 
commercialisation of research results (Griffith et al. 
(2006). 
The model on which the analysis is based represents a 
slightly  modified  version  of  the  CDM  model 
introduced in Crepon et al. (1998). A firms’ choice to 
conduct/report  R&D  is  estimated  in  the  first  stage 
(R&D selection equation). At the second stage of the 
model  the  R&D  expenditures  is  the  dependent 
variable which is influenced by its own set of factors 
(R&D  equation)
133.  Finally,  the  commercialisation 
performance  -  expressed  as  turnover  from  products 
new to the market - is estimated on a set of factors 
including (estimated) R&D efforts measure. Thus, the 
commercialisation  and  the  R&D  equations  are 
connected  as  the  estimated  values  of  the  (log  of) 
R&D expenditure from the latter serve as the input in 
the  former  equation.  This  procedure  avoids  the 
potential and well-known endogeneity problems. The 
details  of  the  model  applied  together  with  results 
from the first and second stages are reported in the 
Annex. 
                                                            
133   Ideally, one should include employment additional to turnover 
to control for size of firms. As this analysis is based on the 
anonymized CD-ROM version of the CIS data this variable is 
not available. Instead we used the two employment size classes 
available for all countries: small (<50) and medium and large 
(>50) for the estimation of the R&D levels.  
Table 4.5. Results of the commercialisation output regressions with CIS2006 
   All firms  EU-15  EU-12  Small firms 
Medium 
and large 
firms 
All manuf. 
firms 
Low-tech 
Medium-
low tech 
Medium-
high and 
high tech 
Commercialisation performance equation 
extramural 
R&D 
0.278***  0.285***  0.261***  0.431***  0.166***  0.231***  0.252***  0.196***  0.242*** 
   (28.26)  (20.59)  (18.39)  (9.30)  (7.22)  (19.01)  (10.70)  (9.67)  (12.50) 
log R&D 
expenditures 
0.0521***  0.0446***  0.0615***  -0.279  0.170***  0.0874***  0.176***  0.0788***  0.0151 
   (6.80)  (3.41)  (6.58)  (-1.74)  (3.53)  (8.67)  (8.32)  (4.67)  (0.96) 
log 2004 
sales 
0.00578***  0.00650***  0.00480**  0.00247  0.0229***  0.00545***  0.00689**  0.00257  0.00652** 
   (5.40)  (4.27)  (3.16)  (1.86)  (9.69)  (4.17)  (2.84)  (1.25)  (2.86) 
vertical 
cooperation 
0.316***  0.223***  0.389***  0.549***  0.182***  0.279***  0.314***  0.231***  0.273*** 
   (27.63)  (13.13)  (24.78)  (7.60)  (7.83)  (20.28)  (11.93)  (10.21)  (12.21) 
horizontal 
cooperation 
0.0640***  0.0822***  0.0165  0.193***  -0.00319  0.0273  0.0206  0.0296  0.0335 
   (4.62)  (3.42)  (0.98)  (4.37)  (-0.15)  (1.56)  (0.59)  (1.02)  (1.23) 
intra-group 
cooperation 
0.0162  0.0600**  -0.0173  0.173***  -0.0287  0.0421*  -0.0901*  0.0146  -0.0328 
   (1.15)  (2.61)  (-1.00)  (3.35)  (-1.22)  (2.48)  (-2.37)  (0.53)  (-1.17) 
local public 
funding 
0.178***  0.199***  0.181***  0.384***  0.0678**  0.150***  0.206***  0.137***  0.124*** 
   (13.90)  (13.14)  (4.99)  (4.98)  (3.04)  (9.78)  (7.10)  (5.62)  (4.84) 
national 
public 
funding 
0.108***  0.160***  0.038  0.506**  -0.0183  0.0421*  0.0148  -0.014  0.146*** 
   (7.78)  (7.91)  (1.91)  (2.91)  (-0.43)  (2.45)  (0.44)  (-0.49)  (5.29) 
EU funding  0.0982***  0.0426  0.139***  0.295***  -0.00892  0.0741***  0.0445  0.118***  0.048 
   (5.91)  (1.53)  (6.80)  (3.84)  (-0.23)  (3.58)  (1.17)  (3.44)  (1.38) 
F-test for 
model’s  
significance 
11800.6***  5333.3***  6695.5***  6288.1***  5176.9***  5353***  2039.0***  1439.3***  1401.1*** 
                   
observations  85238  38127  47111  53915  31323  43897  21677  13080  9140 
Note: t statistics appear in parentheses. ***, **, *indicate statistical significance at the 0,1%; 1% and 5% level respectively. Regressions 
include country and industry fixed effects as well as a constant term which are not reported.   
Source: Community Innovation Survey (CIS)  
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The variables used for the analysis have been chosen 
in a way to ensure the highest possible compatibility 
in  definitions  between  the  CIS2006  and  CIS2008. 
One nonetheless has to be cautious when comparing 
the model’s results from different waves of the CIS 
survey. Most of the conclusions below are therefore 
formulated based on the coefficients’ signs and their 
statistical significance rather than their size.  
In  addition,  to  triangulate  the  obtained  results  and 
check the model’s robustness, separate analyses were 
performed  on  different  types  of  firms  according  to 
size (small and large)
134, geographic location (EU-15 
and  EU-12  countries)  and  for  manufacturing  firms 
according  to  their  production  technology  intensity 
(low-tech,  medium-low  tech,  and  medium-high  and 
high tech as described above). 
                                                            
134   Firms with less than 50 employees are classified as small and 
above 50 as medium and large. Due to differences in the size 
classification among different countries in CIS only these two 
classes can be consistently defined. 
The results from the first CDM equation (the R&D 
intensity estimations presented in Table A8 and Table 
A9 in the Annex) give us particular insights into the 
factors which influence firms’ innovation efforts. The 
patterns are rather consistent, and show that acquiring 
the  R&D  services  externally  and  benefitting  from 
national  and  EU  public  funding  stand  out  as 
consistent  factors  positively  influencing  the  firms’ 
R&D  activities  in  two  waves  of  CIS  and  across 
different firm types and classes. R&D collaborations 
with  suppliers  and  customers  as  well  as  inside  the 
enterprise  group  are  also  found  to  be  important 
determinants of the firms’ R&D efforts. 
Concerning the specific question on determinants of 
R&D commercialisation at the firm level (see Table 
4.5  and  Table  4.6),  the  relationships  between  the 
commercialization performance expressed in terms of 
the share of turnover from products and services new 
to  the  market  and  the  main  characteristics  of  the 
firms’ innovation activities present several distinctive 
patterns. 
Table 4.6. Results of the commercialisation output regressions with CIS2008 
   All firms  EU-15  EU-12  Small firms 
Medium 
and large 
firms 
All manuf. 
firms 
Low-tech 
Medium-
low tech 
Medium-
high and 
high tech 
Commercialisation performance equation 
extramural 
R&D 
0.231***  0.237***  0.227***  0.348***  0.330***  0.160***  0.170***  0.129***  0.183*** 
   (25.31)  (19.65)  (15.99)  (24.76)  (33.78)  (13.13)  (7.37)  (6.59)  (8.89) 
log R&D 
expenditures 
0.0416***  0.0262*  0.0526***  -0.00596  -0.237***  0.0796***  0.147***  0.0699***  0.00911 
   (6.10)  (2.47)  (5.99)  (-0.91)  (-44.98)  (8.64)  (7.73)  (5.37)  (0.52) 
log 2006 
sales 
0.00537***  0.00364***  0.00972***  0.00457***  0.00967***  0.00579***  0.00653**  0.00503*  0.00559* 
   (5.85)  (3.35)  (5.60)  (3.80)  (5.46)  (4.75)  (3.09)  (2.55)  (2.44) 
vertical 
cooperation 
0.260***  0.218***  0.298***  0.376***  0.333***  0.227***  0.219***  0.223***  0.209*** 
   (26.18)  (16.62)  (19.38)  (24.17)  (29.57)  (18.48)  (8.67)  (11.61)  (9.62) 
horizontal 
cooperation 
0.0742***  0.0606***  0.0664***  0.0946***  0.0865***  0.0671***  0.0853**  0.0615*  0.0645* 
   (6.40)  (3.60)  (4.09)  (4.62)  (6.71)  (4.35)  (3.01)  (2.43)  (2.42) 
intra-group 
cooperation 
0.0388***  0.0514**  0.0359*  0.141***  0.170***   -0.0311*  -0.0522  0.00386  0.0125 
   (3.32)  (2.90)  (2.33)  (6.45)  (14.57)  (-2.02)  (-1.77)  (0.16)  (0.47) 
local public 
funding 
0.156***  0.167***  0.266***  0.205***  0.157***  0.120***  0.200***  0.0982***  0.0868*** 
   (14.87)  (14.43)  (8.12)  (12.65)  (11.68)  (9.19)  (8.45)  (4.55)  (3.83) 
national 
public 
funding 
0.138***  0.172***  0.105***  0.243***  0.383***  0.0665***  -0.0368  0.0850***  0.158*** 
   (11.57)  (10.67)  (5.58)  (14.12)  (31.76)  (4.40)  (-1.21)  (3.57)  (6.25) 
EU funding  0.0815***  -0.0478*  0.167***  0.174***  0.258***  0.0831***  0.104**  0.034  0.105** 
   (5.64)  (-2.02)  (9.26)  (6.84)  (17.11)  (4.65)  (3.27)  (1.13)  (3.25) 
F-test for 
model’s  
significance 
14348.6***  7318.3***  7075.4***  7667.7***  6242.8***  6135.6***  2527.8***  1678.8***  1187.3*** 
                   
observations  98070  48472  49598  60780  37290  47144  23615  15096  8433 
Note: t statistics appear in parentheses. ***, **, *indicate statistical significance at the 0,1%; 1% and 5% level respectively. Regressions 
include country and industry fixed effects as well as a constant term which are not reported.   
Source: Community Innovation Survey (CIS)  
125 
First,  the  impact  of  the  R&D  efforts  on 
commercialization  is  positive  and  statistically 
significant when looking at all firms in the sample as 
well  as  manufacturing  firms  only.  Investigating 
different  subgroups,  a  positive,  significant  effect  is 
observed  in  low-  and  medium-low  tech 
manufacturing  industries,  and  also  when  looking  at 
firms  from  EU-15  and  EU-12  in  general.  The 
relationship  between  the  R&D  input  and  the 
commercialisation results is mixed when looking at 
the performance of firms divided in groups by their 
size. The data from both 2006 and 2008 CIS waves 
show that for the small firms the relationship between 
the R&D expenditures and the share of turnover new 
to  the  market  is  not  evident.  For  the  large  and 
medium  enterprises  CIS2006  indicates  the 
statistically significant positive relationship between 
the  R&D  input  and  commercialisation,  while  in 
CIS2008 the opposite picture is observed. 
It is observed that the firms which, in addition to their 
own R&D, also acquire R&D services externally tend 
to  have  higher  share  of  turnover  from  innovative 
products.  This  external  acquisition  of  R&D  results 
can take place as a pure purchase of services, but also 
can be  acquired  in the framework  of the inter-firm 
R&D cooperation. 
Concerning the different forms of R&D cooperation 
activities the results are mixed across different groups 
and  classes  of  firms.  It  can  be  seen  that  vertical 
cooperation  (i.e.  R&D  cooperation  with  suppliers 
and/or customers) is positively associated with higher 
commercialization performance in firms coming from 
different  size  classes  and  different  technology 
intensity groups. 
The  importance  of  customers  and  suppliers  for  the 
firm’s innovation is further underlined by the finding 
that the R&D cooperation inside the group does not 
find broad and consistent support by the regression 
results. The R&D collaboration with other companies 
occupying  the  similar  position  in  the  value  chain 
(horizontal cooperation) has been shown as a relevant 
positive factor by the CIS2008 data and partially by 
the CIS2006. 
Finally,  the  effects  of  public  funding  on  the 
commercialization performance of firms appear to be 
positive  in  most  classes  and  groups  of  firms 
considered. The relationship between the use of local 
public  R&D  support  and  the  commercialisation 
performance  shows  positive  and  statistically 
significant for both CIS waves and across all different 
technology  intensity  domains.  The  public  R&D 
support at the national level is positively related to the 
share  of  innovative  turnover  in  2008  with  results 
being somewhat more mixed for 2006. According to 
CIS2008,  the  firms  appear  to  have  higher 
commercialisation performance when making use of 
the EU-level public R&D support with the exceptions 
of the EU-15 and medium-tech subsamples. Results 
when using CIS2006 are more mixed though when 
significant these are always positive.  
Across  both  CIS  waves,  a  consistently  strong  and 
positive effect of public funding is found especially 
for  firms  in  medium-high  and  high-tech  industries 
and to a lesser degree for lower tech manufacturing 
firms. Regarding firm size, the results using CIS 2006 
indicate a stronger effect of public funding on small 
firms.  
Additional to the direct effect of public funding on 
the commercialization performance, there is also an 
indirect effect via the increase in R&D. As shown in 
the  second  stage,  public  funding  positively  affects 
R&D levels. In most cases, the increased R&D effort 
is  estimated  to  have  a  positive  effect  on  the 
commercialization performance. 
Bringing  the  most  important  findings  of  the  above 
analyses together allows one to formulate a number 
of  conclusions  regarding  the  general  patterns  of 
innovation  and  commercialisation  performance  of 
European firms. At the micro-economic level, when 
observing the behaviour of individual firms, the link 
between  the  R&D  effort  and  the  commercialisation 
performance  is  rather  pronounced  and  a  positive 
relationship has been observed in most cases. 
But not only the R&D itself, also its origin and the 
patterns of R&D cooperation among firms play a role. 
It has been observed that acquiring results of external 
R&D  and  vertical  cooperation  with  customers  and 
suppliers  is  positively  related  to  the  firms’  market 
uptake performance. 
The  above  results  provide  especially  pronounced 
evidence  of  the  positive  effect  of  the  public  R&D 
support at different levels. When looking at all firms 
as well as manufacturing firms only, a positive and 
significant  effect  of  all  types  of  R&D  support  on 
R&D  levels  as  well  as  commercialisation 
performance is observed.  
The  analysis  is  also  performed  for  a  number  of 
subsamples,  which  in  turn  exhibit  some  specific 
patterns. The results suggest that local R&D support 
does  positively  affect  firm  commercialisation 
performance  in  all  technology  intensity  and  size 
classes. The effects of national and EU funding are 
positive  and  significant  for  all  firms  and 
manufacturing firms only, but mixed results are found 
for smaller subsamples. Overall, public funding has 
consistently  positive  effects  on  innovative  sales  for 
medium-high and high-tech sectors firms, while this 
statement is true to a lesser extent for firms in lower 
tech industries.  
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4.15. EFFECTS OF PUBLIC FUNDING FOR FIRMS' 
R&D 
The  previous  results  suggest  there  is  generally  a 
positive  effect  from  public  funding  on  R&D  levels 
and commercialisation performance. Nevertheless, a 
major  problem  that  the  analysis  faces  is  the 
possibility  of selection bias.  Neither  the fact  that  a 
firm applies for funding nor the fact that it receives 
public  support  can  be  considered  random.  Firms 
receiving public support are, for example, more often 
exporting  firms,  which  are  likely  to  be  more 
productive  as  well.  Moreover,  firms  in  higher-tech 
industries  and  those  participating  in  joint  R&D 
projects are more often supported, as are firms which 
are larger in terms of turnover. Thus, selection clearly 
has to be taken into account to be able to produce 
credible results. 
In  the  analysis,  matching  techniques  are  applied  to 
check for selection bias. According to a number of 
observable characteristics, each firm which receives 
public support is matched with a firm that does not. 
The  two  groups  –  the  treatment  group,  those  firms 
receiving  public  support,  and  the  control  group  – 
should  then  be  similar  according  to  the  considered 
observable characteristics. 
One can then estimate the treatment effect on firms 
that receive public support. The complete procedure 
is an extended version of the one found in Czarnitzki 
and Lopes-Bento (2013) and is explained in Box 4.3. 
The results shown in Table 4.7 to Table 4.9 indicate 
that  for  the  full  sample,  public  funding  has 
considerable  effects  on  the  R&D  input  as  well  as 
output. The average R&D intensity in the treatment 
group is 1.6% higher than in the control group (Table 
4.7). The probability of firms to apply for a patent 
(patent  application  propensity)  increases  by  8.4% 
with  public  funding  (Table  4.8)  and  the  share  of 
innovative sales are on average 3.1% higher for firms 
that received public funding (Table 4.9). 
A more detailed look at geographic aspects reveals, 
that  the  R&D  intensity  as  well  as  the  patent 
application propensity of EU-15 firms is well above 
that  of  EU-12  firms.  The  difference  in  the  patent 
application propensity is not a function of firm size 
distributions as firms in the matched sample are on 
average larger in the EU-12 and thus should have a 
higher patent application propensity. However, public 
funding has had a significantly positive effect in both 
country groups. The effects are quite different for the 
other  innovation  output  measure  –  the  share  of 
innovative  sales.  Overall,  this  share  is  found  to  be 
larger in the EU-12 due to faster product upgrading, 
but the results indicate no effect of public funding on 
the  commercialisation  phase  in  this  region.  This 
finding is also rather stable over time when looking at 
different measurement waves (CIS4 and CIS5).  
Interesting results also emerge from the investigation 
of  effects  along  the  dimension  of  firm  size.  Very 
pronounced effects of public support on R&D input 
as well as output can be found for small firms and 
medium-sized enterprises. SMEs often lack sufficient 
internal funds. Support is vital for them to become 
strong  entrants  in  a  competitive  market  able  to  fill 
world market niches and deliver innovative products. 
Effects  on  patent  application  rates  are  especially 
pronounced  for  larger  firms.  At  the  same  time,  no 
significant  effect  of  public  support  on  the  share  of 
innovative  sales  can  be  found  for  large  firms.  One 
reason for this finding is that large firms often split 
research and production facilities geographically and 
thus  output  affects  may  be  generated  in  other 
subsidiaries. 
The most striking results were obtained with respect 
to the industry affiliation of firms. On the one hand, 
the analysis shows that innovation projects in  
Box 4.3. The four-step matching procedure 
1.  Restriction of the sample to the innovative firms of interest: either all innovative firms, or a subsample of 
firms with respect to size, country or industry affiliation 
2.  Estimation  of  probability  of  a  firm  to  receive  public  funding  depending  on  the  following  observable 
characteristics: size based on employment and turnover, country and industry affiliation, exporter status, a 
dummy for multinationals and domestic enterprise groups as well as information on R&D cooperation and 
preconditions for R&D (estimated at a previous stage) 
3.  Matching of firms receiving public support with firms which have a similar probability of getting public 
funds  but  do  not  receive  them.  Firms  are  only  matched  with  other  firms  in  the  same  country  and 
employment size class (small: less than 50 employees, medium: between 50 and 250, large: more than 
250). Firms with no similar counterpart are excluded from the sample using a threshold for the maximum 
allowed difference. 
4.  The average treatment effect can now be calculated as the mean difference of the matched samples.  
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higher-tech  industries  (which  basically  comprise 
advanced manufacturing industries, see Annex Table 
A.2)  benefit  particularly  from  public  funding.  This 
can be seen from the significant and large effects on 
both the patent application propensity and the share 
of innovative sales. 
Publicly funded firms in high- and medium-high-tech 
industries  exhibit  a  higher  increase  in  the  share  of 
innovative  sales  of  8.7  and  4.1  percentage  points, 
respectively  and  an  11.7  percentage  points  higher 
application rate for patents. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  results  indicate  strong 
crowding out effects of public funding in lower-tech 
industries,  especially  with  respect  to  innovation 
output  measures.  The  finding  is  not  an  effect  of 
lower-tech  EU-12  firms,  which  overall  exhibit  no 
significant  effects  of  public  funds  on  the  share  of 
innovative sales, but can be found for lower-tech EU-
15  firms  as  well.  A  possible  explanation  is  that 
innovation projects in these industries take place in an 
environment which is changing less rapidly than that 
of high-tech industries. Thus, there is on average less 
risk  and  asymmetric  information  attached  to 
Table 4.7. R&D intensity 
R&D intensity          Treated          Control  Difference          T-stat    
All firms  0.033  0.017  0.016  13.46  *** 
EU-15 firms  0.035  0.018  0.017  13.23  *** 
EU-12 firms (CIS4)  0.024  0.013  0.011  3.81  *** 
EU-12 firms (CIS5)  0.024  0.012  0.013  4.48  *** 
Small  0.041  0.019  0.022  10.25  *** 
Medium  0.027  0.014  0.014  7.69  *** 
Large  0.029  0.019  0.010  4.66  *** 
High-tech  0.069  0.036  0.033  6.27  *** 
Medium-high-tech  0.041  0.025  0.016  5.97  *** 
Medium-low-tech  0.019  0.011  0.009  4.41  *** 
Low-tech  0.020  0.013  0.007  3.22  *** 
Food processing  0.015  0.006  0.008  2.23  ** 
 
Note: The stratified sample overall contains all CIS4 EU-27 countries; the number of treated firms in each sample is: full sample: 5152, 
EU-15: 4338, EU-12: 814 (CIS4), 954 (CIS5), Small: 2090, Medium: 1827, Large: 1235, Domestic enterprise groups: 1580, Foreign 
enterprise groups: 411, High-tech 633 firms, Medium-high-tech: 1447, Medium-low-tech: 1131, Low-tech: 902, Food processing: 441  
***, ** and * denote tests being significant at a 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.   
Source: Community Innovation Survey (CIS), waves 4 and 5, wiiw estimations 
Table 4.8. Patent application propensity 
Patent application propensity 
Treated  Control  Difference 
T-stat    
All firms  0.303  0.219  0.084  7.54  *** 
EU-15 firms  0.323  0.234  0.089  7.03  *** 
EU-12 firms (CIS4)  0.192  0.138  0.054  2.62  *** 
EU-12 firms (CIS5)  0.158  0.108  0.050  3.00  *** 
Small  0.193  0.128  0.066  4.59  *** 
Medium  0.284  0.201  0.082  4.62  *** 
Large  0.516  0.399  0.117  4.09  *** 
High-tech  0.404  0.288  0.117  3.38  *** 
Medium-high-tech  0.435  0.317  0.117  5.08  *** 
Medium-low-tech  0.249  0.195  0.055  2.55  ** 
Low-tech  0.121  0.127  -0.007  -0.35 
  Food processing  0.163  0.091  0.073  2.51  ** 
 
Note: The stratified sample overall contains all CIS4 EU-27 countries; the number of treated firms in each sample is: full sample: 5152, 
EU-15: 4338, EU-12: 814 (CIS4), 954 (CIS5), Small: 2090, Medium: 1827, Large: 1235, Domestic enterprise groups: 1580, Foreign 
enterprise groups: 411, High-tech 633 firms, Medium-high-tech: 1447, Medium-low-tech: 1131, Low-tech: 902, Food processing: 441.  
***, ** and * denote tests being significant at a 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.   
Source: Community Innovation Survey (CIS), waves 4 and 5, wiiw estimations.  
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innovation projects in low-tech industries. Banks and 
other  financial  intermediaries  can  therefore  better 
evaluate  them.  Innovation  market  failures  can  be 
expected  to  be  less  pronounced  in  traditional 
industries meaning here is also less need for public 
funding. This is especially true for larger firms, which 
can  either  rely  on  internal  funding  or  have  easier 
access to external sources such as banks. The finding 
also  indicates  that  the  increased  innovation  support 
via the Rural Development Policy, which is part of 
the European Common Agricultural Policy, has no or 
very small effects on innovation output.
135 It might 
thus be more desirable to reallocate these innovation 
funds to a broader support of competitiveness, as is 
planned in the budget for the period 2014-2020. 
4.16. SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Despite of longer-term trends in advanced economies 
whereby  the  manufacturing  sector  accounts  for  a 
shrinking share of value-added of employment, there 
is a considerable case for preserving a ‘critical size’ 
of manufacturing activities in European economies.  
The  main  arguments  are  the  following:  Firstly, 
manufacturing  still  accounts  for  a  major  part  of 
innovation  effort  in  advanced  economies  which 
translates into above-average contributions to overall 
productivity growth and thus to real income growth. 
Secondly,  there  are  very  important  ‘backward 
linkages’  from  manufacturing  to  services  which 
provide  important  inputs  for  manufacturing  (in 
                                                            
135   ‘Food  processing’  was  analysed  separately,  as  firms  in  this 
industry exhibit by far the highest support rate with respect to 
EU funds. 
particular business services). Thirdly, manufacturing 
has  a  ‘carrier  function  for  services  which  might 
otherwise be considered to have limited tradability. In 
the  same  direction  goes  the  increased  ‘product 
bundling’  of  production  and  service  activities  in 
advanced  manufacturing  activities.  This  ‘carrier 
function’ – through international competitive pressure 
– has furthermore a stimulus effect for innovation and 
qualitative  upgrading  for  service  activities.  Lastly, 
and  related  to  the  first  argument,  is  the  higher 
productivity  growth  in  manufacturing  which  is 
important because the sector of origin of productivity 
growth  be  the  sector  that  benefits  most  from  the 
actual productivity gain.  
The  main  findings of  the  analyses  of  state  aid  and 
export-oriented  manufacturing  are  the  following. 
Regarding extra-EU manufacturing export shares of 
Member States, internationalisation measures appear 
to be a support item that has a positive effect. Also, in 
the case of internationalisation  measures, there is a 
positive  interaction  effect  with  governance 
effectiveness. 
As  for  the  per  capita  levels  of  the  export-oriented 
manufacturing sector in the EU-27 countries, regional 
aid and training aid were positively associated with 
value-added per capita growth while risk capital aid 
has a significant negative effect. 
The  results  from  the  analyses  of  public  funding  of 
R&D&I suggest that it can be better targeted in the 
EU-12 and make it more effective. Especially in the 
EU-12, and irrespective of the actual objectives of the 
support  programmes,  de  facto  governments  end  up 
providing  innovation  support  more  often  to  larger 
firms than to their smaller competitors (for detailed 
Table 4.9. Share of innovative sales 
Share of innovative sales 
Treated  Control  Difference 
T-stat    
All firms  0.232  0.201  0.031  4.11  *** 
EU-15 firms  0.222  0.188  0.033  4.04  *** 
EU-12 firms (CIS4)  0.288  0.269  0.019  1.09 
  EU-12 firms (CIS5)  0.285  0.277  0.009  0.57 
  Small  0.225  0.198  0.027  2.19  ** 
Medium  0.233  0.190  0.042  3.55  *** 
Large  0.244  0.222  0.022  1.37 
  High-tech  0.336  0.249  0.087  3.84  *** 
Medium-high-tech  0.261  0.220  0.041  3.04  *** 
Medium-low-tech  0.178  0.166  0.012  0.83 
  Low-tech  0.200  0.190  0.010  0.60 
  Food processing  0.173  0.149  0.024  0.92 
  Note: The stratified sample overall contains all CIS4 EU-27 countries; the number of treated firms in each sample is: full sample: 5152, 
EU-15: 4338, EU-12: 814 (CIS4), 954 (CIS5), Small: 2090, Medium: 1827, Large: 1235, Domestic enterprise groups: 1580, Foreign 
enterprise groups: 411, High-tech 633 firms, Medium-high-tech: 1447, Medium-low-tech: 1131, Low-tech: 902, Food processing: 441.  
***, ** and * denote tests being significant at a 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.   
Source: Community Innovation Survey (CIS), waves 4 and 5, wiiw estimations.  
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evidence  refer  to  the  background  study  of  the 
report).Given  the  substantial  evidence  that  small 
firms  in  particular  face  considerable  financial 
problems  due  to  asymmetric  information  impacts, 
they should be the primary target of public funds. 
In order to increase support to small firms, a special 
targeting  of  grants  is  one  way  to  improve  the 
allocation  of  public  funds.  Other  initiatives  could 
include  information  campaigns  about  credits, 
deductions  and  subsidised  loans  for  new 
entrepreneurs.  As  problems  lie  mainly  in  the 
commercialisation  phase,  fostering  venture  capital 
investment would be another starting point. 
Industrial policy is designed to improve the growth 
process  (in  its  quantitative  and  qualitative  aspects) 
through its impact upon economic structures (see also 
Pack  and  Saggi,  2006).  This  could  be  done  by 
impacting  economic  structure  in  terms  of  the 
composition  of  activities  or  industries,  or  by 
influencing  the  directions  in  which  technologies 
develop  or  within  industries,  by  affecting  the 
distribution  of  enterprises  and  plants  according  to 
different  performance  characteristics.  There  is  also 
the influence on the distribution of economic activity 
over geographic area, so that industrial policy has an 
interface  with  regional  policy.  The  impact  of 
industrial policy on economic activity may take place 
directly  (e.g.  through  direct  support  for  particular 
types of industries, firms, technologies) or indirectly 
(through  framework  conditions  such  as  the  way 
financial  markets  operate  or  the  legal  and 
administrative  system  or  the  quality  of  educational 
and training institutions). 
The second goal of industrial policy – apart growth – 
is external competitiveness, which means that would 
pay  particular  attention  to  the  development  of  the 
tradable sector (in all the dimensions cited previously: 
composition of activities and industries; intra-industry 
composition; technologies and product quality). 
Furthermore, industrial policy has to be attentive to 
the  different  needs  of  countries  and  regions  at 
different levels of economic development. 
The  maintenance  of  a  competitive  and  diversified 
industrial base is part of the Europe 2020 strategy. 
The policy challenge could be seen as providing the 
right framework conditions and public inputs so that 
gaps  do  not  open  up  in  the  spectrum  of  industrial 
activities which could be deemed strategic in terms of 
the  future  development  of  industrial  activity. 
‘Strategic’ in this context means that such segments 
of  industrial  activity  do  or  could  (in  future)  exert 
important ‘spillover effects’ in terms of backward or 
forward learning processes in linked activities and/or 
could  also  provide  important  inputs  for  various 
activities. 
Industrial policy at the EU level should ensure that 
Europe has a broad and diversified industrial structure 
which  is  well-equipped  to  be  a  major  actor  in  the 
development  of  new  areas  of  activity  such  as 
environmental technology. In this it is able to benefit 
from the diversified character of European industrial 
and demand structures and benefit from the pooling 
of resources. This encourages innovations in existing 
areas,  in  which  Europe  draws  on  its  specific 
comparative advantages, to be based on traditions of 
production specialisation (fashion in France and Italy, 
high-quality  mechanical  engineering  and  transport 
equipment in Germany and in a number of the central 
European economies), or on a diversified pattern of 
private  and  public  demand.  The  latter  includes 
features of the ‘European model’ such as the strong 
position  of  public  transport,  of  high-quality  health 
services  or  linked  medical  devices  and 
pharmaceuticals. 
Furthermore,  the  preservation  of  the  ‘industrial 
commons’ includes nurturing manufacturing-services 
inter-linkages  and  exploiting  specialisation 
advantages  of  different  European  economies.  State 
aid  measures  to  support  structural  change  and 
structural  adjustment  have  so  far  been  used 
predominantly at national level and did not rely much 
on the coordinated use of state aid tools. In a highly 
integrated  European  economy,  the  preservation  and 
development of ‘industrial commons’ should be seen 
as a joint responsibility because of strong externalities 
across  the  European  economy.  Such  joint 
responsibility for ‘industrial commons’ includes rules 
for  quality  assurance  and  recognition  of 
qualifications, supporting the mobility of skilled staff, 
learning from successful cluster policies, support for 
necessary  transport  and  communications 
infrastructure. 
It  is  important  that  concept  of  industrial  policy 
support the ‘structural change enhancing’ rather than 
the  ‘structure  preserving’  aspects.  Industrial  policy 
should play an active role in reducing entry barriers in 
four directions: supporting new firms, developing and 
marketing new products, moving into new markets or 
market niches.  
Something well worth elaborating and increasing is 
demand-side  industrial  policy  as  an  instrument  to 
stimulate  the  commercial  application  of  innovation. 
There  is  a  broad  consensus  that  the  existing  gap 
between  European  research  excellence  and  the 
development of marketable products is a major weak 
spot in Member States’ innovation systems. The US 
defence-related public procurement policy may serve 
as an example of how to remedy this shortcoming. As 
pointed  out  above,  public  procurement  can  provide 
the necessary incentive to invest in the development 
of  marketable  products.  Given  the  strong  political 
commitment of the EU to environmental protection 
and  the  mitigation  of  climate  change,  a  long-term  
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industrial  policy  targeted  at  the  development  of 
‘clean’ products and technologies could well form the 
base  for  a  major  industrial  policy  initiative. 
Importantly, such a strategy should not only include a 
long-term funding commitment for research but also 
needs  a  reliable  source  of  demand  that  should  be 
provided  by  public  procurement  of  EU  Member 
States and the EU itself. 
The industrial policy strategy laid out in the European 
Commission’s  Industrial  Policy  Communication  of 
October 2012 (European Commission, 2012a) goes in 
the  same  direction:  Five  of  the  six  priority  areas 
(priority action lines) defined in this Communication 
are related to meeting the challenge of climate change 
and the degradation of the environment. It remains to 
be  seen  whether  public  procurement  will  have  any 
role  to  play  in  the  EU’s  policy  initiatives  for 
stimulating the commercialisation of innovations and 
the development of green and more resource-efficient 
products. 
This issue has been much researched and forms the 
backbone  of  many  policy  initiatives  (most 
prominently the Lisbon Agenda, and subsequently in 
the  Europe  2020  Agenda).  In  the  face  of 
technological  competition,  particularly  with  the 
United States and more recently with a range of Asian 
economies,  innovation  has  increasingly  become  the 
focus of industrial policy at EU level. 
Analyses  in  this  chapter  have  contributed  to  the 
evaluation  of  innovation  policy  in  the  way  it  is 
conducted at national and EU levels. They come out 
in  favour  of  further  efforts  towards  increased 
harmonisation of ‘innovation systems’ and the use of 
innovation  policies  across  the  EU  Member  States. 
Attempts  at  EU  level  have  already  been  made  to 
create  an  ‘internal  market  for  research’,  supporting 
the  ‘free  movement  of  knowledge,  researchers  and 
technology, with the aim of increasing cooperation, 
stimulating  competition  and  achieving  a  better 
allocation of resources and an improved coordination 
of  national  research  activities  and  policies’  (FREE, 
2010).  The  attempts  have  been  further  reinforced 
through the Article 179 of the Lisbon Treaty, creating 
an unified research area based on the internal market, 
in  which  researchers,  scientific  knowledge  and 
technology  circulate  freely  and  through  which  the 
Union  and  its  Member  States  strengthen  their 
scientific  and  technological  bases,  their 
competitiveness  and  their  capacity  to  collectively 
address  grand  challenges  (European  Commission, 
2012c). 
However,  the  empirical  analysis  conducted  also 
shows  that  innovation  policies  conducted  at  EU, 
national and regional levels partly address different 
needs,  such  as  support  for  large  firms  vs.  SMEs, 
national  enterprise  groups  vs.  multinationals, 
activities where the technological spillovers are more 
local  vs.  those  which  are  international.  It  was  also 
found  that  there  can  be  different  instances  of 
misallocation of resources in the way programmes are 
conceived  at  EU  or  national  levels.  The  different 
focus  is  understandable  as  issues  of  asymmetric 
information  and  knowledge  of  spillover  effects  are 
perceived differently at local, national and EU levels. 
Hence a clear view of division of tasks and use of 
resources at these different levels is important in the 
area of innovation policy as in many other areas. 
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ANNEX 1  
INDUSTRY LISTS AND COUNTRY ABBREVIATIONS 
 
Table A1. Country abbreviations 
AT    Austria 
BE    Belgium 
BG    Bulgaria 
CY    Cyprus 
CZ    Czech Republic 
DE    Germany 
DK    Denmark 
ES    Spain 
EE    Estonia 
FI    Finland 
FR    France 
UK    United Kingdom 
EL    Greece 
HU    Hungary 
IE    Ireland 
IT    Italy 
LT    Lithuania 
LU    Luxembourg 
LV    Latvia 
MT    Malta 
NL    Netherlands 
PL    Poland 
PT    Portugal 
RO    Romania 
SK    Slovakia 
SI    Slovenia 
SE    Sweden 
US    Unites States 
JP    Japan 
KR    South Korea 
BR    Brazil 
CN    China 
IN    India 
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Table A2. Industry classification with detailed advanced manufacturing industries 
15t16  Food, Beverages and Tobacco  Low technology 
17t18  Textiles and Textile Products  Low technology 
19  Leather, Leather and Footwear  Low technology 
20  Wood and Products of Wood and Cork  Low technology 
21t22  Pulp, Paper, Paper , Printing and Publishing  Low technology 
23  Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel  Medium-low technology 
24  Chemicals and Chemical Products  Chemicals 
25  Rubber and Plastics  Medium-low technology 
26  Other Non-Metallic Mineral  Medium-low technology 
27t28  Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal  Metals 
29  Machinery, nec  Machinery 
30t33  Electrical and Optical Equipment  Electrical equipment 
34t35  Transport Equipment  Transport equipment 
36t37  Manufacturing, nec; Recycling  Low technology 
Note: Based on NACE Rev. 1 industry classification. 
 
Table A3. Industry classification according to technology intensity 
15t16  Food, Beverages and Tobacco  Low technology 
17t18  Textiles and Textile Products  Low technology 
19  Leather, Leather and Footwear  Low technology 
20  Wood and Products of Wood and Cork  Low technology 
21t22  Pulp, Paper, Paper , Printing and Publishing  Low technology 
23  Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel  Medium-low technology 
24  Chemicals and Chemical Products  Medium-high and high technology 
25  Rubber and Plastics  Medium-low technology 
26  Other Non-Metallic Mineral  Medium-low technology 
27t28  Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal  Medium-low technology 
29  Machinery, nec  Medium-high and high technology 
30t33  Electrical and Optical Equipment  Medium-high and high technology 
34t35  Transport Equipment  Medium-high and high technology 
36t37  Manufacturing, nec; Recycling  Low technology 
Note: Based on NACE Rev. 1 industry classification. 
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Table A4. Industry classification according to Eaton et al. (1998) 
15t16  Food, Beverages and Tobacco  Labour-intensive / Chemical-linked 
17t18  Textiles and Textile Products  Labour-intensive / Chemical-linked 
19  Leather, Leather and Footwear  Labour-intensive / Chemical-linked 
20  Wood and Products of Wood and Cork  Resource-intensive / Earth-linked 
21t22  Pulp, Paper, Paper , Printing and Publishing  Resource-intensive / Earth-linked 
23  Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel  Resource-intensive / Earth-linked 
24  Chemicals and Chemical Products  Chemicals 
25  Rubber and Plastics  Labour-intensive / Chemical-linked 
26  Other Non-Metallic Mineral  Resource-intensive / Earth-linked 
27t28  Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal  Metals 
29  Machinery, nec  Machinery 
30t33  Electrical and Optical Equipment  Electrical equipment 
34t35  Transport Equipment  Transport equipment 
36t37  Manufacturing, nec; Recycling  Resource-intensive / Earth-linked 
Note: Based on NACE Rev. 1 industry classification. 
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ANNEX 2 
ADDITIONAL RESULTS FROM THE QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF STATE AID 
Table A5. Percentile ranks of EU Member States' governance effectiveness, average 1995-2011 
AT    93.4 
BE    93.8 
BG    56.4 
CY    91.5 
CZ    81.5 
DE    91.9 
DK    99.5 
ES    82.0 
EE    84.8 
FI    100 
FR    88.2 
UK    92.4 
EL    66.8 
HU    73.0 
IE    89.1 
IT    66.4 
LT    72.0 
LU    94.8 
LV    72.5 
MT    82.9 
NL    96.7 
PL    71.6 
PT    78.7 
RO    47.4 
SK    76.3 
SI    79.6 
SE    98.6 
Note: Percentile range (globally) is from 0-100. Higher percentiles indicate higher governance effectiveness.   
Source: World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) database. 
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Table A6. Aid to research, development and innovation and competitiveness
136 
Dependent variable: Member States’ share in total extra-EU exports 
Specification  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)   
                 
R&D aid  -0.004    0.001    0.011    -0.013   
                (0.018)    (0.022)    (0.026)    (0.020)   
R&D aid²  -0.001    0.000    0.001    -0.004  * 
                (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.003)    (0.002)   
loans to GDP  0.035                                                      
                (0.069)                                                      
loans to GDP²  -0.253  ***                                                    
                (0.035)                                                      
loans to GDP * R&D aid  -0.002                                                      
                (0.011)                                                      
governance                    0.454                                     
                                  (0.342)                                     
governance²                    0.658                                     
                                  (0.964)                                     
governance * R&D aid                    -0.134  ***                                   
                                  (0.033)                                     
wage share                                     -0.376                    
                                                   (0.401)                    
wage share²                                     2.853                    
                                                   (2.276)                    
wage share R&D aid                                     -0.248  ***                  
                                                   (0.061)                    
tariff rate                                                      -0.046   
                                                                    (0.052)   
tariff rate²                                                      -0.081  *** 
                                                                    (0.029)   
tariff rate * R&D aid                                                      -0.020  * 
                                                                    (0.012)   
                 
R²  0.992    0.989    0.988    0.988   
adjusted R²  0.991    0.987    0.987    0.986   
Observations  373    380    341    391   
Note:  Standard  errors  appear  in  parentheses.  ***,  **,  *indicate  statistical  significance  at  the  1%;  5%  and  10%  level  respectively. 
Regressions include country and year fixed effects as well as a constant term which are not reported. The standard errors are robust. All the 
data was logarithmised (observations of the value zero were changed to 0.01 in order to make the taking of logarithms possible) and centred 
in order to make the estimated coefficients interpretable. R&D aid is aid to research, development and innovation.   
Source: WIOD, European  Union  State  Aid  Scoreboard, Eurostat, UNCTAD-TRAINS, World  Bank’s  Worldwide  Governance Indicators 
(WGI) database. 
   
                                                            
136   It is important to note that this analysis is of a general nature and does not imply a specific link between a certain type of aid and the 
trade performance of any particular product or sector.  
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Table A7. Sectoral aid to manufacturing and competitiveness
137 
Dependent variable: Member States’ share in total extra-EU exports 
Specification  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)   
                 
manufacturing aid  0.002    -0.008    0.000    -0.004   
                (0.006)    (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.006)   
manufacturing aid²  -0.001    -0.001    -0.001    -0.001   
                (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)   
loans to GDP  0.054                                                      
                (0.070)                                                      
loans to GDP²  -0.250  ***                                                    
                (0.031)                                                      
Loans * manufacturing aid  0.004                                                      
                (0.008)                                                      
governance                    0.446                                     
                                  (0.362)                                     
governance²                    0.889                                     
                                  (1.020)                                     
governance * manufacturing aid                    0.071  ***                                   
                                  (0.023)                                     
wage share                                     -0.091                    
                                                   (0.399)                    
wage share²                                     1.436                    
                                                   (1.983)                    
wage share * manufacturing aid                                     -0.091  **                  
                                                   (0.044)                    
tariff rate                                                      0.007   
                                                                    (0.042)   
tariff rate²                                                      -0.090  *** 
                                                                    (0.032)   
tariff rate * manufacturing aid                                                      0.004   
                                                                    (0.007)   
                 
R²  0.992    0.988    0.988    0.988   
adjusted R²  0.991    0.987    0.986    0.986   
Observations  373    380    341    391   
Note:  Standard  errors  appear  in  parentheses.  ***,  **,  *indicate  statistical  significance  at  the  1%;  5%  and  10%  level  respectively. 
Regressions include country and year fixed effects as well as a constant term which are not reported. The standard errors are robust. All the 
data was logarithmised (observations of the value zero were changed to 0.01 in order to make the taking of logarithms possible) and centred 
in order to make the estimated coefficients interpretable. Manufacturing aid is sectoral aid to manufacturing.   
Source: WIOD, European  Union  State  Aid  Scoreboard, Eurostat, UNCTAD-TRAINS, World  Bank’s  Worldwide  Governance Indicators 
(WGI) database. 
   
                                                            
137   It is important to note that this analysis is of a general nature and does not imply a specific link between a certain type of aid and the 
trade performance of any particular product or sector.  
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ANNEX 3 
METHODOLOGY 
Decomposition of manufacturing R&D intensity 
The results for the decomposition of R&D intensities in Figure 4.6. are derived followings the approach of Eaton 
et al. (1998). The decomposition approach takes the following form: 
    
        
    ∑      
 
                    ∑       
 
                    ∑      
 
                  
          
where    
  denotes R&D intensity in the manufacturing sector and       denotes R&D intensity in industry 
i. Subscript c denotes countries and subscript w denotes the global average which for this purpose is the average 
of Finland, France, Germany, United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands as well as the United 
States and Japan, i.e. the nine countries included in the decomposition exercise. The valued added shares of 
manufacturing are denoted by   .  
Therefore the first term represents the composition effect, i.e. the differences in industry specialisation across 
countries and the second term captures the differences in the industry level R&D intensities. The last term is an 
interaction term between those two which has no particular economic interpretation. 
Calculation of value added exports 
The concept of value added exports used throughout this Report is that of Johnson and Noguera (2012). The 
value added exports approach requires global input-output data. In this chapter the world input-output database 
(WIOD) is used for this purpose. The WIOD contains information on 40 countries plus the rest of the world 
(ROW) for 35 industries. The global input-output table in the WIOD that summarises the inter-industry linkages 
is therefore of dimension 1435 x 1435. 
The starting point for calculating value added exports (VAX) is the basic input-output identity  
                  
where   denotes a vector of gross output for each country and industry (i.e. of dimension 1435x1),   is a matrix 
of intermediate inputs per unit of gross output (of dimension 1435x1435) and   is a vector of final demand by 
country and sector and therefore again of dimension (1435x1). A final product, e.g. a car, is made of many other 
parts produced in other industries maybe even in other countries.  
The  calculation  of  VAX  consists  of  decomposing  the  output  vector  q  of  each  country  r  in 
                    where      denotes the output absorbed in country r that was sourced from partner 
country 1 and likewise for the other partner countries. The elements of q are also referred to as output transfers. 
These output transfers are in turn used to calculate the value added produced in a source country i and absorbed 
in another country r which constitutes the bilateral value-added exports (VAXi,r).  
Bilateral value added exports are defined as         
   
  
     , where 
   
  
 is the ratio of value added to gross 
output  in  country  i  and  qjr  is  the  output  produced  in  country  i  that  is  absorbed  in  r  (see  Johnson  and 
Noguera, 2012). The global value-added exports of country r        are obtained by summing up the bilateral 
value added exports for all partner countries. The market share of each country in global value added exports 
used in the text is then simply 
    
∑    
     .  
Quantitative analysis of state aid 
Section 4.13 uses three types of approaches to estimate the relationship between the provision of state aid by 
Member States and  export market shares, value added and value  added growth respectively.  The empirical 
approaches are briefly outlined below. 
Aghion, Boulanger and Cohen (2011) type equation: In its basic form the following panel data equation is being 
estimated:  
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                                                                                     , 
where  lnEXit  represents  the  log  of  the  overall  share  of  extra-EU  manufacturing  and  services  exports  of  an 
EU Member State i in the sample to total EU exports in year t. The variable SA covers total sectoral state aid to 
industry and services (also all the other types and sub-groups of state aid are being controlled for) and PC is a 
proxy for financial development, measured by the ratio of private credit by deposit-taking banks and other 
financial intermediaries to GDP (similarly also indicators of governance, competition and tariff protection are 
being checked). The squared terms control for non-linearity and the interaction term checks whether the two 
explanatory  variables  are  substitutes  or  complements.  Finally,  γi  and  δt  are  country  and  time  fixed  effects 
respectively, while εit is the error term and the β’s are the coefficients to be estimated. The rationale of this 
estimation exercise is to find out whether state subsidies can act as a promoter of international competitiveness, 
especially in those cases where access to private finance is limited. (It is important to note that this analysis is of 
a general nature and does not imply a specific link between a certain type of aid and the trade performance of 
any particular product or sector.) While the original sample of Aghion, Boulanger and Cohen (2011) included 
EU-15 data for the years 1992-2008, here EU-27 data for the period 1995-2011 are exploited. 
Haraguchi and Rezonja (2011) type equation: The following modified base-line equation is being estimated: 
      
                                                                         
 , 
where lnVA
j
it is the log of the real value added per capita of the respective manufacturing sector j in country i and 
year t. The variable DP accounts for the per capita gross domestic product, PD stands for population density and 
NR is an indicator for natural resource endowment. Following Haraguchi and Rezonja (2011), the modified 
natural resource proxy variable can be calculated as the ratio between exports and imports of crude natural 
resource commodities. The commodities included are those categorised under SITC Rev. 1 in Code 2 (crude 
materials, inedible, except fuels), 32 (coal, coke and briquettes), 331 (petroleum, crude and partly refined) and 
3411 (gas, natural). 
These three explanatory variables are seen as mostly exogenous for the specific sample analysed. Here, SA is 
state aid per capita, and the β’s, γi and δt are defined as in the earlier equation. ε
j
it is the error term. The value 
added data was taken from Eurostat’s intermediate ISIC aggregation Rev. 2. GDP and population density data 
stems also from Eurostat. Data for constructing the natural resource endowment indicator were taken from the 
Comtrade database. In the preferred regressions the single manufacturing sectors have been aggregated in two 
groups – export-oriented industries and industries focusing on the domestic markets, based on an exportability 
measure,  in  order  to  make  the  results  better  interpretable.  In  following  Rajan  and  Subramanian  (2011)  the 
exportability of an industry is assumed if the respective industry has a ratio of exports to value added that 
exceeds the industry median. For each industry, the median ratio of exports to value added was calculated using 
data  from  all  EU-27  countries.  The  industries  above  the  median  are  manufacturers  of  petroleum  products, 
chemicals,  pharmaceuticals,  electronics,  machinery  and  cars.  Those  below  are  manufacturing  food,  textiles, 
paper, plastics, metals, electric and other equipment. 
Rajan and Subramanian (2011) type equation: The basic equation estimated is the following: 
                                       , 
where the MGij variable depicts the average annual real growth rate of manufacturing value added of industry j in 
country i over the period 2000-2010. A country- and industry-specific indicator of the initial manufacturing 
share (IS) is added to the regression in order to control for convergence. Most importantly an interaction term of 
state aid as a share of GDP (SA) and a manufacturing sector-specific exportability dummy variable (ED) is 
included  as  well.  Similarly  to  the  regression  before  and  following  Rajan  and  Subramanian  (2011)  the 
exportability dummy takes a value of 1 if the respective industry has a ratio of exports to value-added that 
exceeds the industry median. For each industry, the median ratio of exports to value added was calculated using 
data from all the EU-27 countries. The aim of this regression equation is to check in what way public subsidies 
influence the growth of the export-oriented manufacturing sectors in Europe. All the data used have the same 
origin as in the second approach. 
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Estimation of commercialisation output model specification 
The estimation procedure below for the commercialisation output model specification (used in 4.14) follows a so 
called CDM-approach (see Crepon et al. (1998) and Griffith et al. (2006) for more detail) towards estimating the 
innovation-driven economic performance of firms based on the CIS data. The CDM procedure uses a multiple 
equation econometric model estimate the economic outcomes from the firms’ innovation efforts. 
When estimating the R&D intensity equation using Heckman procedure, the firm’s decision to perform/report 
R&D has been considered as depending on such specific factors as: the firm’s size represented by the logarithm 
of total sales ( ) log( i S ) in the previous period, whether or not the firm is a member of a group (
i GR ): 
it i i i i GR S r RDperforme         2 1 ) log(  
The first equation has the logarithm of the firm’s R&D expenditures as dependent variable and is estimated 
conditional on the firm’s decision to perform/report R&D above: 
i i i i i
i i i i i i
FSize EUS NPS LPS
GCoop HCoop VCoop exRD RD
    
    
   
    
8 7 6 5
4 3 2 1 ) ln( , 
where the explanatory variables are the following
138: 
  Extramural R&D indicator, 
i exRD  (1/0); 
  Vertical Cooperation indicator, 
i VCoop  (1/0); 
  Horizontal Cooperation indicator, 
i HCoop  (1/0); 
  Cooperation inside the group indicator, 
i GCoop  (1/0); 
  Local public funding indicator, 
i LPS  (1/0); 
  National Public funding indicator, 
i NPS  (1/0); 
  EU funding indicator, 
i EUS  (1/0) 
  Firm size class, 
i FSize  (0: <50 employees, 1: >=50). 
The second equation is estimated by the means of the tobit regression where the dependent variable is the share 
of the turnover from products and services new to the market (
i Y ): 
it i i i i
i i i i i i i
EUS NPS LPS GCoop
HCoop VCoop S RD exRD Y
    
     
    
     
9 8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1 ) log( ) ln( ) ln(  
The additional explanatory variables are the following: 
  Predicted value of the logarithm of total R&D,  ) ln( i RD ; 
  The logarithm of total sales in the previous period,  ) log( i S . 
The estimations also take into account the country-specific intercepts and industry class dummies in order to 
correct for individual effects. 
 
   
                                                            
138   The innovation activities and funding indicators are taking the value one if they engaged in the past three years in some innovation 
activities respectively if they received public funding for innovation activities and the value zero if not. The dummy variables for co-
operation partner takes the value one if the firm indicated a certain type of collaboration in their country or other countries in Europe or 
the US or China/India or all other countries and the value zero if not.  
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Table A8. Results of the R&D regressions with CIS2006 
   All firms  EU-15  EU-12 
Small 
firms 
Medium 
and large 
firms 
All manuf. 
firms 
Low-tech 
Medium-
low tech 
Medium-
high and 
high tech 
R&D expenditures equation 
extramural 
R&D 
0.367***  0.266***  0.504***  0.275***  0.414***  0.365***  0.375***  0.455***  0.253** 
   (8.48)  (5.88)  (6.07)  (4.68)  (6.65)  (6.96)  (3.66)  (5.58)  (2.84) 
vertical 
collaboration 
0.429***  0.328***  0.557***  0.436***  0.398***  0.370***  0.455***  0.385***  0.242* 
   (7.82)  (5.52)  (5.51)  (5.69)  (5.17)  (5.59)  (3.49)  (3.71)  (2.19) 
horizontal 
collaboration 
0.276***  0.349***  0.176  0.238*  0.306***  0.215*  0.129  0.409**  0.103 
   (4.08)  (4.13)  (1.58)  (2.40)  (3.34)  (2.53)  (0.72)  (3.06)  (0.77) 
intra-group 
collaboration 
0.468***  0.507***  0.384**  0.283*  0.372***  0.541***  0.626***  0.449***  0.579*** 
   (6.52)  (6.09)  (3.12)  (2.24)  (4.16)  (6.22)  (3.30)  (3.33)  (4.20) 
local public 
funding 
0.381***  0.354***  0.707**  0.464***  0.317***  0.333***  0.211  0.308**  0.453*** 
   (6.19)  (6.69)  (2.84)  (5.96)  (3.32)  (4.57)  (1.44)  (2.73)  (3.76) 
national 
public 
funding 
0.986***  0.954***  1.003***  1.076***  0.853***  1.006***  0.915***  1.031***  1.037*** 
   (18.30)  (17.50)  (9.13)  (14.31)  (11.22)  (15.82)  (6.87)  (10.45)  (10.24) 
EU funding  0.589***  0.666***  0.491***  0.444***  0.715***  0.561***  0.570**  0.466**  0.678*** 
   (7.58)  (7.17)  (3.77)  (3.86)  (6.85)  (5.67)  (2.94)  (2.88)  (4.26) 
firm size class  0.984***  0.858***  1.104***        0.919***  0.773***  0.913***  1.045*** 
   (20.01)  (17.01)  (11.07)        (15.30)  (6.59)  (9.72)  (10.23) 
R&D selection equation 
log 2004 sales  0.0370***  0.0230***  0.0646***  0.00322  0.111***  0.0442***  0.0502***  0.0374***  0.0450*** 
   (21.32)  (10.68)  (21.03)  (1.62)  (22.91)  (19.56)  (12.83)  (10.09)  (10.67) 
member of a 
group 
0.424***  0.418***  0.441***  0.357***  0.246***  0.501***  0.545***  0.505***  0.447*** 
   (33.72)  (24.65)  (23.17)  (18.15)  (13.37)  (29.47)  (19.21)  (17.54)  (14.14) 
chi2 for 
model’s 
significance 
4895.0***  2832.6***  1591.3***  2861.4***  1743.0***  2216.9***  680.3***  892.3***  734.4*** 
                   
observations  85281  38172  47109  53940  31341  43916  21686  13089  9141 
Note: t statistics appear in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 0,1%; 1% and 5% level respectively. Regressions 
include country and industry fixed effects as well as a constant term which are not reported.   
Source: Community Innovation Survey (CIS) 
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Table A9. Results of the R&D regressions with CIS2008 
   All firms  EU-15  EU-12 
Small 
firms 
Large 
firms 
All manuf. 
firms 
Low-tech 
Medium-
low tech 
Medium-
high and 
high tech 
R&D expenditures equation 
extramural 
R&D 
0.619***  0.556***  0.729***  0.510***  0.633***  0.702***  0.745***  0.765***  0.542*** 
   (13.70)  (11.64)  (7.81)  (8.67)  (9.41)  (11.99)  (7.31)  (8.31)  (4.80) 
vertical 
collaboration 
0.559***  0.437***  0.769***  0.540***  0.567***  0.492***  0.807***  0.302**  0.424** 
   (9.98)  (7.26)  (6.82)  (7.34)  (6.87)  (6.78)  (6.24)  (2.64)  (3.11) 
horizontal 
collaboration 
0.121  0.170*  -0.000436  0.162  0.0841  0.129  -0.117  0.364*  0.0484 
   (1.74)  (2.10)  (-0.00)  (1.66)  (0.86)  (1.35)  (-0.67)  (2.46)  (0.27) 
intra-group 
collaboration 
0.514***  0.686***  0.23  0.267*  0.454***  0.588***  0.553**  0.571***  0.600*** 
   (7.30)  (8.55)  (1.79)  (2.30)  (4.97)  (6.42)  (3.16)  (3.97)  (3.66) 
local public 
funding 
0.219***  0.228***  0.218  0.250**  0.209*  0.157  0.0257  0.158  0.292* 
   (3.44)  (4.01)  (0.78)  (3.26)  (2.05)  (1.93)  (0.17)  (1.24)  (1.97) 
national 
public 
funding 
1.032***  1.004***  1.098***  0.953***  1.044***  1.011***  1.080***  1.037***  0.890*** 
   (19.08)  (18.19)  (9.05)  (13.22)  (13.19)  (14.75)  (8.44)  (9.70)  (7.17) 
EU funding  0.716***  0.960***  0.440**  0.740***  0.693***  0.666***  0.766***  0.533**  0.748*** 
   (8.77)  (9.61)  (3.12)  (6.25)  (6.14)  (6.20)  (4.08)  (3.04)  (3.76) 
firm size 
class 
0.957***  0.819***  1.151***        0.907***  0.722***  1.075***  0.923*** 
   (18.40)  (15.24)  (9.96)        (13.22)  (6.12)  (10.13)  (6.76) 
R&D selection equation 
log 2006 
sales 
0.0380***  0.0253***  0.0880***  0.00792***  0.108***  0.0532***  0.0649***  0.0436***  0.0533*** 
   (23.99)  (14.27)  (23.92)  (4.37)  (24.77)  (22.83)  (15.69)  (11.99)  (11.63) 
member of a 
group 
0.450***  0.431***  0.451***  0.390***  0.289***  0.529***  0.543***  0.562***  0.462*** 
   (40.14)  (29.65)  (24.88)  (22.19)  (17.63)  (33.32)  (20.80)  (21.69)  (14.58) 
chi2 for 
model’s 
significance 
4794.1***  3828.8***  1004.0***  2795.5***  1862.0***  2322.88***  829.8***  958.0***  596.3*** 
                   
observations  98345  48831  49514  60845  37500  47306  23667  15152  8487 
Note: t statistics appear in parentheses. ***, **, *indicate statistical significance at the 0.1%; 1% and 5% level respectively. Regressions 
include country and industry fixed effects as well as a constant term which are not reported.   
Source: Community Innovation Survey (CIS) 
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  Chapter 5.  
EU PRODUCTION AND TRADE BASED ON KEY ENABLING 
TECHNOLOGIES 
 
BACKGROUND 
Previous chapters  have discussed  the specialisation, 
complexity  and  sophistication  of  economies  basing 
their  output  on  key  enabling  technologies  (KETs). 
This  chapter  takes  an  in-depth  look  at  the 
specialisation, strengths and weaknesses of the EU in 
the global production and trade in products based on 
KETs. 
Two  years  ago,  the  High-Level  Group  on  Key 
Enabling  Technologies  published  its  final  report 
which estimated that the global market potential for 
products  based  on  KETs  would  grow  from  USD 
832 bn  around  2008  to  USD  1,282 bn  around  2015 
(HLG KETs 2011). 
It  was  followed  by  the  European  Commission 
Communication  ’A  European  strategy  for  Key 
Enabling  Technologies  –  A  bridge  to  growth  and 
jobs’ (European Commission 2012 a) which outlined 
a strategy to boost the industrial production of KETs-
based products and enable maximum exploitation of 
the EU’s potential in competitive markets. 
In  addition,  in  its  Communication  ‘A  stronger 
European  Industry  for  Growth  and  Economic 
Recovery’  (European  Commission  2012 b),  the 
Commission identified six priority action lines, one of 
which  was  the  creation  of  markets  for  KETs.  The 
European  Commission  expressed  its  intention  to 
implement the European Strategy for KETs, ensuring 
better  co-ordination  of  EU  and  Member  State 
technology  policies;  funding  of  essential 
demonstration and pilot lines and cross-cutting KET 
projects; and the timely development of the internal 
market  for  KETs-based  products  (Calleja  2013). 
Moreover, the industrial deployment of KETs will be 
considered  in  future  European  Innovation 
Partnerships,  while  a  ‘knowledge  and  innovation 
community on added-value manufacturing’ has been 
proposed as a forum for integration and promotion of 
skills  and  competences  (European  Commission 
2013 c). 
OBJECTIVES 
The overall objective of this chapter is to analyse the 
current position of the EU in the global production of 
KETs-based  products  in  order  to  assess  upcoming 
challenges  for  the  competitiveness  of  the  EU.  The 
chapter aims to: 
•  Provide  a  narrative  overview  of  most  recent 
technological and industry developments in each 
KET since 2009; 
•  Update estimations on future market potentials in 
each  KET,  building  on  the  analyses  of  recent 
trends  in  ‘market  shares’  in  the  production  of 
KET-related technologies; 
•  Assess  the  EU  position  in  the  value  chain  by 
studying two promising KETs-based products; 
•  Analyse the EU position in international trade for 
certain  subfields  of  KETs-based  products, 
including  changes  in  the  competitiveness  of  the 
EU over time; 
•  Determine  the  EU  position  in  value  chains  (in 
terms  of  ‘technology  content’)  within  certain 
subfields of KETs-based products based on unit 
value analysis of exports and imports; 
•  Analyse  the  specialisation  of  a  selection  of  EU 
Member States in production and trade of KETs-
based products by combining production and trade 
statistics. 
This  chapter  applies  the  following  definition  of 
KETs-based  products  (European  Commission 
2012 a).  A  KETs-based  product  is:  (a)  an  enabling 
product  for  the  development  of  goods  and  services 
enhancing their overall commercial and social value; 
(b)  induced  by  constituent  parts  that  are  based  on 
nanotechnology,  micro-/nanoelectronics,  industrial 
biotechnology, advanced materials and/or photonics; 
and,  but  not  limited  to  (c)  produced  by  advanced 
manufacturing technologies. 
STRUCTURE OF THE CHAPTER 
This  chapter  is  structured  as  follows:  Section  5.1 
presents an update of market share calculations and 
market potential estimates. 5.2 analyses the position 
of  the  EU  in  international  trade  in  KETs-based 
products. In 5.3 to 5.5, the value chain of two KETs-
based  products  is  analysed,  namely  lipase  enzymes 
and  the  accelerometer.  Section  5.6  summarises  the 
main conclusions and potential policy implications. 
5.1.  TECHNOLOGY POSITIONS AND MARKET 
POTENTIAL 
5.1.1.  Introduction 
Key  Enabling  Technologies  (KETs)  are  defined  as 
knowledge-intensive  technologies  associated  with  
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high  R&D  intensity,  rapid  innovation  cycles,  high 
capital  expenditure  and  highly  skilled  employment. 
They  are  multidisciplinary,  cutting  across  many 
technology  areas  with  a  trend  towards  convergence 
and integration. 
The  following  technologies are  identified as  KETs: 
micro-  and  nanoelectronics,  nanotechnology, 
photonics,  advanced  materials,  industrial 
biotechnology  and  advanced  manufacturing 
technologies for other KETs (HLG KETs 2011). 
The  objective  of  this  section  is  to  provide  an 
overview of the competitive position of the EU in the 
generation of technology and to estimate the future 
market  potential  for  KETs-based  products  and 
applications.  As  such,  it  provides  an  update  of  the 
analysis undertaken in the background study to the 
2010  European  Competitiveness  Report  (European 
Commission  2010).  The  calculation  of  technology 
market shares is based on the number of international 
patent  applications.  KETs-relevant  patent  activities 
are identified through a list of IPC codes developed 
for  the  2010  report  and  recently  updated  in  the 
‘Feasibility  study  for  a  KETs  Observatory’ 
commissioned by DG Enterprise and Industry (Van 
de Velde et al. 2013). In order to estimate the market 
potential of each KET, an analysis of existing studies, 
reports  and  reviews  has  been  conducted.  For  each 
KET,  several  market  segments  have  been  selected, 
depending on KETs-based applications. 
5.1.2.  Approach 
An  important  measure  of  a  country’s  competitive 
position  in  KETs  is  its  ability  to  produce  new, 
commercially relevant technological knowledge. One 
way to measure this ability is to look at patent data. 
Patent data have certain advantages when it comes to 
measuring  technological  performance.  Patents 
represent  new  technological  knowledge  that  has  a 
particular  potential  for  economic  application.  Each 
patent  is  linked  to  technological  areas  through  an 
internationally  standardised  system  (International 
Patent Classification (IPC)) which enables patents to 
be ‘linked’ to KETs. Since patents are essential for 
the  production  and  protection  of  new  technologies 
and  innovative  products  and  processes,  they  are  a 
commercial  good  which  serves  as  an  input  to 
production and can be traded on technology markets 
(through licensing or by selling and purchasing patent 
rights). In contrast to many other goods, most patents 
are produced and used in-house while only a small 
part  is  actually  traded  between  firms  (see 
Gambardella et al. 2007; Arora et al. 2002; Serrano 
2005; Lamoreaux and Sokoloff 1999). 
When  using  patent  applications  to  assess  the 
competitive  strength  and  weakness  of  an  economy, 
some limitations need to be pointed out. First, not all 
new technological knowledge needed for innovations 
is represented by patents, while a number of patents 
will  never  be  used  for  innovations.  Secondly,  the 
economic value represented by one patent can vary 
substantially.  Thirdly,  not  all  patents  seek  legal 
protection of new technological knowledge but some 
are  used  to  block  competitors  from  patenting 
activities or to keep strategic information away from 
competitors. For these reasons, patents represent only 
a fraction of the technology market. 
As  with  any  other  market,  one  can  analyse  the 
technology market performance of individual actors 
as  well  as  of  countries.  Here,  for  each  country  a 
‘market  share’  of  the  technology  market  for  each 
KET  is  calculated  based  on  the  number  of 
international patent applications. International patent 
applications are patents applied for at the European 
Patent  Office  (EPO)  or  through  the  Patent 
Cooperation  Treaty  (PCT)  procedure  at  the  World 
Intellectual  Property  Organization.  Using 
international patent applications reduces the risk of an 
overly strong home-country bias and excludes patents 
of low (expected) commercial value since applying at 
the EPO or via the PCT is comparatively costly. 
Technology  market  shares  by  KET  are  calculated 
using a conversion table that links IPC codes to KETs 
(see Van de Velde et al. 2013). Patent applications are 
assigned  to  countries  using  the  country  of  the 
applicant and by applying ‘fractional counting’ in the 
event  that  a  patent  application  is  submitted  by 
organisations  from  different  countries.  Patents  are 
assigned  to  four  regions:  Europe  (all  EU  Member 
States  plus  Albania,  Andorra,  Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia,  Iceland, 
Liechtenstein,  Monaco,  Montenegro,  Norway,  San 
Marino,  Serbia,  Switzerland);  North  America  (US, 
Canada, Mexico); East Asia (Japan, China including 
Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan); and 
the rest of the world (RoW). The April 2013 edition 
of the Patstat database published by EPO is used. 
5.1.3.  Industrial biotechnology 
  Technology market share   5.1.3.1.
International  patent  applications  in  the  field  of 
industrial  biotechnology  have  been  decreasing  over 
the past ten years. Globally, the number of patents fell 
by 33 % between 2000 and 2010 (Figure 5.1). Europe 
and North America report even greater drops (– 46 %). 
East  Asia  and  RoW  increased  the  number  of 
international  patent  applications  in  industrial 
biotechnology by 28 % and 14 % respectively. As a 
consequence, the market shares of Europe and North 
America are declining. Nevertheless, North America 
remains the region with the highest market share in 
2010 (39 %). Europe lost its second position in 2010 
even though its market share in that year (27 %) was 
above the low level reported for the mid-2000s (23 % 
in  2006).  East  Asia  gained  market  shares  and  
149 
contributed  28 %  to  global  patent  applications  in 
industrial  biotechnology  in  2010.  Rest-of-the-world 
countries showed increasing market shares up to 2008 
but no further growth afterwards, contributing 5 % to 
total patenting in industrial biotechnology in 2010. 
In  Europe,  Germany  gradually  lost  market  share, 
declining from 44 % (2000) to 27 % (2010). France 
gained market shares and by 2008 had replaced the 
UK as the second largest European patent producer in 
industrial  biotechnology.  The  Netherlands  showed 
high market shares in the mid-2000s (ranking second 
in 2005 with a European market share of 15 %) but 
clearly lost ground in recent years. Switzerland and 
Denmark  hold  position  five  and  six  in  European 
patenting in industrial biotechnology. 
  Market potential  5.1.3.2.
Industrial biotechnology is used in the production of 
chemicals  and  derived  biomaterials.  The  use  of 
biotechnology for chemical production has increased 
over  the  past  decade  and  is  likely  to  continue 
increasing,  driven  by  rising  energy  costs,  new 
chemicals  legislation  and  increasingly  stringent 
environmental regulations (OECD 2009). 
According  to  Festel  Capital,  the  sales  of  products 
made  by  biotechnological  processes  in  2007  was 
around EUR 48 bn, or 3.5 % of total chemical sales, 
while by 2017 predicted sales of products made by 
biotechnological  processes  will  be  around  EUR 
340 bn,  or  15.4 %  of  total  chemical  sales  in  2017. 
Based on Festel Capital research, the most important 
sub-segments  in  2017  are  expected  to  be  active 
pharma ingredients and polymers and fibres (Festel 
2010). Other sources start from a market share of 9 –
 13 % in 2010 and predict further growth to 22 – 28 % 
by 2025. Major growth is expected to take place in 
polymers and bulk chemicals (Kircher 2012). 
The global market for industrial enzymes is forecast 
to  reach  USD  3.74 bn  by  2015.  Important  factors 
driving the market include new enzyme technologies 
with  a  view  to  enhanced  cost  efficiencies  and 
productivity,  and  growing  interest  in  substituting 
petroleum-based  products.  BCC  projects  the 
industrial enzymes market to grow to USD 6 bn by 
2016  (BCC  Research  2011 a).  Major  growth  is 
expected  in  the  segments  of  food  and  beverage 
enzymes and technical enzymes. Two other segments 
with  high  growth  potential  are  carbohydrases  and 
lipases (see also 5.4). 
5.1.4.  Photonics 
  Technology market share  5.1.4.1.
Over  the  past  ten  years,  East  Asia  has  gained 
significantly in technology market shares in the field 
of  photonics  (Figure 5.2).  Since  2003,  East  Asian 
organisations  have  become  the  largest  group  of 
applicants for photonics patents and have been able to 
strengthen  their  position  continuously,  increasing 
their market share from 27 % in 2000 to 50 % in 2010. 
North American applicants lost the leading position 
which  they  held  in  the  early  2000s.  Their  market 
share fell from 40 % (2000) to 19 % in 2010. Europe 
did  significantly  better:  its  market  share  increased 
until 2008, when it reached 32 %. In 2009 and 2010, 
Europe’s contribution to photonics patenting fell back 
to  29 %.  Countries  from  outside  the  three  main 
regions slightly lost market shares. 
Changes  in  market  shares  in  photonics  took  place 
against  the  background  of  expanding  overall 
patenting.  The  total  number  of  international  patent 
applications grew by 25 % between 2000 and 2010, 
almost four times the growth rate for all KET patent 
applications and equal to the growth rate of patenting 
across all fields of technology. 
Germany further strengthened its position as the main 
producer  of  new  technological  knowledge  in 
photonics  within  Europe  over  the  past  decade.  Its 
share of total European patent applications was 43 % 
in 2010, compared to 33 % in 2001 – 2002. Among the 
other five main European applicant countries in 2010 
–  France,  Netherlands,  UK,  Austria  and  Italy  –
Netherlands  and  the  UK  lost  market  shares  while 
France  and  Italy  maintained  their  positions  within 
Europe.  Austria  recently  increased  patenting  in 
photonics and overtook Swiss patents applicants. 
  Market potential   5.1.4.2.
The  photonics  industry  is  expected  to  grow 
significantly in coming years. The global market for 
photonic  components  and  systems  forecast  to  be 
worth  EUR  480 bn  by  2015,  suggesting  an  annual 
growth rate of 8 % (HLG KETs 2011). 
Solar photovoltaic (PV) is the third most important 
renewable  energy  in  terms  of  globally  installed 
capacity. Its growth rate reached almost 70 % in 2011. 
In  terms  of  cumulative  installed  capacity,  Europe 
leads  the  way  worldwide  with  more  than  51  GW 
installed  as  of  2011  (75 %  of  world  capacity). 
Internationally, significant market growth is expected 
until 2017, reflecting the large untapped potential of 
many countries (EPIA 2013). 
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By 2020, light emitting diodes (LEDs) are expected 
to  account  for  around  95 %  of  the  market  for  light 
bulbs, currently estimated at EUR 11 bn per year (J.P. 
Morgan  Cazenove  2012).  The  expected  growth  in 
market demand for LEDs will be driven by product 
substitution.  Other  application  areas  of  LEDs  are: 
mobile  applications  including  mobile  phone 
notebooks  and  tablets;  TV  and  monitor  backlights; 
sign and automotive lighting. Japan accounts for the 
greatest portion of overall LED component revenues 
(30 %) followed by South Korea (26 %), Taiwan and 
Southeast Asia (19 %). 
The optical communication industry is experiencing a 
recovery from the economic downturn. In 2010 and 
2011,  the  sales  of  data  communication  systems 
started to pick up again. The global market for lasers 
for  communications  (data  and  telecoms)  was 
estimated to be worth USD 1.95 bn in 2010 and USD 
2.22 bn in 2011 (+ 14 %) (Overton et al. 2011). While 
Europe  is  experiencing  a  decline  in  demand,  the 
construction of optical communication is at a peak in 
China. 
5.1.5.  Micro-/nanoelectronics  
  Technology market share   5.1.5.1.
East Asia has since 2002 been the largest producer of 
international  micro-  and  nanoelectronics  patent 
applications (Figure 5.3). Its market share is gradually 
increasing over time. In 2010, 56 % of global patent 
applications  in  this  KET  originated  in  East  Asia. 
North  America  and  Europe  are  both  losing  market 
shares.  In  2010,  North  America  reported  a  market 
share of 23 %, while the figure for Europe was 20 %. 
Countries  from  the  rest  of  the  world  are  of  little 
importance in the technology market for micro- and 
nanoelectronics:  their  market  share  is  1%  to  2 %. 
Dynamics in micro- and nanoelectronics patenting are 
high. Globally, patent applications grew by 35 % from 
2000 to 2010. The number of European applications 
in 2010 was 2 % higher than in 2000, while applicants 
from North America reported a 17 % lower figure in 
2010  than  in  2000.  The  highest  growth  is  in  East 
Asia, where patent  applications  increased  by  116 % 
over the same ten-year period. 
In  Europe,  Germany  is  clearly  the  largest  patent 
producer  in  micro-  and  nanoelectronics  and 
maintained a European market share of 42 – 45 % from 
2001 to 2010. France increased its European market 
share from  10 %  (2000)  to 17 %  (2010),  overtaking 
the  Netherlands.  The  Dutch  market  share  within 
Europe declined from 19 % in 2003 to 8 % in 2010. 
The  UK  is  the  fourth  largest  producer  of  micro-
/nanoelectronics  patent  applications  in  Europe, 
followed by Switzerland and Italy. 
  Market potential  5.1.5.2.
The global market for the semiconductor industry has 
increased  significantly  from  USD  25 bn  in  1985  to 
USD  299.5 bn  in  2011  (SIA  2012).  This  growth  is 
driven  by  the  increasing  need  for  microelectronic 
devices  and  smart  sensors  in  intelligent  products, 
such  as  smart  phones,  tablets,  car  driver  assistance 
systems,  smart  grids,  networked  sensors,  and  other 
products. Smart sensors can also be used to detect and 
make risk assessments of disasters. That sort of risk 
management  reduces  the  vulnerability  of  Member 
States,  sectors  and  individual  firms,  thereby 
increasing competitiveness and sustainable growth. 
Figure 5.1. Market shares in international patent applications in industrial biotechnology, 2000–2010 (percent) 
 
Source: EPO: Patstat, ZEW calculations 
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From  a  total  investment  of  EUR  28 bn  in 
microelectronics in 2007, only 10 % was in the EU, 
compared  to  48 %  in Asia.  Europe’s  semiconductor 
market share has declined from 21 % to 16 % since 
2000  (Silicon  Europe  2012).  After  the  global 
economic crisis, the semiconductor market recovered 
quickly  and  global  sales  reached  a  record  high  in 
2010. While billings fell by 11 % from their peak in 
2007 to 2009, sales subsequently recovered by 33 % 
from  2009  to  2010,  an  unprecedented  growth  rate 
which  more  than  compensated  for  previous  losses 
(Ballhaus  et  al.  2011).  PWC  estimates  that  the 
semiconductor market will grow by 7.4 % per year on 
average from 2010 to 2015. 
According to IC Insights, worldwide processor sales 
are expected to regain strength in 2013 and grow 12 % 
to USD 65.3 bn, after a more modest increase in 2012 
to USD 58.2 bn (+ 5 %). The slow growth in 2012 is 
attributed  to  weaknesses  in  the  personal  computer 
segment  of  the  market  and  global  economic 
uncertainty  (Clarke  2013).  The  strongest  growth  is 
expected for microprocessor units, especially in the 
area of tablet computers and smartphones. 
The total flash memory market grew by 2 % to USD 
30.4 bn  by  end-2012,  overtaking  the  DRAM 
139  
market for the first time, as the latter declined from 
USD 31.2 bn to USD 28 bn. This is because DRAM is 
used mostly in PCs while flash memory is used in 
smartphones, media tablets, and other personal media 
devices.  IC  Insights  forecasts  NAND 
140  flash 
memory sales to increase by 14 % annually from 2012 
to 2017, growing to USD 53.2 bn by 2017, while the 
DRAM market is forecast to grow by 9 % over the 
same period. 
                                                            
139   Dynamic random-access memory. 
140   The other main type of flash memory is NOR. 
Figure 5.2. Market shares in international patent applications in photonics, 2000–2010 (percent) 
 
Source: EPO: Patstat, ZEW calculations 
Figure 5.3. Market shares in international patent applications in micro and nanoelectronics, 2000–2010 (percent) 
 
Source: EPO: Patstat, ZEW calculations 
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5.1.6.  Advanced materials  
  Technology market share   5.1.6.1.
East Asia is constantly increasing its market share in 
international  patenting  in  the  field  of  advanced 
materials (Figure 5.4). In 2010, 48 % of all advanced 
materials patent applications originated in East Asia, 
compared to 28 % from Europe and 21 % from North 
America. 
North America’s share of global patent applications is 
declining  much  faster  than  the  European  share. 
Changes in market shares should be seen against the 
backdrop  of  low  patent  dynamics  in  advanced 
materials.  Global  patent  applications  fell  by  4 % 
between  2000  and  2010.  While  international  patent 
applications in advanced materials are going down in 
Europe  and  North  America,  applicants  from  East 
Asian  and  the  rest  of  the  world  are  filing  more 
applications each year. 
Within Europe, the market shares of countries with 
the  highest  numbers  of  advanced  materials  patents 
have  remained  stable  over  time.  Germany  still 
accounts  for  more  than  40 %  of  European  patent 
applications,  followed  by  France  (16 %  in  2010), 
Italy,  Switzerland,  the  UK  and  Belgium.  The 
Netherlands  held  third  place  in  advanced  materials 
patenting in Europe until 2008 but its patent activities 
have since decreased considerably. 
  Market potential   5.1.6.2.
Advanced materials tend to outperform conventional 
materials  with  their  superior  properties  such  as 
toughness,  hardness,  durability  and  elasticity.  The 
scope of advanced materials research is very broad. 
While  some  advanced  materials  are  already  well-
known,  like  polymers,  metal  alloys,  ceramics, 
semiconductors,  composites  and  biomaterials,  other 
advanced  materials  like  carbon  nanomaterials, 
activated carbon, titanium, are becoming increasingly 
important. 
‘Smart materials’ are a class of materials that respond 
dynamically  to  electrical,  thermal,  chemical, 
magnetic, or other stimuli from the environment. 
These materials are incorporated in a growing range 
of  products,  enabling  these  products  to  alter  their 
characteristics  or  otherwise  respond  to  external 
stimuli. The market for these materials was estimated 
to be worth USD 19.6 bn in 2010 and was expected to 
approach USD 22 bn in 2011 and exceed USD 40 bn 
by 2016, a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 
12.8 % from 2011 to 2016 (BCC Research 2011 b). 
Lightweight materials are increasingly being used in 
the transportation industry as weight reduction is one 
of  the  most  important  ways  of  reducing  fuel 
consumption. In 2010, the total global consumption 
of  lightweight  materials  used  in  transportation 
equipment  was  worth  USD  95.5 bn.  By  2015  this 
market  is  expected  to  reach  USD  125.3 bn,  with  a 
compound  annual  growth  rate  (CAGR)  of  5.6 % 
between 2010 and 2015. 
Value-added  materials  (VAMs)  are  a  group  of 
advanced  materials  with  strategic  importance  for 
economic  growth,  industrial  competitiveness  and 
societal  challenges.  Their  market  potential  is 
estimated  to  reach  EUR  1,000 bn  by  2050.  In  the 
environmental market segment, VAM growth will be 
driven  by  energy-efficient  and  carbon-capture 
technologies. VAMs in the ICT sector are expected to 
grow  substantially  in  the  coming  years,  with  an 
average compound annual growth rate of 5 %. 
5.1.7.  Nanotechnology  
  Technology market share   5.1.7.1.
Trends  in  technology  market  shares  in  the  field  of 
nanotechnology  significantly  diverge  from  the 
general  trends  in  KETs  patenting.  With  a  share  of 
39 %  of  all  applications  in  2010,  North  America  is 
still  the  most  important  origin  of  nanotechnology 
patent applications. While North America’s share of 
all  nanotechnology  applications  was  falling  until 
2007  (when  it  reached  35 %),  the  downward  trend 
changed in 2008. 
Europe  and  East  Asia  report  similar  market  shares 
over the entire period. In most years, the East Asian 
share of applications exceeded the European share but 
in  recent  years  Europe  has  taken  a  slightly  higher 
share (28 % in 2010, versus 27 % for East Asia). The 
total  number  of  nanotechnology  patent  applications 
grew by 31 % between 2000 and 2010, with all four 
regions reporting growing nanotechnology patenting. 
Within Europe, Germany has lost market shares over 
the past decade, from 41 % in 2000 to 23 % in 2010. 
At the same time, France substantially increased its 
nanotechnology patenting and gained market shares, 
catching up with Germany in 2010. The market share 
of the Netherlands dropped from 14 % in 2004 to 6 % 
in 2010, while the UK was able to maintain its share 
of  total  European  patent  applications  in 
nanotechnology  at  around  10 %.  Switzerland  filed 
about  5 %  of  European  nanotechnology  patent 
applications  over  the  entire  period,  while  Italy  has 
recently increased its share. 
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  Market potential   5.1.7.2.
Nanotechnology  has  many  applications  in  a  broad 
range  of  industries.  The  global  market  for 
nanotechnology was valued at USD 20.1 bn in 2011 
and  USD  20.7 bn  in  2012  (BCC  Research  2012). 
Total sales are expected to reach USD 48.9 bn in 2017 
after  increasing  at  a  five-year  compound  annual 
growth rate of 18.7 %. The US is the most prominent 
market and in 2011 accounted for an estimated share 
of around 35 % of the global nanotechnology market 
– slightly less than its share of patent applications. 
Whilst  it  is  expected  to  remain  a  major  player, 
emerging economies such as China and South Korea 
as well as India and Brazil have started to catch up. 
The  global  market  for  products  based  on  the 
revolutionary new nanomaterial graphene is projected 
to reach USD 122.9 million in 2017 and USD 986.7 
million  in  2022,  growing  at  a  five-year  compound 
annual growth rate of 51.7 %. The segment made up 
of capacitors is projected to be the largest segment in 
2022. Capacitors are expected to increase from USD 
31 million in 2017 to USD 410 million in 2022, a 
CAGR  of  67.6 %.  Others  sources  indicate  a  more 
conservative  estimate  of  USD  100  million  in  2018 
and  an  annual  growth  rate  of  40 %,  making  the 
capacitors segment worth USD 216 million by 2020. 
The global market for quantum dots, which in 2010 
was  generated  revenues  of  USD  67  million,  is 
projected  to  grow  over  the  next  five  years  at  a 
compound  annual  growth  rate  of  58.3 %,  reaching 
almost USD 670 million by 2015 – a tenfold increase. 
MarketsandMarkets  estimate  the  total  market  for 
quantum dots to be worth USD 7.5 bn by 2022, the 
result of a compound annual growth rate of 55.2 % 
from 2012 to 2022. The US has a leading position in 
the  quantum  dots  technology  market,  followed  by 
Europe and Asia-Pacific (MarketsandMarkets 2012). 
5.1.8.  Advanced manufacturing technologies 
  Technology market share  5.1.8.1.
Trends in market shares for advanced manufacturing 
technologies for other KETs are quite similar to those 
for  micro-/nanoelectronics  and  advanced  materials, 
since  many  patents  classified  as  advanced 
manufacturing technologies for other KETs relate to 
the former two KETs and a significant overlap exists. 
East Asia is producing the highest number of patents 
in the field of advanced manufacturing technologies 
for  other  KETs  (46 %  in  2010),  while  Europe  and 
North America have about 25 % each of global patent 
applications.  North  America’s  contribution  to  the 
global patent output has fallen sharper (from 40 % in 
2000) than Europe’s share (31 % in 2000). Rest-of-
the-world countries increased their share marginally 
between 2000 and 2010, contributing 3 % to global 
patent applications in 2010. 
Patent  dynamics  in  this  KET  are  low.  The  total 
number of  international patent  applications  in 2010 
was  9 %  below  the  2000  figure.  Declining  patent 
output in Europe (– 25 %) and North America (– 41 %) 
are partly outweighed by significant increases in East 
Asia (+ 57 %) and RoW (+ 11 %). 
In Europe, Germany has lost market shares but is still 
the  largest  patent  producer  in  this  KET  with  a 
European  market  share  of  38 %  in  2010.  France 
follows second with 17 % to European patent output 
in in 2010. The Netherlands has fallen to rank 5 in 
2010, overtaken by the UK and Switzerland. Sweden 
was  the  sixth  largest  patent  producer  in  Europe  in 
2010, ousting Italy to rank 7. 
Figure 5.4. Market shares in international patent applications in advanced materials, 2000–2010 (percent) 
 
Source: EPO: Patstat, ZEW calculations 
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  Market potential  5.1.8.2.
Manufacturing  is  an  essential  step  to  bring 
technological innovations to the market. The global 
manufacturing  economy  is  estimated  to  be  worth 
GBP 6.5  trillion  (TSB  2012).  In  the  2013  Global 
Manufacturing  Competitiveness  Index,  China  was 
found  to  be  the  most  competitive  manufacturing 
nation, followed by Germany, US, India and South 
Korea. Five years from now, the report predicts China 
to  maintain  the  first  ranking,  followed  by  India, 
Brazil, Germany and US (Deloitte 2013). 
Additive manufacturing is a layer-by-layer technique 
of producing three-dimensional objects directly from 
a  digital  model.  With  markets  such  as  prototyping, 
tooling, direct part manufacturing, and maintenance 
and  repair,  the  industry  has  grown  significantly  to 
USD 1.3 bn of materials, equipment, and services in 
2010. The additive manufacturing market, including 
consumer products, business machines, medical, and 
aerospace  industries,  is  expected  to  grow  at  a 
compound  annual  growth  rate  (CAGR)  of  13.5 % 
from 2012 to 2017. 
In 2011, BCC Research estimated the global market 
for  robots  and  robot-related  products  to  grow  to 
nearly USD 22 bn in 2011 and USD 30 bn by 2016, a 
compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 6.7 %. In a 
more  recent  report  (BCC  Research  2013),  BCC 
forecast  a  slightly  lower  compound  annual  growth 
rate (CAGR) of 5.9 % between 2013 and 2018. The 
Asian market is expected to see the fastest growth in 
the  coming  years,  while  growth  in  the  European 
Union is anticipated to be concentrated in the latter 
part of the forecast period, when robotic development 
initiatives now being undertaken on an EU-wide basis 
will result in commercialised products. 
5.1.9.  North American decline, East Asian rise 
The  preceding  analysis  of  shares  of  patent 
applications for KETs reveals a steady strengthening 
of  East  Asia  as  the  main  producer  of  new 
technological knowledge in KETs. Over the past ten 
years, East Asian organisations have increased their 
share in total patent activity in each of the six KETs. 
In four KETs – photonics, advanced materials, micro-
/nanoelectronics,  advanced  manufacturing 
technologies for other KETs – East Asian applicants 
were the most important patent producers by 2010. At 
the beginning of the 2000s, North America held the 
leading position in all six KETs: nowadays industrial 
biotechnology and nanotechnology are the only two 
areas that still show North America as the region with 
the largest share of patent applications. While North 
America  has  lost  market  shares  in  all  six  KETs, 
Europe has performed relatively better. In photonics 
and  nanotechnology,  Europe  has  remained  stable 
during the past decade, while in the other four KETs 
losses were less severe compared to North America. 
The decline in North America and general stability in 
Europe occurred despite productivity gains in North 
American  manufacturing  which  have  tended  to  be 
greater than in Europe. 
These trends in KET patenting are very similar to the 
overall trend in international patenting: an increasing 
East  Asian  share  and  a  declining  contribution  by 
North America, while Europe reports moderate losses 
in market shares. The main difference with respect to 
KETs  is  the  speed  with  which  East  Asia  captures 
market shares, giving this region a leading position 
globally. By contrast, the shift from West to East in 
general international patenting is taking place more 
slowly, with Europe still holding the largest share in 
2010. 
In  Europe,  Germany  and  France  were  the  main 
sources of patent applications in 2010 in each of the 
six KETs. While Germany maintained its dominant 
position during the past ten years, France increased its 
share of total European patent applications in all six 
KETs.  The  UK  and  Netherlands  both  show 
decreasing market shares. 
A  more  disaggregated  analysis  at  the  level  of 
subfields within each KET reveals that Europe is the 
leading KET patent applicant in some subfields and 
has  been  able  to  gain  market  shares.  In  photonics, 
European strengths are in the fields of measurement 
and  electro-optics  as  well  as  lasers.  In 
nanotechnology,  Europe  is  the  leading  source  of 
patent  applications  in  nano-analytics  and  has 
increased  its  market  share  in  nano-materials.  In 
micro- and nanoelectronics, Europe has been able to 
maintain its market share in the field of devices and 
shows an increasing market share in the small area of 
testing  and  amplifiers.  In  advanced  manufacturing 
technologies for other KETs, Europe has a very high 
market share in the subfield of instruments and has 
been  able  to  maintain  its  share  in  the  global 
technology  output  of  advanced  manufacturing 
technologies  for  biotechnology  and  materials 
production. 
The analysis of the market potential of KETs reveals 
that substantial market growth is expected in all six 
KETs over the coming years. Depending on the KET, 
growth  potentials  of  10 – 20 %  per  year  can  be 
expected.  For  particular  submarkets,  the  growth 
potential is even larger. The position of Europe with 
respect to market size differs for the various KETs, 
but in general the increasing importance of East Asia 
and the higher pace of market share gains can be seen 
here as well.  
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5.2.  THE POSITION OF EUROPE IN THE 
PRODUCTION AND TRADE OF KETS-RELATED 
PRODUCTS  
5.2.1.  Introduction  
Analysing  the  position  of  countries  and  regions 
within value chains of a certain production process 
typically  requires  information  on  input  and  output 
links between the countries or regions. Input-output 
tables,  however,  offer  such  information  only  at  a 
highly  aggregated  level  of  industries,  not  for 
individual products which can be linked to KETs. For 
that reason, this section uses an alternative approach. 
In order to identify Europe’s position in global value 
chains within each KET in relation to North America 
and East Asia, characteristics of production and trade 
and their relation to technology inputs are examined. 
The following metrics are complementary and will be 
used jointly: 
1.  The technology content of manufactured goods, 
i.e. whether products are more technologically 
advanced; 
2.  The type of competition of Europe’s exports in 
KET-related  products,  distinguishing  between 
quality and price competition; 
3.  The  links  between  the  creation  of  new 
technological  knowledge  (measured  by  patent 
applications)  and  the  technology  content  of 
manufactured goods. 
By  combining  these  three  approaches,  a 
comprehensive  picture  of  Europe’s  competitive 
advantage vis-à-vis its main competitors in each KET 
will  emerge.  The  analysis  is  based  on  data  for 
individual products related to one of the six KETs, in 
the  sense  that  the  products  represent  certain 
technological features which are directly linked to a 
KET (a certain new material, a photonics element, a 
semiconductor,  a  biochemical  entity  or  a  machine 
tool) but which do not use KETs as an input for more 
complex  goods  (such  as  batteries,  measuring 
instruments,  medical  devices,  information  and 
communication devices). The notion of ‘value chain’ 
as used in this chapter therefore refers entirely to the 
division  of  labour  within  the  production  of  KET 
products.  In  order  to  identify  products  linked  to 
KETs,  the  results  of  a  recent  feasibility  study  on 
monitoring KETs are used (Van de Velde et al. 2013). 
In that study, KET products were defined at an 8-digit 
level  of  the  Prodcom  product  classification  system. 
For the purposes of this report, a narrow version of 
the  definition  is  used  in  order  to  avoid  analysis  of 
products  that  are  only  partially  linked  to  a  certain 
KET. 
5.2.2.  Technology content of products related to 
key enabling technologies 
The  concept  of  technology  content  assumes  that 
similar products can be produced by using different 
qualities and quantities of ‘technology’. Technology 
may  refer  to  the  sophistication  of  production 
methods, the variety of different technologies used in 
the  production,  or  how  technologically  advanced 
inputs are. Products with higher technology content 
are supposed to be positioned further along the value 
chain. As high technology content products should be 
superior to products with lower technology content, 
they should also reflect a higher unit price. Therefore 
a  common  trade  indicator  will  be  used  to  measure 
technology content: the unit value of exports. Based 
on the assumption that a country’s exports of a certain 
product  represent  that  country’s  total  production  of 
the product, export unit values give the average value 
of  a  product  manufactured  in  a  country.  The 
assumption  is  somewhat  unrealistic,  since  many 
studies have shown that exports tend to contain more 
innovative products than the average since it is the 
more  innovative  firms  that  engage  in  exports  (see 
Wakelin 1998; Bleaney and Wakelin 2002; Beise and 
Rammer 2006; Wagner 1996; Ebling and Janz 1999; 
Roper  and  Love  2002;  Lefebvre  et  al.  1998).  Here 
though,  the  possible  bias  of  exports  towards 
innovative  products  can  be  seen  as  an  advantage 
because it means the analysis will focus on the more 
innovative products within each KET. 
A country or region’s export unit value of a certain 
product is compared with the export unit value of the 
same product in global trade. A value greater than one 
indicates  that  the  country  (region)  exports  (and 
therefore  manufactures)  products  of  a  higher  value 
per  unit,  hence  products  with  a  higher  technology 
content.  Comparing  export  unit  values  over  time 
provides  information  about  the  dynamics  in 
technology content, in other words whether a country 
(region) moves away from the average unit value or 
converges towards it. Combining both dimensions – 
the level and dynamics of unit values – produces a 
matrix with four quadrants.  
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The technology content (TC) of a country (region) i 
in a certain KET k is examined by determining the 
position p in the quadrants shown in Figure 5.5 (p 
{1,2,3,4}) of each individual product j belonging to 
KET area k, weighted by the product’s share in total 
exports  X  of  products  related  to  KET  area  k  of 
country (region) i. 
The analysis is conducted for three regions: EU-28 
(EU  Member  States),  North  America  (US  and 
Canada)  and  East  Asia  (Japan,  South  Korea  and 
China).  The  total  exports  of  the  three  regions 
constitute  ‘total  trade’  w.  Furthermore,  separate 
analyses  for  12  Member  States  (Germany,  France, 
United  Kingdom,  Italy,  Belgium,  Netherlands, 
Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Poland, Czech Republic 
and  Hungary)  are  carried  out.  The  analysis  is 
undertaken  for  individual  KET-related  products 
defined  as  6-digit  classes  of  the  HS  (harmonised 
system) product classification used in trade statistics. 
The  6-digit  HS  classes  were  identified  using  a 
conversion  table  from  8-digit  Prodcom  codes.  Data 
on exports (in USD) and quantities (kg) were taken 
from the UN Comtrade database. The analysis covers 
the period from 2002 to 2011. Data for 2007 to 2011 
rely on the HS 2007 classification while data for 2002 
to 2006 are based on HS 2002. A conversion table 
was  used  to  link  the  two  classifications.  To  avoid 
picking  up  unit  value  fluctuations  between  single 
years,  the  analysis  focuses  on  the  development 
between  two  sub-periods,  2002 – 2006  and  2007 –
 2011.  In  order  to  classify  products  by  their 
technology content, changes in unit values between 
the  average  values  for  2002 – 2006  and  2007 – 2011 
are calculated. 
The  EU-28  reports  a  high  and  increasing 
technological content of its exports in four KETs. The 
strongest  performance  is  found  for  industrial 
biotechnology. Here about 90 % of the exports in the 
years 2007 to 2011 were generated by products with a 
higher unit value than in the main competitor regions 
and for which unit values increased more rapidly over 
time  than  in  the  other  regions  (Figure  5.6).  In 
advanced  manufacturing  technologies  (AMT)  for 
other KETs, 74 % of EU-28 exports were in products 
with  high  and  increasing  technology  content.  For 
photonics exports, the corresponding share was 69 % 
and for advanced materials it was 57 %. 
Low  technology  content  occurs  for  nanotechnology 
and micro- and nanoelectronics. In nanotechnology, 
28 %  of  the  EU-28  export  volume  2007 – 2011  was 
generated by products with high and increasing unit 
values, while 37 % of exports were in products with 
low and decreasing technology content and another 
30 % with low but decreasing unit values. For micro- 
and  nanoelectronics,  because  of  limited  data 
availability  only  the  2002 – 2006  period  can  be 
analysed. In this earlier period, the EU-28 exported 
products related to micro- and nanoelectronics with a 
lower  unit  value  compared  to  the  same  products 
exported by the main competitor regions (East Asia in 
particular). However, for almost all of these products, 
unit values increased more strongly in the first half of 
the 2000s (from 2002 – 2003 to 2005 – 2006) than in 
the competitor regions. 
Whilst  North  America  shows  a  similar  pattern  of 
technology  content  of  exports  of  KETs-related 
products as the EU-28, it performs significantly better 
(in  terms of having a higher technology content of 
exports)  in  photonics  and  nanotechnology  but  less 
well  in  industrial  biotechnology  and  advanced 
materials. In photonics, North America is the leading 
technology  region  with  broad  and  constantly 
increasing technological content. In nanotechnology, 
75 %  of  the  2007 – 2011  exports  were  based  on 
products with high technology content, and for most 
of these products, unit values increased more rapidly 
than in the competitor regions. 
 
Figure 5.5. Measuring technology content of manufactured products 
 
For each KET-related product, a country (region) can be positioned in the following way: 
1.  High and increasing technology content. 
2.  High but decreasing technology content. 
3.  Low but increasing technology content.  
4.  Low and decreasing technology content. 
Source: NIW/ZEW 
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In AMT for other KETs, the composition of North 
America’s  exports  by  technology  content  is  very 
similar to the EU-28. This result indicates that both 
regions specialise in trade in different products, each 
region specialising in those products for which it has 
superior  unit  values.  Like  the  EU-28,  North 
America’s  exports  in  micro-  and  nano-electronics 
were focused on low technology content products, at 
least in the first half of the 2000s. In contrast to the 
EU-28,  almost all export products faced decreasing 
unit values compared with the export unit values of 
the  same  products  in  the  competitor  regions.  In 
advanced  materials,  North  American  exported 
products of varying technology content. 
East  Asia  exports  KET-related  products  which  are 
classified mainly as low technology content products. 
The main exception is micro- and nano-electronics, 
where  all  products  exported  by  East  Asia  have 
technology  content.  In  addition,  46 %  of 
nanotechnology exports in 2007 – 2011 were based on 
products with higher-than-average unit values, though 
most  of  these  products  reported  decreasing  export 
unit values compared with the same products in the 
competitor  regions.  In  advanced  manufacturing 
technologies for other KETs, most East Asian export 
products show an increasing technology content over 
time.  In  advanced  materials,  East  Asia  reports  a 
similar  pattern  of  technology  content  as  North 
America: a mix of high and low technology content 
products.  Photonics  is  clearly  where  East  Asian 
exports focus on low technology content products, an 
indication of early stages in the value chains. 
Within the EU-28, export performance with respect to 
technology  content  varies  among  Member  States, 
though  the  main  patterns  for  the  EU-28  can  be 
recognised  for  many  of  the  largest  Member  States 
(Figure 5.7). In industrial biotechnology, a high share 
of  exports  with  products  showing  a  high  and 
increasing  technology  content  can  be  found  for 
Denmark,  the  Czech  Republic,  Belgium,  Austria, 
France, Netherlands, the UK, Germany and Italy. 
Figure 5.6. Technology content of KET-related products by KET and triadic region, 2007 – 2011 averages  
 
* 2005 – 2006 average, change in unit values for 2002 – 2003 to 2005 – 2006. 
Source: COMTRADE Database, NIW calculations 
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In  nanotechnology,  only  the  UK,  Netherlands, 
Belgium  and  Italy  report  a  share  above  50 %  for 
products with high and increasing technology content. 
For  photonics,  the  high  share  of  EU-28  exports 
products with high and increasing technology content 
is due mainly to the export activities of France and 
Sweden. 
5.2.3.  Type of competition and competitive 
advantages in international trade  
In  addition  to  technology  content,  the  type  of 
competition a country’s or region’s products face in 
international  trade  provides  further,  complementary 
information on the position of the country/region in 
international  value  chains.  To  simplify:  product 
market competition can be driven either by price or 
by quality. Price competition dominates if the price 
elasticity  is  high  while  at  the  same  time  product 
differentiation  (differentiating  similar  products  by 
quality  characteristics  such  as  durability,  usability, 
flexibility, additional performance characteristics) is 
of little relevance. Price competition often indicates 
that products are positioned earlier in the value chain, 
while  quality  competition  may  be  associated  with 
more  complex  products  further  along  the  values 
chain. 
Aiginger (1997, 2000) proposed a method to classify 
products according to quality and price competition 
based on the relation of a region’s export unit values 
to its import unit values on the one hand, and its trade 
balance on the other. Products are price elastic (price 
competition  dominates)  if  export  unit  values  which 
are higher (lower) than import unit values lead to a 
negative (positive) trade balance.  
Conversely, products for which higher (lower) export 
unit values than import unit values result in a positive 
(negative) trade balance are price inelastic, in other 
words quality competition dominates. For both types 
of  competition,  a  positive  trade  balance  is  an 
indication that the region can build on a competitive 
advantage  for  that  type  of  competition.  Combining 
the relation of export unit values to import unit values 
with  the  trade  balance  produces  four  quadrants 
(Figure 5.8) in which a region can be positioned for 
each KET-related product: 
1.  Quality  competition  with  a  quality  advantage: 
where  export  unit  values  exceed  import  unit 
values  and  the  trade  balance  is  positive  –  a 
country or region can export more of a certain 
product than it imports, despite higher prices. 
2.  Quality competition without quality advantage: 
export  unit  values  are  lower  than  import  unit 
values while the trade balance is negative  – a 
country or region imports more than it exports 
despite  lower  prices,  indicating  that  quality  is 
the main driver for trade. 
3.  Price  competition  with  a  price  advantage:  a 
country  or  region  shows  lower  export  unit 
values than import unit values and can translate 
lower prices into a positive trade balance. 
4.  Price  competition  without  a  price  advantage: 
export  unit  values  are  higher  than  import unit 
values  in  combination  with  a  negative  trade 
balance. 
As  for  technology  content,  the  type  of  competition 
that dominates the exports of country or region i in a 
certain KET k is determined by the position p in the 
quadrants  shown  in  Figure 5.8  (p  {1,2,3,4})  that 
each  individual  product  j  belonging  to  KET  area  k 
occupies,  weighted  by  the  product’s  share  in  total 
exports  X  of  products  related  to  KET  area  k  of 
country  or  region  i.  To  calculate  the  type  of 
competition,  the  same  data  source  is  used  as  for 
calculating the technology content of trade.  
The results for the three main regions are reported in 
Figure 5.9. Exports of KETs-related products by the 
EU-28  face  very  different  competition  on 
international  markets.  In  advanced  manufacturing 
technologies  for  other  KETs,  most  EU-28  exports 
(64 %)  concern  products  for  which  trade  is 
characterised by quality competition. For almost all 
these products, the EU-28 has a quality advantage; in 
other words, it is able to gain a positive trade balance 
based on superior product quality. In nanotechnology, 
industrial biotechnology and advanced materials, only 
23 % to 34 % of EU-28 exports are based on quality 
competition. Although the majority of EU-28 exports 
in these KETs is characterised by price competition, 
most of these exports benefit from price advantages. 
This  means  that  Member  States  specialise  in  those 
price-  sensitive  products  for  which  a  cost-efficient 
production  in  the  EU  is  possible.  In  photonics  and 
micro-/nanoelectronics, most of the products exported 
by the EU-28 are in price competition (89 % and 9 4% 
respectively), and for the majority of these products 
the EU has no price advantage. 
North  America  reports  a  strong  focus  on  exports 
which face quality competition: it relies on a quality 
advantage  in  international  trade  in  the  fields  of 
photonics  (78 %  of  all  exports  in  this  KET)  and 
nanotechnology  (54 %).  In  micro-  and  nano-
electronics, 41 % of North America’s exports fall into 
this category, while 15 % are characterised by quality 
competition, without having a quality advantage. In 
the  other  three  KETs,  exports  from  North  America 
mainly face price competition, with a price advantage 
over their main competitors. 
East Asia’s trade in KET-related products is strongly 
focused  on  price  competition.  In  five  KETs  – 
industrial biotechnology, nanotechnology, micro- and 
nanoelectronics,  advanced  materials  and  advanced 
manufacturing  technologies  for  other  KETs  –  East 
Asia benefits from a price advantage, in other words a 
cost-efficient production. Photonics is the only area 
where East Asia’s exports are under major pressure, 
as  most  of  its  products  face  price  competition  but  
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cannot compete on a price advantage. In each KET, 
the share of KET-related products exported from East 
Asia  which  are  in  markets  dominated  by  quality 
competition is lower than for North America, ranging 
from  10 %  (micro-and  nanoelectronics)  to  29 % 
(photonics).  The  majority  of  these  exports  do  not 
have a quality advantage. 
When  examining  the  development  of  competition 
types  by  KET  over  time,  no  clear  trends  for  the 
EU-28  emerge.  In  advanced  manufacturing 
technologies for other KETs, the share of EU exports 
based on quality competition and quality advantage 
increased during the 2000s, while the share of exports 
based  on  price  competition  and  price  advantage 
decreased. In photonics, the share of EU exports in 
markets  with  price  competition  which  could  profit 
from an EU price advantage has fallen substantially in 
the last ten years, while the share of exports facing 
price  competition  without  a  price  advantage  has 
increased. 
At the level of EU Member States (Figure 5.10), most 
countries face price competition for the majority of 
their KETs-related exports. Interestingly, for products 
facing price competition some large Member States 
(Germany, France, UK, Italy) and the Netherlands do 
not appear to have any price advantage. By contrast, 
exports of price-sensitive KET-related products from 
Figure 5.7. Technology content of KET-related products by KET for selected Member States, 2007 – 2011 averages  
 
Notes: IB: Industrial biotechnology; NT: Nanotechnology; PH: Photonics; ME: Micro and nanoelectronics; MA: Advanced materials; 
MT: AMT for other KETs.   
* 2005 – 2006 average, change in unit values for 2002 – 2003 to 2005 – 2006. 
Source: COMTRADE Database, NIW calculations 
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Sweden, Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary rely mostly on price advantages, though in 
each Member State there are also some KETs with 
products that  
predominantly feature price disadvantages. 
Quality competition dominates for only a few KETs 
in each Member State. In Germany and Austria, most 
exports in advanced manufacturing technologies for 
Figure 5.8. Measuring the type of competition and competitive advantages of manufactured products  
 
Source: NIW/ZEW based on Aiginger (1997) 
Figure 5.9. Type of competition in trade with KET-related products, 2002 – 2011 averages 
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other KETs rely on quality advantages and compete 
on quality. In Denmark and Sweden, the same is true 
for  industrial  biotechnology.  Exports  from  the 
Netherlands  and  Hungary  in  products  related  to 
nanotechnology are also predominantly  
based on a quality advantage in markets where they 
face  quality  competition.  In  micro-  and 
nanoelectronics, Denmark is the only Member State 
considered here which exports most of its products 
based on quality competition and quality advantage. 
In advanced materials, only the Netherlands is in the 
same situation. In photonics, for all Member States 
considered  here  apart  from  Poland,  most  export 
markets  are  characterised  by  price  competition,  but 
most Member States do not possess a price advantage 
for these exports. 
 
5.2.4.  Link between patenting and technology 
content of products related to key 
enabling technologies 
The  link  between  patenting  activities  and  the 
technology  content  of  products  provides  another 
indication of a country’s position in the value chains 
of  KET-related  products.  If  the  production  of  new 
technological knowledge (as revealed through patent 
Figure  5.10.  Type  of  competition  in  trade  with  KETs-related  products  for  selected  Member  States,  2002 – 2011 
averages 
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applications) has a direct impact on the technology 
content  of  traded  products,  one  may  conclude  that 
these products are closer to the technological frontier 
and depend on a direct technology input from recent 
efforts  in  developing  new  technology.  In  order  to 
examine this link, a country’s unit values of exports 
of products based on a certain KET are regressed are 
regressed on the patent activities of that country in the 
same KET. 
The level of export unit values (UV) for each product 
j belonging to a KET k in country i in period t are 
explained  by  the  country’s  patent  activity  in  the 
respective KET area k in a previous period t – n. Since 
unit  values  do  not  depend  on  country  size,  while 
patent activity does, the latter is divided by country 
population to derive a size-adjusted patent intensity 
(PINT).  Country-specific  variables  such  as  size 
(GDP) and productivity (GDP per capita, PROD) are 
used to control for the effects of market size and the 
sophistication of  the production  system,  while  time 
dummies are used to capture changes in prices over 
time: 
ln(UV
X)ij,t =  + 1 ln(PINT)ik,t–n + 2 ln(GDP)i,t + 
3 ln(PROD)i,t + t t dt + i         with j  k 
The patent intensity indicates to what extent a country 
produces  new  technological  knowledge  in  a  certain 
subfield of KETs given the total resources available 
in  that  country.  All  variables  are  measured  in 
logarithms.  The  model  is  estimated  for  each  KET 
separately as well as across all KETs for the period 
2002 to 2011 for 39 countries (EU-28, US, Canada, 
China,  Japan,  South  Korea,  Switzerland,  Norway, 
Iceland,  Israel,  Former  Yugoslav  Republic  of 
Macedonia, and Russia). 
The  estimation  results  confirm  a  positive  link 
between  lagged  patent  intensity  and  unit  values. 
Across  all  six  KETs,  a  10 %  increase  in  patenting 
results  in  a  1.2 %  increase  in  export  unit  values 
(Figure 5.11).  The  impact  of  patenting  on  the 
technology content of exports is largest in advanced 
manufacturing  technologies  for  other  KETs  (2.4 % 
increase  in  unit  values,  or  twice  as  high  as  for  all 
KETs)  and  micro-/nanoelectronics  (2.3 %  increase). 
In  industrial  biotechnology,  the  elasticity  of  unit 
values on patent intensity is 1.5 %, in nanotechnology 
1.4 %, in advanced materials 1.0 % and in photonics 
0.8 %. 
The main findings also hold when only EU Member 
States are considered. For the EU, the link between 
patent  intensity  and  unit  values  of  exports  is  of 
similar magnitude as for the entire set of countries. A 
10 % increase of patent intensity would transfer into 
an increase of export unit values of 1.0 %. For three 
KETs,  the  link  between  patenting  and  technology 
content of exports is stronger in the EU than for all 39 
countries  considered  in  this  analysis.  In  micro-
/nanoelectronics, a 10 % increase in patent intensity in 
the EU-28 results in a 2.7 % increase in export unit 
values. 
In photonics, the elasticity in the EU-28 is 1.0 % and 
1.6 %  in  industrial  biotechnology.  In  advanced 
manufacturing technologies for other KETs, the EU 
Member States report the same elasticity for patenting 
as the total group of 39 countries. In nanotechnology 
and  advanced  materials,  the  EU-28  elasticity  of 
patenting  is  somewhat  lower  (0.9 %  and  0.8 % 
respectively). 
5.3.  VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS OF PROMISING KETS-
BASED PRODUCTS 
5.3.1.  Introduction 
How  do  these  general  observations  hold  when 
focusing  on  a  number  of  product-specific  value 
chains?  In  this  section,  the  value  chains  of  two 
promising  products  based  on  key  enabling 
technologies  are  analysed  and  discussed.  First,  the 
selection  of  the  two  products,  lipase  enzymes  and 
accelerometers, is explained. A more detailed analysis 
of  the  value  chain  of  lipase  enzymes  and  the 
accelerometer is then provided. 
The analysis begins with a detailed description of the 
value chain, after which all relevant players in each 
part  of  the  value  chain  are  identified,  thereby 
analysing  the  position  of  EU  companies  vis-à-vis 
non-EU companies. The information and analyses are 
based on expert interviews, articles, news sites and 
market reports. The methodology used to analyse the 
value  chain  is  the  same  methodology  as  in  the 
feasibility study for an EU monitoring mechanism on 
KETs (Van de Velde et al. 2013).  
The  analysis  points  out  that  EU  firms  play  an 
important  role  in  essential  parts  of  the  value  chain 
even  though  the  exact  proportions  of  value  added 
captured by EU firms could not be retrieved.
141 
5.3.2.  Selection of products 
The economic importance and growth potential of the 
candidate  product  has  been  the  main  selection 
criterion.  Furthermore, whether  a  candidate  product 
constitutes  a  relatively  new  application  or  is  well-
established is another factor to consider. The value 
chain analysis aims to focus on upcoming products 
that  are  driven  by  technological  innovation,  and  to 
analyse  how  the  EU  performs  in  developing  and 
marketing new high technology products in the KETs 
                                                            
141   A  major  difficulty  here  is  the  possibility  of  estimating  the 
value  added  of  a  KETs-based  product  in  the  total  product 
range of a company. For example, in the case of foundries, no 
information  is  disclosed  on  the  share  of  the  accelerometer 
production versus total production. Moreover, this share tends 
to change over time, particularly due to rapid shifts in market 
demand.  There  is  also  often  a  problem  of  corporate 
confidentiality to overcome.  
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area and how EU policies support this process. On the 
basis  of  an  extensive  literature  review,  the  enzyme 
class  lipases  in  industrial  biotechnology  and  the 
accelerometer  in  micro-  and  nanoelectronics  were 
chosen. The overall selection process is presented in 
Figure 5.12. 
  Lipase enzymes  5.3.2.1.
The  first  key  enabling  technology  selected  is 
industrial  biotechnology because  of  its  fundamental 
role in the development of a bio-based economy. Bio-
based products are one of the six priority action lines 
in the Communication ‘A stronger European Industry 
for  Growth  and  Economic  Recovery’  (European 
Commission  2012 b).  Within  industrial 
biotechnology,  enzymes  have  been  selected  as  the 
product  segment.  Enzymes  are  one  of  the  major 
promising  areas  in  industrial  biotechnology.  They 
enable  a  broad  range  of  applications  and  provide 
several  advantages  over  traditional  chemistry, 
including high selectivity, lower energy use and mild 
reaction  conditions.  The  market  for  enzymes  has 
grown  rapidly  over  the  past  decade,  and  both 
households  and  industry  are  becoming  more 
dependent  on  enzymatic  catalysis.  Even  so,  there 
remains  a  vast  untapped  potential  in  the  enzyme 
market (Sarrouh et al. 2012). In 2010, the market for 
industrial  enzymes  was  worth  USD  3.3 bn  and  is 
expected to grow to USD 4.4 bn by 2015, a compound 
annual growth rate of 6 % over those five years (BCC 
Research 2011 a). 
Within  enzymes,  lipases  are,  together  with 
carbohydrases, considered to have the highest growth 
prospects (Global Industry Analysts 2012). Lipases – 
enzymes that catalyse chemical conversions of fats – 
have traditionally been used in detergents to remove 
fat and oily stains. In addition, they are increasingly 
used in the food industry, for instance in applications 
involving dairy products and baking. In recent years, 
lipases  have also received  more attention as highly 
effective,  versatile  and  flexible  biocatalysts  for 
organic synthesis. This has opened up a whole new 
range  of  possibilities,  including  the  production  of 
basic  chemicals,  specialty  chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals,  cosmetics  and  biodiesel.  Lipases 
have  the  potential  to  impact  positively  on  several 
industries,  both  in  terms  of  competitiveness  and 
environmental friendliness (lower energy use, fewer 
unwanted  side-products).  Therefore  this  product  is 
selected to analyse the position of the EU in the value 
chain of this class of enzymes. 
  Accelerometer   5.3.2.2.
Micro  and  nanoelectronics  provide  knowledge  and 
technologies which generate some 10 % of GDP. The 
expected market size for this key enabling technology 
is  estimated  to  be  USD  300 bn  in  2015,  with  an 
expected compound annual growth rate of 13 % (HLG 
MNE 2011). It has enabled the rise of the information 
age, impacts deeply on everyday life and is expected 
to continue to do so. Given the increasing importance 
of ‘More-than-Moore’ (MtM) applications, a product 
within MtM and more specifically in the segment of 
micro-electro  mechanical  systems  (MEMS)  was 
chosen.  MEMS  are  products  elementary  for  many 
types of interactions of electronics with the outside 
world, and provide a good example of the continued 
Figure 5.11. Different steps in the selection of products 
for the value chain analysis 
 
Source: IDEA Consult 
Figure 5.12. Link between patent output and unit values of exports, 2002 – 2011, change in unit values from a 10 % 
change of patent output, by KET, 2002 – 2011 
 
Source: COMTRADE and PATSTAT data, ZEW calculations  
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integration of digital and non-digital functions over 
time (the  MtM trend). This integration has enabled 
MEMS  to  grow  rapidly  in  recent  years.  The  MtM 
trend is a major evolution with potential for radical 
innovations, and the relative weight of MtM in the 
industry is expected to increase (ITRS 2010). 
In the MEMS segment, rapid growth is expected for 
inertial  sensors  (Yole  Développement  2012).  One 
example  of  fast-growing  inertial  sensors  is  the 
accelerometer, which is the chosen product based on 
this key enabling technology. It is a motion sensor 
which measures the acceleration of a given object. It 
was first introduced on a large scale in the automotive 
sector  but  has  since  found  its  way  into  many 
consumer electronics applications. In mobile devices 
such as smartphones, accelerometers are key sensors 
as  they  enable  gesture  recognition,  user  interface 
control  and  activity  monitoring.  Other  consumer 
electronics applications include measuring motion in 
gaming  and  sports  applications.  The  accelerometer 
has been an important sensor in the evolution towards 
more  ‘intelligent’  consumer  electronics  –  devices 
becoming increasingly aware of the environment and 
the conditions of the device (Ryhänen 2010). As the 
accelerometer  is  representative  of  two  major 
evolutions in micro- and nanoelectronics – the trend 
towards  mobile,  intelligent  devices  and  the 
integration of heterogeneous functions – this product 
has been selected. 
5.4.  VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS OF LIPASE ENZYMES  
5.4.1.  Value chain decomposition 
Figure 5.13 shows the value chain of lipase enzymes, 
consisting  of  two  broad  phases.  First  there  is  the 
selection  and  genetic  engineering  of  an  appropriate 
microorganism capable of producing the enzyme of 
interest.  Then  there  is  the  actual  production  of  the 
enzyme. The latter phase can be subdivided into four 
major steps. The first step is the development of the 
production process, which entails discerning the right 
conditions for fermentation (the following step) and 
the up-scaling of production from laboratory scale to 
commercial  scale.  Once  the  production  process  is 
optimised, large-scale fermentation can occur. During 
fermentation, the microorganisms grow on a substrate 
and  produce  the  enzyme  of  interest.  Once 
fermentation is complete, the next step is to separate 
the  enzymes  from  the  fermentation  mass  (product 
recovery).  In  the  final  step,  the  enzyme  product  is 
purified. The necessity of this final step depends on 
the application. 
The value chain in Figure 5.13  applies not only to 
lipase enzymes but to enzymes in general, and to a 
large  extent  even  to  industrial  biotechnology  in 
general. 
5.4.2.  EU activity along the value chain  
In what follows, the key players in the lipase enzymes 
value chain will be identified and discussed. First, the 
lipase enzyme producers – companies selling lipase 
enzymes – will be described. Next, companies that do 
not  sell  lipases  directly  but  contribute  to  the  value 
added of this product by executing a specific step in 
the value chain will be discussed. The focus will be 
on the companies providing services for the selection 
and engineering of the microorganism, followed by 
companies  active  in  the  second  part  of  the  value 
chain, namely enzyme production. Table 5.1 provides 
an overview of identified companies along the value 
chain. 
  Lipase producers  5.4.2.1.
Fifteen  companies  selling  lipases  have  been 
identified, almost half of them located in Europe. In 
Denmark-based  Novozymes,  Europe  hosts  the 
world’s largest player in the overall enzyme industry 
with a market share of about 47 % of global enzyme 
sales  in  2011.  With  regard  to  lipase  enzymes,  the 
company  offers  a  broad  portfolio  of  enzymes  for 
various applications, including as detergents and food 
processing, but also more recent applications such as 
biocatalysis  for  the  pharmaceutical,  cosmetics  and 
chemicals industry. Netherlands-based DSM is larger 
than Novozymes in terms of revenue but has a lower 
market share in enzymes (6 % compared with 47 % for 
Novozymes 
142). DSM is active particularly in lipases 
for food applications and has recently underlined its 
interest in this field  by acquiring lipase  technology 
from  US-based  Verenium,  primarily  to  extend  its 
activities  in  food  applications.  However,  its  lipase 
portfolio is not as broad as that of Novozymes. 
                                                            
142   Source: Novozymes 
Figure 5.13. Value chain decomposition for enzymes 
 
Source: IDEA Consult  
165 
The  other  European  companies  active  in  the  lipase 
segment are generally an order of magnitude smaller 
than DSM and Novozymes. Many of them focus on a 
number  of  specific  applications.  For  example,  AB 
Enzymes  (owned  by  the  UK-based  ABF)  produces 
lipases  predominantly  for  food  (baking)  purposes, 
while  Biocatalysts  focuses  on  dairy  applications. 
Eucodis  Bioscience  is  a  relatively  young  company 
with a high share of lipases in its product portfolio, 
targeting  mainly  pharmaceutical  applications. 
Germany-based  C-lecta  is  also  a  relatively  young 
company, offering enzymes for a limited number of 
applications.  With  its  lipase  products  it  focuses 
notably on the production of specialty chemicals. 
Outside the EU, the main emerging country is the US, 
where the largest player is Dupont, due to its recent 
acquisition  of  Genencor.  Genencor  is  the  second 
largest enzyme producer in the world, with about half 
the  sales  of  Novozymes.  While  Genencor  holds  a 
strong position in the food enzyme market, it has so 
far not been able to play a leading role in the lipase 
segment  of  the  food  market.  In  addition,  unlike 
Novozymes it is much less present in the emerging 
markets  for  lipases,  such  as  pharmaceutical  and 
chemical  market  applications.  The  other  US 
companies  are  significantly  smaller  than  Genencor. 
Codexis  produces  enzymes  used  to  improve 
production processes in the pharmaceutical industry 
and  is  currently  developing  its  lipase  activities. 
Verenium  has  achieved  some  success  in  the 
commercial development of lipases, as illustrated by 
the  recent  acquisition  of  its  enzyme  technology 
including lipases by DSM. Dyadic is another rather 
small  company  which  owns  a  revolutionary 
technology platform for the discovery and production 
of enzymes, but it does not have a specific focus on 
lipases. 
Japan  has  two  companies  in  Table 5.1.  Amano 
Enzymes  has  a  long  history  as  a  specialty  enzyme 
developer, with key strengths in hydrolases. One of 
its  most  successful  products  is  a  lipase  which  has 
been widely produced in the past. However, Amano 
does  not  serve  the  wide  range  of  applications 
Novozymes  does.  The  other  Japanese  company, 
Meito-Sangyo, is smaller than Amano but is also a 
recognised player in the field of lipases, especially in 
applications involving chiral transformations. 
Two  companies  from  India  also  appear  in  the  list, 
both  offering  a  broad  portfolio  of  lipases.  This 
reflects  the  emergence  of  India  in  the  enzyme 
industry as one of the countries with the highest level 
of  commitment  to  the  development  of  industrial 
biotech in Asia. 
European  companies  are  well  represented  in  each 
segment.  In  the  detergent  segment,  Genencor  and 
Novozymes are the two companies with the highest 
market  shares.  The  food  segment  is  dominated  by 
Novozymes  and  DSM.  Novozymes  is  the  clear 
market leader in the biocatalysis segment. 
  Companies active in microorganism selection  5.4.2.2.
and engineering 
Lipase producers are not necessarily active in all parts 
of the value chain. Other companies can be active in 
specific segments. Only three companies have been 
identified as providers of services for microorganism 
selection and engineering services, the first part of the 
value chain. This can be explained by the fact that the 
first step of the value chain can be considered as a 
core  competence  of  most  lipase  producers.  One 
example of a company offering such services is DSM, 
which provides guidance to other companies in the 
development  of  their  technologies.  For  example, 
when  a  lipase  producer  is  working  on  the 
commercialisation of its products, DSM can propose 
other  microorganisms  for  expressing  the  gene  of 
interest in order to facilitate the up-scaling of enzyme 
production.  Similarly,  Lonza  possesses  so-called 
‘expression  platforms’  –  in-house  engineered 
microorganisms  enabling  high  enzyme  production 
levels. 
  Companies active in enzyme production  5.4.2.3.
The  large-scale  production  of  enzymes  requires 
considerable investment in infrastructure, which often 
creates  a  hurdle,  especially  for  smaller  (start-up) 
companies.  Outsourcing  enzyme  production  can 
deliver  specific  benefits  to  enzyme  companies,  not 
only  by  reducing  the  financial  risk,  but  also  by 
gaining access to the fermentation service provider’s 
know-how. In this respect, it is important to note that 
in  industrial  biotechnology,  the  scaling  up  of  the 
production of a given product (such as enzymes or 
vitamins)  from  laboratory  to  commercial  scale  is 
more difficult than in classical chemical production 
processes (Wydra 2012). Therefore the fermentation 
service  providers  often  guide  enzyme  producers 
through the gradual up-scaling of production of a new 
enzyme,  a  service  primarily  used  by  smaller 
companies, whereas large industrial players typically 
organise the whole production in-house. 
The  companies  identified  as  active  in  enzyme 
production are shown in the lower part of Table 5.1. 
These companies are known to be engaged in contract 
production  of  enzymes  for  industrial  purposes. 
However, it should be noted that the importance of 
lipase  production  in  their  production  services  may 
vary over  time,  and  is not fully  disclosed  by  these 
companies.  This  list  therefore  applies  to  industrial 
enzyme  production  in  general.  Four  companies  are 
located in Europe. DSM, by far the largest company 
involved,  is  present  also  in  the  list  of  lipase 
producers. Apart from producing enzymes under its 
own  brand  name,  it  also  offers  a  broad  range  of 
fermentation services to other companies. Two other 
companies, Eucodis Bioscience and Biocatalysts, are  
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also  identified  as  lipase  producers.  Finland-based 
Galilaeus  is  a  small  company  focusing  on 
fermentation services for various fields. 
Outside  the  EU,  Switzerland  hosts  two  companies. 
However,  the  presence  of  the  large  pharmaceutical 
company Novartis is due to its ownership of Sandoz, 
which offers a broad range of fermentation services to 
its facilities in Germany, Austria and Italy. Lonza is 
also a large company with a broad range of activities. 
Given that the main fermentation site of this company 
is located in the Czech Republic, it can be concluded 
that many activities of interest here of the two Swiss 
companies  take  place  in  Europe,  particularly  the 
fermentation  services  accessible  to  European  firms. 
Fermic, based in Mexico, has an agreement with US-
Table 5.1. Overview of companies active along the lipase value chain 
Region  Country  Company name  Total revenue 2011 
(USD million) 
Lipase producers 
EU 
Netherlands  DSM  9 048 
Denmark  Novozymes  1 891 
UK  ABF (AB Enzymes)
a  16 650 (127) 
Germany  C-lecta  n.a. 
UK  Biocatalysts Ltd  n.a. 
Austria  Eucodis Bioscience  n.a. 
Non-EU 
US  Dupont (Genencor)
a  38 000 (835b) 
US  Codexis  124 
US  Verenium  61 
US  Dyadic  10 
Japan  Amano  1 074c 
Japan  Meito-Sangyo  176 
India  Advanced Enzymes  34 
India  Aumgene Bioscience  n.a. 
China  Syncozymes  n.a. 
Companies active in microorganism selection and engineering 
EU  Netherlands  DSM  9 048 
Non-EU 
Switzerland  Lonza  2 019 
India  Aumgene Bioscience  n.a. 
Companies active in enzyme production 
  Netherlands  DSM  9 048 
EU  Finland  Galilaeus Oy.  1.9
b 
  Austria  Eucodis Bioscience  n.a. 
  UK  Biocatalysts Ltd  n.a. 
  Switzerland  Novartis (Sandoz)
a  58 566 (10 700) 
  Switzerland  Lonza  2 019 
Non-EU  Israel  Biodalia  n.a. 
  Mexico  Fermic  n.a. 
  India  Aumgene Bioscience  n.a. 
 
Source: IDEA Consult. Company turnover and main production sites are based on corporate annual  reports and company website 
information   
Notes: a: in case the relevant activities are performed by a specific subsidiary, this subsidiary is listed in parentheses behind the parent 
company. b: total revenue 2010; c: total revenue 2012; n.a. = not available  
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based Verenium for the manufacturing of all of the 
latter’s enzymes. 
Table 5.2. Dominant companies per lipase application 
field 
Application field  Companies with highest 
market shares 
Detergent  Genencor, Novozymes 
Food  DSM, Novozymes 
Biocatalysis  Novozymes 
Source: IDEA Consult 
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The world enzyme market is dominated by a select 
number of companies (Novozymes, Genencor, DSM). 
In  a  market  where  product  innovation  is  very 
important,  their  extensive  R&D  capabilities  allow 
these companies to remain at the forefront. However, 
a second important element in the enzyme industry is 
the capability  to produce enzymes on a large scale 
(and therefore at a moderate cost). This is because the 
scaling  of  manufacturing  processes  in  industrial 
biotech  is  far  less  straightforward  than  in  classical 
chemistry.  Currently  Novozymes,  Genencor  and 
DSM (and to a lesser extent AB Enzymes) distinguish 
themselves in the large-scale effective production of 
enzymes. While many smaller firms are good at the 
discovery of new enzymes with interesting properties, 
the step to large-scale manufacturing is not easy to 
take. As a consequence, the technology of the smaller 
companies is often acquired by larger companies who 
then  set  up  large-scale  production  of  the  enzyme. 
Europe is well-placed in this regard and should foster 
its capabilities in large-scale enzyme production since 
it gives an important competitive advantage. 
5.4.3.  EU position in the value chain of lipase 
enzymes 
With  Novozymes  (the  world’s  leading  enzyme 
supplier) and DSM, Europe has leading companies in 
all lipase application fields. In addition, Europe hosts 
a group of smaller companies which tend to specialise 
in  certain  applications.  There  is  considerable 
competition from US companies, primarily Genencor. 
However,  this  company  only  has  a  leading  market 
position in detergent lipases. Japan, on the other hand, 
hosts  two  recognised  players  which  are  strong  in 
emerging  applications  such  as  pharmaceutical  and 
chemical applications. However, the lipase activities 
of these companies do not have the scale of the large 
EU players. 
Looking at more specific parts of the value chain, a 
significant share of fermentation services is provided 
within Europe,  especially when taking into account 
several EU-based activities of companies with Swiss 
                                                            
143   Table 5.2. is based on replies from interviewees about the most 
important players in each application field. 
headquarters. No other major region emerges in this 
segment.  As  for  the  first  step  of  the  value  chain, 
microorganism selection and engineering, only a few 
companies were identified, one of which is based in 
the  EU.  This  represents  a  smaller  segment  though. 
The analysis – largely expert-driven – confirms that 
Europe is a key player in the global enzyme market 
and holds a strong position in the subfield of lipases. 
It has not been possible to calculate the value added 
captured  by  European  firms  in  the  value  chain  of 
lipases.  In  order  to  assess  the  performance  of  EU 
companies,  industry  experts  were  asked  to  list  the 
companies with the highest market shares for each of 
the three major application fields of lipases in order to 
gain insight into which regions lead in the segment. 
For  companies  not  selling  lipases  but  focusing  on 
specific parts of the value chain, information on the 
relevance  of  lipases  in  their  activities  is  typically 
more difficult to find since these activities are more 
remote from the end-product. 
5.5.  VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS OF THE 
ACCELEROMETER 
5.5.1.  Value chain decomposition 
The  accelerometer  consists  of  two  main  functional 
units:  a  mechanical  component  which  senses  the 
acceleration (the sensor) and an electronic unit which 
receives and translates the signals coming from the 
mechanical component. The electronic unit is often 
referred to as an application-specific integrated circuit 
(ASIC), as its sole purpose is to receive and translate 
signals from the mechanical component. Figure 5.14 
is a schematic representation of the value chain of the 
accelerometer. It covers two major phases, the design 
and manufacturing of the ASIC and of the sensor. In 
the design phase, a complete plan of the ASIC and 
sensor is drawn, detailing all functional structures and 
how they will be interconnected. These plans will be 
translated  into  a  format  that  can  be  used  for 
manufacturing.  The  manufacturing  process  can  be 
divided  into  four  steps.  The  first  step  is  the 
fabrication of the ASIC and sensor on a large silicon 
substrate (or wafer). The next step, wafer probing, is 
to  inspect  the  wafer  for  malfunctioning  ASICs  and 
sensors. Then the two components are integrated into 
one package, followed by a final phase of tests of the 
accelerometer. Each step will be discussed in more 
detail below. 
The  value  chain  of  the  accelerometer  consists  of 
many steps. A company can opt to cover the whole 
value chain itself or focus on a specific number of 
steps.  Companies  covering  the  entire  chain  are 
integrated  device  manufacturers  (IDMs)  and  are 
responsible for the design, manufacturing and sale of 
their own products. However, other business models 
exist  as  well.  A  company  can  focus  on  design  but 
leave  manufacturing  to  another  firm  (a  ‘fabless’ 
company).  Companies  focusing  exclusively  on  
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manufacturing  chips  commissioned  by  ‘fabless’ 
companies are referred to as foundries. Intermediate 
forms can also exist: a company can manufacture part 
of its products and outsource the rest to a foundry, or 
be  active  only  in  the  design  phase  by  providing 
design services to other companies. 
This illustrates that the value added from creating an 
accelerometer  is  divided  among  several  companies, 
each covering particular stages of the value chain. It 
is  therefore  important  to  look  not  only  at  the  end-
producers of this product but at all parts of the value 
chain when assessing the competitiveness of the EU 
in this product. In the following paragraphs, the key 
players will be identified for each step of the value 
chain.  First  the  end-producers  of  accelerometers 
(companies selling accelerometers) will be discussed, 
followed by companies active in the first part of the 
value  chain  (design)  and  then  those  active  in  the 
second part of the value chain (manufacturing). 
  Accelerometer producers  5.5.1.1.
Table 5.3  lists  the  most  important  players  in  the 
accelerometer industry. It is clear that Germany, the 
US  and  Japan  are  the  three  countries  covering  the 
majority  of  the  market  (in  case  of  multinational 
companies, the country assigned is the location of the 
parent company). 
Europe has a small group of large companies, while 
in the US there is a larger group of somewhat smaller 
companies.  Japan  has  three  major  players  on  the 
market, but two are the result of recent acquisitions 
(Rohm  Semiconductor  acquired  US-based  Kionix, 
while  Murata  Electronics  acquired  Finland-based 
VTI). The widespread use of accelerometers started in 
the automotive industry, which remains an important 
market.  All  large  companies  in  Table 5.3  have  a 
strong  presence  in  the  automotive  sector.  In  this 
respect  it  has  been  an  advantage  for  companies  in 
Europe to have a strong domestic automotive market. 
The interest of consumer electronics manufacturers in 
accelerometers  (and  other  MEMS)  has  grown 
gradually as a result of their drive to give electronics 
‘intelligent’  attributes.  This  posed  a  number  of 
technical  challenges  –  smaller  chips,  higher 
production volumes and extreme cost consciousness. 
STMicroelectronics  was  one  of  the  first  sensor 
producers  to  spot  the  potential  of  the  consumer 
electronics market and develop large-scale production 
facilities  for  that  market.  This  has  brought  the 
company solid growth and a strong position in this 
segment. Robert Bosch is another key player in the 
consumer  electronics  market.  Strength  in  both  the 
automotive  and  consumer  segments  provides  an 
opportunity to operate at a large scale, thus reducing 
costs.  The  main  competition  in  the  accelerometer 
market  comes  from  US-based  companies.  Analog 
Devices  and  Freescale  are  two  well-established 
competitors,  while  Memsic  and  Invense  are  two 
young,  promising  and  innovative  companies  with 
strong growth rates over the past years. 
The  accelerometer  market  was  worth  around 
USD 1.5 bn  in  2011  and  dominated  by  companies 
such as STMicroelectronics and Bosch (around 20 % 
each),  Freescale  (around  10 %),  Analog  Devices, 
Denso and VTI. The success of STMicroelectronics 
and  Bosch  in  both  automotive  and  consumer 
electronics makes them the two largest players in the 
accelerometer market. The EU represents almost half 
of the market in this segment, making it the leading 
region.  Two  US  companies,  Freescale  and  Analog 
Devices,  also  capture  a  significant  share  of  the 
market,  although  less  than  STMicroelectronics  or 
Bosch.  Together  with  other  US  companies  with 
smaller market shares, the US has the second largest 
market share after the EU. The third player, Japan, 
has been able to capture a considerable share of the 
market with Denso  and the acquisition of VTI and 
Kionix. 
  Companies active in design  5.5.1.2.
Companies  specialising  in  support  for  MEMS 
producers in the design phase are often referred to as 
‘design  houses’.  Their  task  involves  helping  other 
companies with the design and prototyping of a new 
product.  Design  houses  can  help  deliver  a  faster 
‘time-to-market’  (which  tends  to  be  quite  long  for 
MEMS in general) and ensure a good match of the 
design  with  more  conventional  manufacturing 
techniques. 
Figure 5.14. Value chain decomposition for the accelerometer 
 
Source: IDEA Consult  
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Table 5.3 also lists companies active as design houses 
for MEMS. It should be noted that the importance of 
accelerometer  design  in  the  activities  of  these 
companies  varies  over  time  and  is  not  disclosed. 
Therefore, the list applies to MEMS more generally. 
Of  the  four  identified  actors,  three  are  US-based. 
France-based Movea is a young, innovative company 
specialised  in  motion  sensing.  Design  houses  are  a 
relatively  small  segment  (much  smaller  than  the 
foundry segment) since design is a core competence 
of  most  accelerometer  end-producers  and  is  often 
undertaken to a significant extent by these companies 
themselves. 
  Companies active in manufacturing  5.5.1.3.
Companies active in accelerometer manufacturing are 
those which manufacture accelerometer products on 
behalf of a second party. Most of the large companies 
in  Table 5.3  (Bosch,  STMicroelectronics,  Freescale, 
Analog Devices) are IDMs covering the whole value 
chain. However, this is not true for all accelerometer 
producers.  The  US-based  company  Invensense,  for 
example,  operates  a  fabless  model  by  operating  a 
simplified and innovative manufacturing process. 
Outsourcing is not unique to small companies such as 
Invensense.  Companies  like  Analog  Devices  also 
outsource  part  of  their  MEMS  manufacturing.  The 
main rationale behind outsourcing is cost reduction. 
The manufacturing equipment for integrated circuits 
is capital intensive and cost-competitive production is 
only possible if done on a large scale. A high-volume, 
quick-turnaround  consumer  segment  can  often  be 
better served by dedicated large-scale foundries. An 
exception  is  the  automotive  market,  where  strict 
compliance requirements are in place and production 
is in most cases done internally. Another reason to 
use foundry services is the expertise these companies 
have  in  the  successful  up-scaling  of  production  to 
large volumes. 
Table 5.3 lists the most important foundries active in 
accelerometer  manufacturing.  This  list  consists  of 
companies  that  undertake  manufacturing  of 
accelerometer products on behalf of a second party. It 
should be noted that while the companies listed in the 
table  are  known  to  have  accelerometer  production 
capabilities,  the  importance  of  accelerometer 
production  in  their  total  activities  varies  over  time 
and is not disclosed. Two types of foundries can be 
distinguished:  those  making  only  MEMS  products 
and  those  active  also  in  the  regular  electronics 
markets  (memory,  microprocessors).  The  latter 
category of firms is referred to as silicon foundries. 
Foundries  (whether  MEMS-exclusive  or  not)  often 
develop  their  own  technological  (manufacturing) 
competences  and  hold  a  number  of  patents  on  in-
house  manufacturing  technology.  MEMS  foundries 
also  tend  to  offer  a  number  of  services  aimed  at 
facilitating the translation of design into a successful 
product,  going  from  co-design  to  custom-specific 
process development and packaging and testing. 
In  Europe  there  is  considerable  foundry  activity  in 
four  countries.  Silex  Microsystems  has  grown 
strongly in MEMS and has become a strong player 
thanks  to  its  in-house  manufacturing  technology 
which allows close integration of the ASIC and the 
sensor.  However,  the  EU  foundry  companies  are 
relatively small; and as only a part of their revenues 
stems from accelerometer production their weight is 
much smaller than accelerometer producers such as 
STMicroelectronics and Robert Bosch. 
Outside  the  EU,  US  companies  are  somewhat  less 
present in the foundry segment than the end-product 
market. Global Foundries is a leading silicon foundry, 
but in MEMS it is currently a small player as it has 
only  recently  moved  into  this  field  (including 
accelerometers),  attracted  by  the  good  market 
prospects.  Taiwanese  companies  have  a  stronger 
presence  on  the  foundry  list  than  on  the  list  of 
accelerometer producers. The less prominent presence 
of  US  companies  and  the  strong  emergence  of 
Taiwanese  companies  might  be  interrelated,  as  a 
number  of  US  companies  employ  Taiwanese 
foundries  for  their  manufacturing.  For  example, 
Invensense operates as a fully fabless company, with 
all the manufacturing done in Taiwan by TSMC. 
In  addition,  Analog  Devices  also  outsources  the 
manufacturing of the electronic component (ASIC) of 
its accelerometer to TSMC. 
The Taiwanese foundry giants TSMC and UMC are 
two examples of the successful development of the 
semiconductor industry in Taiwan, particularly of the 
foundry  segment.  These  firms  make  the  large 
majority  of  their  sales  in  the  mainstream 
semiconductor segments but are increasingly used by 
other companies for MEMS production because the 
large foundries are able to produce at low cost and in 
large volumes. The positive growth prospects of the 
MEMS segment have caught their attention, and both 
have  been  active  in  developing  skills  needed  for 
mechanical sensor production in recent years. Other 
silicon  foundries  are  also  entering,  or  planning  to 
enter, the MEMS segment. Germany-based Xfab has 
invested heavily in MEMS production capacities in 
recent years and has recorded positive growth figures 
in this segment. The competition from foundries in 
the mainstream semiconductor industry is expected to 
grow in the near future. 
A possible future competitive threat for Europe is its 
low  level  of  investments  over  the  past  decade  in 
semiconductor  production  capacity.  European 
companies have followed a strategy of prolonging the 
life of 150 mm and 200 mm fabs by using them for 
MEMS production. Investments in 300 mm fabs have 
been low compared to US and Asia. Europe currently 
has  a  very  limited  market  share  in  the  mainstream 
semiconductor  segments,  where  production  in  most  
170 
cases is done on 300 mm wafers and with advanced 
technology.  On  the  other  hand,  MEMS  production 
can be achieved competitively on 150 mm or 200 mm 
wafer fabs and without using the latest technology. 
However, with the ongoing depreciation of the older 
150 mm and 200 mm fabs and the expected move of 
the  mainstream  semiconductor  industry  to  450 mm 
technology, it is expected that within five to ten years 
all  MEMS  production  will  take  place  on  300 mm 
wafer fabs. Given that there is currently little 300 mm 
production technology in Europe, there is a risk that 
manufacturing  of  MEMS  (and  the  associated  value 
added and employment) will increasingly move out of 
Europe.  Moreover,  the  increasing  dependence  on 
foreign  countries  for  enabling  technologies  such  as 
micro- and nanoelectronics may at some point also 
give rise to strategic concerns. 
A  study  for  the  European  Commission  in  2012 
suggests that Europe needs to take advantage of the 
shift  to  450 mm  production  technology  to  catch  up 
with  its  investment  deficit  in  production  capacity. 
Indeed, once the new 450 mm technology is installed, 
significant  spare  300 mm  capacity  will  become 
available  in  other  regions,  and  it  will  not  make 
economic  sense  for  the  EU  to  invest  massively  in 
300 mm capacity. One of the proposed scenarios is to 
install  450 mm  capacity  initially  to  safeguard  the 
current  strong  position  in  ‘More  than  Moore’ 
(including MEMS and the accelerometer) and later to 
expand the scope to more advanced technology for 
‘More  Moore’  (mainstream  semiconductor) 
production. The investment costs will be so high that 
they will need to be spread over several years, which 
means that early commitment is needed. 
5.5.2.  The EU position in the value chain of the 
accelerometer  
The analysis shows that EU companies have a solid 
position  in  the  end-producers  segment  of  the 
accelerometer  market.  The  EU  is  represented  by  a 
relatively small group of large companies that have a 
strong  base  in  the  automotive  market.  These 
companies  have  also  been  able  to  take  significant 
shares  of  the  fast-growing  consumer  market.  The 
strongest  competition  in  the  end-producers  segment 
comes from US-based companies which consist of a 
mixture  of  well-established  companies  and  some 
younger, more innovative companies. In the smaller 
design  segment,  only  a  few  companies  have  been 
identified, all of which are located in the EU or the 
US.  In  the  foundry  segment  the  EU  is  also  well 
represented,  with  four  companies  active  in  four 
different countries. Here the main competition comes 
from  the  US,  Canada  and  Taiwan,  where  regular 
silicon  foundries  as  well  as  MEMS  foundries  are 
increasingly used by producers. 
EU  companies  perform  well  thanks  to  a  strong 
background  in  the  automotive  industry,  good  R&D 
competence and – particularly in the case of the two 
large  IDMs  –  a  rapid  understanding  of  the 
possibilities  of  new  markets  and  the  advantage  of 
large-scale production. However, an important future 
competitive  threat  exists  as  investments  in  new 
(300 mm wafer) production capacity have been low in 
Europe  in  recent  years.  Currently  this  is  not  a 
problem for MEMS (accelerometer) production, but 
as the mainstream semiconductor industry migrates to 
450 mm  wafers,  manufacturing  of  MEMS 
(accelerometers) will occur on 300 mm within five to 
ten years. Therefore there is a risk that manufacturing 
of  these  products  will  move  to  other  regions, 
primarily Asia. For Europe it seems that the transition 
to  450 mm  should  be  taken  as  an  opportunity  to 
safeguard its leading position in accelerometers, but 
also in MEMS as a whole. 
Again, in the case of the accelerometer it has not been 
possible  to  calculate  the  value  added  captured  by 
European firms in the value chain. For accelerometer 
producers  however,  market  reports  contain 
information  on  the  market  share  of  each  company, 
providing  insights  into  how  different  regions  are 
performing  in  the  accelerometer  market.  For 
companies  focusing  on  specific  parts  of  the  value 
chain,  information  on  the  relevance  of  the 
accelerometer  in  their  activities  is  typically  more 
difficult to find since these activities are more remote 
from the end-product and is therefore not included in 
this chapter. 
5.6.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The  results of the analysis show that Europe holds 
varying  positions  in  the  different  KETs.  Asia  is 
gaining  ground  as  a  main  producer  of  new 
technological  knowledge  in  KETs,  thereby 
demonstrating fast market share gains. 
Europe  has  a  strong  technological  capacity,  a 
substantial production base, is specialised in (mature) 
products  with  high  technology  content,  but  has  to 
compete mainly on price. Moving to the higher end of 
the value chain is a real challenge.  
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Table 5.3. Overview of companies active along the value chain of the accelerometer 
Region  Country  Company name  Total revenue 2011 
(USD million) 
Accelerometer producers 
EU 
Germany  Robert Bosch  70 539 
Netherlands  STMicroelectronics
  9 735 
Germany  Infineon  5 479 
France  Sagem (Colibrys)
a  16 438 (16) 
Non-EU 
US  Freescale Semiconductor  4 572 
US  Analog Devices  2 993 
US  Invensense  96 
US  Honeywell  36 529 
US  MEMSIC  68 
US  Endevco  n.a. 
Japan  Denso  37 660 
Japan  Murata Electronics (VTI)
a  7 130b (76c) 
Japan  Rohm Semiconductor (Kionix)  3 187 (n.a.) 
Companies active in design 
EU  France  Movea  n.a. 
  US  A.M. Fitzgerald  n.a. 
Non-EU  US  Nanoshift  n.a. 
  US  SVTC Technologies  n.a. 
Companies active in manufacturing 
EU 
Sweden  Silex Microsystems  47 
France   Tronics  15.2 
Germany  Xfab  n.a. 
UK  Semefab  n.a. 
Non-EU 
Norway  Sensonor  7.5 
Israel  TowerJazz  611 
US  Global Foundries  3 480 
US  Teledyne (Dalsa Semiconductor)
 a  1 941 (212c) 
US  IMT  24 
Canada  Micralyne  15 
Taiwan  Asia Pacific Microsystems  n.a. 
Taiwan  TSMC  12 914 
Taiwan  UMC  3 855 
Malaysia  MEMSTech  n.a. 
US/Japan  UT - SPP (Silicon Sensing Systems)
a   n.a. 
 
Source: IDEA Consult. Company turnover is based on corporate annual reports and company website information.    
Notes: a= in case the relevant activities are performed by a specific subsidiary, this subsidiary is listed in parentheses behind the parent 
company; b= total revenue 2012; c= total revenue 2010; n.a. = not available 
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Looking at its position in the production and trade of 
KETs,  Europe  has  both  a  strong  technological 
capacity  and  a  substantial  production  base  in  all 
KETs. Europe is, in contrast to emerging competitors 
from  East  Asia,  specialised  in  key  enabling 
technology  products  with  high  technology  content. 
However, most of these products seem to be mature 
as  they  compete  mostly  on  price,  less  on  quality. 
There are, however, differences between and within 
KETs. 
-  Industrial biotechnology: high and increasing 
technology  content  of  exports,  and  a  price 
advantage. In industrial biotechnology, Europe 
specialises  in  products  with  high  technology 
content,  in  other  words  products  with  higher 
quality  or  further  along  the  production  chain. 
During the past decade, Europe has been able to 
further strengthen its position. Despite Europe’s 
technological  advance,  exports  predominantly 
face price competition. However, Europe tends 
to have a price advantage in international trade in 
industrial  biotechnology  products  which  could 
point to a more efficient production. Patenting is 
a  major  driver  for  the  technology  content  of 
industrial biotechnology products. 
-  Nanotechnology:  low  and  decreasing 
technology content of exports but with a price 
advantage. In the nanotechnology sector, the EU 
position  is  less  favourable.  The  technology 
content of most products is lower than in the two 
main  competitor  regions  (North  America  and 
East  Asia)  and  going  down,  indicating  a 
specialisation  in  less  complex  products.  EU 
exports  in  nanotechnology  compete  mainly  on 
price  and  in  most  cases  EU  products  enjoy  a 
price  advantage.  Patenting  is  important  to 
achieve high technology content but this effect is 
less  pronounced  in  Europe  than  in  North 
America and East Asia. 
-  Micro-  and  nanoelectronics:  low  and 
decreasing technology content of exports with 
no price advantage. The technology content of 
products is low and decreasing, accompanied by 
strong price competition for exports and no sign 
of  a  price  advantage  for  Europe.  To  maintain 
high  levels  of  technology  content,  patenting  is 
extremely  important,  having  an  even  stronger 
impact in Europe than in the other two regions. 
Patent  activities  in  Europe  have  not  been 
sufficient to improve its trade position, though. 
-  Photonics:  high  and  increasing  technology 
content of exports and a price advantage. In 
photonics, EU exports show high and increasing 
levels  of  technology  content,  which  primarily 
face price competition. Most of its exports do not 
show a price advantage relative to competitors. 
The role of patenting is lower for the technology 
content of photonics products than for most other 
KETs.  A  conclusion  could  be  that  Europe  is 
specialised  in  high-end  products  in  photonics, 
while  global  markets  are  increasingly 
characterised by price erosion. 
-  Advanced  materials:  high  and  increasing 
technology  content  of  exports  and  a  price 
advantage. Advanced materials are in a similar 
position as industrial biotechnology products in 
Europe.  The  technology  content  is  high  and 
increasing  for  most  of  Europe’s  exports. 
International  competition  is  driven  by  price 
competition  and  Europe  can  build  on  price 
advantages  for  most  of  its  export  products. 
Patenting  is  of  secondary  relevance  for  the 
technology content of products. 
-  Advanced  manufacturing  for  other  KETs: 
Europe is leading; high technology content of 
exports; a clear quality advantage. Advanced 
manufacturing for other KETs is the KET area in 
which Europe holds the most advanced position 
in production and trade. The technology content 
of exports is high, increasing and strongly based 
on patenting. Most of Europe’s exports compete 
on quality and Europe holds quality advantages 
for  most  of  its  export  products.  Europe  is  the 
leading  region  in  this  KET,  which  is  also 
confirmed by a high positive specialisation and a 
high positive trade balance. 
The  EU  position  in  each  of  the  key  enabling 
technology value chains is summarised in Table 5.4. 
A key challenge for European competitiveness policy 
is to bring European industry onto a competitive 
path  that  rests  firmly  on  more  innovative  and 
more complex products. In many KETs this would 
mean  a  focus  on  more  integrated  technologies, 
including  those  which  link  several  KETs.  Such  a 
product portfolio would imply a shift of competitive 
pressure  towards  quality  competition.  In  such  an 
environment,  EU  industry  could  better  exploit  its 
competitive  advantages  and  create  real  value  on 
several levels. 
In order to achieve this, various approaches may be 
followed: 
-  Improving the links between producers of basic 
technological  elements  with  producers  of 
components and final products; 
-  Strengthening  cross-fertilisation  of  technology 
developments across key enabling technologies; 
-  Fostering  and  reinforcing  the  development  of 
clusters  along  value  chains  in  key  enabling 
technologies,  including  knowledge  producers 
(such as universities and research institutes) and 
knowledge users.  
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The  strategy  of  moving  European  industry  to  the 
higher end of value chains could build on a strong 
base in each basic element within each key enabling 
technology.  Policy  should  also  consider  the 
advantages of global cooperation in the development 
and  deployment  of  new  key  enabling  technologies 
and new applications. This could mean cooperation 
with  specialised  technology  suppliers  from  other 
world  regions.  On  the  other  hand,  successful 
commercialisation of new applications often depends 
on  cooperating  with  the  right  customers  in  those 
markets  that  set  future  trends  (‘lead  markets’).  It 
could  be  more  beneficial  for  European  industry  to 
commercialise new key enabling technologies abroad 
–  even  if  parts  of  the  production  will  move  to 
dynamic markets abroad – than to focus on European 
markets with less promising long-term prospects. 
Moving to the higher end of the value chain is at the 
same  time  enormously  complex  and  challenging. 
While  monitoring  the  developments  in  the  entire 
value  chain,  it  is  equally  important  to  focus  on 
promising segments and the position of the EU in the 
value chains of these segments. This is confirmed by 
the  analysis  of  the  two  promising  KETs  products 
which have been analysed above. 
Focusing on promising KET product segments: a 
starting point for moving up the value chain? On 
the basis of the analysis of the value chains of two 
products,  lipase  enzymes  (industrial  biotechnology) 
and the accelerometer (micro- and nanotechnology), a 
qualitative assessment has been made of the strength 
of  the  EU  in  these  two  selected  value  chains. 
Although precise figures on the value added captured 
by  European  companies  are  unavailable  (due  to 
confidentiality issues and the lack of insight into the 
share of a particular technology in the overall valued 
added of a company) the results show that the EU is 
a key player in the area of lipase enzymes and the 
global  enzyme  market.  Europe  also  has  a  solid 
position  in  the  end-producers  segment  of  the 
accelerometer, as some EU companies have taken a 
significant  share  of  the  automotive  and  consumer 
electronics  markets,  two  markets  where 
accelerometers  are  applied.  Competition  is 
nevertheless  strong,  especially  in  the  foundry 
segment. 
It is interesting to note that although the general EU 
position  in  the  entire  micro-  and  nanotechnology 
value chain is weak, its position with respect to the 
accelerometer value chain is good. This suggests that, 
even  if  the  overall  position  in  a  particular  key 
enabling technology is not optimal, there may always 
be segments – existing or emerging – where the EU is 
in a good position and where active policy support 
can  make  a  difference  in  the  longer  run.  It  is 
important  to  observe  and  monitor  these  specific 
segments closely, for instance through the future 
KETs  Observatory,  and  act  in  time  in  order  to 
stay  ahead  of  the  competition.  A  focused  and 
intensified policy in this respect might, in the long 
run,  lead  to  Europe  moving  up  the  global  key 
enabling technology value chains. 
 
Table 5.4. The position of the EU in the production and trade of KET-related products: summary overview 
 
Industrial 
biotechnology 
Nano-
technology 
Micro-/nano-
electronics 
Photonics  Advanced 
materials 
AMT for  
other KETs 
Technology content of 
exports 
high and 
increasing 
low, mostly 
decreasing 
low and 
decreasing 
high and 
increasing 
high and 
increasing 
high and 
increasing 
Type of competition  mostly price 
competition, 
price advantage 
price 
competition, 
mostly with 
price advantage 
price 
competition, no 
price advantage 
price 
competition, no 
price advantage 
price 
competition, 
mostly with 
price advantage 
mostly quality 
competition, 
quality 
advantage 
Impact of patenting  moderate  low   high  low  low  high 
 
Source: ZEW and NIW 
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  Chapter 6.  
STATISTICAL ANNEX 
6.1.  SECTORAL COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS 
6.1.1.  Explanatory notes 
Geographical coverage: all indicators refer to EU-27 
Production index
144: The production index is actually an index of final production in volume terms. 
Labour productivity: this indicator is calculated by combining the indexes of production and number of persons 
employed or number of hours worked
145. Therefore, this indicator measures final production per person of final 
production per hour worked. 
Unit Labour Cost: it is calculated from the production index and the index of wages and salaries and measures 
labour cost per unit of production. “Wages and salaries” is defined (Eurostat) as “the total remuneration, in cash 
or in kind, payable to all persons counted on the payroll (including homeworkers), in return for work done 
during the accounting period, regardless of whether it is paid on the basis of working time, output or piecework 
and whether it is paid regularly wages and salaries do not include social contributions payable by the employer”.  
Relative Trade Balance: it is calculated, for sector “i”, as (Xi-Mi)/(Xi+Mi), where Xi and Mi are EU-27 exports 
and imports of products of sector “i” to and from the rest of the World. 
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA): The RCA indicator for product “i” is defined as follows: 
 
where: X=value of exports; the reference group (‘W’) is the EU-27 plus 109 other countries (see list below); the 
source used is the UN COMTRADE database. In the calculation of RCA, XEU stands for exports to the rest of the 
world (excluding intra-EU trade) and XW measures exports to the rest of the world by the countries in the 
reference group. The latter consists of the EU-27 plus the following countries: Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, 
Argentina, Australia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Armenia, Bermuda, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia 
Herzegovina, Brazil, Belize, Belarus, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Rep., Sri Lanka, Chile, 
China,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Croatia,  Dominican  Rep.,  Ecuador,  El  Salvador,  Ethiopia,  French  Polynesia, 
Georgia, Gambia, State of Palestine, Ghana, Greenland, Guatemala, Guyana, China, Hong Kong SAR, Iceland, 
Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Côte d'Ivoire, Japan, Kazakhstan, Jordan, Rep. of Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, China, 
Macao SAR, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Other Asia, nes, Rep. of 
Moldova, Montenegro, Montserrat, Namibia, Nepal, Aruba, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, 
Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, India, Singapore, Viet Nam, South Africa, 
Zimbabwe, Suriname, Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, United Arab Emirates, Tunisia, Turkey, Turks and 
Caicos Isds, Uganda, Ukraine, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Egypt, United Rep. of Tanzania, US, 
Burkina Faso, Samoa, Yemen, Zambia. 
Statistical nomenclatures: the indicators in Table 6.1 to Table 6.6 are presented at the level of divisions of the 
statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE Rev.2
146), while those in 
Table 6.7 to Table 6.9.2 are presented in terms of divisions of the statistical classification of products by activity 
(CPA).  
                                                            
144   The data are working-day adjusted for production. 
145   The data are working-day adjusted for hours worked. 
146   Compared  to  the  statistical  annexes  of  the  previous  publications,  the  new  activity  classification  is  used:  NACE  REV  2.  The 
correspondence tables from NACE Rev. 2 – NACE Rev. 1.1 and from NACE Rev. 1.1 to NACE Rev. 2, are available on:    
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/nace_rev2/introduction  
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Table 6.10 uses extended balance of payments services classification. In terms of data sources: Table 6.1 to 
Table 6.6 are based on Eurostat’s short-term indicators data. Table 6.7, Table 6.8, Table 6.9.1 and Table 6.9.2 
are based on United Nations’ COMTRADE. Table 6.10 is based on IMF balance of Payments. Royalties and 
license fees were not included as it is not related to a special service activity.  
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Table 6.1. EU-27 - Industry production index, annual growth rate (%) 
 
N/A: Data not available, Source: Eurostat 
Code
(NACE Rev. 2)
Sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Average
2007-2012
B MINING AND QUARRYING -2.8 0.5 -2.8 -1.9 -6.0 -3.8 -0.1 -3.6 -10.7 -0.3 -7.0 -5.8 -5.5
C MANUFACTURING 0.1 -0.8 0.3 2.5 1.6 4.8 4.2 -1.9 -15.3 7.3 4.5 -2.2 -1.8
C10 Manufacture of food products 1.4 1.9 0.5 2.1 2.4 1.3 1.9 -0.5 -1.0 2.2 1.0 -0.7 0.2
C11 Manufacture of beverages 2.7 1.6 1.3 -2.3 0.9 3.7 1.2 -2.1 -3.2 -1.0 6.5 -2.8 -0.6
C12 Manufacture of tobacco products -1.6 -2.1 -5.8 -11.4 -5.5 -4.7 1.5 -11.7 -0.7 -5.9 -6.2 -4.5 -5.9
C13 Manufacture of textiles -2.9 -4.5 -3.4 -4.8 -5.9 -0.8 -1.1 -10.2 -18.0 7.8 -2.1 -6.0 -6.1
C14 Manufacture of wearing apparel -4.7 -11.5 -7.3 -5.6 -10.4 -0.5 -0.6 -7.6 -14.0 -1.1 -4.1 -5.8 -6.6
C15 Manufacture of leather and related products -5.7 -8.3 -6.8 -10.2 -9.0 -2.9 -5.7 -8.1 -14.1 2.1 5.4 -4.2 -4.0
C16
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, 
except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and 
plaiting materials
-4.2 0.7 2.3 3.2 0.2 4.2 0.7 -9.1 -14.9 2.9 2.6 -4.3 -4.8
C17 Manufacture of paper and paper products -2.0 3.4 1.4 2.9 -0.1 3.9 2.6 -3.2 -8.7 6.0 -1.1 -1.5 -1.8
C18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media -1.9 -0.6 -1.2 1.4 2.4 0.2 0.7 -2.2 -7.9 -0.3 -0.5 -6.6 -3.6
C19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products -0.9 0.9 1.3 4.6 0.7 -0.9 0.4 1.0 -8.0 -2.0 -1.7 -1.9 -2.6
C20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products -1.9 1.9 -0.1 3.3 2.0 3.4 2.9 -3.3 -12.5 10.3 1.3 -1.6 -1.4
C21
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and 
pharmaceutical preparations
10.9 8.6 5.0 -0.2 4.7 5.9 0.4 0.6 2.9 4.9 1.6 0.2 2.0
C22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products -0.3 0.0 1.9 1.8 0.9 3.9 4.5 -4.6 -13.9 7.3 3.8 -3.4 -2.4
C23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products -0.6 -1.7 0.3 1.7 0.5 4.2 1.8 -6.7 -19.4 1.9 3.2 -8.4 -6.2
C24 Manufacture of basic metals -1.2 -0.4 0.2 4.9 -0.7 6.3 1.3 -3.6 -27.1 18.1 3.6 -5.1 -4.0
C25
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery 
and equipment
0.4 -0.6 0.9 2.6 1.5 4.8 6.1 -3.0 -22.6 6.9 7.2 -3.3 -3.6
C26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products -6.3 -10.2 0.5 6.4 2.8 9.0 7.6 0.7 -17.2 7.2 5.1 -2.0 -1.6
C27 Manufacture of electrical equipment -0.7 -4.1 -1.6 2.3 0.9 8.4 4.3 -0.7 -21.0 11.4 4.3 -2.3 -2.3
C28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 1.3 -1.8 -0.8 4.1 3.9 8.4 8.4 1.4 -26.8 10.6 11.5 0.5 -1.7
C29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 1.6 0.7 1.6 4.5 1.4 3.3 6.1 -5.9 -25.1 21.6 12.1 -3.1 -1.4
C30 Manufacture of other transport equipment 1.2 -3.5 0.5 0.4 2.0 7.8 4.8 3.9 -5.7 -0.7 4.1 2.8 0.8
C31 Manufacture of furniture -2.3 -5.1 -2.5 0.3 1.1 3.8 3.3 -5.0 -16.7 -1.0 2.0 -5.6 -5.5
C32 Other manufacturing 3.6 3.0 -2.2 1.2 0.9 5.3 1.7 -1.5 -6.9 8.2 3.1 0.0 0.5
C33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 0.3 -4.0 -2.0 4.5 1.1 7.9 4.5 3.7 -10.2 2.2 4.5 -1.5 -0.4
D
ELECTRICITY, GAS, STEAM AND AIR CONDITIONING 
SUPPLY
2.0 0.9 3.0 2.3 2.0 0.9 -0.7 -0.1 -4.5 4.1 -4.1 0.3 -0.9
E
WATER SUPPLY; SEWERAGE, WASTE MANAGEMENT 
AND REMEDIATION ACTIVITIES
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
F CONSTRUCTION 1.1 0.3 1.7 0.7 2.8 3.4 2.7 -2.9 -7.5 -4.7 0.2 -5.2 -4.1 
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Table 6.2. EU-27 - Number of persons employed, annual growth rate (%) 
 
N/A: Data not available, Source: Eurostat 
Code
(NACE Rev. 2) Sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Average
2007-2012
B MINING AND QUARRYING -3.4 -4.6 -4.5 -4.6 -3.1 -3.8 -3.5 -1.5 -3.8 -4.1 -3.4 -1.4 -2.9
C MANUFACTURING 0.0 -1.9 -2.0 -1.9 -1.3 -0.8 0.5 -0.3 -7.3 -3.7 0.6 -0.3 -2.2
C10 Manufacture of food products -0.6 -0.9 -0.5 -1.2 0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -1.9 -0.5 0.5 -0.3 -0.5
C11 Manufacture of beverages -1.8 -1.1 -1.8 -1.2 -1.3 -1.4 -0.1 -1.2 -6.4 -1.9 -1.5 -1.6 -2.5
C12 Manufacture of tobacco products -4.2 -0.3 -5.0 -5.2 -2.1 0.1 -11.1 -9.9 -6.0 -6.8 -2.4 -4.9 -6.0
C13 Manufacture of textiles -3.2 -5.0 -7.2 -6.3 -4.3 -5.9 -5.3 -6.3 -12.9 -5.9 -2.7 -2.4 -6.1
C14 Manufacture of wearing apparel -3.1 -3.6 -3.9 -6.2 -7.7 -5.8 -5.9 -6.7 -13.1 -8.5 -1.8 -2.7 -6.6
C15 Manufacture of leather and related products -1.2 -0.6 -4.4 -6.7 -5.6 -2.7 -3.7 -5.9 -12.5 -3.6 4.1 0.4 -3.7
C16
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, 
except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and 
plaiting materials
-0.9 -1.5 -1.3 -1.4 -0.6 -1.3 0.6 -2.3 -12.6 -3.4 -0.1 -3.2 -4.4
C17 Manufacture of paper and paper products -1.7 -0.7 -3.0 -1.6 -2.6 -2.6 -2.8 -2.2 -5.5 -2.3 -0.5 -1.9 -2.5
C18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media -0.2 -2.1 -4.0 -1.9 -3.3 -1.6 -0.1 -2.3 -7.0 -4.8 -3.6 -3.6 -4.3
C19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products -1.9 -3.0 -3.2 -1.7 -2.9 -3.1 0.9 -0.7 -3.3 -2.8 -2.8 0.7 -1.8
C20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products -0.8 -1.6 -2.6 -3.3 -2.2 -1.2 -0.6 -2.3 -4.5 -2.3 -0.2 -0.1 -1.9
C21
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and 
pharmaceutical preparations
1.8 2.2 -0.5 -2.4 -1.4 1.6 0.3 -2.5 -3.6 -1.0 -0.4 1.2 -1.3
C22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 1.0 -0.9 0.2 0.0 -0.8 -0.8 1.6 0.6 -7.0 -2.6 1.3 0.6 -1.5
C23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products -0.6 -2.3 -2.8 -2.1 -1.0 -0.7 1.2 -2.1 -10.7 -6.5 -1.9 -3.0 -4.9
C24 Manufacture of basic metals -0.2 -4.0 -2.9 -4.2 -1.1 -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -8.4 -5.4 1.0 -1.4 -3.0
C25
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery 
and equipment
1.0 -1.0 -1.1 0.2 -0.2 1.4 3.3 2.6 -8.4 -5.4 1.6 0.5 -1.9
C26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 1.9 -5.6 -4.4 -2.9 -1.3 -0.8 1.2 -1.8 -8.7 -3.9 1.2 -1.9 -3.1
C27 Manufacture of electrical equipment 0.5 -3.9 -4.1 -1.4 -0.6 0.9 2.5 1.1 -8.2 -2.0 3.3 0.5 -1.1
C28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 1.0 -1.5 -2.2 -2.4 -0.9 0.7 3.0 1.9 -5.9 -5.0 2.7 1.9 -0.9
C29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 1.7 -1.0 -0.4 0.2 -0.8 -1.0 -0.2 0.8 -8.9 -2.8 2.9 1.3 -1.4
C30 Manufacture of other transport equipment 0.0 -1.7 -2.7 -1.7 0.3 0.8 2.7 1.7 -1.5 -4.7 -0.3 1.0 -0.8
C31 Manufacture of furniture 0.5 -3.4 0.2 -2.6 -2.5 -1.3 0.3 -2.1 -9.6 -8.4 -1.7 -3.1 -5.0
C32 Other manufacturing 1.1 -1.6 -0.2 -1.0 -1.7 -0.5 0.3 -0.1 -3.1 -1.9 -0.9 0.8 -1.1
C33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 0.2 -2.3 -2.0 -0.5 -0.5 0.5 0.6 3.5 -1.8 -2.8 -1.4 1.0 -0.3
D
ELECTRICITY, GAS, STEAM AND AIR 
CONDITIONING SUPPLY
-2.7 -5.1 -4.9 -3.6 -2.4 -1.2 -1.6 -0.9 1.8 -0.2 0.4 -1.8 -0.1
E
WATER SUPPLY; SEWERAGE, WASTE 
MANAGEMENT AND REMEDIATION ACTIVITIES
-0.4 -0.3 0.5 -1.0 -1.8 1.9 0.7 -1.0 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 1.1 -0.2
F CONSTRUCTION 1.9 0.6 1.7 2.1 3.7 3.8 4.8 -0.3 -7.1 -5.5 -3.0 -3.9 -4.0 
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Table 6.3. EU-27 - Number of hours worked, annual growth rate (%) 
 
N/A: Data not available, Source: Eurostat 
Code
(NACE Rev. 2)
Sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Average
2007-2012
B MINING AND QUARRYING -2.7 -4.7 -5.3 -3.8 -3.0 -4.8 -3.6 -1.3 -5.4 -2.5 -2.3 -0.1 -2.3
C MANUFACTURING -1.2 -2.4 -2.5 -1.4 -1.5 -0.1 0.1 -0.7 -9.6 -0.7 1.5 -0.7 -2.1
C10 Manufacture of food products -1.1 -1.8 -2.0 -0.3 -0.5 -0.2 -0.5 0.2 -2.6 0.3 0.2 -0.7 -0.5
C11 Manufacture of beverages -0.2 -3.5 -0.3 0.5 -2.9 -4.0 -1.2 -1.7 -4.6 -4.5 -0.3 -1.4 -2.5
C12 Manufacture of tobacco products 2.0 -2.3 -10.3 -1.9 -3.8 -8.7 -2.5 -10.6 -6.1 -4.1 -1.3 -1.2 -4.7
C13 Manufacture of textiles -4.4 -5.6 -7.4 -7.2 -5.4 -5.7 -3.2 -5.7 -15.3 -0.6 -0.3 -1.4 -4.8
C14 Manufacture of wearing apparel -3.5 -2.3 -3.1 -3.7 -4.1 -3.7 -5.8 -6.9 -15.3 -8.3 0.3 -3.1 -6.8
C15 Manufacture of leather and related products -1.9 -0.6 -1.8 -2.6 -4.1 -0.9 -4.7 -7.1 -12.0 -0.6 3.9 0.4 -3.2
C16
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, 
except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and 
plaiting materials
-3.3 -1.2 -1.9 -1.1 -2.2 -0.4 -0.3 -3.0 -13.6 0.1 0.2 -2.1 -3.8
C17 Manufacture of paper and paper products -1.8 -0.4 -2.9 -1.9 -2.0 -0.9 -1.3 -4.1 -7.7 -0.5 0.2 -1.6 -2.8
C18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media -1.2 -3.5 -4.4 -2.9 -2.3 -0.1 0.2 -2.0 -6.1 -3.7 -2.4 -5.1 -3.9
C19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products -1.9 -3.9 -2.1 -0.4 0.0 -3.7 0.4 2.0 -9.0 -2.2 -1.8 1.0 -2.1
C20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products -2.3 -2.2 -2.7 -2.0 -3.2 -0.9 -1.6 -1.9 -5.5 -1.5 0.8 0.8 -1.5
C21
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and 
pharmaceutical preparations
0.4 1.9 -0.2 -0.7 -1.6 0.0 0.9 0.0 -1.9 -0.8 -0.1 1.8 -0.2
C22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products -0.3 -1.8 -1.5 -0.2 -1.4 1.6 0.6 -0.4 -9.4 0.9 2.2 0.3 -1.4
C23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products -2.6 -3.3 -3.2 -1.3 -1.0 -0.5 0.4 -2.7 -12.4 -2.4 -0.4 -3.5 -4.4
C24 Manufacture of basic metals -1.6 -3.2 -4.7 -2.1 -2.1 0.0 -0.5 -0.9 -13.1 1.8 2.6 -2.1 -2.5
C25
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery 
and equipment
-0.5 -1.3 -2.0 -0.3 -1.0 1.7 2.2 2.9 -11.7 -0.7 1.9 0.4 -1.6
C26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products -0.3 -5.0 -4.4 -2.9 -1.5 -0.7 0.3 -1.0 -12.2 -2.4 -0.1 -1.7 -3.6
C27 Manufacture of electrical equipment -1.2 -2.9 -3.8 -1.6 -1.9 2.5 1.7 0.6 -13.4 3.4 3.3 -1.2 -1.7
C28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. -0.6 -2.3 -2.2 -1.2 -1.3 1.5 2.5 1.7 -11.2 -0.2 4.3 0.7 -1.1
C29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.4 -1.8 -0.9 0.4 -0.3 -0.6 0.8 -1.4 -14.2 4.1 4.5 -0.2 -1.7
C30 Manufacture of other transport equipment -1.4 -2.0 -1.8 -2.3 -0.4 1.0 0.9 1.3 -1.9 -3.8 -0.4 2.1 -0.6
C31 Manufacture of furniture 0.7 -4.6 -3.3 -0.5 -3.4 0.8 0.3 -2.9 -11.9 -5.5 -0.8 -2.8 -4.9
C32 Other manufacturing 0.2 -3.2 -2.5 0.3 -2.8 -0.8 0.6 0.4 -5.7 0.2 2.4 1.5 -0.3
C33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment -1.5 -3.0 -3.4 -2.7 0.0 0.9 0.6 1.6 0.1 -3.7 -0.1 0.6 -0.3
D
ELECTRICITY, GAS, STEAM AND AIR 
CONDITIONING SUPPLY
-1.8 -4.9 -4.6 -2.0 -0.3 -1.4 -1.0 -0.1 -0.9 -0.5 1.2 -2.7 -0.6
E
WATER SUPPLY; SEWERAGE, WASTE 
MANAGEMENT AND REMEDIATION ACTIVITIES
-1.2 -1.4 -0.9 1.2 -2.2 -0.2 0.2 0.7 -2.8 0.5 0.3 1.6 0.0
F CONSTRUCTION 0.6 -1.7 0.7 1.0 7.2 2.9 2.7 -1.3 -9.3 -7.2 -0.8 -1.7 -4.1 
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Table 6.4. EU-27 - Labour productivity per person employed, annual growth rate (%) 
 
N/A: Data not available, Source: Eurostat 
Code
(NACE Rev. 2)
Sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Average
2007-2012
B MINING AND QUARRYING 0.6 5.4 1.8 2.8 -3.0 0.0 3.5 -2.1 -7.1 4.0 -3.7 -4.4 -2.7
C MANUFACTURING 0.1 1.2 2.3 4.5 3.0 5.6 3.7 -1.6 -8.7 11.4 3.9 -1.9 0.4
C10 Manufacture of food products 2.0 2.8 1.0 3.3 2.3 1.5 1.9 -0.4 0.9 2.7 0.5 -0.4 0.7
C11 Manufacture of beverages 4.6 2.7 3.2 -1.2 2.3 5.2 1.3 -0.9 3.5 1.0 8.1 -1.3 2.0
C12 Manufacture of tobacco products 2.7 -1.8 -0.8 -6.6 -3.5 -4.8 14.1 -2.0 5.7 1.0 -3.9 0.4 0.2
C13 Manufacture of textiles 0.3 0.5 4.1 1.6 -1.7 5.4 4.5 -4.1 -5.8 14.5 0.6 -3.7 0.0
C14 Manufacture of wearing apparel -1.7 -8.2 -3.5 0.6 -2.9 5.7 5.6 -1.0 -1.0 8.1 -2.4 -3.2 0.0
C15 Manufacture of leather and related products -4.5 -7.8 -2.5 -3.7 -3.7 -0.2 -2.1 -2.3 -1.8 6.0 1.2 -4.6 -0.4
C16
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, 
except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and 
plaiting materials
-3.3 2.2 3.7 4.7 0.8 5.6 0.1 -7.0 -2.7 6.5 2.7 -1.2 -0.4
C17 Manufacture of paper and paper products -0.3 4.1 4.5 4.6 2.6 6.6 5.5 -1.0 -3.4 8.5 -0.6 0.4 0.7
C18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media -1.8 1.5 2.9 3.3 5.8 1.9 0.8 0.1 -0.9 4.7 3.2 -3.1 0.7
C19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 1.0 4.0 4.7 6.4 3.7 2.2 -0.5 1.7 -4.9 0.8 1.1 -2.6 -0.8
C20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products -1.1 3.6 2.6 6.8 4.2 4.7 3.5 -1.1 -8.4 12.9 1.5 -1.5 0.5
C21
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and 
pharmaceutical preparations
8.9 6.3 5.5 2.3 6.2 4.2 0.1 3.2 6.7 6.0 2.0 -1.0 3.3
C22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products -1.3 0.9 1.7 1.8 1.7 4.7 2.9 -5.2 -7.4 10.1 2.5 -4.0 -1.0
C23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 0.0 0.6 3.2 3.9 1.5 4.9 0.6 -4.7 -9.7 9.0 5.2 -5.6 -1.4
C24 Manufacture of basic metals -1.0 3.7 3.2 9.5 0.4 7.4 1.9 -3.0 -20.5 24.8 2.6 -3.8 -1.0
C25
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery 
and equipment
-0.6 0.4 2.0 2.4 1.7 3.4 2.7 -5.5 -15.5 13.0 5.5 -3.8 -1.7
C26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products -8.1 -4.8 5.2 9.6 4.2 9.8 6.3 2.6 -9.3 11.5 3.8 -0.1 1.5
C27 Manufacture of electrical equipment -1.2 -0.2 2.6 3.7 1.5 7.4 1.8 -1.8 -14.0 13.7 1.0 -2.8 -1.2
C28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.2 -0.3 1.5 6.7 4.8 7.6 5.3 -0.5 -22.2 16.4 8.5 -1.4 -0.7
C29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers -0.1 1.7 2.0 4.3 2.2 4.3 6.4 -6.7 -17.8 25.1 8.9 -4.4 0.0
C30 Manufacture of other transport equipment 1.2 -1.8 3.3 2.1 1.7 7.0 2.0 2.2 -4.3 4.2 4.4 1.7 1.6
C31 Manufacture of furniture -2.7 -1.7 -2.6 3.0 3.7 5.1 3.0 -3.0 -7.8 8.1 3.7 -2.5 -0.5
C32 Other manufacturing 2.4 4.7 -2.0 2.2 2.7 5.8 1.4 -1.4 -3.9 10.3 4.0 -0.8 1.5
C33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 0.1 -1.7 0.0 5.0 1.6 7.4 3.8 0.2 -8.6 5.1 5.9 -2.4 -0.1
D
ELECTRICITY, GAS, STEAM AND AIR 
CONDITIONING SUPPLY
4.8 6.3 8.3 6.1 4.5 2.1 0.9 0.8 -6.2 4.3 -4.5 2.1 -0.8
E
WATER SUPPLY; SEWERAGE, WASTE 
MANAGEMENT AND REMEDIATION ACTIVITIES
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
F CONSTRUCTION -0.8 -0.3 0.0 -1.4 -0.9 -0.4 -2.0 -2.6 -0.4 0.8 3.3 -1.4 -0.1 
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Table 6.5. EU-27 - Labour productivity per hour worked, annual growth rate (%) 
 
N/A: Data not available, Source: Eurostat 
Code
(NACE Rev. 2)
Sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Average
2007-2012
B MINING AND QUARRYING -0.1 5.4 2.6 2.0 -3.1 1.0 3.7 -2.3 -5.6 2.2 -4.8 -5.7 -3.3
C MANUFACTURING 1.3 1.6 2.9 3.9 3.2 4.9 4.1 -1.2 -6.3 8.0 3.0 -1.5 0.3
C10 Manufacture of food products 2.5 3.8 2.6 2.4 2.9 1.5 2.4 -0.7 1.6 1.9 0.8 0.0 0.7
C11 Manufacture of beverages 2.9 5.3 1.6 -2.8 3.9 8.0 2.4 -0.4 1.5 3.7 6.8 -1.4 2.0
C12 Manufacture of tobacco products -3.6 0.2 5.0 -9.7 -1.8 4.3 4.1 -1.2 5.7 -1.9 -4.9 -3.3 -1.2
C13 Manufacture of textiles 1.6 1.1 4.3 2.5 -0.6 5.2 2.2 -4.8 -3.2 8.5 -1.8 -4.7 -1.3
C14 Manufacture of wearing apparel -1.2 -9.4 -4.3 -2.0 -6.5 3.3 5.5 -0.7 1.5 7.8 -4.4 -2.8 0.2
C15 Manufacture of leather and related products -3.8 -7.7 -5.1 -7.8 -5.1 -2.0 -1.1 -1.1 -2.4 2.7 1.4 -4.6 -0.8
C16
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, 
except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and 
plaiting materials
-0.9 1.9 4.2 4.4 2.4 4.6 1.0 -6.3 -1.5 2.8 2.4 -2.3 -1.0
C17 Manufacture of paper and paper products -0.2 3.8 4.4 4.9 2.0 4.8 3.9 0.9 -1.0 6.6 -1.3 0.1 1.0
C18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media -0.7 3.1 3.3 4.5 4.8 0.3 0.5 -0.2 -1.9 3.5 1.9 -1.6 0.3
C19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 1.0 4.9 3.5 5.0 0.7 2.9 0.0 -0.9 1.1 0.2 0.1 -2.9 -0.5
C20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 0.5 4.2 2.7 5.5 5.4 4.4 4.6 -1.4 -7.4 12.0 0.5 -2.4 0.0
C21
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and 
pharmaceutical preparations
10.4 6.5 5.2 0.5 6.4 5.9 -0.5 0.6 4.8 5.8 1.7 -1.6 2.3
C22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 0.0 1.9 3.5 2.0 2.3 2.2 3.9 -4.2 -5.0 6.4 1.6 -3.7 -1.1
C23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 2.1 1.7 3.6 3.1 1.5 4.7 1.4 -4.1 -8.0 4.4 3.6 -5.1 -1.9
C24 Manufacture of basic metals 0.4 2.8 5.2 7.2 1.4 6.3 1.9 -2.8 -16.1 16.0 1.0 -3.1 -1.5
C25
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery 
and equipment
0.9 0.7 3.0 2.9 2.5 3.1 3.8 -5.7 -12.4 7.6 5.2 -3.7 -2.1
C26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products -6.0 -5.4 5.1 9.5 4.4 9.7 7.3 1.7 -5.7 9.9 5.2 -0.4 2.0
C27 Manufacture of electrical equipment 0.5 -1.3 2.3 3.9 2.9 5.8 2.6 -1.3 -8.8 7.7 1.0 -1.1 -0.6
C28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 1.9 0.6 1.4 5.3 5.3 6.8 5.8 -0.3 -17.5 10.9 7.0 -0.2 -0.5
C29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 1.2 2.5 2.6 4.1 1.7 3.9 5.3 -4.6 -12.7 16.8 7.3 -2.9 0.3
C30 Manufacture of other transport equipment 2.7 -1.6 2.4 2.8 2.4 6.7 3.8 2.5 -3.9 3.3 4.6 0.7 1.4
C31 Manufacture of furniture -3.0 -0.5 0.8 0.8 4.6 3.0 3.0 -2.2 -5.4 4.8 2.8 -2.9 -0.7
C32 Other manufacturing 3.4 6.4 0.3 0.9 3.8 6.2 1.0 -1.8 -1.3 8.0 0.7 -1.5 0.7
C33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 1.9 -1.1 1.4 7.4 1.1 6.9 3.9 2.1 -10.3 6.2 4.6 -2.1 -0.1
D
ELECTRICITY, GAS, STEAM AND AIR 
CONDITIONING SUPPLY
3.8 6.1 8.0 4.3 2.3 2.4 0.3 0.0 -3.6 4.6 -5.2 3.1 -0.3
E
WATER SUPPLY; SEWERAGE, WASTE 
MANAGEMENT AND REMEDIATION ACTIVITIES
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
F CONSTRUCTION 0.5 2.0 1.0 -0.3 -4.1 0.5 0.0 -1.6 2.0 2.7 1.0 -3.6 0.1 
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Table 6.6. EU-27 - Unit labour cost, annual growth rate (%) 
 
N/A: Data not available, Source: Eurostat 
Code
(NACE Rev. 2)
Sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Average
2007-2012
B MINING AND QUARRYING 7.1 -0.7 6.4 4.2 -0.4 7.4 4.8 10.7 11.7 1.6 10.2 9.1 8.6
C MANUFACTURING 3.0 1.7 0.3 -1.2 -0.5 -2.2 -0.1 6.0 10.6 -6.4 -0.6 4.5 2.7
C10 Manufacture of food products 2.1 0.9 2.1 -0.7 -0.7 0.4 1.4 4.9 1.2 -0.2 0.5 2.3 1.7
C11 Manufacture of beverages 1.3 -1.1 2.8 3.5 -1.2 -3.8 1.0 4.5 2.2 -0.7 -4.0 3.1 1.0
C12 Manufacture of tobacco products 5.2 2.2 5.8 19.1 6.8 2.2 -1.7 9.2 -3.1 0.9 1.3 4.2 2.4
C13 Manufacture of textiles 2.0 3.0 0.5 0.8 2.9 -2.3 0.4 9.6 6.3 -8.7 2.2 5.2 2.7
C14 Manufacture of wearing apparel 1.6 10.8 4.1 2.1 5.4 -0.9 2.1 8.2 4.9 -3.9 4.7 4.4 3.6
C15 Manufacture of leather and related products 9.8 8.2 4.1 8.1 5.7 5.8 9.2 10.9 5.5 -0.2 0.6 8.6 5.0
C16
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, 
except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and 
plaiting materials
5.2 -1.4 -1.9 -0.6 0.7 -0.3 5.0 12.0 5.5 -3.9 -0.4 1.6 2.8
C17 Manufacture of paper and paper products 4.9 -2.5 -1.5 -1.5 0.7 -3.5 -1.3 3.6 3.8 -5.0 2.2 1.7 1.2
C18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 4.8 0.3 -1.6 -1.5 -2.3 -0.5 0.4 4.2 2.4 -4.6 -2.5 3.0 0.4
C19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 1.7 4.8 -4.4 -0.5 2.2 3.8 2.2 5.1 6.4 3.5 3.2 4.0 4.4
C20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 3.8 -1.1 1.7 -3.4 -0.9 -3.5 0.0 5.4 11.2 -9.1 4.5 3.7 2.9
C21
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and 
pharmaceutical preparations
-6.1 -2.6 -0.1 1.6 -2.6 -2.7 5.7 -0.1 -2.5 -3.6 0.2 4.1 -0.4
C22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 3.3 1.3 -0.1 0.6 0.1 -2.3 -0.6 7.7 8.3 -4.8 0.9 5.9 3.5
C23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 2.0 2.7 0.4 -0.8 0.5 -1.7 2.8 9.2 13.1 -3.0 -2.6 7.3 4.6
C24 Manufacture of basic metals -2.6 -0.8 -0.2 -3.6 3.1 -3.0 2.9 7.2 23.7 -13.8 1.4 6.4 4.3
C25
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery 
and equipment
4.2 1.8 -0.2 0.0 0.1 -0.9 0.9 10.5 16.1 -6.5 -2.6 5.9 4.3
C26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 12.9 7.9 -4.7 -6.4 -2.6 -7.6 -4.1 1.7 11.3 -8.1 -2.7 4.4 1.1
C27 Manufacture of electrical equipment 3.4 3.3 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -4.2 1.2 5.8 12.6 -8.4 2.3 4.5 3.1
C28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 3.1 2.5 1.7 -1.9 -2.5 -3.7 -1.5 4.3 27.9 -8.9 -3.6 3.9 4.0
C29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 1.7 1.0 0.9 -2.1 0.2 -0.1 -5.2 9.2 17.6 -15.5 -3.5 7.3 2.4
C30 Manufacture of other transport equipment 3.4 7.7 1.5 -1.2 1.0 -4.1 0.1 2.4 8.1 2.1 -1.2 3.8 3.0
C31 Manufacture of furniture 6.0 4.7 -0.7 -0.9 -0.7 -0.8 0.3 7.4 10.5 -3.6 -2.5 4.4 3.1
C32 Other manufacturing 1.0 -1.2 3.3 1.1 -1.3 -3.0 4.2 3.7 4.4 -5.5 0.6 2.9 1.2
C33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 4.6 5.2 1.9 -2.7 1.6 -4.5 -0.2 3.8 14.0 -5.7 -3.9 4.1 2.2
D
ELECTRICITY, GAS, STEAM AND AIR 
CONDITIONING SUPPLY
0.6 1.6 -1.7 -1.4 0.0 4.0 4.9 4.5 8.4 -1.7 6.1 1.5 3.7
E
WATER SUPPLY; SEWERAGE, WASTE 
MANAGEMENT AND REMEDIATION ACTIVITIES
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
F CONSTRUCTION 7.2 5.8 2.6 3.5 9.3 3.0 6.5 6.7 0.4 -1.3 1.0 4.4 2.2 
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Table 6.7. EU-27 - Revealed comparative advantage index 
 
Note:  there was a transition from NACE REV 1 to NACE REV 2, therefore the data are only available from 2007   
Source: own calculations using Comtrade data 
Code
(NACE Rev. 2)
Sector 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
C10 Manufacture of food products 1.20 1.12 1.10 1.09 1.06
C11 Manufacture of beverages 1.61 1.59 1.61 1.70 1.72
C12 Manufacture of tobacco products 1.52 1.56 1.61 1.67 1.72
C13 Manufacture of textiles 0.81 0.76 0.69 0.67 0.66
C14 Manufacture of wearing apparel 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.74 0.75
C15 Manufacture of leather and related products 0.96 0.91 0.91 0.87 0.91
C16
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles 
of straw and plaiting materials
1.15 1.18 1.18
1.16 1.15
C17 Manufacture of paper and paper products 1.28 1.30 1.35 1.35 1.34
C18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 1.20 1.62 1.79 1.88 1.87
C19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 0.84 0.84 0.77 0.79 0.78
C20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 1.13 1.13 1.16 1.16 1.13
C21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations 1.47 1.53 1.54 1.65 1.62
C22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 1.18 1.21 1.18 1.19 1.19
C23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 1.22 1.19 1.18 1.15 1.13
C24 Manufacture of basic metals 0.92 0.88 0.82 0.85 0.86
C25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 1.18 1.19 1.16 1.20 1.20
C26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 0.60 0.60 0.57 0.57 0.58
C27 Manufacture of electrical equipment 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.99
C28 Manufacture of machineryand equipment n.e.c. 1.14 1.18 1.18 1.17 1.18
C29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 1.22 1.22 1.30 1.28 1.32
C30 Manufacture of other transport equipment 0.85 0.88 1.15 1.21 1.15
C31 Manufacture of furniture 1.27 1.24 1.20 1.13 1.15
C32 Other manufacturing 0.80 0.78 0.75 0.77 0.72 
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Table 6.8. EU-27 - Relative trade balance (X-M)/(X+M) 
 
Note:  there was a transition from NACE REV 1 to NACE REV 2, therefore the data are only available from 2007   
Source: own calculations using Comtrade data 
Code
(NACE Rev. 2)
Sector 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
C10 Manufacture of food products -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
C11 Manufacture of beverages 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.24
C12 Manufacture of tobacco products 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.08
C13 Manufacture of textiles 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
C14 Manufacture of wearing apparel -0.19 -0.19 -0.21 -0.22 -0.21
C15 Manufacture of leather and related products -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06
C16
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles 
of straw and plaiting materials
0.00 0.02 0.04
0.03 0.04
C17 Manufacture of paper and paper products 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06
C18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.09
C19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
C20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.03
C21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10
C22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05
C23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08
C24 Manufacture of basic metals -0.06 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.00
C25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10
C26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.13 -0.10
C27 Manufacture of electrical equipment 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07
C28 Manufacture of machineryand equipment n.e.c. 0.16 0.17 0.20 0.19 0.19
C29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.13
C30 Manufacture of other transport equipment 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.14
C31 Manufacture of furniture 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.05
C32 Other manufacturing -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 
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Table 6.9.1. Revealed comparative advantage index in manufacturing industries in 2011 - EU countries, Japan and Brazil, China, India and Russia. 
 
Source: Own calculations using COMTRADE data 
Food Bevarages Tobacco Textiles Clothing
Leather 
& 
footwear
Wood & 
wood 
products
Paper Printing
Refined 
petroleum
Chemicals
Pharma-
ceuticals
Rubber & 
plastics
Non-
metallic 
mineral 
products
Basic 
metals
Metal 
products
Computers, 
electronic 
& optical
Electrical 
equipment
Machinery
Motor 
vehicles
Other 
transport
Furniture
Other 
manufacturing
C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 C15 C16 C17 C18 C19 C20 C21 C22 C23 C24 C25 C26 C27 C28 C29 C30 C31 C32
Austria 0.87 2.24 0.28 0.68 0.55 0.70 4.49 2.19 1.30 0.24 0.47 1.52 1.30 1.36 1.34 2.16 0.43 1.35 1.40 1.34 0.70 1.19 0.71
Belgium 1.28 1.00 1.10 0.78 0.72 0.93 0.85 0.92 7.34 1.21 2.20 3.17 1.00 1.06 1.11 0.68 0.22 0.42 0.70 1.09 0.16 0.49 1.26
Bulgaria 1.31 0.81 4.94 1.14 2.87 1.18 1.63 0.76 0.22 1.55 0.55 0.90 0.92 2.20 2.83 0.86 0.27 1.11 0.93 0.36 0.24 1.31 0.35
Cyprus 2.16 1.22 27.96 0.13 0.32 0.82 0.20 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.97 7.44 0.30 0.34 0.78 0.68 0.72 0.71 0.41 0.27 1.15 0.47 1.20
Czech Rep. 0.44 0.57 1.57 0.88 0.31 0.46 1.42 0.94 1.74 0.20 0.53 0.32 1.67 1.63 0.64 2.14 1.11 1.66 1.16 2.00 0.39 1.52 0.73
Denmark 3.05 1.29 1.34 0.68 1.75 0.77 1.00 0.69 0.84 0.67 0.64 1.65 1.09 0.97 0.34 1.69 0.56 0.95 1.56 0.34 0.79 2.51 0.84
Estonia 1.00 2.10 0.20 1.17 1.04 0.86 7.71 0.83 0.73 2.33 0.64 0.10 1.29 1.38 0.49 1.79 0.95 1.40 0.75 0.61 0.24 2.74 0.53
Finland 0.35 0.49 0.04 0.26 0.19 0.25 5.28 9.87 0.74 1.60 0.85 0.62 0.92 0.77 1.66 1.04 0.47 1.32 1.46 0.27 0.37 0.23 0.46
France 1.18 4.63 0.59 0.54 0.70 1.18 0.63 1.03 1.80 0.51 1.30 1.70 1.10 0.99 0.75 0.90 0.48 0.88 0.87 1.15 3.97 0.52 0.76
Germany 0.74 0.65 2.05 0.53 0.50 0.39 0.81 1.20 2.49 0.21 1.00 1.34 1.29 1.02 0.76 1.31 0.58 1.22 1.60 1.91 1.30 0.85 0.57
Greece 2.16 1.52 4.89 1.08 1.47 0.55 0.55 0.58 1.14 4.56 0.71 1.26 0.98 1.33 1.93 0.84 0.22 0.65 0.29 0.09 0.50 0.31 0.32
Hungary 0.85 0.40 0.62 0.35 0.27 0.50 0.74 0.88 0.08 0.42 0.58 1.11 1.44 1.18 0.33 0.80 1.68 1.89 0.86 1.78 0.17 1.00 0.27
Ireland 1.44 1.76 0.53 0.10 0.15 0.09 0.41 0.11 0.00 0.23 2.85 9.43 0.32 0.22 0.08 0.28 0.65 0.24 0.31 0.03 0.41 0.09 1.49
Italy 0.87 2.30 0.03 1.35 1.58 3.09 0.53 1.03 0.98 0.70 0.70 1.10 1.35 1.90 1.09 1.68 0.23 1.05 1.82 0.73 0.75 2.38 0.95
Latvia 1.48 6.43 1.67 0.99 1.07 0.32 19.91 0.95 1.92 0.96 0.55 1.17 0.98 2.04 1.26 1.55 0.50 0.63 0.48 0.73 0.32 2.31 0.40
Lithuania 1.64 1.58 7.16 0.94 1.22 0.34 3.42 1.08 0.23 4.21 1.32 0.39 1.05 0.86 0.20 0.98 0.24 0.51 0.56 0.78 0.21 5.67 0.40
Luxembourg 0.89 1.02 6.08 2.17 0.32 0.45 2.24 1.79 0.01 0.01 0.49 0.15 4.16 2.51 3.86 1.20 0.28 0.74 0.74 0.63 1.09 0.12 0.21
Malta 0.53 0.31 0.69 1.05 0.10 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.93 4.67 0.13 2.04 1.12 0.33 0.05 0.23 1.87 0.92 0.24 0.03 1.64 0.08 1.78
Netherlands 1.94 1.29 5.35 0.45 0.61 0.66 0.31 0.86 0.29 2.02 1.62 0.95 0.79 0.49 0.61 0.79 1.05 0.54 1.07 0.39 0.32 0.40 0.80
Poland 1.46 0.45 4.79 0.60 0.71 0.41 2.33 1.66 0.54 0.59 0.76 0.32 1.85 1.61 0.92 1.79 0.60 1.35 0.57 1.64 1.29 5.03 0.27
Portugal 1.12 3.70 4.25 1.86 2.15 3.08 4.15 3.22 0.77 0.60 0.76 0.46 1.85 3.19 0.69 1.77 0.32 1.01 0.43 1.46 0.19 2.80 0.28
Romania 0.49 0.28 5.73 1.04 2.18 2.40 4.18 0.31 1.90 0.85 0.53 0.47 1.61 0.54 0.98 1.12 0.61 1.48 0.77 1.82 0.91 3.61 0.23
Slovakia 0.50 0.47 0.00 0.35 0.57 1.38 1.19 1.07 0.40 0.82 0.45 0.17 1.53 1.09 1.05 1.56 1.22 1.01 0.74 2.49 0.17 1.52 0.27
Slovenia 0.51 0.59 0.00 0.80 0.37 0.61 2.93 1.87 0.27 0.45 0.86 2.54 1.84 1.59 1.02 2.07 0.22 2.28 0.95 1.46 0.19 2.78 0.46
Spain 1.55 2.27 0.46 0.76 1.21 1.19 0.82 1.43 0.51 0.79 1.09 1.28 1.26 2.10 1.06 1.25 0.17 0.95 0.65 2.17 1.15 0.73 0.36
Sweden 0.49 0.84 0.28 0.29 0.36 0.21 3.54 5.49 0.22 1.06 0.67 1.37 0.85 0.60 1.11 1.11 0.82 1.01 1.25 1.34 0.31 1.55 0.43
United Kingdom 0.67 3.99 0.60 0.50 0.63 0.48 0.18 0.66 1.88 1.27 1.17 2.51 0.92 0.72 0.80 0.73 0.65 0.72 1.11 1.30 1.61 0.42 1.01
EU-27 1.06 1.72 1.72 0.66 0.75 0.91 1.15 1.34 1.87 0.78 1.13 1.62 1.19 1.13 0.86 1.20 0.58 0.99 1.18 1.32 1.15 1.15 0.72
USA 0.88 0.76 0.24 0.52 0.15 0.20 0.61 1.19 0.56 1.29 1.41 0.99 0.97 0.73 0.72 0.89 1.00 0.86 1.36 1.04 0.41 0.48 1.52
Japan 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.43 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.26 0.18 0.32 0.94 0.17 1.09 1.04 1.11 0.73 1.08 1.09 2.09 2.01 1.35 0.14 0.45
Brazil 5.17 0.11 0.47 0.37 0.04 1.74 1.73 2.99 0.34 0.38 0.94 0.39 0.72 0.98 1.75 0.73 0.10 0.43 0.82 1.04 1.42 0.52 0.17
China 0.37 0.09 0.15 2.54 2.72 2.52 0.93 0.43 0.23 0.21 0.53 0.23 1.00 1.53 0.53 1.34 1.88 1.47 0.74 0.28 0.86 2.12 1.29
India 1.35 0.10 0.47 2.82 1.94 1.18 0.11 0.23 0.74 3.07 0.93 1.02 0.61 0.74 0.77 0.94 0.19 0.38 0.39 0.32 1.23 0.32 5.37
Russia 0.49 0.22 1.07 0.05 0.02 0.11 3.45 0.99 0.15 7.83 1.50 0.05 0.22 0.35 2.61 0.27 0.10 0.17 0.13 0.10 0.46 0.12 0.03 
188 
 
   
Table 6.9.2. Relative trade balance (X-M)/(X+M) in manufacturing industries in 2011 - EU countries, Japan and Brazil, China, India and Russia. 
 
Source: Own calculations using COMTRADE data 
Food Bevarages Tobacco Textiles Clothing
Leather & 
footwear
Wood & 
wood 
products
Paper Printing
Refined 
petroleum
Chemicals
Pharma-
ceuticals
Rubber & 
plastics
Non-
metallic 
mineral 
products
Basic 
metals
Metal 
products
Computers, 
electronic 
& optical
Electrical 
equipment
Machinery
Motor 
vehicles
Other 
transport
Furniture
Other 
manufac-
turing
C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 C15 C16 C17 C18 C19 C20 C21 C22 C23 C24 C25 C26 C27 C28 C29 C30 C31 C32
Austria -0.06 0.53 -0.71 -0.03 -0.42 -0.20 0.42 0.23 -0.37 -0.55 -0.27 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.11 -0.09 0.11 0.06 0.02 0.15 -0.21 -0.10
Belgium 0.12 -0.02 0.08 0.23 -0.01 0.22 -0.01 -0.05 0.04 0.02 0.13 0.13 0.04 0.11 0.18 -0.04 -0.19 -0.06 0.05 -0.04 -0.12 -0.21 0.03
Bulgaria -0.12 -0.19 0.49 -0.43 0.56 0.09 0.25 -0.34 -0.75 0.07 -0.34 -0.21 -0.23 0.21 0.40 -0.14 -0.38 -0.01 -0.04 -0.27 -0.23 0.27 -0.16
Cyprus -0.67 -0.87 -0.32 -0.92 -0.93 -0.82 -0.96 -0.92 -1.00 -1.00 -0.62 0.03 -0.91 -0.95 -0.55 -0.80 -0.54 -0.78 -0.77 -0.89 -0.52 -0.93 -0.61
Czech Rep. -0.20 0.02 0.32 0.09 -0.20 -0.17 0.34 -0.06 0.01 -0.22 -0.20 -0.39 0.01 0.21 -0.20 0.18 -0.04 0.15 0.16 0.34 0.34 0.28 0.18
Denmark 0.25 -0.16 0.29 -0.03 -0.02 -0.20 -0.37 -0.36 -0.24 -0.22 -0.09 0.21 -0.08 -0.12 -0.34 0.13 -0.12 -0.06 0.26 -0.38 0.06 0.21 -0.04
Estonia -0.04 -0.25 -0.73 0.06 0.12 0.05 0.44 -0.13 -0.55 -0.11 -0.19 -0.72 -0.11 0.04 -0.28 0.21 0.01 0.04 -0.07 -0.10 -0.32 0.61 0.04
Finland -0.44 -0.39 -0.95 -0.37 -0.67 -0.43 0.56 0.80 -0.54 0.21 -0.05 -0.18 0.01 -0.12 0.32 0.03 -0.18 0.12 0.20 -0.50 0.08 -0.61 -0.10
France -0.05 0.62 -0.60 -0.15 -0.38 -0.10 -0.34 -0.19 0.20 -0.37 0.02 0.04 -0.12 -0.17 -0.08 -0.15 -0.20 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 0.25 -0.51 -0.16
Germany 0.05 -0.06 0.51 0.02 -0.32 -0.27 0.06 0.14 0.40 -0.38 0.12 0.13 0.20 0.18 0.00 0.23 -0.02 0.21 0.39 0.39 0.07 -0.08 0.05
Greece -0.31 -0.24 0.08 -0.15 -0.31 -0.65 -0.50 -0.68 -0.49 0.25 -0.50 -0.57 -0.25 -0.24 0.17 -0.24 -0.62 -0.35 -0.52 -0.79 -0.69 -0.73 -0.63
Hungary 0.15 0.04 -0.14 -0.18 -0.06 -0.09 0.12 -0.04 -0.83 0.04 -0.09 0.04 0.05 0.15 -0.31 -0.14 0.14 0.15 -0.07 0.41 0.18 0.42 0.05
Ireland 0.28 0.22 0.05 -0.32 -0.61 -0.59 0.06 -0.69 -0.95 -0.49 0.67 0.76 -0.23 -0.29 -0.26 -0.05 0.28 -0.10 0.15 -0.75 -0.46 -0.55 0.55
Italy -0.13 0.62 -0.98 0.17 0.12 0.27 -0.41 -0.05 -0.04 0.24 -0.22 -0.12 0.24 0.42 -0.06 0.42 -0.41 0.20 0.47 -0.12 0.22 0.64 0.14
Latvia -0.23 0.31 -0.30 -0.11 -0.07 -0.48 0.79 -0.37 -0.45 -0.50 -0.32 -0.19 -0.30 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.13 -0.24 -0.40 -0.22 -0.30 0.33 -0.35
Lithuania 0.11 -0.15 0.54 -0.11 0.26 -0.22 0.26 -0.15 -0.70 0.75 0.04 -0.39 0.01 -0.15 -0.42 0.05 -0.23 -0.08 -0.12 -0.10 -0.35 0.82 0.04
Luxembourg -0.29 -0.54 -0.06 0.61 -0.53 -0.32 0.14 -0.07 -0.98 -0.99 -0.46 -0.68 0.27 0.04 0.32 -0.15 -0.31 -0.12 -0.01 -0.48 -0.50 -0.89 -0.47
Malta -0.60 -0.77 -0.63 0.41 -0.80 -0.73 -0.98 -0.98 -0.54 -0.39 -0.79 0.26 -0.07 -0.72 -0.78 -0.63 0.10 -0.01 -0.46 -0.88 -0.48 -0.91 0.43
Netherlands 0.24 0.15 0.62 0.07 -0.12 -0.05 -0.51 -0.05 -0.30 0.12 0.21 0.08 -0.01 -0.17 -0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.23 -0.15 0.11 -0.31 0.01
Poland 0.17 -0.09 0.78 -0.30 -0.06 -0.32 0.39 -0.03 -0.30 0.07 -0.24 -0.47 0.07 0.15 -0.05 0.10 -0.16 0.12 -0.24 0.25 0.23 0.75 -0.24
Portugal -0.35 0.43 0.47 0.06 0.15 0.22 0.39 0.27 -0.11 -0.20 -0.34 -0.54 0.12 0.38 -0.19 0.18 -0.32 -0.04 -0.27 -0.05 -0.15 0.30 -0.48
Romania -0.40 -0.45 0.68 -0.47 0.53 0.08 0.59 -0.64 -0.14 0.09 -0.38 -0.52 -0.18 -0.47 -0.09 -0.28 -0.19 -0.11 -0.25 0.25 0.57 0.63 -0.27
Slovakia -0.10 -0.11 -1.00 -0.16 0.02 0.23 0.28 0.16 -0.05 0.40 -0.08 -0.53 0.16 0.11 0.23 0.06 0.12 0.03 0.08 0.32 0.10 0.26 0.01
Slovenia -0.35 -0.14 -1.00 0.03 -0.36 -0.34 0.17 0.09 -0.63 -0.61 -0.17 0.41 0.15 0.03 -0.12 0.20 -0.24 0.33 0.12 0.05 -0.01 0.33 -0.07
Spain 0.03 0.25 -0.75 -0.05 -0.28 -0.11 -0.02 0.02 -0.42 -0.22 -0.11 -0.11 0.04 0.37 0.13 0.11 -0.57 0.01 -0.07 0.16 0.38 -0.22 -0.38
Sweden -0.32 -0.13 -0.40 -0.25 -0.41 -0.47 0.51 0.71 -0.62 0.15 -0.13 0.32 -0.07 -0.23 0.13 0.09 -0.01 0.02 0.14 0.11 -0.09 0.09 -0.09
United Kingdom -0.44 0.14 -0.47 -0.31 -0.57 -0.55 -0.81 -0.47 0.44 0.09 -0.06 0.13 -0.21 -0.27 -0.08 -0.24 -0.24 -0.21 0.01 -0.14 0.16 -0.63 -0.16
EU-27 -0.01 0.24 0.08 -0.03 -0.21 -0.06 0.04 0.06 0.09 -0.05 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.10 -0.10 0.07 0.19 0.13 0.14 0.05 -0.02
USA -0.04 -0.48 -0.18 -0.33 -0.88 -0.82 -0.39 0.04 0.48 0.00 0.13 -0.26 -0.17 -0.25 -0.20 -0.15 -0.26 -0.25 -0.03 -0.30 -0.46 -0.69 -0.19
Japan -0.87 -0.83 -0.96 -0.18 -0.97 -0.95 -0.98 -0.29 0.38 -0.46 0.15 -0.64 0.35 0.28 0.30 0.18 0.12 0.30 0.63 0.76 0.60 -0.66 -0.26
Brazil 0.78 -0.81 0.91 -0.51 -0.81 0.54 0.82 0.54 -0.29 -0.69 -0.46 -0.59 -0.29 -0.08 0.33 -0.22 -0.85 -0.45 -0.38 -0.22 0.02 0.30 -0.53
China 0.07 -0.43 0.66 0.72 0.95 0.81 0.26 -0.12 0.40 -0.20 -0.22 0.14 0.42 0.61 -0.03 0.62 0.24 0.35 -0.02 -0.15 0.41 0.91 0.73
India 0.32 -0.15 0.83 0.65 0.95 0.65 -0.47 -0.54 -0.31 0.56 -0.30 0.51 0.14 0.03 -0.65 0.15 -0.61 -0.29 -0.44 0.15 0.24 0.03 0.38
Russia -0.61 -0.81 0.31 -0.89 -0.97 -0.89 0.61 -0.20 -0.89 0.91 0.15 -0.95 -0.75 -0.65 0.49 -0.73 -0.82 -0.82 -0.88 -0.91 -0.51 -0.83 -0.92 
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Table 6.10. Revealed comparative advantage index in service industries in 2011 - EU countries, US, Japan, Brazil, China, India and Russia. 
 
Source: Own calculations based on IMF and OECD data 
Country name
Telecom., 
computer and 
information
Construction Finance
Insurance and 
pension
Other business 
services
Personal, cultural 
and recreational Transport Travel
Austria 0.56 0.52 0.41 0.81 1.10 0.43 1.17 1.25
Belgium 0.86 1.17 0.70 0.65 1.62 0.69 1.29 0.45
Bulgaria 0.89 0.42 0.20 0.98 0.52 0.74 0.97 2.00
Cyprus 0.13 0.27 2.20 0.28 1.14 0.49 1.23 1.22
Czech Republic 0.90 1.44 0.07 0.64 1.23 0.89 1.08 1.21
Denmark 0.36 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.88 0.72 2.78 0.37
Estonia 0.76 2.28 0.27 0.07 0.78 0.29 1.73 0.81
Finland 2.51 1.17 0.50 0.10 0.78 0.30 0.65 0.54
France 0.47 1.81 0.59 1.32 1.23 1.67 1.00 0.97
Germany 0.78 1.85 1.04 1.17 1.19 0.33 1.08 0.53
Greece 0.23 1.28 0.08 0.72 0.26 0.46 2.26 1.38
Hungary 0.66 0.76 0.16 0.08 1.08 5.64 0.96 0.92
Ireland 4.06 0.00 1.67 5.63 0.93 0.00 0.26 0.16
Italy 0.79 0.05 0.47 1.16 1.29 0.25 0.67 1.52
Latvia 0.53 0.75 1.29 0.28 0.71 0.40 2.26 0.62
Lithuania 0.26 0.87 0.17 -0.01 0.34 0.32 2.56 0.90
Luxembourg 0.45 0.22 11.17 2.30 0.69 3.34 0.24 0.25
Malta 0.28 0.00 1.02 0.35 0.49 35.88 0.39 0.95
Netherlands 1.07 1.01 0.26 0.34 1.66 0.62 1.28 0.50
Poland 0.68 1.70 0.24 0.57 1.28 1.18 1.35 1.06
Portugal 0.43 1.23 0.23 0.30 0.68 1.10 1.30 1.65
Romania 1.35 1.53 0.30 0.56 1.00 0.86 1.20 0.44
Slovak Republic 0.92 1.49 0.10 0.20 0.75 1.09 1.48 1.37
Slovenia 0.74 1.34 0.13 0.88 0.70 0.91 1.29 1.55
Spain 0.61 1.23 0.69 0.51 1.14 1.28 0.77 1.56
Sweden 1.51 0.54 0.44 0.72 1.39 0.75 0.81 0.78
United Kingdom 0.76 0.35 4.16 3.16 1.52 1.14 0.58 0.45
EU27 1.11 0.75 1.28 1.19 1.13 1.10 1.06 0.88
United States 0.44 0.20 2.34 1.33 0.76 0.40 0.61 0.92
Japan 0.13 3.20 0.57 0.62 1.29 0.10 1.29 0.30
Brazil 0.13 0.02 1.33 0.69 2.50 0.12 0.71 0.64
China 0.71 3.19 0.09 0.85 1.23 0.06 0.89 0.98
India 4.33 0.24 0.87 0.98 0.77 4.52 0.59 0.48
Russian Federation 0.51 3.04 0.36 0.30 1.23 0.72 1.38 0.73European Competitiveness Report 2013
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